

*The
Philosophical
Conception
of Man*



The authors of this symposium are prominent Soviet scholars, Fellows and Corresponding Members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, philosophers and sociologists, students of culture and aesthetics, authors of studies on philosophical problems of man, and active participants in world congresses of philosophy.

The Philosophical Conception of Man

Translated by
H. Campbell Creighton, M. A. (Oxon)



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The Philosophical Conception of Man

MAN IN TODAY'S WORLD

P. N. Fedoseyev

The choice of man as the central theme of the 28th World Congress of Philosophy is by no means accidental. One can say without exaggeration that man is one of today's most actual and burning problems, in which the complex, contradictory picture of the social, scientific and technical, and moral development of humankind is brought to a focus.

Man did not, of course, become the most significant object of the meditations of philosophers, scientists, and cultural figures just today. But only in the present age, which is distinguished by the special depth and dynamism of the changes taking place, the complexity and newness of the tasks facing social practice and scientific cognition, have the fundamental problems of human life and being been brought to the foreground of philosophical analysis with unprecedented sharpness.

At the end of the twentieth century the existence and development of man have taken on largely new conditions. These are the following:

(1) deepening of the processes of social renewal of the world, acceleration of humankind's movement from obsolescent to new, more perfected and humane forms of social organisation; (2) changes in the character of man's work, the essence of which is that the development of the productive forces is reaching a point (due to the second industrial revolution) at which man's development himself is more and more becoming a prerequisite and basis of the further progress of production; (3) a largely new problem situation in man's relations with his habitat; (4) the linking of the new conditions of his existence and development with growing opportunities to elevate the rational and moral elements in his activity as a biosocial being. Finally, the new conditions of human life are giving rise to a change in and complicating of the international factors in the realisation of social progress in our time. In this case it is a matter primarily of the fundamentally new situation that humanity is in today. The danger of thermonuclear war is posing the

question, with all sharpness, of the very existence of human civilisation and survival of the human race. Not only does this danger need to be eliminated, but a way of life and international intercourse need to be created in which the fruits of world scientific and technical progress will serve the good of all mankind.

The problems mentioned above, and many others, which constitute the content of the modern posing of the problem of man, understandably actualise the need for a far-reaching social and philosophical comprehension of it. Present-day philosophical and scientific literature, including fiction, are literally crammed with reflections on the phenomenon of man, his nature, the possibilities of changing his nature, his relations with the world around him, the present and future of the whole of humankind, etc. There is a very broad range of ideological, socio-political, and moral stances, views, and forecasts, some of which are mutually exclusive.

1. Man as a Complex Problem. The Specific Nature of the Study of This Problem in Philosophy

In our day the theme of man has been converted, directly or indirectly, to a greater or less extent, and in one aspect or another, into a general problem for all the sciences, all spheres of the artistic comprehension of reality, and of all systems of culture. Man has long been the object of study of many concrete sciences, of course, (anthropology, ethnography, psychology, biology, physiology, pedagogics, ethics, medicine, etc.), but present-day studies of man, in contrast to the preceding period, are characterised by a considerably greater diversity of approaches, the singling out of new aspects, and the posing of new problems. As a result new disciplines have arisen (of an interdisciplinary character, as a rule), namely, age physiology and morphology, the typology of higher nervous activity, human genetics, somatology, ergonomics, axiology, heuristics, social ecology, etc.

In sum, the total volume of scientific knowledge of man is quite impressive, but we have not yet managed to compile an integral picture of his life activity from it. There is a danger of being buried under the abundance of material accumulated through studies of heterogeneous 'partial' questions. The point, of course, is not just the growing abundance of the data of the

special sciences but also the difficulties of comparing and generalising them, since they relate to different disciplines that employ different methods of research. Methodological problems are therefore taking a foremost place today in the study of man. In that connection, analysis of the specific nature of the various sciences' levels and methods of cognising man is acquiring great significance, and likewise their mutual relationship and the opportunities for synthesising them, and the methodology of a complex, comprehensive, operational approach to the study of man. It is becoming more and more obvious that it is impossible to know man in a comprehensive way by the means of one or more special sciences, and that joint efforts of a whole set of natural and social sciences, and sciences of man, and of the whole system of modern scientific methods, are required.

The comprehensive approach to study of man is undoubtedly opening up significant prospects for deepening scientific knowledge of man in the diversity of his social and natural interconnections. But can a single, all-round, integral theory be constructed through uniting the heterogeneous data about him? In my view, it cannot, because man is a very complex system that is studied not by one but by a whole set of social and natural sciences, each of which, moreover, has its own methods and approaches and its own definite angle of view; the references to integration of the sciences often made in this connection cannot be recognised as convincing, for the integration of knowledge is not a merging or mutual dissolving of sciences, but their interaction and mutual enrichment so as to tackle complex problems jointly. The attempts made to unite varied scientific knowledge of man by employing the special methods of particular and general sciences have frequently led to a mechanical pooling and uniting of the heterogeneous data being obtained rather than an integral scientific picture. One can conclude from this that no systematising and simple summation of the knowledge of man obtained by the particular sciences lead in themselves to knowledge of man as an integral system, and to the creation of an integrated picture of man and his world.

The need for such a general, united conception in order to provide a new level of knowledge of man theoretically (including well-grounded principles connected with the educating and moulding of the individual personality in an interaction of social, ideological, moral, and natural, biological factors) is meanwhile being sharply felt as never before.

Philosophy which, by virtue of its specific nature, itself per-

forms the function of a kind of integrator of knowledge of man, is being called upon to play a special role in this. One of its chief tasks is to comprehend the specific nature and content of the philosophical conception of man and its role in the development of the specific sciences of man that study various aspects and facets of his existence and development, and to work out a methodology for an integral, scientific study of man and his functioning in a system of social, economic, political, ideological, scientific, technological organisational, and administrative relations. The task of a further creative development of the philosophical conception of man in the wholeness of all the manifestations of his activity, can only be fruitful, however, given a close interaction of philosophy and the particular sciences. The experience of posing and tackling the theme of man in the various philosophic trends of the past century witnesses to that in particular.

Two diametrically opposite approaches took shape in regard to the relation of philosophy and the social sciences in the study of man, viz., the scientist and anti-scientist. The considerable achievements of the particular sciences gave rise, on the one hand, to positivist notions that the development of special scientific knowledge would further full resolution of the problem of man. On the other hand, spokesmen of the various forms of anti-scientism and anthropologism on the contrary made an absolute of the possibilities of 'purely' philosophic methods of knowing man, and stressed the limited nature and incapacity of science to bring out the 'true' nature of man. But experience of modern philosophic and scientific studies of the theme of man have shown that an absolutising of both the philosophic and particular approaches leads to the constructing of one-sided, inadequate images of man. For all the differences between the particular-science and philosophic levels of analysis, they are organically linked and mutually supplement and enrich each other.

I would like, at the same time, to emphasise that the philosophic aspect has definite significance in the operational, complex approach to man. The philosophical conception of man, in particular, is the ideological and methodological basis for the natural and social sciences' analysis and solution of the problem of man. But that is not the sole point. By making man the object of cognition and knowledge, and by correlating its whole problematic with him, philosophy reveals the road and chief link leading to explanation of his wholeness.

What is the main link that gives a character of integrity and

wholeness to every possible definition of man? The sole and determinant index of human nature, in which man's various faculties and qualities find expression, is the conception of him as a social being and object-using creature, as the subject of all socially practical, historical, as well as spiritual activity. It is in his practical, creative activity with objects that man exhibits the whole integrity of his being, and in it, and its concrete forms, that he realises the unity of the material and ideal, of ideals and reality.

The philosophic approach to knowing man presupposes first and foremost the study of those aspects of his nature and activity that characterise him as an object-using and creative being who creates the objective, cultural forms of his being, and brings out the connection of these forms with the subjective human factor as relatively independent yet concrete, historical products of human creativity. The problem of man in philosophy can correspondingly only be understood when the unity of all the elements of social development and the personal qualities of man himself are taken into account.

The philosophical conception of man thus does not coincide with the biological, the psychological, or the sociological. In the context of philosophic analysis man does not simply appear as an empirical individual characterised by a set of special, social-psychology attributes, or as some abstract 'species' being outside time and living circumstances. Philosophy presents man as a social being capable of acting and thinking in a definite historical age in accordance with his general human nature. Philosophy strives to develop a view of man that would reflect everything that makes him an authoritative representative of the whole human race. The theme of man is thus a problem of discovering the parameters of human existence that would simultaneously include the necessary conditions of existence of humankind as a whole in contrast to all other species of living creatures.

This approach makes it possible not only to clearly delineate the so-called sphere of the human but also, on the basis of an objective scientific analysis, the problem of the preconditions and ways of creating conditions of man's life and development worthy of him, and of liberating the creative potentials inherent in the individual. This problem, as experience of comprehending and understanding the theme of man in the history of philosophical and scientific thought indicates, is no less difficult and important than the development of an adequate understanding of the nature of man.

The foundations of humanism as a general theory of man were laid by the thinkers of the Renaissance. The view of man as a being who independently chooses goals in his behaviour, and realises them through rational analysis of reality, had already been developed in their works. In their conceptions man thus already appeared as an internally whole, rational, active being; the question of the relationship between human aims and activities and the conditions of the social milieu was also posed in them.

The thinkers of the Renaissance, however, had not yet seen the real bases of this relationship, so that many humanist conceptions acquired a naturalistic character, since paramount importance was attributed in them to man's bodily constitution and his natural, biological characteristics. As a counterweight to such a clear belittling of the role of consciousness, and man's rationality, conceptions were advanced in the context of the humanist tradition in which, on the contrary, the spiritual element in man was made an absolute.

It is also no less to the point that the glorifying of the powers of human reason characteristic of the European humanist culture of modern times (reason shackled by nothing and endowed with the will of man who had won the freedom to create and reorganise the world in his image and likeness, and to rejoice over it) was embodied in all versions of early humanism in a conception of the value of the individual in himself, and of his possibility not only of resisting any oppression and pressure from outside but also of opposing himself to the social milieu, to another person, and to nature. As a result the supporters of that conception were unable to plant the theme of humanism in real, concrete, historical soil. The humanist ideals they proclaimed had an extremely abstract character, and—the main thing—were not brought out and substantiated by converting these ideals into reality.

Even today humanism often appears as a doctrine out of touch with man's real life, and limited to proclaiming certain eternal, 'timeless' values. Humanism is sometimes no more than a set of wishes and normative demands on the individual. Even when we are dealing with conceptual systems of views, ideals, and evaluations in which human good is proclaimed the supreme value and the main goal of social development, and which are aimed against conditions and forces that enslave the personality and individuality of man, they are often more or less stamped with an abstract speculative humanism. They are unable to give a convincing answer to the main problems

blocking realisation of humanist ideals, namely, how, while recognising the value of man in himself, his making of history and of his own being, to learn to see this creator in the real, empirical man; how to bring it about that all people in all countries could really enjoy all human rights, and satisfy and develop their potentialities and capacities; how to guarantee protection of his personal dignity to each member of the human race, and life without destructive wars, hunger and famine, poverty and disease.

Spokesmen of all the latest philosophical trends, who make it their central task to analyse man's being in the world (whether personalism, neo-Freidism, existentialism, Protestant neo-orthodoxy, or contemporary Catholic philosophy) put the accent on manifestations of subjectivism, individuality, and primacy of the personal element. But it inevitably turns out (1) that this subjectivity and 'primacy' of the individual are illusory and always associated, moreover, with a clearly formulated or implied dependence of the individual on supernatural or other forces uncontrollable by man; (2) that this 'primacy' appears as a speculative expression of a dual 'split' really existing in Western society—of the individual and society on the one hand, and of the personality itself, on the other. The idea of the 'primacy' of the individual, and of its absolute independence on the general philosophical plane, is paradoxically twisted and turned into an affirmation of the personality's non-sovereign character on the concrete, historical, social plane. The main reasons for that are the separation of man from society and the counterposing of him to it. In their view man preserves his real essence, and himself as an individual, and becomes a moral being, by 'emancipating' himself from the social ties imposed on him by society.

Such an isolation of the individual from society is deeply contradictory, and contains an element of the anti-social. It is also objectively both against bourgeois society, whose values and culture man cannot share, and against the idea of social solidarity and liberation movements. At the same time, and perhaps involuntarily, it can serve both as a theoretical expression and stimulus of mass protest in capitalist countries and as grounds for withdrawal from struggle. As recent history has shown, youth and student movements, and various alternative movements inspired by ideas of counterposing man and society, are as inconsistent and contradictory as the ideas of anarchistic social revolt. For humanists of that type social reformism is reorganisation and restructuring of society's culture and of

man's consciousness and not transformation of the social system. They also count mainly on renewal of the individual's emotional and psychological life, and on transformation of man's biological nature, rather than on the power of mass movements.

Of all the humanist theories of the present time, only real humanism, whose founder was Karl Marx, insists on the priority significance of reorganising social relations. Only for it does man appear in his essence as 'the ensemble of the social relations', and not in isolation from them, and not in opposition to them. The task of realising the ideas and principles of humanism in reality itself is therefore, from this point of view, to change man's social position, i.e., the system of social relations. By bringing out man's social dimension Marxism thereby overcame the fundamental limitation of the humanism that preceded it and, at the same time, of all the latest philosophical, anthropological constructs. The difference between Marxian humanism and other conceptions is that it gives the general ideas of humanism a real content, as a result of a scientific analysis, indicates the ways to its real embodiment, and converts them into a guide for practical action.

To create possibilities for man's life and development worthy of him is above all to transform the conditions of his work and labour, both mental and physical. For it is the social conditions of work that determine the measure of man's development as a personality, and as a creator and originator. In contrast to idealist conceptions, Marxism approaches solution of this problem from a simple, clear proposition, namely that there is nothing except nature and man, who alters the former by his active intervention and creates civilisation out of material inherent in nature. It is labour, transforming nature, that is the first and decisive, specific feature of man, distinguishing him from the animal kingdom.

Having seen in labour the force that makes man human, Marxism naturally considers that a truly humanist position cannot help putting this theme in the foreground. Labour not only created man and has figured throughout history as the main criterion of the humanising of both nature and man himself, but is still the most important index of his social maturity. And it is quite impossible to call a society human in which the wealth of some is created through the exploitation and poverty of others, in which a social division of labour that exploits man prevails, and which deprives millions of people of the chance to realise their right to work.

This contradiction between man and social conditions that limit the possibilities of manifesting his personality in socially useful labour is ultimately due to private ownership of the means of production. For private property is not just an economic category. To proclaim personal freedom with domination of private ownership of the means of production, means only to affirm conditions of free development for a few privileged persons. The majority of mankind, deprived of means of production, do not have these conditions. Because private property not only underlies the division of social labour that maims man, but also alienates their product from the real producers. Real humanism therefore calls for abolition of private ownership of the means of production first of all. Avoiding of this very important condition of genuine humanism and, furthermore, defending and fighting for the existence of private ownership of the main means of production, means to remain a humanist in the realm of dreams, sometimes beautiful and honest, but impotent and powerless.

Recognition of objective conditions as primary not only does not belittle the subject and his activity but, on the contrary, elevates his creative, constructive role, and uncovers the human dimensions of social life in all its unity and diversity, contradictions and wholeness. For the objective conditions of which I speak are not some natural essences but the products of human activity, and forms and modes of this activity historically developed through creative work. There are no grounds, therefore, for reproaching Marxists with allegedly preferring to talk only about the 'objective', 'material' factor of human life to the detriment of the 'subjective'. The important role of 'subjective' factors in history is clearly defined in Marxism. At the same time it brings out the link of subject and object in human practice. The subjective is understood as man's positive, transforming activity. It is a matter precisely of man and of the subjective forms of human existence, but with an essential proviso that by subjective form here are understood not only the various manifestations of man's intellectual and spiritual life (including the fantasies and illusions he can create about himself), but precisely the real, actual, objectively established forms and modes of human labour, of the practical activity that transforms natural material and creates spiritual values.

The accent on man's social essence does not, of course, mean at all that his personal, existential characteristics that describe phenomena of subjective reality and his inner world, such as emotions, convictions, ideals, illusions, tastes, aspirations, etc.,

can be abstracted from him either in theory or in practical activity. Marxism overcame the antinomy of the social and the individual that had dominated the history of philosophy, by showing that the individual was not simply a single, empirical being, 'embedded' in society, but the individual form of that society's being. Each individual, while a member of the human race, is at the same time an inimitable individuality but it does not follow that the individual is counterposed in principle to the social, because it, too, is defined by socially active characteristics. The essence of the individual cannot be brought out by counterposing him to the social, but can only be disclosed by analysing social relations; on the other hand, society is not just a sum total of empirical individuals characterised by chance (individual) traits, but an aggregate of the connections and relations into which these individuals enter with one another. As Marx noted:

Above all we must avoid postulating 'society' again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being. His manifestations of life, even if they may not appear in the direct form of communal manifestations of life carried out in association with others—are therefore an expression and confirmation of *social life*.²

The advent of the new in social development obviously cannot simply be derived from existing being, from the objective circumstances, without taking into account the specific, and still little-studied 'contribution' introduced into the objective process by creative activity and by such a specific property of social reality as man's consciousness and subjective world. It is therefore important, in present-day studies of the processes of the development of man's spiritual and intellectual world, to surmount the metaphysical isolation of consciousness from man, the subject of practical activity, as a result of which consciousness becomes a special, unique object of investigating existing in itself in the manner of Hegel's spirit, and likewise impossible to accept the inordinate 'epistemologising' of consciousness and its reduction to cognitive processes, and accordingly, also, the 'rationalised' treatment of man mainly as a cognising, knowing, 'reflecting', philosophising subject. One must also largely take into account such aspects and functions of consciousness as the choice and posing of aims, decision-making, the organising of activity and evaluating of its results, and the criteria of its effectiveness—and all other aspects of human knowledge and action.

The individual personality develops under the influence of determinant factors of the social milieu and natural environ-

ment. But its inner content is not the result of a mechanical introduction of patterns of the objective world into its consciousness, but is the sum of its own internal work during which it absorbs the content of the external factors and assimilates them into its activity. In other words, the individual personality's determination by external conditions comes about through its subjectivity and not in spite of it, and the individual's system of values and mechanism of value orientation play a most important role in that.

The principle of unity of the individual and social has methodological significance both for overcoming attempts to make an absolute out of individual being or to dissolve the individual in society and so remove the theme of study of man as an individual itself and on the plane where it indicates the need to pose the problem of man in a broad, historical, and socio-philosophical context, allowing for all aspects of his existence and development (his personal qualities in their interaction and interconnection with social relations; the patterns of the moulding of the individual during education and upbringing and work, in socio-cultural creation, and in moral perfecting; the interaction and mutual adaptation of man and technique, in particular the new and latest; the dialectic of the inter-relation of social and biological qualities, etc.). All these are matters without deep study of which it is impossible to comprehend the world of modern man with due allowance for the new conditions and requirements of social development.

2. The Dialectic of the Interconnection of Man, Science, Technology, and Nature

The new conditions of man's existence and development are largely governed in the first place by the broad development of the contemporary industrial revolution.

The science and technology of our time are making it possible to provide both an abundance of goods on earth and the material conditions for (a) an all-round transformation and perfecting of society, and (b) development of the individual. Yet they, these creations of the mind and hand of man when put to the service of the selfish, egoistic interests of the elite who govern capitalist society, are being turned against man himself. Such is the glaring contradiction in which humanity has reached the threshold of the twenty-first century.

Even at the beginning of our century, mankind did not know

such contradictions. Only in fantastic novels, it seemed, could the future grandeur and 'demonry' of science and technology be expressed. But their position in society changed radically in the middle of the twentieth century. Science began to be fully converted into a direct productive and social force.

This is a reflection of deep-seated processes within science itself and engineering, when the new industrial revolution took its start in the 40s and 50s, inseparably linking qualitative transformations in the fundamental sciences with radical changes in engineering and technology. This led not only to the rise of new disciplines and trends at the 'joints' of the various sciences and engineering, but also to many branches of today's economy being born in scientific laboratories (as happened, for example, with atomic power engineering, the microbiological industry, and so on).

Today the development and application of micro-electronics, informatics, and biotechnology demonstrate to the highest degree the advances in the fundamental sciences in their connection with revolutionary changes in engineering and technology. Ahead lies mastery of the energy of thermonuclear fusion, comprehension of the mysteries of the human brain and psyche, progress in medicine, etc., all of which will signify a qualitatively different stage in the new industrial revolution and consequently open up new prospects for the development of civilisation and man both in the specific conditions of the various social and economic systems and on a global scale.

These new opportunities will not by any means be realised automatically however. If the industrial revolution is not controlled, it can cause serious disproportions and contradictions in social progress.

There is nothing new in scientific knowledge being employable both for people's good and for evil. What is new in principle is that the scale of production and the power of modern weaponry, on the one hand, and the degree of science's penetration into the depths of matter and of the most intimate mechanisms of life, on the other, have brought humanity to certain crisis points and are facing it with the need to protect itself against possible disastrous, suicidal use of science and technique. Consciousness of that is the reason for the acuteness with which the problem of the relation of scientific and technical and social progress, and the effect of the industrial revolution on the future of man and the human race is being posed today.

A tendency toward a sharply critical attitude to scientific and

technical progress had already appeared in certain trends of social thinking and public opinion at the beginning of the twentieth century that became particularly strong and influential in its second half. Philosophers, sociologists, writers, and journalists began to compete with one another in painting very dismal pictures in which scientific and technical progress was leading to the degeneration of the human, ethical, and spiritual elements in man. Engineering and science were accused, quite without grounds, allegedly in the name of man, of a demonic capacity for destruction, a duality of inherent creative and destructive elements, and man himself proved to be only a marionette.

Various kinds of scientist and technocratic conceptions that presented the progress of science and engineering as universal means for overcoming the contradictions and ulcers of capitalist society rested on that false foundation (the counterposing of engineering and science to man, and the attributing of an independent life and power to them), although seemingly opposed to it. In them the development of science, and likewise technico-economic growth, determines historical progress in one way or another, right down to complete predetermined of the prospects of development of all its spheres. Man, his role in history, and his social and intellectual development were dropped as themes.

Understanding of the man-science-engineering-nature relationship has proved to be at the centre of the clash of the various conceptions. The significance of this problem is growing continuously as the humanist tasks with solution of which humanity links the industrial revolution are defined more clearly. The commensurability of the development of science and engineering and man's development and prospects is determined by the adequacy of the industrial revolution to mankind's humanist ideals and hopes. The growing power of science and technology are facing humanity with a complex, contradictory problem of developing social mechanisms that could rule out the possibility of their being used against man.

It is only possible to realise these needs adequately through profound social transformations and reforms during which the new technique and technology will be put at man's service and development as 'ends-in-themselves' of history. Many progressively-minded scientists, politicians, public figures, and members of the artistic intelligentsia, who have different ideological and political outlooks, agree on that.

At the same time profound changes are needed in the social

status and trends of development of science itself, and confirmation of its closer tie with human values. Such an orientation is making its way in the work of several international organisations, above all in the United Nations and UNESCO, and in such non-governmental organisations as the Club of Rome, the Life Institute, and others. As for Marxism, right from its beginning it has stressed the need to affirm the humanist trend of scientific and technical progress, its subordination to the aims of man and society, the linking of the investigatory and value approaches, development of the socio-ethical principles of science and its inclusion in the general system of humanist culture.

It is understandably not easy to realise these aims since, as the conversion of science into a direct productive force of society accelerates, problems of its practical effectiveness are naturally brought to the fore. But it is important, when stressing the growing practical significance of science, not to fall into a dangerous one-sidedness, and not to push the criteria of its cultural, humanist significance into the background. Unfortunately, that often happens, for example, in the divergence of the cultures (scientific and technological and humanist), a phenomenon that has become sharply visible in our time. It is necessary to stop this process and to ensure unity of science and other spheres of human culture. Only by so doing can we bring out science's general, cultural significance and its human purpose to the full. Furthermore, science does not simply supplement culture, but itself emerges as culture, to the extent that it deals with man and comes forward as a factor of his development. Science shapes man's mode of thinking and the character of his activity; its influence is felt by all other forms of social consciousness. But at the same time it itself also experiences an active feedback and reverse action of other spheres of culture.

A one-sided orientation of science on the greatest possible isolation from the world of human aspirations and needs is destructive for science itself; it weakens the living connections that advance the development of science and stimulate the activity of scientists. It is therefore very important now to ponder on the ethical problems of the development of science. And here it is necessary in many cases to reevaluate values, including rejection of the striving to picture the scientific quest itself as the highest ethical value. Science can indisputably exist and develop only given freedom of scientific creation and the right of research to freedom from any outside bans by incompetent

interference, which is essentially equivalent to science's right to independent existence. So it was in the period of the shaping and moulding of science; it is the right thing, too, in our day. The point is something else: recognition of the priority of humanist values over 'purely' scientific ones. The very posing of that point brings out the social purpose and humanist nature of science, i.e., the fact that it exists for man.

Humanism in regard to science means study of the laws of nature and society from the standpoint of the highest interests of man. The anti-human in science, and even more in the use of the results of research, is everything that is aimed against humanity and all-round development of the individual. Real humanism, consequently, also includes a specific approach to scientific and technical progress from the standpoint of guaranteeing the interests of man and preservation of his life and health, maintenance of a certain quality and level of life, and a guarantee of safety and security. The last point, i.e., problems connected with ensuring the safety of scientific and technical progress, is acquiring ever greater importance. The power concentrated in man's hands is so considerable that it is simply criminal to release it without picturing all the consequences.

It is important, when stressing the mounting significance of the cultural, humanist functions of science, to emphasise at the same time that humanism does not oppose science's social, economic effectiveness, but rather sordid, mercenary utilitarianism, the use of science exclusively or mainly for purposes of maximum exploitation of nature and man. For all the differences and accents in the evaluation of science, it is a constant point that modern society and man need it. It is therefore impossible to agree with the view sometimes expressed that the more science is converted into a direct productive force, the more it ceases to be a factor of humanism. On the contrary, since humanism includes a struggle to create material conditions of man's life worthy of him, science performs its humanist purpose, too, as a direct productive force. These functions of science are interconnected, but the relationship is mediated by social conditions. In a society in which science as a productive force is opposed to the working people, and is employed more and more widely to intensify exploitation, and for militarist ends, it may seem to be a force opposed to the ideals of humanism. But such a position contradicts both the nature of science and its deep social purpose.

The natural environment and man himself in his natural,

biological existence and development are being drawn more and more today into the orbit of influence of modern scientific and technical progress. People's social activity, intensified by the advances of scientific and technical progress, has been converted into a powerful geological and even cosmic force, through which radical changes (by no means always positive and foreseeable) are taking place in the natural conditions of man's existence, in the atmosphere and water, the landscape, climate, temperature and radiation regime, the flora and fauna, zones of settlement, etc. These changes, by exerting a reverse, feedback effect on man and society, are sharply posing social, economic, demographic, and ecological problems of a global as well as a regional character, and giving rise to complex medico-biological problems of man's adaptation to changing parameters of the social milieu. The responsibility of man himself and of all humankind for the consequences of this activity, which is transforming the planet itself, for preserving the natural environment, and for the expediency of the changes being made in it, is rising steeply. For the first time in history a very complicated task is rising before us, viz., to ensure an optimal, harmonious combination of the perfecting of scientific and technical, and social and industrial activity with the development of processes taking place in the biosphere. Scientifically substantiated development of natural systems in conditions of their increasing involvement in the processes of man's practical activity is acquiring essential importance in particular.

It is essential, at the same time, to stress that the mounting ecological danger, for all its tension and vital importance, is only one facet of the 'man and nature' problem. Over the whole of history, exchange of matter with nature has not simply and not only been the basis of man's existence as a living, natural creature, but in its specifically human forms it has essentially determined the historically concrete limits and possibilities of people's social development. Attempts to comprehend this relation in its most profound essential characteristics are correspondingly a necessary precondition and very important component of man's knowing of himself. The new type of man-nature link taking shape in our day must therefore be understood both on the plane of its role of providing the necessary conditions and prerequisites for man's activity as a living creature and from the aspect of its significance for the development of the human in man and enrichment of the conception of humanism. The peculiar modern posing of the problem of the interaction of man and nature is due to its solution being inseparable from

the shaping of the conditions of his existence that make exchange of matter with nature possible 'under a form appropriate to the full development of the human race'.¹ The point concerns the transition to a new type of man's connection with nature that is expressed in a purposive and humanist orientation of the development of this link.

In this case the task consists in organising society's control over the processes of a spontaneous, anarchic effect on nature, and on that basis confirming an interaction with nature in which nature loses its 'bare usefulness', and ceases to be just a means of producing wealth as an end in itself. Overcoming of the consumer, one-sided utilitarian attitude to nature will open up prospects of forming a qualitatively new stage in the interaction of nature and society which Marx characterised as the 'complete unity of man with nature—the true resurrection of nature—the consistent naturalism of man and consistent humanism of nature'.² Its essence consequently consists in the humanising of nature, mastering of her forces, and development of man forming a single social process of social, material, and cultural transformation of nature, society, and man himself, during which possibilities appear for the first time of realising the 'totality of human manifestations of life'.³

The very acute, and still largely unresolved problems of man's adaptation to the radical and far from always positive changes in the natural conditions of his existence that he himself is causing, are particularly strongly actualising the need for a very rapid transition from an elemental, spontaneous interaction with the natural environment (of which man himself is a part) to a consciously controlled one.

We know, for example, that many modern technological processes create various mounting wastes that present a certain danger for man. Among them are atmospheric, hydro-spheric, soil, and industrial effluents and wastes, by-products of farm production, the exhausts of motor transport and aviation, etc. Their effects can cause a heightened load on the natural ecological systems (and in areas with specialised production and technical activity even a multiplying load), and on their restorative and cleansing possibilities. The wastes of various industries, aerosols, industrial smog, and local concentrations of toxic substances (including dangerous carcinogens) accumulating in man's natural habitat are creating an additional adverse load on the human organism, specially in case of a high level of urbanisation. The heating of the atmosphere, noise, electromagnetic radiation, vibration, dust content, etc., are

operating in the same direction, creating a danger for man's psychophysical well-being leading to a deterioration of his general condition, a higher sick rate, and premature death. Supplementing them, too, are unfavourable conditions in the organisation of social labour and of social opportunities as a whole, and also such adverse phenomena aggravating the pathology of the human organism as overweight and obesity, hypodynamia, psychic stress, smoking, drinking, drug addiction, etc.

It is becoming particularly obvious in these conditions that social progress should be realised in our day in forms that would make a mutually co-ordinated simultaneous solution of a triple task possible: viz., protection and development of the environment; maintenance and fortifying of man's health and ensuring of long years' of activity and productive work for him; and the ensuring of scientific and technical progress and dynamic development of social production on that basis.

The society in which competition, a drive for profit, consumerism and the type of social effect on the environment corresponding to it predominate, is proving incapable of coping with this task, so vitally important for the fate of civilisation, although it is understandably doing a lot in that respect.

Only a society free of such conflicts, and guided by a different scale of values (viz., the good health and happiness of present and future generations) is in a position, by relying on rational planning, to regulate and control, and rationalise the use of natural resources, and ensure defence of the environment and health of the population by legislation.

There are still problems everywhere on this plane, of course, that are evoking alarm and a need to take emergency measures and strengthen control over nature-use, to give it a socially orientated and planned character, and to widely develop ecological education of the population.

The contribution of real humanism to the moulding of a rational system of relations between nature and society is characterised by the fact that the technical, economic, socio-political, and humanist aspects and sides of the problem are interlocked, and that perspectives for the defence and maintenance of the environment and reproduction of natural resources are being opened up comprehensible for all nations and favourable for the future of the human race. But, while achieving a purposive, organised effect on nature, and a maintenance of the equilibrium of the biosphere, socialist society cannot limit itself just to maintaining a statistical balance of natural processes.

and the status quo of the environment, but has to ensure a planned transformation of it that would help establish more and more favourable conditions for man's physical and moral being, and for the development of humanity.

It is necessary to approach not only burning ecological problems from such a humanist standard, but also those of improving man's biological and psychic nature, that have been actively discussed in recent decades both as a very important component of the 'man-nature' problem and as an independent one. Unlike the biologising and sociologising trends, Marxism does not counterpose the natural and social in man, and allows for their unity, which determine his physical and spiritual needs, his interests, activity, aims, and intercourse.

The dialectical unity and interpenetration of the biological and social does not mean either their dissolving in one another, or their parallel existence. The biological structures and functions of the human organism are being modified to a considerable extent by the action of the social factor (above all labour), and in some respects have reached a higher level of development than in other members of the animal kingdom; they have been 'humanised'. In other words, the biological in man does not present itself on the same level as the social, but rather in the very sphere of the social.

The unsoundness of approaches to analysis of the interconnection of the biological and social in man that understand the mechanism of this interaction in a simplified way, and that attempt to single out the biological factors and components that determine it in pure form in the nature of man, is therefore understandable. A contemporary attempt of this kind is that of E. O. Wilson, the founder of sociobiology, who proposed the following methodological approach:

Let us now consider man in the free spirit of natural history, as though we were zoologists from another planet completing a catalog of social species on Earth. In this macroscopic view the humanities and social sciences shrink to specialised branches of biology; history, biography, and fiction are the research protocols of human ethology; and anthropology and sociology together constitute the sociobiology of a single primate species.⁶

As is to be expected, attempts of that kind (which its author himself proclaimed the only scientific materialism) to explain people's social behaviour as organised by genes, very quickly revealed their flimsiness. That was to be seen, for example, in sociobiology's interpretation of the institutions of modern society as hypertrophied modifications of genetic structures that

existed in prehistoric times in the society of food-gatherers and hunters.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Wilson's closest followers had already hastened to get away from rigid biogenetic determinism in the examination of human behaviour and to replace it with the idea of a dual (genetic and cultural) determination of man's social life that thus essentially rejected the original position of 'reducing' sociology and all social knowledge of man and society to a complex of biological sciences.⁷ Wilson himself has tried, in his latest works, to free himself from the extremism of genetic determination and took up a kind of middle position, proposing to talk now of 'the genetic basis of the forms of behaviour', and not of its genetic predetermined.⁸ But the essence of his position was nevertheless not altered in practice. Its fundamental basis remained a naturalistic, biologiser approach, only more neatly camouflaged in the guise of allowing for factors of evolution and culture, because the primary and radical in man is explained as before by the biological, while the social is represented as secondary and transient. This is confirmed by the persistent efforts of Wilson and his followers, employing various research procedures, to discover empirical confirmations of a direct biological conditioning of various types and aspects of people's social behaviour: the relations of men and women and parents and children in society; the behaviour of adolescents; social manifestations of conformism and aggressiveness, egoism and altruism, and the differences in social status of members of society; and the forming of hierarchical models of 'dominance and subjection', etc.

These attempts contradict the root principles of scientific method. Biologising is methodologically incorrect in social disciplines, primarily because it does not allow for the universal, qualitatively heterogeneous structure of the material world and its historical differentiation.

A proper solution of the inter-relation of the biological and social will be based on the general philosophical idea of the unity and diversity of material reality. The general laws that reflect this unity are manifested in qualitatively unique forms that express the relative separateness and independence of different material structures. According to this idea, life should be understood as a qualitatively new phenomenon not wholly reducible in principle to the physical-chemical processes occurring in living matter, even though their role in the determination of biological phenomena is exceptionally great. In the same way the psyche, consciousness, and thought have to be treated

as new, qualitatively peculiar phenomena, but determined by more complex, specific laws in no way reducible to physiological ones, even though it is quite necessary to know the latter and biological laws in general, and to take them into account when studying psychic processes.

The human organism, which is the highest level of biological organisation that has arisen in the course of the evolution of the organic world, consequently differs from other living organisms in that it responds to specifically social laws qualitatively new in comparison with biological ones, as well as to the latter, and depends on these social laws. To deny these laws, which determine the qualitative uniqueness of the human organism and the conditions of its existence and further evolution is therefore as unconvincing and dangerous as incomprehension of their unity.

We also approach comprehension of the problem of the future of man (which is being so actively discussed these days) from the standpoint of the interaction of the social and biological and the leading role of the former. In that respect our approach differs in principle from conceptions that make an absolute of some one of the forms of human being, more often than not the biological. Absolutising of the biological component of human nature naturally leads to man's prospects and future being posed and decided as a problem of the self-perfecting of human nature, a radical reorganisation of man's genetics, brain, and psyche, a reorganisation capable of giving rise to a 'new species', and to the creation of a 'superman' endowed with a 'superbrain'. That is how the matter is posed, for example, in Jeremy Rifkin's book *Algeny*, which has been quite widely read not just in academic circles, and which can be regarded as a kind of gospel of the 'biotechnology of man'.

Rifkin's main idea is that not only should the biological nature of man be altered in principle by applying 'gene engineering' but also that the human community should develop a new way of thought in regard to the environment as a whole and the laws of its development (as is indicated by his book's subtitle 'A New Word—a New World'). It is difficult, when one reads this book, to get away from a feeling of the far-fetched nature of the contrast between the particularly pessimistic description of the present and the rosy picture of the future, in which a leading place is assigned to biotechnology. The latter is conceived as a panacea for all the misfortunes visited on mankind, and as a miraculous means for radically altering man's nature and the character and style of his thinking and behaviour.

But is it really necessary to reorganise man's biology in a radical way? Is it dictated by real needs? What are its possible consequences? There is no convincing, seriously grounded answer to these questions, and the many more that inevitably arise, either in Riskin's book or works of the same type.

It cannot be denied, of course, that man's adaptive possibilities may be substantially widened in the future through the use of various means (psychological, chemical, genetic, etc.). Modern science has data witnessing to hitherto unknown psychophysiological reserves in man, in particular in the brain. New paths are being opened in this direction, for example, by work in the field of 'artificial intellect', capable of equipping man's mental activity with new means and multiplying his possibilities. But will man's biological nature be altered by that? Will some 'superman' replace *Homo sapiens*? Will new forms of his existence arise, organically combining natural and artificial organs? While not denying the importance of a profound philosophical and scientific thinking out of these often complex and delicate problems, I nevertheless consider that biologising, neogenetic, and other projects for creating a 'superman' are vulnerable on the scientific and theoretical plane, and unacceptable on the social and ethical plane.

It is expedient to pose the theme of man's prospects in the present age, first and foremost, and mainly, as a social problem, as that of the forming of a society and an individual of a new type. The evolution of man is a process of the individual's acquisition and reproduction of the social and historical experience and material and spiritual culture of mankind during dealings and intercourse with people. The main 'resources' of man, and of his development and future, which, in contrast to the biological are truly inexhaustible, consist precisely in that. A socio-historical approach like that makes it possible not only to understand the patterns of this process but also successfully to build a strategy for developing and activating the human factor (including its biological parameters) in accordance with the new demands of the industrial revolution and the real conditions of life.

3. Man's Prospects: on the Road to Ideal Harmony of the Individual's Development

The humanist ideal of the man of the future is undoubtedly a harmoniously developed individual, a creator for whom work is a primary vital need, a person whose free development is a

condition for the development of society in general, while society in turn makes this wholeness of the development of each individual and of the entire human race an end in itself.

That social ideal is not the fruit of speculative reflections but a rigorous scientific conclusion based on analysis of the real trends of the past and tendencies of today. It not only corresponds to the social trends of development of civilisation but also to those of the contemporary industrial revolution. In our day man's broad social development, and cultivation of all his powers and faculties, are being presented for the first time in history as a direct condition of the further progress of social production, realisation of which is getting a firm, objective, material, technical, social, and economic foundation through a radical transformation and perfecting of society's productive forces and relations of production under the impact of the industrial revolution and a qualitative reorganisation and over-haul of society's life. All-round development of man is more and more clearly becoming a necessary condition, prerequisite, and predominant factor of a development of the industrial revolution, free from deforming influences.

This revolution, by uniting the development of science and technology in a single process, and at the same time linking this process with contemporary production tasks, is promoting a change of the united three-stage 'science-engineering-man' system in which the human factor is not only being converted into a unifying but also becoming an ever more active link in realisation and development of the powerful forces of technique and technology and the highest achievements of science, and their use to meet people's mounting material and spiritual needs. In these conditions the worker is being freed more and more from the role of an appendage of technical equipment and mechanisms, and is being faced with a need to control the whole technological cycle. This is not only requiring corresponding skills and habits from him, but also demanding an ever broader general educational, scientific, technical, and cultural outlook. The increasing use of 'thinking' cybernetic devices of necessity presupposes highly intellectual work associated with the solution of complex mental problems and the forming of a scientific style of thinking of a creative character. As Marx foresaw, the production process is being converted more and more, through the intellectualising of labour and extension of its creative content, into objectified science and free play of man's intellectual powers for the sake of social development.

As a result the spheres of people's social activity are being

broadened and brought closer together, and universalised, and the creative potential of the concrete individual employed more and more rationally and fully through the shaping of an integral productive activity that includes all its generic types (production, cognitive, educational, regulative and controlling, communicative, aesthetic, moral, and consumer). In accordance with that kind of activity the individual more and more needs a capacity to freely pose and realise the socially significant aims, in other words, to give shape gradually to a universal mode of realising his essential powers and creative potential, and his self-assertion as an integral, spiritually rich, comprehensively developed social being.

The moulding of such an individual cannot of course be guaranteed by transforming the character and content of labour, and a shake-up and reorganisation only of economic processes and relations, however essential that may be. It is only possible through an all-round reorganisation of the whole aggregate of social relations, providing really comprehensive social activity by the individual in all the spheres (without exception) that determine society's life activity. That is also understandable, for the ideal of the man of the future put forward and developed by real humanism starts from a scientific understanding and conception of the essence of man, which means that the man of the future will be first and foremost a whole aggregate of social relations of a new type inherent in the new type of civilisation. Hence it follows that one can raise the measure of the individual's development toward a fuller manifestation and display of his essential powers only through tackling all the other problems of the life of socialist society, and above all the economic ones, in inseparable connection with the overcoming of class differences, and consistent and general confirmation of the principles of social justice.

A socialist organisation of society, meant to provide ever fuller satisfaction of material and cultural needs, and to actively influence the moulding of positive, social qualities of the citizen, and at the same time to block and cut short anti-social manifestations, can realise these aims. A *sine qua non* of ensuring all-round development of the individual is a further democratisation of the life of society, when the administration of state and public affairs regularly, step by step, become the direct business of the working people themselves.

At the same time, the affirmation and development of harmonious relations between society and the individual and real activation of the human factor presuppose the provision of sub-

jective preconditions as well as of objective ones. It is impossible really to activate the human factor of social development, and so create the preconditions for sure progress toward the ideal of a harmoniously developed man without raising the standard of culture of the individual himself, and to inculcate an orientation in him on maximum realisation of his powers and faculties.

It will be obvious from this that the problem of the wholeness of the individual's development does not boil down, in our understanding, to a simple increase in and multiplication of his functions and knowledge, although many-sidedness of the functions arising through a change in the various types of activity in society, and high educational standards are undoubtedly a very important prerequisite of the individual's development. But neither an abundance of the social functions and roles performed, nor varied professional work, nor all-round education in themselves yet make an all-round developed personality. To get that we have to pay attention as well to the complex of human qualities and moral ideals and principles that characterise a person's way of life, the social direction of his activity, and the forms of his social connections. Furthermore, it is 'indicators' of the individual's social development like his moral principles and criteria of life and activity, and their sense (taken not only generally but also in particularly personal aspects), people's initiatives and discipline, the forms of their intercourse, etc., that are coming to the fore today.

We clearly see that many very complicated, unresolved problems lie ahead and that a considerable acceleration of social and economic development, and an increase in social achievements, will be needed in order to raise the personality's level of development and to advance to the high ideal of the man of the future.

The road to building a new society is thus not easy, but it is the sole real road for realising humanism. To dream of the triumph of humanism without proposing a genuinely humanist transformation of society as a preliminary and very essential precondition of it is therefore equivalent to dreaming of bread without ploughing and sowing.

Another precondition for ensuring the triumph of humanism, which stems from the features of the contemporary period, is a humanistically orientated tackling of international problems. Today, humanity is faced with a historical choice; either to tolerate skidding along the path of confrontation and the arms race to the abyss of nuclear self-annihilation, or to make its way

of thought and action correspond to the realities of the nuclear-space age and to reorganise international relations on principles of co-operation so as to maintain peace and preserve the world.

The new thinking that must be guided by and conducted in the interests of all mankind, and its survival, i.e. by the principles of genuine humanism, is determined by the need of a new approach to the problems of ensuring security in the world.

Attention is thus riveted not only on the fate and prospects of the individual person in his uniqueness and individuality, but also on the future of the human race as a whole.

The very conception of humanism has to be refined and generalised in accordance with the real facts of the age. Such aspects as the extension of humanism to everything living (the saving of nature) and protection of the whole population of our planet and of the human race as a biological species, are being added in our day to the value-in-himself of human individual traditionally affirmed by humanism (or are at least being made urgent). Attitude to war and peace is now the most important criterion of humanism. Real humanism unreservedly rejects wars as a means of settling the political and economic contradictions and ideological disputes between countries. The ideal of socialism is a world without weapons and violence, a world in which every nation is free to choose its path of development and way of life. That is a new philosophy of international relations and the expression of real humanism in the nuclear-space age. One of the most important jobs of philosophers is therefore active involvement in the fight against the nuclear danger and the arms race, and for the maintenance and consolidation of world peace.

There is no doubt that there are more and more people among philosophers of various orientations who feel and understand the whole depth of the danger of a world thermonuclear disaster, and stand for firm, lasting peace on Earth. That meets the interests and expectations of nations, and corresponds to humanist principles and the traditions of progressive social thought.

It is impossible at the same time not to see that theories are still in circulation at the present time that do not promote but rather hinder maintenance of peace. One can find every kind of nuance among them, from preaching war as an element allegedly restoring humanity's health and regenerating it, to pessimistic fatalism and passive submission to the inevitable evil

of war. The conception that the causes of war are rooted in human nature is anti-human, and philosophically unsound.

True humanism not only demands condemnation of war but also calls for a real fight against the war danger. Finding the way to tackle the supreme task of the present day presupposes scientific thinking about, and comprehension of, the fact that there is now no fatal inevitability of war.

While there are still forces acting today that present the world with a hitherto unprecedented danger, modern reality at the same time brings people a hope not known in the past. The main support of this hope is the continuously growing power of the forces of peace, social progress, and national liberation, and the mounting anti-war movement. For the first time powerful peace forces have developed in the world that can banish war forever from the life of society, and they are growing stronger.

The very atmosphere of the preparations for a new war, and the orgy of militarism, is restricting the constructive power of the human mind, crushing the human in man, and converting him into a blind tool of forces hostile to social progress, and so holding back mankind's progressive development. Participation in the fight for social progress, and for triumph of the principles of peace and friendship among nations, on the contrary, is promoting development of the personality, and of all that is elevated and human in man.

In opposition to conceptions in which the most fundamental fact of our age, viz., the historical rivalry of two world socio-economic systems, is interpreted in a spirit of an absolute splitting of the civilisation into two quite autonomous, isolated, unconnected streams of history nor subject to general historical laws, Marxism starts from the point that there is not only antagonism in the relations of the two systems but also a unique unity and wholeness of the historical development of humanity. The world-historical rivalry and competition of the different systems expresses the objective pattern of mankind's social progress in the present age.

The dialectic of today's historical process is such that it is in conditions when the relations of the old and the new social system are penetrating all areas of mankind's affairs, and precisely in these conditions, that the interconnection, interdependence, and mutual conditionality of the processes taking place in separate countries and regions are growing with special intensity and depth. The rivalry of the two world systems does not exclude common interests in the progressive development of

humanity and world civilisation. The strength of the scientific vision of the present age is that, while opposing attempts to eliminate the radical opposition of the two world systems, it simultaneously affirms the essential unity of modern mankind and the community of its future and ultimate prospects, and brings out the pattern of the whole human race's transition to a more rational social organisation and higher civilisation.

The place that such global matters as prevention of nuclear disaster, detente, reduction of armaments and disarmament, the forming of a new system of international relations, protection of the environment, problems of demography, and the food, energy, and raw material problems, occupy in mankind's present-day affairs is bringing out particularly clearly the growing significance of a correct method to help us to see both the difference of the two world systems and the necessity of co-operation among countries with different social systems.

It is an urgent task of all nations and states to tackle these global problems. No one state, no one nation is able to do so by itself. These are problems of a kind that are becoming more and more urgent with each passing year, and more and more difficult, complex, and dangerous for the existence of civilisation. It would be a suicidal delusion and fallacy to suppose that their solution can be put off to the morrow.

The dialectic of history is such that the development of weaponry which led to the making of the atom bomb, and then of the hydrogen bomb, and to the proliferation of an arsenal of atomic weapons whose destructive power is quite enough to make our planet uninhabitable, is urgently dictating the need to abolish the nuclear weapon and other means of mass destruction, to achieve universal international security, mutual confidence, and co-operation among nations. This need must not be treated as a good intention or wish, or an abstract ideal or moral imperative. Maintenance of peace and the uniting of all nations in the fight against the danger of nuclear disaster, peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial co-operation and collaboration of states with different social systems are an objective necessity and the sole alternative to destruction of the human race.

Humanity can survive together or perish together. And the more acute the threatening danger of nuclear destruction is, the more strongly are people becoming conscious in our day of belonging to one, single human species, and of the need to fight resolutely for the survival of civilisation.

Hence the exceptional importance of uniting the efforts of

all people of good will on a platform of defence of peace. In today's world, the size and scale of which have been reduced as it were by the advances of science and engineering, there is no area or region where people do not have an interest in maintaining peace, and in preventing thermonuclear war. The movement for peace therefore includes millions of people, advocates of different ideologies and religious views, and has a truly international character. The finding of real ways and means of preventing nuclear war is an obligation of all true humanists irrespective of their ideological views and religious persuasion.

The world situation is such that fundamental shifts are needed in outlooks and political theory on matters of international relations.

The main direction of these shifts, the ensuring of priority of the interests of all mankind, recognition of human life as the main value, and the survival and development of humanity, is the supreme aim of all nations and their governments.

And that calls for principles of confidence and mutual understanding between nations to be affirmed in the consciousness of people and political leaders as a counterweight to suspicion and hostility, and to the burden of the irrational that is preventing peaceful coexistence and co-operation of different countries.

Philosophy can play a key role in shaping the new thinking, new ideological orientations in international relations, and can influence political theory in that direction.

Philosophy cannot help counting as its main problems those that are the chief ones for humanity. The philosopher's responsibility in today's world is first and foremost one for the present and future of man. And the problems bothering everybody cannot help being the main problems of philosophy.

An urgent task of philosophy and the social sciences is to promote investigation and development of the conditions and factors of social progress, and to inspire people with confidence that the future will bring the triumph of lofty ideals of social justice, peace, and humanism.

NOTES

¹ Karl Marx. *Theses on Feuerbach*. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 7.

² Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, pp. 92-93.

¹ Karl Marx. *Capital*. Vol. I. Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Avilez. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p 474.

¹ Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p 92.

¹ *Ibid.* p 93.

¹ E. O. Wilson. *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, The Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1975, p 547.

¹ See D. Freedman. *Human Sociobiology: A Holist Approach*, Free Press, New York, 1979.

¹ Such as the following works, for example, written jointly with Charles Lumsden: C. J. Lumsden, E. O. Wilson. *Genes, Mind and Culture. The Coevolutionary Process*, Harvard U. P., Cambridge, Mass., 1981; Charles J. Lumsden and Edward O. Wilson. *Prometheian Fire*, Harvard U. P., Cambridge, Mass., 1983.

¹ Jeremy Rifkin. *Algeny. A New Word—A New World*, Viking Press, New York, 1983.

I. Man as a Human Being

THE HUMAN, SPECIFICALLY HUMAN?

T. I. Oizerman

Man, in Benjamin Franklin's profound definition, whose significance Karl Marx stressed, is a tool-making animal. The definition can be shown to be incorrect, since it includes a patent contradiction: animals do not make tools, which means that an animal that does is not an animal. The paradox, however, is that this contradiction is not so much one of the definition as of life itself. Man is, in fact, an animal, and at the same time is no longer an animal. And this contradiction cannot be resolved by saying that he is an animal in one respect and not an animal in another. It is all much more complicated, since the one turns into the other, yet is retained at the same time in the other, but transformed. Such is the dialectic of identity and difference, which was first substantiated by Hegel. Identity includes difference; difference includes identity. Difference and identity thus form a unity of opposites. It is already senseless to ask which is the greater in this unity of the human and the animal (biological), identity or difference, since both identity and difference have a qualitative character here and not a quantitative one. There are both difference and identity; furthermore, the more essential the difference, the more essential, too, is the identity. That actually also includes the unity, in every way enigmatic, of the human and the animal, the social and the biological, which is specifically characteristic of man, and only of man.

One must make a reservation, incidentally: man is not animal in the ordinary sense of the word. In everyday life the word 'animal' is understood, without sufficient grounds, as pejorative, a word of abuse. The positive sense that it has in science is quite different.

Study of the social life of people [a textbook of biology says] is the subject-matter of the social sciences. Biology, however, studies the structure and life activity of the human organism. Profound study of man as an animal organism is of immense importance for the protection of health, improving living conditions, and dealing with many social problems.¹

This stressing of the social significance of the study of human

biology seems to me to be very much to the point.

Man occupies a definite place in the generally accepted classification of animals, divided into classes, orders, species, etc.

In his anatomical features [this same textbook says] man belongs to the phylum Chordata, the class of mammals, and the order of primates. All the main traits that characterise the order of primates are therefore inherent in him.²

Various species of ape, some of which are called anthropoid, belong to the primates. The special, essentially unique place that man occupies in this order is due to his not being an ape, not even an anthropoid one. Nevertheless, from the biological standpoint, the legitimate difference between man and the anthropoid apes, which also reflects a definite reality (within certain limits, of course), is a *species difference* in the same way as the difference between the apes. The stating of that biological fact arouses quite legitimate indignation because species differences are the less stable differences between living creatures, and are reproduced from generation to generation. Such are the differences between the horse and ass, the common blue or meadow violet (*Viola papilionacea*) and the garden violet (*Viola tricolor*). And not to stray outside biology, i.e. a certain aspect of the real existence of man (it is another matter that this aspect is insufficient, despite all its essential character), the difference between the 'anthropoid' orang-utan and the horse seems more substantial than the difference between man and the orang-utan. In fact, however, the orang-utan is closer to the horse than to man, since the description of both the horse and the ape is exhausted by the aggregate of their biological traits, while the description of man as a biological organism does not have a specific or species character. Man, of course, is also an animal, but his difference from other primates is not just a species one; it is undoubtedly more substantial and radical than any difference in the animal kingdom, even such an 'enormous' one as the difference between the elephant and the amoeba. This means that his difference from all other animals (when it is taken, of course, in the whole fullness of its historically developed content) breaches all the biological boundaries and determinacies. Marx called man a species being, having in mind not the biological determinacy, but the *social essence* of man. Man 'is not purely a natural being: he is a *human* natural species-being'.³

What is a being that exists for itself? Presumably it is a creature that can convert all other creatures, and likewise objects

of external nature, into means to realise its own nature. Such is production, and labour as a specifically human activity: purposeful activity directed to its own goal. And that goal, in the last analysis, is man himself.

People alter external nature by means of production, not only creating 'human' things but thereby also giving rise to their own needs, in short altering not only external nature but their own human nature. And to the extent that each person is capable of purposefully altering both these natures, he really exists for himself. I leave the contradictions of this process out of account here, and the tendencies and forces counteracting it, a survey of which is beyond the scope of my paper. The main point here is that the essence of man, or rather *human* essence, is not his species, i.e. biological, difference from other animals.

When a biologist speaks of man's difference from the animal he does not have the tapeworm in mind, of course, but highly developed members of the animal kingdom possessing a psyche. But such a clearly formulated posing of the matter is already quite inadequate outside the context of biology because it concerns the difference between man and that which forms the essence of animals in general, what unites both the tapeworm and the fully anthropoid gorilla in one whole. Man also differs from the animal in his having already surmounted not only the limited nature of his species difference from other primates, but also the limited nature of the whole diversity of the animal mode of existence.

An animal forms objects only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.¹

Whatever distinguishes man from the animal, however, he is, as Aristotle said, a *social animal*. That definition, too, is contradictory since an animal is not essentially a social being. Every definition, Spinoza said, is a negation, a negation (I suggest) of its own, inevitable limitedness, abstractness, and one-sidedness. This is seemingly not because certain scholars, limiting themselves to the *external* attributes of sociality (which is quite justified outside the social sciences), speak of various 'social animals', having in mind bees, ants, beavers, gregarious animals, colonies of birds, etc. The ornithologist Niko Tinbergen, for example, claimed 'that a gull colony is not a haphazard accumulation of gulls, but that it must be an intricate social structure organised according to some sort of plan'.⁵ Students of the

life of bees often discuss the existence of a 'state' among them, the division of a hive into 'classes' or 'castes', of the existence of a 'social' division of labour, and so on. By that connection, of course, certain facts are being stated and described, but the point is *how* they are explained and interpreted.

Not every known form of organised, differentiated existence and interaction of separate individuals and specimens is called a society. When such an abstract concept as society is employed it turns out to be applicable not only to certain species of animals but also to a number of plant organisms. It is consequently necessary to concretise the concept of social being. In general, we do not call those living creatures social that cannot lead an isolated way of life by virtue of their inherent *natural properties*. In the specific, essential meaning of the word (which I do not propose to impose on zoologists and botanists), the social is not a natural property at all. It is not innate in man, but formed, moulded, and developed through intercourse among human individuals, through which a human being becomes a member of society in the course of his individual, biological development. As for the animal, the features inherent in it and an individual specimen are the realisation of an inherited programme. A colony of gulls, to take Tinbergen's example, is a specific form of the realisation of a genotype. A 'community' of gulls does not create something new and different, differing essentially from what has been laid down in the stuff of heredity. Gulls, just like all other animals, are therefore seemingly the same in our time as they were several thousand years ago.

Man, unlike the animal, is the *product* of that interaction between human individuals which forms a society. The human individual, of course, also develops from germ plasm. The general trend of ontogenesis, as Henri Wallon wrote, characterising the individual development of the human individual, 'is only the accomplishing of what the *genotype* or germ of the individual potentially possesses... The history of a being is dominated by its genotype and constituted by its phenotype.'⁶ But man is not born a social being. In that sense the newborn human is still 'in itself', to use Hegel's expression. Its difference from the animal is also only 'in itself', i.e. it can develop into a specifically human difference and become a social quality only through upbringing, education and training, and the whole diversity of inter-individual communion and intercourse, and social effects. *Social being makes man as a social creature or being.*

The moulding of the human, as a process of individual development possible only in society, only through the latter, is

also studied, to some extent, by natural science. Some naturalists point out, in particular, that man's very difference from the animal is not only the result of the anthropological forming of the human race, which took thousands of years, but also the consequence of each human individual's own development, i.e. of an individual that belongs from birth to the species called *Homo sapiens*.

The word 'social', when employed by the biologist to describe certain species of animals, thus indicates only species, biological features. But the difference between man and the animal (not only the higher ones but all animals in general) is not a species, particular one, but a general difference that is revealed in everything and is essential in all respects. In that sense the concept of the social is applicable only to man, to people.

I began with man's being a tool-making animal, and for that reason not an animal. My subsequent discussion of the matter has led me to the conclusion that man differs from the animal as a social being. Both these essential characteristics of man ultimately coincide. Material production is social production; it is realised through definite social relations of production that mould its social form. The aggregate of relations of production form a society's economic structure. The origin of production was also the moulding of man and the forming of society. They were all united processes. Production is social production and also the production (and correspondingly reproduction) of society. Production is a social process, the determinant basis of the diversity of social processes.

When we call the production of tools the distinguishing feature of man, it is necessary to avoid oversimplification. In developed society, in which there is a diversity of human knowledge and division of labour, not all people, of course, are engaged in the production of tools or in material production in general. Man's difference from the animal is varied. It is deepened and diversified during social development and through the historical process that alters man. As Marx and Engels wrote:

Man can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their material life.

This definition stresses the diversity of man's differences from the animal, at the same time singling out the fundamental dif-

ference that constitutes the main feature of anthropogenesis. Consciousness of their difference from animals arose in men after they began really to differ from the latter by their instrumental activity, which essentially strengthened the natural biological organs right from the start. Marx and Engels pointed to the features of the 'physical organisation' of man, the biological preconditions for the origin of non-biological, specifically human, social characteristics. Anthropology, archaeology, and other sciences are concerned with investigating these preconditions. The British archaeologist Gordon Childe said: 'To the archaeologist man is the tool-making animal. Man makes tools because he has to.'

Making the simplest tools presupposes know-how and knowledge. In other words, a tool is material evidence of skill, know-how, and knowledge. Archaeologists describe and analyse the level of knowledge and skills of Paleolithic, Neolithic, and other prehistoric men from their finds of tools and everyday utensils.

Labour and production, as planned, purposive, organised activity, the posing and solution of definite tasks, and the social aims that anticipate the results of labour in ideas, are the activity of a being who knows, and possesses thought and awareness. These prerequisites of labour are the result of his development and perfecting, i.e. were initially the consequences and later the preconditions. This means that labour was not conscious activity from the very start; it arose as the instinctive activity of animals that built themselves 'nests', hunted other animals, and obtained food for themselves in various ways. The rise of labour as a specifically human activity would have been impossible if there had not been prototypes of it in the animal kingdom. And here, consequently the difference between man and the animal contains an element of identity.

The beavers of our day build exactly the same kind of dams as their predecessors thousands of years ago. Their skill or, if you wish, art, has remained the same, unchanged, like all the main species characteristics of beavers. There are no grounds for assuming that they know and understand what they are doing. The eels that migrate from Europe to America, taking the shortest and most convenient route across the ocean do not have navigational knowledge; likewise migratory birds. But man, unlike the animal, cannot make anything without knowing *how* to do it, without having ideas of its arrangement and structure and constituents. This 'defect' of man's compared with the animal (which does not need knowledge in order to make what it does

in accordance with its species determinacy) subsequently becomes his advantage.

In order to know how to make something, it is necessary to have it in front of one already, or to have some other thing that can be appropriately altered and adapted. This contradiction between knowledge and creation characterises their undeveloped forms, not yet separated from one another or having achieved relative independence, that are seemingly inherent in the first stages of mankind's existence. In order to make a hammer it is necessary to have some other hammer. The first hammer was seemingly made without the aid of one and was therefore not yet a real hammer. The relation between labour and knowledge is the same: only the long historical moulding of mankind formed labour as a specifically human activity in which knowledge and creation were differentiated and determined in relative independence of each other but at the same time merged into a single process of creation. Knowing and knowledge are thus rooted in the very basis of human, social life. The source of knowledge, and the ability to cognise itself, are man's progressive differentiation from his highly developed, and in their own way perfected, animal ancestors, a differentiation that must be understood as the process of the forming and becoming of labour. Man, by his essential determinacy, is a working creature and so a knowing one; that definition retains its fundamental significance despite the subsequent separation of mental and physical labour, a division that has acquired the character of a social opposition.

Knowing, like practice, with which it is linked in a partially mediated way, thus characterise all human activity and all the stages of man's individual development from birth to death. The question, however, is whether knowing is an activity specifically characteristic of man.

According to Descartes, animals are automata that, in contrast to man, have no 'soul', do not think, do not possess consciousness, and whose actions are not distinguished by any fullness or perfection whatsoever. Descartes introduced the concept of reflex into science, by which he tried to explain the purposefulness of the behaviour of 'soulless' animals. Subsequent studies of the physiology of animals, in particular of their instinctive forms of behaviour, became the basis for developing the theory of the reflex mechanisms of higher nervous activity, which proved to be innate in man as well as animals. The theory of conditioned reflexes developed by Pavlov and his followers has made it possible to demarcate congenital behaviour (unconditioned

reflexes) from those purposeful actions of animals that are formed through its own 'experience', in particular through learning. Zoo-psychology, and ethology, i.e. the science of animal behaviour, which has taken shape on its basis, partly confirm the classical notion of the unconscious, stereotyped behaviour of animals, and partly bring out new features of it conditioned, as has now been shown, by the cognitive activity of the animal, individual, 'personal' experience, and learning.

Tinbergen, whom I have already referred to, came to the conclusion in his research into the behaviour of gulls that its main features were innate. Their behaviour brings out

their lack of insight into the ends served by their activities, and into the way their own behaviour serves these ends. A rigid, almost automatic dependence on internal and external conditions is revealed every time an analysis is made.¹⁰

Tinbergen criticised workers who tried to explain animals' behaviour in the manner of human behaviour. Animals proved, in that case, to be poor likenesses of man that tried to act in the way a human would and did not, of course, succeed in doing so. Tinbergen characterised that methodological position as a very naive, smug anthropocentrism that ignored the *differentia specifica* of the animals. In his view the herring gull 'learning capacity ... is excellent', but 'is only applied in special cases'.¹⁰ Nevertheless the behaviour of the adult birds shows that they learn much during their lives. From that standpoint congenital behaviour is only the basis on which a variety of acquired reactions is formed. Some of them distinguish one bird from another, i.e. are not 'standard' species characteristics.

The reactions of adult birds to their mates—and to their chicks once they have learned to know them—become so selective that no other individual can release them. This can only mean that after this learning process they are sensitive to such fine details that the very slight differences between the birds' own mate and other birds, and between their own chicks and strange chicks, are sufficient to prevent responses to strangers.¹¹

The learning capacity inherent in almost all animals is evidence that their adaptation to the conditions of their habitat largely takes place after birth, i.e. is the result of individual development. Yet it is mainly determined by congenital forms of behaviour. One can agree with Tinbergen, whose conclusions about gulls are applicable *mutatis mutandis* to other animals as well,

that behaviour, however variable it may seem to be at first sight, is dependent on mechanisms in the nervous system, mechanisms with strictly limited functions. Here, as in so many other cases, nature has only developed what is necessary, and no more.¹²

This strict limitedness of knowledge by what is necessary is a biological characteristic of it. Development of 'only what is necessary' is a formulation that successfully defines the biologically determined forms of behaviour. But even those forms of behaviour in man that are biologically 'predetermined' are never reducible to the 'necessary minimum'. Man does not have congenital behaviour in general, in spite of the dependence of his individual peculiarities on inherited instincts. Walking erect is undoubtedly biologically inherent in man, just like articulated speech. But if a baby does not learn either, it will never master its natural capacities.

Spinoza called man, not without grounds, *res cogitandi*. Yet he was mistaken, since knowing in the broad sense of the word presupposes, first of all, elementary cognitive acts (for example, identification of objects) that are not only inherent in man. Some contemporary workers treat the simplest cognitive acts as unconscious reactions and responses inherent even in the simplest living creatures, since they possess the capacity to adapt to the environment. From this stand the irritability of plants is at least pre-knowing, if not knowledge. The difference between people's diverse, specialised, to some extent even autonomous, cognitive activity and the elementary acts fixed by biochemistry is of course immense, but here, too, the dialectic of identity and difference, the general and the particular, is manifested. The failure of the anthropological model for explaining animal behaviour is obvious, but the absolute, anti-dialectical opposing of man to the animal, and the social to the biological, is just as groundless, since man's cognitive activity also presupposes a central nervous system, which is quite developed, at least, in the higher animals. Engels wrote apropos of this:

we have in common with animals all activity of the understanding: *induction, deduction*, and hence also *abstraction* ... *analysis* of unknown objects (even the cracking of a nut is a beginning of analysis), *synthesis* (in animal tricks) and, as the union of both, *experiment* (in the case of new obstacles and unfamiliar situations). In their nature all these modes of procedure—hence all means of scientific investigation that ordinary logic recognises—are absolutely the same in men and the higher animals. They differ only in degree (of development of the method in each case).¹³

That conclusion, which summed up the scientific data of his time and men's centuries-long everyday experience of dealing one way and another with animals, has been confirmed by later scientific research, which has enriched and concretised our understanding of animals' psyche and cognitive actions, while at the

same time rejecting certain notions of ordinary consciousness based on analogy.

Different animals are capable, to various degrees of fixing significant and insignificant differences between the objects they come across, and of identifying these differences in changing situations. Memory, quick wits and ingenuity, and inventiveness are also different in the various animal species, and to some extent, as well, in individuals belonging to one species. All these capacities, however, are determined in advance and limited by the animal's main species characteristics.

The eagle [Engels wrote] sees much farther than man, but the human eye discerns considerably more in things than does the eye of the eagle. The dog has a far keener sense of smell than man, but it does not distinguish a hundredth part of the odours that for man are definite signs denoting different things. And the sense of touch, which the ape hardly possesses in its crudest initial form, has been developed only side by side with the development of the human hand itself, through the medium of labour.¹⁴

The many descriptions of animals' life indicate how the adults teach their offspring everything needed for the life of an individual of the species. In some cases this is ability to hunt, in others to employ features of the habitat so as to hide from a dangerous enemy, in all cases a capacity to react adequately to certain objects. The experience of training animals indicates that their inherent cognitive capacities respond to improvement within quite wide limits. The conditioned reflex character of animals' actions does not exclude their cognitive character. Many of man's actions, based on knowledge, ultimately become not simply habits but in essence reflexes. A driver brakes his car quite mechanically in response to traffic signals, although this action initially had a cognitive character.

L. V. Krushinsky, who is engaged in ethological studies, suggests that the traditional opposing of man as a creature possessing reason to animals that lack it, is a last concession to the idealist and religious interpretation of man. But how far is it legitimate to link the notion of a radical difference between man and the animal with idealism and religion, i.e. a notion that arose when this difference had in fact become radical? For is man not in fact a unique creature?

In his article 'Do Animals Have Reason', Krushinsky answers the question of his title positively in the main, starting from an operational definition of reason as an aggregate of definite, purposive actions performed in order to achieve a more or less

While recognising a capacity for complex abstract operations of the type of generalisation [he wrote] (and for explication as a partial case of generalisation) and for non-standard use of personal skill as an expression of elementary rational activity, we must also note its development among bees.¹¹

Such an answer to the question cannot help drawing attention to its non-standard, frankly original character. But are the operational characteristics of thinking sufficient for a scientific understanding of reason, as essentially developed, employing concepts and symbols? Theoreticians preoccupied with problems of artificial intelligence from the standpoint of cybernetics, and who often identified the brain and computer, have subsequently, of course, rejected this simplified operational understanding of reason.

From my point of view, based like any philosophical opinion on a theoretical summing up of the historical development of knowledge and practice, the question of animals' capacity to think still remains unresolved. An operational definition of thinking is undoubtedly necessary for objective study of animals' psyche, but it is abstracted precisely from the psyche. Yet thinking, at least in the form most studied by science, i.e. human thinking, presupposes the existence not only of a psyche but also of consciousness, i.e. of the most developed form of the psyche. Behaviourist psychology, true, denies the existence of consciousness in general, trying to explain thinking simply as an aggregate of more or less purposive actions. That reduction of thinking and consciousness simply to behaviour abstracts the fact that man's action is quite often the result of a preliminary pondering and weighing of motives, and choice; yet it is the existence of this preliminary stage, i.e. of a kind of motivation, and in particular the existence of considerations of various kinds accepted as the basis of action, that essentially characterises human behaviour. But the behaviour of animals that have a developed central nervous system is also not reducible to reflex responses to outside stimulation. And it is not just a matter of an inner stereotype of behaviour inherent in an animal that is relatively independent of external influences. When we recognise animals' capacity to cognise certain things and properties, and recognise in that an often highly developed capacity for identifying phenomena, it is necessary to explain these facts without assuming anything analogous to thought, consciousness, and reason. Human thinking and consciousness, of course, presuppose not only the existence of the brain but also of a social medium. Biologically, however, thinking is a function of the brain and human thinking is seemingly preceded phylogenetically by similar forms of

psychic orientation, something akin to pre-consciousness, pre-thinking, and pre-reason.

Leibniz claimed that man differed from the animal in a capacity for *apriori* thought. The sense of that (when abstracted from the idealist interpretation of the *apriori*) seemingly consists in highly developed conceptual thinking being specifically characteristic only of man.

A scientific explanation of animal 'thinking' is seemingly possible without assuming that animals perform logical operations, i.e. draw conclusions from generalisations and concepts. The grounds for an animal's 'conclusion' is its sensing and perception of a certain fact that signifies in accordance with an inner (mainly its own, species) stereotype of the sought-after prey, a danger, or simply something unknown that arouses watchfulness, and so on.

There are no grounds for claiming that animals realise what is known to them; they hardly have even an inkling that they do not understand something. They perceive the unknown only where it is an object of perception, but this identification of the object is not at the same time a self-identification of the subject. And though man quite often does not know what he knows, that which is imprinted in his memory, for example, without cognitive effort, i.e. without study, observation, and conscious fixing. Man therefore sometimes even remembers facts that, it seems to him, he had no idea of.

Comparison of man's cognitive activity with the similar functions of animals brings out quite clearly the radical difference between them only when it sees beyond the scope of a biological study. In other words, the comparison presupposes analysis of knowing as a social and, moreover, developing process, whose results had already, thousands of years ago, brought out quite clearly the difference in principle between human knowledge and the cognitive activity of animals. The conviction that animals do not possess consciousness, do not think, and do not understand, which has been held not only by idealists but also by the majority of materialists, is not so much evidence of human 'arrogance' as a definite, if not wholly adequate, explanation of the fact that men are constantly discovering, uncovering, and cognising more and more new objects, and continuously extending the boundaries of their knowledge and achieving obvious practical successes thanks to that, while animals only repeat their old way of life from generation to generation, without revealing any marked capacity to improve it. The question naturally arises whether this strictly limited stock of know-

ledge, mainly predetermined by the animal's species characteristics, is compatible with the concept of knowing, consciousness, and thinking.

Knowing, in the human sense of the word, is extended production of knowledge, the pace of which is steadily growing, overcoming the physiologically limited nature of the human sense organs. That is why man cognises according to the level of development of society and not according to his species (biological) limitation. The analogy between the production of things and the production of knowledge is quite legitimate, despite the latter's being unable, because of its nature, to be such a continuous process, organised in a planned way and standardised, as the production of things is.

The production of things requires the production of definite, applied knowledge. The latter is developed through knowledge of phenomena that, at least in their overwhelming part, lie outside production, forming the whole objective world accessible to knowledge (in the given historical conditions). It is no less essential, too, that the production of things is a many-dimensioned alteration of the phenomena of nature, and, as it were, discloses them for knowledge. The progress of knowledge is dependent therefore on the production of things, if not directly than indirectly. I have in mind not so much scientific knowledge as knowledge as a whole in all its forms. As for scientific knowledge, material production provides it as well by instrumental means of investigation.

The development of material production above all presupposes each new generation's inheritance of the level of the productive forces attained by the preceding generation of people. Not only are the means of production thus handed down in this relay as basic to further proliferation of the wealth of each new generation, but also the technology and organisation. All that, plus the articles of production whose diversity grows together with progress, are not only embodied labour but also materialised human knowledge, which is fully amenable to distribution. Human knowledge, through its objectification, is preserved not only in the objects of labour but also in a more specific form, is amenable to more or less direct mastery, since it is fixed in language, set out in books and passed on to the rising generation during learning, upbringing, training, education, etc. When we take into account that this inheriting of acquired knowledge has only become really effective in modern times, it will be more understandable why knowledge has been developing at constantly accelerating tempos since then.

The main fact, for instance, that makes knowledge a historically developing, social process, i.e. one proper only to man, lies in the preservation, accumulation, and proliferation of knowledge through its materialisation and objectification. Some workers have called this process social heredity,¹⁶ distinguishing it in that way from heredity as a biological process. The genetic information passed on to offspring does not contain any knowledge, even in coded form, since the knowledge acquired by a living creature during its individual development is not inherited by its offspring. The learning that takes place during an animal's individual development is the older generation's assimilation of certain experience. But the scope of this knowledge and these skills remains unaltered because of the absence in animals of a means of materialising them, let alone means of spreading them. Therefore not only the main features of an animal's behaviour are a realisation of the genotype, but also the knowledge of objects that it has acquired. Deviations in a better or a worse direction that come out in the phenotype do not get expression in succeeding generations. The changes in the gene stock that come about through mutations have no relation with the knowledge and skills that the living being has. When genetic continuity is the sole type of link between generations, development of knowledge is ruled out. Only *historical* continuity (about whose forms I have already spoken above) makes both social progress and the development of knowledge possible. Since the knowledge inherent in an animal of any species remains immutable, the rise of developing knowledge is a radical qualitative alteration of its form and content. While an animal's knowledge coincides with the skills acquired by it, and is inseparable from them, human knowledge possesses an essential independence of its application and use. The development of knowledge radically alters this process, giving rise to types of knowledge qualitatively different from each other.

At the dawn of civilisation the social division of labour had already called knowledge into being as a specialised form of mental activity, qualitatively different from everyday human knowing. Subsequently this intellectual curiosity, which is seemingly to some extent inherent in certain animals was transformed into an organic need for knowledge and, moreover, for specialised knowledge (mathematical, scientific, philosophical, etc.). An illusion of 'pure knowledge' arose on that soil, knowledge for its own sake, an illusion that in fact only confirmed investigatory activity as a specific form of socially useful mental labour. And when Plato claimed that 'life without

enquiry is not worth living for a man',¹¹ he was only stating this historical fact and his awareness that it was also an undisputed fact, in the spirit of the idealist interpretation of knowledge.

Knowing became a specialised organic need whose satisfaction gave special intellectual pleasure in the conditions of slave-owning society, in which labour was slavish and not worthy of a free man. The opposition becoming established between knowing as the satisfaction of an organic need and physical labour as unfree, even hateful activity, inseparable from compulsion and coercion, corresponded to the antagonistic opposition between freemen and slaves. The forming of an opposition between mental and physical production was very closely linked with this basic antagonism of slave-owning society. That did not mean, of course, that intellectual activity was becoming the occupation of slave-owners, but it did mean that only freemen belonging to that class possessed the privilege of indulging in that exalted task—knowledge. Mental labour, and intellectual cognition, activity not directly linked with the exploitation of man by man, thus first arose only as an alienated activity opposed to productive labour and consciously counterposed to it. The counterposing of theory and practice was consequently born of civilisation itself, arising as a consequence of the origin of private property and the splitting of society into antagonistic classes.

In developed capitalist society, in which theoretical activity has fully disclosed its significance for practice, which undoubtedly discredits the idealist counterposing of theory to practice, the alienation of knowledge finds mystified reflection in reactionary philosophic doctrines of an irrationalist hue. Schopenhauer, for example, saw the very fact of specialised cognitive activity as a distortion of human nature.

Knowledge [he wrote] is becoming the main point, the *aim* of all life; individual existence, on the contrary, is being reduced to a minor matter, to a mere *means*; consequently, the normal relation is being turned quite inside out.¹²

From his standpoint the existence of knowledge simply as a means subordinated to the will would have been the normal relation. Typically, however, this distortion of the normal relation (which seemingly should be avoided) was described as (sic!) genius. The highest development of man's intellectual capacities, though, was not slighted but treated as a patent abnormality.

The counterposing of 'life' to knowledge, and the disparaging of knowing in its most developed, specialised forms, already revealed in Schopenhauer, was taken further by thinkers close

to him like Nietzsche and Bergson, who no longer treated genius as a one-sided development of intellect to the detriment of other vital functions but as an irrational domination of vital elements over a 'pure' need for knowledge allegedly foreign to life. The unsoundness of the irrationalist counterposing of life to knowledge is that the opposition between specialised intellectual activity, which has become professional, and the diversity of human life is made an absolute by an anti-intellectualist treatment of life. Knowledge, in fact, whether it is a matter of its unspecialised forms that constitute the essential content of every person's life, even when he does not suspect it, or when one has in mind its specialised forms that presuppose a corresponding education and professionalisation, is becoming the affair of an ever-increasing part of the population of our planet. The striking fact that 90 per cent of all scientists are our contemporaries impressively characterises this process of the intellectualisation of mankind.

Knowledge, even in its specialised forms, i.e. those that pursue special, in particular production or socio-political tasks, is not only a means, of course, but also an end, i.e. the intellectual development of the human personality. One can agree with Einstein, that 'the product of our work is not the final goal'.¹⁹ The final goal for man is man himself. And the fact that the mass of the people in an exploiter society are the 'means' for producing a surplus product, however it has deformed man's nature, has not eliminated its main determinacy. The alienation of human essence, including the alienation of cognitive activity, is a historically transient form of development that enriched the essence of man. That is what Marx was stressing when summing up the development of the capitalist formation.

In fact, however, if the narrow bourgeois form is peeled off, what is wealth if not the universality of the individual's needs, capacities, enjoyments, productive forces, etc., produced in universal exchange; what is it if not the full development of human control over the forces of nature—over the forces of so-called Nature, as well as those of his own nature? What is wealth if not the absolute unfolding of man's creative abilities, without any precondition other than the preceding historical development which makes the totality of this development—i.e. the development of all human powers as such, not measured by any *previously given* yardstick.²⁰

All these measures of human wealth, irrespective of the historically transient forms of its manifestation, generated by exploitation society, are measures of cognitive activity inherent, it goes without saying, only in man. In that sense we can say that cognition as developing knowledge overcoming its own, inevitably limited character, is a human activity only, a specifically

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¹ B. A. Kuznetsov (Ed.), *Biologiya*, Vysshaya shkola, Moscow, 1975, p 205.

² *Ibid.*, p 206.

³ Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 136.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p 69.

⁵ Niko Tinbergen. *The Herring Gull's World*, Collins, London, 1953, p XIV.

⁶ Henri Wallon. *L'évolution psychologique de l'enfant*, Armand Colin, Paris, 1968, p 33.

⁷ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 37.

⁸ V. Gordon Childe. *Society and Knowledge*, Harper & Bros., New York, 1956, p 9.

⁹ Niko Tinbergen. *Op. cit.*, p. 232.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p 234.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p 235.

¹² *Ibid.*, p 234.

¹³ Frederick Engels. *Dialectics of Nature*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, pp 222-223.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p 174.

¹⁵ L.V. Krushinsky. Do Animals Have Reason? *Priroda*, 1968, 8: 62.

¹⁶ See, for example: M. Steenbeck. *Social Heredity and Tomorrow. Budushchese nauki*, Znaniye, Moscow, 1974.

¹⁷ *Great Dialogues of Plato*, New American Library, New York, 1956, p 443.

¹⁸ Arthur Schopenhauer. *Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften*, Vol. 2, Verlag A. M. Hayn, Berlin, 1851, p 80.

¹⁹ Albert Einstein. *Sobranie nauchnykh trudov* (Collected Scientific Works), Vol. IV, Nauka, Moscow, p 143.

²⁰ Karl Marx. *Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy*. Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*. Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, pp 411, 412.

MAN AND PHILOSOPHY

K. M. Dolgov

Man and philosophy—what should one begin with? With man? But with what man—the savage or the one that is called rational or thinking, *Homo sapiens*? Or perhaps one should begin with philosophy? But again, with what philosophy? With that which existed in Ancient China? In Ancient India? In Ancient Egypt? In Greece? Or with later philosophy (mediaeval, Renaissance, modern, contemporary)?

It is seemingly impossible to begin our survey with the one or the other, i.e. with man or with philosophy. That is paradoxical but a fact. It is impossible to begin philosophy with I (the Ego), because there is no objective movement, but there are no objective grounds either for beginning examination of man with philosophy. But we do get a hint from that of the way out of this very embarrassing position; since man is part of nature, and philosophy as a form of individual and social consciousness is a reflection of objective reality in man's consciousness, one can begin immediately with that, i.e. with nature, man, and philosophy. As Lenin wrote in his *Philosophical Notebooks*:

Logic is the science of cognition. It is the theory of knowledge. Knowledge is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not a simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws, etc. (thought, science = 'the logical idea'), embrace conditionally, approximately, the universal law-governed character of eternally moving and developing nature. Here there are actually, objectively, three members: 1) nature, 2) human cognition = the human brain (as the highest product of this same nature), and 3) the form of reflection of nature in human cognition, and this form consists precisely of concepts, laws, categories, etc. Man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as a whole, in its completeness, its 'immediate totality', he can only eternally come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world, etc., etc.

Lenin caught the most important and most essential point in that of the whole aggregate of the complex relations of nature, man, and philosophy. For it is impossible to begin a survey of the relation of man and philosophy with primitive man or the

savage since he has not yet differentiated himself from nature; he is an organic part of it and his intellectual capacities or 'intellect' is organically bound up in his natural existence. There is therefore no counterposing here yet of the subject and object as the quite necessary basis of any cognition. It is consequently necessary to begin examination of the 'man and philosophy' problem from the moment in human history when (as Aristotle said) 'it was only after nearly everything that was necessary ... had been obtained, that people began to trouble themselves about philosophic knowledge'. From the very beginning philosophising has thus not been an empty game of the mind or mental distraction but has been difficult, serious work of man's intellect to develop general concepts or categories, 'classes of what exists' i.e. concepts, laws, and categories that are also both logical and historical, and in the social sense a degree of man's cognition of nature and consequently a stage on man's separation from nature, mental instruments or means of a sort by which he cognises and masters nature. Categories, it is true, cannot be reduced to purely auxiliary, practical functions, since they are not simply implements or means but an expression of the regularities of nature and man. To the extent that man knew nature and objective reality, he also knew himself. The knowing of nature, consequently is at the same time a process of knowing man; man and philosophy developed simultaneously in inextricable connection with one another and, as it were, helping one another.

While nature itself has an immanent dialectical character, i.e. internally contradictory, dialectical, riddled with contradictions and a struggle of opposites from the beginning, it is an extremely difficult and lengthy business both in time, historically and in the social and logical sense, to know the laws of dialectics and the categories that reflect the contradictory nature of being; for the history of philosophy is to some extent the history of the forming, moulding, and development of man and of his intellect, capacities, and talents, practical skills and theoretical thinking. Philosophy, consequently, is a mirror of man as a subject that is in a dialectical relation with the object, with nature, and with objective reality. The dialectics of thinking, the dialectics of human thought, the dialectics of human knowledge are shaped under the influence of the dialectics of objective reality. The essence of dialectical cognition consists in development of the whole aggregate of the elements of reality, in disclosing the all-round, all-embracing character of the world connection, of the universal, general connection of everything that exists. Man's freedom or subjectivity, the teleology of his activity, i.e. his goal, con-

sciousness, and striving, are moulded and developed in that process. Although it sometimes also seems to man that his aim is quite independent of the objective world,

in actual fact [Lenin wrote], men's ends are engendered by the objective world and presuppose it.—they find it as something given, present.¹

And again:

in his practical activity, man is confronted with the objective world, is dependent on it, and determines his activity by it.²

Is that good or bad? Perhaps it would be better if man were freed in general from any dependence whatever on the external objective world?

One could answer that as follows: man will never free himself completely from his dependence on the external world because he is part, and an organic part, of it. By creating new means of production he has obtained a certain power over nature, but for all that this power has a relative character, just as human knowledge of the laws of nature is relative; the more and deeper man understands nature and its laws, the more obvious the relative character of what he knows becomes, and the broader is the extent of the sphere of what he does not yet know and what it is necessary to know. This process of knowing is endless in all respects and in all senses (objective, subjective, logical, historical, in the abstract and the concrete, and in the material and the ideal, etc.).

Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object. The reflection of nature in man's thought must be understood not 'lifelessly', not 'abstractly', not devoid of movement, not without contradictions, but in the eternal process of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution.³

The endless, contradictory process of cognition shows that man not only and not so much depends on nature as interacts with it, i.e. is in a dialectical relationship and interaction with nature and objective reality. When cognising the objective world man actively affects it, and transforms it in accordance with his aim, interests, ideas, and ideals. 'Man's consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it'.⁴

By mastering the world and cognising it, man strives not only to transform it but also to realise himself, to give himself objectivity in the objective world through himself and to fulfil himself. The world always does not satisfy him in something, and he endeavours to transform it by his practical activity. Man asserts and realises his aims, ideas, and ideals in practice, and also asserts himself as a human being in practice. In that sense

practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality.

True, even man's practical activity comes up against obstacles in its path that are difficult and sometimes even impossible to overcome since the objective world goes its own way and man's path and the way of the world do not always correspond and even less often coincide. Man's will and his practical activity, furthermore, often detach themselves from cognition and do not recognise the truth behind objective reality. To avoid that it is necessary to unite cognition and practice in a theory of knowledge, otherwise the good and kindly, and good intentions remain subjective imperatives. When, on the contrary, man compiles a true picture of the objective world for himself, he can change this world in the direction and forms that are necessary for him.

The activity of man, who has constructed an objective picture of the world for himself, changes external actuality, abolishes its determinateness (= alters some sides or other, qualities, of it), and thus removes from it the features of Semblance, externality and nullity, and makes it as being in and for itself (= objectively true)."

Man is constantly striving in his life to know the truth, in spite of its often being very bitter.

So, what is the truth that man strives to find by means of philosophy, i.e. the theory of knowledge, logic, and dialectics?

Pontius Pilate of the Bible, the Roman procurator, having heard the word truth from the mouth of Christ, remarked 'What is truth?', which he invested with a sense that he himself already knew, that there was no truth. In that question one could catch a feeling that the man asking it—Pilate—had convinced himself that truth did not and could not exist, and had lost interest in everything in the world because it was a vanity of vanities. A distrustful attitude to philosophy (which is concerned with the search for truth) is transparent in that question. People like Pontius Pilate and all who have power, never take philosophy seriously, if they have studied it, since they assume that truth depends on them, that it comes from them, or at least should be at their service. Throughout time the ruling classes have striven to harness philosophy in defence of their interests. But when philosophy tried to concern itself with the search for truth, it evoked suspicion at once, and a taboo was clapped on this investigation. People were sentenced to death, done away with, burnt at the stake for the real alliance of philosophy and man. Recall Socrates, Copernicus, Giordano Bruno, and the thousands and even millions of honest people who have preferred to die for their belief in the truth than to betray the truth or to

renounce it, because they well understood that rejection of the truth was worse than any death for a real human. It was no accident that the great dialectician Hegel, when touching on the subject-matter of philosophy, wrote:

The simplest and most intelligible answer to this question [what is the object of our science—Ed.] is that Truth is the object of Logic. Truth is a noble word, and the thing is nobler still. So long as man is sound at heart and in spirit, the search for truth must awake all the enthusiasm of his nature."

Hegel's confession about his philosophical activity is significant in this respect:

What I have generally aimed at and aim for in my philosophical efforts is scientific knowledge of truth. It is the hardest way but it alone can have interest and value for the mind when the latter once ventures on the road of thought, and has not fallen into conceit from that, but has retained the will and courage of the truth; it soon finds that method alone is able to control thought, and to lead it to the point and keep it there.¹⁰

The thinking mind strives not only to know objective truth as a reflection of objective reality but also to know the forms of social consciousness themselves, i.e. science, morality, law, art, and religion, in which objective reality is also reflected, and which are to some extent 'applied logic'. For each of these forms of social consciousness reflects human life, and the life of the individual person. But that only happens when a subject-object relation arises and exists.

If one considers the relation of subject to object in logic, one must take into account also the general premises of Being of the *concrete* subject (= *life of man*) in the objective surroundings.

wrote Lenin. It is man who reflects and knows the objective world, naturally, and in that sense his life is organically linked with the process of reflection and cognition, just as reflection and cognition organically enter his life. Philosophy is thus immanent in man, and man immanently inherent in philosophy. Both man and philosophy are concerned with the search for truth, which is a complex, contradictory process, covering three stages in its development: life, the process of cognition (including practice and technique), and more or less full truth. Lenin gave a brilliant formulation of truth: 'Truth is a process. From the subjective idea, man advances towards objective truth through "practice" and technique'.¹² And further: '*From the subjective notion and subjective end to objective truth*'.¹¹ At all stages of this process practice plays a most vital role; it is in practice that man realises his creative capacities and confirms himself as a human being and as an individual. He develops theory in practical activ-

ity as a kind of generalisation of practice, as awareness of it, as awareness of forward movement: practice—theory—practice, etc. It is in practical activity that the theory of knowledge, logic, and dialectics arise. Man's historical activity is essentially the history of his practical activity; the latter becomes logic, the theory of knowledge, and in a general sense dialectics through practice. Lenin repeatedly noted that the billion-times repetition of practice led man's consciousness to the repetition of various figures, so that the latter got the significance of axioms:

Man's practice, repeating itself a thousand million times, becomes consolidated in man's consciousness by figures of logic. Precisely (and only) on account of this thousand-million-fold repetition..."

In that respect the development of philosophy in history corresponds to the development of logic, i.e. the historical coincides in its main elements with the logical, and vice versa. The process of reflection of the objective world in human consciousness is a dialectical process—dialectics; at the same time this process is the history of knowledge and, of course, of logic.

Logic [Lenin wrote] is the science not of eternal forms of thought, but of the laws of development of all material, natural and spiritual things, i.e., of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of its cognition, i.e., the sum-total, the conclusion of the *History of knowledge of the world*.¹⁵

That is how broadly, profoundly, and universally Lenin understood dialectical logic. Dialectical logic is the natural result of the dialectical development of the concrete content of the world, and of man's and mankind's cognition of it, its reflection by human knowledge historically and logically. That is why logic is the study of the laws of development of all that exists, i.e. the doctrine of the laws and categories of dialectics in their historical development. On that basis Lenin drew a conclusion on the coincidence of logic, the theory of knowledge, and dialectics:

In *Capital*, Marx applied to a single science logic, dialectics and the theory of knowledge of materialism [three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing] which has taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further.¹⁶

Philosophy attains its highest development in that definition; it becomes the method of revolutionary transformation of reality. Marxism does not reject the philosophical system but brings it into organic unity with the dialectical method, and that means that the whole complex, varied system of the laws and categories of materialist dialectics as logic and theory of knowledge is not congealed but has a dynamic, dialectical character. All the laws and categories of materialist dialectics are in a universal dialec-

tical relationship with and interdependence on one another in the process of reflection and cognition of the objective world, pass into one another, and are in constant movement and development, reflecting and summing up the development of the whole aggregate of the elements of the objective world. Method and system coincide in a certain sense in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, since method is the application of the categorial system of the laws and categories of materialist dialectics to the concrete object of investigation, for example to studying capitalist society. As Hegel wrote: 'method is the consciousness of the form taken by the inner spontaneous movement of the content of Logic'.¹⁷ And in his *The Phenomenology of Mind*, he gave an example of concrete application of the dialectical method to the study of consciousness.¹⁸ Both the method and the system, naturally, had an idealist character with Hegel. But Marx developed the method of materialist dialectics and applied it to analysing the capitalist socio-economic formation. Because of that he not only made great discoveries in science but also revolutionised human practice. His philosophy has proved the most active and effective one, and that closest to man and the majority of mankind, and consequently the most humanist one. That is why the philosophy of Marxism has become widespread in the world and has received such general recognition. In it man finds a scientific outlook on the world, a scientific methodology and humanist basis for transforming the world on socialist principles and for transforming man himself and human society on true humanist traditions and principles. The 'meeting' of man and Marxist-Leninist philosophy was historic; it ushered in a new era in the history of mankind, the era of the socialist transformation of human society, the era of the struggle of man and mankind for its national and social emancipation, for peace, democracy, and social progress. What the best minds of mankind have dreamed of—for man to rise by means of philosophy 'to Freedom and Truth'¹⁹—is developing and gathering force today despite enormous obstacles.

Many people agree, irrespective of their philosophical orientation, that the individual's existence is impossible without the existence of other people and nature. But other people are in man, we necessarily also ask what is the society in which man lives, and what is nature, because, however man develops and improves himself, he remains all the same a component part of nature and a natural being. The question 'what is man?' consequently means at the same time, or includes, the questions

as well of 'what is human society?' and 'what is nature?'

Furthermore, as soon as we ask 'what is man?' we inevitably imply by it 'what can man become?', that is, can he be the master of his fate and make himself the man he would like to become.

The key for unlocking the secret of human essence was Marx's famous discovery that the essence of man in its reality is the aggregate of all social relations. Marx showed that man cannot be treated abstractly, in isolation from nature and society, but only in the closest interconnection with them, i.e. concretely and historically.

The abstract treatment of man mostly dealt with revealing human individuality and paid no attention at all to the material and historical preconditions that in the final analysis determine the origin and development of individuality as such. A concrete, historical treatment of the question 'what is man?' presupposes the dialectical interconnection of the historical preconditions and historical factors determining the genesis of man, his moulding, formation, and constant development, and also his individuality.

The starting point is very simple: in order to engage in any activity whatsoever and, in the final analysis, to make history, men had to have the possibility of living, eating, drinking, clothing themselves, having a dwelling, etc., that is of satisfying their vital needs. And to satisfy them men created means of producing their material life as the basic condition of history. The process of satisfying needs by means of appropriate tools and instruments of production leads to the rise of new needs, and is endless. Finally, men constantly reproduce their kind—production of life as a natural relation. And the co-operation of individuals in the process of production is a social relation. And since a certain mode of production is always linked with a certain mode of joint activity, mankind's history has to be studied and developed in connection with history of production and exchange.

Man must also be studied and treated, consequently, in connection with the history of industry and exchange. If his essence is the aggregate of all social relations, and if these relations themselves are determined by the form of society, man and his consciousness, and his individuality, i.e. definite capacities, innate abilities, and talents, etc., are determined by society and are social products. Do we thereby not reduce the role of man in his own becoming, formation, and development? Doesn't who he is and who he will be depend on him and on his choice? Is man really so weak and insignificant that he cannot mould, develop,

and educate himself? He can, but only through and thanks to society. Along with the universal development of the productive forces, universal intercourse among people sets in, as Marx emphasised. In those conditions the 'real intellectual wealth of the individual depends on the wealth of his real connections'.¹⁰ The more the individual person enters into various relations with other people in his life and his activity, and the more he interacts with them and relies on their experience, the more varied, profound, and universal he becomes both as a personality, and as an individuality. Man's relationships with other people cannot be understood solely in the horizontal dimension, i.e. as relationships with contemporaries, but must be also understood in the vertical dimension, historically, as relationships with other individuals of all past ages and societies, i.e. with representatives of the culture of the past, and with individuals of all past generations. Figuratively speaking, such a man and such an individual will be a pyramid, the base of which is the mind, knowledge, and experience of the whole human race. It is understandable from this that the broader the base of the pyramid is, the deeper, and more varied, universal and human the personality will be in all respects.

Admittedly, one must note that, because of the divergence of individuals' own interests from the common interest or the universal interest governed by the concrete, historical stages in the development of division of labour, when the consolidation of men's social activity was determined or realised in the form of material forces that dominated them, and run counter to their interests, expectations, and hopes, it has happened that this common or universal interest has become to be regarded by individuals as something foreign, hostile, and unnatural. The objective basis for such an attitude of individuals to the common and general interest is rooted in the contradiction between the productive forces and forms of intercourse, between the social character of the productive forces and the private property forms of appropriating the product. That contradiction underlies the class, political, economic, and ideological struggle. The division of labour leads to that of the conditions of labour, tools and materials, to the distribution of capital among owners, and—the main point—to the cleavage between capital and labour, and to the contradiction between labour and capital. The productive forces come into relation with individuals as a world alien to them, though they are real forces only because of the intercourse and relationships of these same individuals. The productive forces long ago reached such a level of development that they

can exist only in a context of universal intercourse, and their mastery by individuals must also have a universal character. But since mastery of the productive forces is a development of individual capacities, the formation and development of the human personality is inextricably linked with the universal character of the productive forces and the universal character of intercourse. 'Modern universal intercourse', Marx and Engels said, 'cannot be controlled by individuals, unless it is controlled by all'.⁵¹

It is no accident that the universality of production and intercourse has reached such a level that people have become aware of themselves, perhaps for the first time in history, not only within the limits and significance of class, nation, tribe, and other communities, but also in the form of a single human race living on the single, unique planet—Earth, capable of endlessly improving itself as a race, as mankind, and of perfecting and developing each individual and his/her capacities, gifts, and talent, and capable at the same time of destroying and annihilating itself and Earth on which it lives. The danger of nuclear war, the danger of total annihilation of everything living, and perhaps even of the whole planet is pushing the contradictions existing between nations and states into the background, in order to unite mankind's creative forces in constructive activity, and search for a positive solution of the most important issues brought up by the present age (the problems of maintaining and defending peace, of preserving life on Earth, the search for new sources of energy, the struggle against the widespread diseases that kill millions of humans every year, problems of ecology, the battle against hunger, poverty, and natural calamities, etc.). All these problems are equivalent today to the most elementary and vitally necessary needs of people that have to be necessarily met. It is consequently necessary to pool efforts to work out and create appropriate means of production and forms of intercourse (domestic and international, i.e. between nations) by which these vitally important and quite urgent needs of the people of the globe could be fully met. The solution of these issues will be a kind of global revolution, because the material and social position of people, social and individual consciousness will be altered in many respects. It will also contribute to promoting universal intercourse.

Since it is a matter of the radical interests of billions of people, i.e. of the root interests of all mankind, it is quite clear that these issues have such a scientific and such a practical, political character that they consequently call for pooling the efforts of the

people the world over to tackle them, irrespective of people's political, ideological, and philosophical views, national allegiance, creed, etc. It is that which explains the arousing of many countries and nations to vigorous international activity, and of hundreds upon hundreds of millions of people to active involvement in the struggle for peace and political work both in their own countries and internationally. A peaceful, progressive policy is more and more becoming a symbol of faith at the present time, a *profession de foi*, and the philosophical and moral conviction of the peoples of the world. This policy is openly intervening in history so as to preserve life, preserve the planet, preserve the human race, and that means to preserve and continue history. A politicising of philosophy, science, law, morality, religion, and art, and politicising of all forms of social consciousness and social being is taking place before our eyes. All aspects of men's material and spiritual activity are being gradually penetrated by politics; Aristotle's old definition of man as a 'political animal'²² is being given a new content. Only now man's political dimensions are becoming so universal that we cannot yet be fully aware of them; they affect everything, with which human life and activity is linked one way or another, i.e. with everything that has existed and now exists in this world (man, society, Earth, and outer space and the whole of cosmos), not to mention all the forms and types of social being and social consciousness.

Responsibility for the fate of the world now rests with all classes, all peoples and nations, all states and countries, all people together and each human being individually. The face and inimitable individuality of each person, his personality and human nature, largely depend on how far and how actively he or she is contributing to this world movement. An individual's personal opportunities are very limited, of course, but as I have already said a human being is strong through his or her links with other people and interaction with them, and in his or her reliance on mankind. Then his/her forces and possibilities are multiplied many-fold. A possibility or opportunity does not always and immediately become reality. It is necessary to raise the extent of one's personal responsibility for the universal cause, then the real possibility will mean freedom, which will become an organic part of the definition of man and of the human personality. Freedom, interacting with necessity, and moreover with historical posed. In order to attain that end the will and the means by which man realises his intentions are quite necessary. His personality is moulded in his theoretical and practical activity, during which

a concrete direction is given to his life activity, and appropriate means are developed to realise the aims set and the efforts of will, and changes emerge in the corresponding conditions so that the individual's intentions, wishes, aspirations, and aims can be realised to the maximum. In that connection a person's activity can be regarded as a definite result of a certain unity of his/her individual and subjective elements with material, objective, and mass elements. It is due to the fact that man is the core and most revolutionary element of the productive forces that he can transform the objective world and objective relations, and so, at the same time, alter and develop himself, multiplying his own forces and consequently the forces of all mankind. Man must therefore develop and improve himself not only morally but also practically and politically, because only in labour and political activity does he acquire the main dimensions of a human personality, the main substance and essence of man as such. Man is the connecting centre of theory and practice, because, through his theoretical and practical activity, advanced theory, which is the concentrated expression of practical activity, coincides in its key elements with practice, so accelerating development of the historical process; practice in turn, by generating theoretical ideas and embodying them in reality, acquires unusual effectiveness and actuality. The organic interaction of theory and practice in man's activity makes practice rational and theory realistic. It is this that can explain the need for maximum unity and interaction among theory and practice that becomes exceptionally actual in the most critical and responsible periods of history for mankind like, for example, the present when it is a matter of the fate of nations and the fate of all mankind. In these periods further development of theory and improvement of practice becomes possible and so necessary, only under the aegis of developed political consciousness and the self-awareness of the million-strong masses of the working people. It is in these periods of responsibility for all mankind that the categorial system of philosophical thought is sharpened, polished, perfected, and enriched. A historically new type of philosophical thinking is developed and a new type of philosopher, a historically new type of culture, and a new type of world outlook.

What does a new type of philosophical thinking or new philosophy mean? Whereas philosophy used to be understood as 'love of wisdom', a love developed by sages and then passed on to those who were interested in it (i.e. philosophy was created by philosophers who then taught this subject to members of the elite), the rise of Marxism produced a radical revolution in philo-

sophy; philosophy became the property of the broad masses of the people as their own outlook on the world, as a scientific, theoretical, and practical world outlook, and as a method of revolutionary transformation of reality. The new philosophy is the method of revolutionary transformation of reality (dialectics); it is a summing up of a given age (history) and its transformation (practice), and the working out of the prospects for its development (theory). The new philosophy is a creative one, but not just in the sense of the creative character of the thinking but in the sense that underlying it is the practical, political activity of the masses of the people, their conscious will, striving to realise historical necessity, i.e. it is a philosophy that becomes part and parcel of the working masses, becomes their world outlook, attitude to the world, interpretation of the world, and culture. A creative philosophy is one that is assimilated by the minds of millions and therefore is transformed into a material force capable of changing the world.

As for the new type of philosopher, by it must be understood a professional philosopher who studies the whole history of philosophy, knows the history and logic of knowledge and the dialectics of human thinking, and also the fact that every man who takes part in the historical movement of his age, and who tries to comprehend and tackle the issues that it poses to society, becomes a philosopher.

A whole people becomes a philosopher in essence, and not separate sages, so that the traditional division into those who teach philosophy (professional philosophers) and those who study philosophy (the broad masses of the working people) is wiped out. Rather the contrary. Philosophy is produced and reproduced by the philosopher people, in order to become the possession of all, and of each one separately. That does not mean that there is no more need for professional philosophers; they are needed to the same extent as other specialists, in order to generalise the main tendencies of the thinking of their age, to tie up the philosophical problems of past ages with those of the modern age, and to elaborate science, the theory of knowledge, logic, and dialectics at a new level of development.

As to the new type of culture, one must note the following: the struggle for a new culture means a struggle for new thinking, new feeling, a new style, new artistic and aesthetic taste, a new moral climate in society, etc., in short, a struggle for a new socio-cultural unity of society, for its greater cohesion, and ever greater social homogeneity on the basis of a common world outlook and emotional and psychological mood. When the cultural heri-

tage of the past and the contemporary intellectual potential are united, assimilated, experienced, and rooted in the hearts and minds of millions and millions of people, then ideas and ideals become an inspiration, enthusiasm, and passion, and progress to the attainment of aims vitally important for mankind will be ensured, because the democratic character of cultural activity will be an inexhaustible source of the upsurge of ever newer and more constructive and creative forces that after all will be able to alter not only the cultural medium but also the social and natural environment. Philosophy and politics can do much and do so precisely by means of culture: culture in turn is tied up in a single whole in relation to theory and practice, philosophy and history, tradition and innovation, politics and action.

Man and philosophy are thus closely linked together, though their relation changes in accordance with the changes that man himself and philosophy undergo in their historical development.

But let me return to the questions with which I began: 'what is man' and 'what is the sense of his life'?

In that connection I would like to cite the words of young Marx from his 'Reflections of a Young Man on the Choice of a Profession':

Man's nature is so constituted that he can attain his own perfection only by working for the perfection, for the good, of his fellow men. If he works only for himself, he may perhaps become a famous man of learning, a great sage, an excellent poet, but he can never be a perfect, truly great man.

History calls those men the greatest who have ennobled themselves by working for the common good; experience acclaims as happiest the man who has made the greatest number of people happy.²

To fight for man's freedom from enslavement, coercion, and oppression at any rate, to fight for the emancipation of all mankind, to fight for peace throughout the world, for life on Earth without wars and weapons, to fight for man's freedom and happiness, and for truth and social justice—that is the main sense of human life. In his noble struggle man finds his spiritual weapon—in philosophy, as philosophy finds its material weapon in man. The practically possible emancipation of man is his emancipation from the standpoint of the theory that declares man himself the supreme essence of man. Man's freedom is the cause of revolution, and revolution is a festival of the people in which everyone for whom the fate of the world and the fate of mankind, the fate of culture and civilisation is dear must take part!

NOTES

¹ V. I. Lenin. *Conспектus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic*. Philosophical Notebooks. *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981, p 182.

² Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, A.2; cited from *Hegel's Science of Logic* translated by W.H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, Allen & Unwin, London, 1923, p 42 (see also V. I. Lenin, *Op. cit.*, p 90).

³ V. I. Lenin. *Op. cit.*, p 189.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp 187-188.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p 195.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p 212.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p 213.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp 217-218.

⁹ *Hegel's Logic*, being Part One of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Translated by William Wallace, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, p 26.

¹⁰ G.W.F. Hegel. *Encyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundlehre*, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1966, pp 3-4.

¹¹ V. I. Lenin. *Op. cit.*, p 202.

¹² *Ibid.*, p 201.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p 191.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p 216.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp 92, 93.

¹⁶ V. I. Lenin. *Plan of Hegel's Dialectic (Logic)*. *Op. cit.*, p 317.

¹⁷ *Hegel's Science of Logic*, Vol. I. Translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, Allen & Unwin, London, 1923, p 64.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* See also G.W.F. Hegel. *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Translated by J. B. Baillie, Harper Colophon Books, New York, 1967.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p 46.

²⁰ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology*. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 59.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p 97.

²² Aristotle. *Politics* (ed. W.L. Newman), I, 2.

²³ See: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 8.

STIMULI TO WORK AND THE ESSENCE OF MAN

R. I. Kosolapov

It is important for philosophical understanding of man to make clear the motives of his life activity. Why man acts; why he acts as he does and not otherwise; what self-interest, and concern with what, move and stimulate him at any stage of historical development; how they influence his social and moral image—all these questions call for a substantiated concrete answer. And that answer is an inseparable component of timely solution of the snowballing problems of mankind at the turn to the twenty-first century: peace-making and ecological; scientific and technical and economic; social and political; cultural and moral. Not only does further social progress hang on it, but also mankind's very capacity to survive.

This paper examines two basic problems not traditional in science and that have not yet found answers in practice: 1) the problem of the shifting in the historical perspective of man's material interest from the direct and indirect results of labour (concern with the product or the income from it) to its content and the labour process itself as one of creation; 2) the problem of the psycho-physiological mechanism of the need for creative work, which is of fundamental importance for explaining how the biological individual becomes a social one, and becomes capable of being the bearer of human essence. This is what is new in my position, which possibly has no precedent in literature.

There is a point of view that human activity is only stimulated by the need in means of everyday subsistence. It is difficult to wage a polemic against it because hundreds of millions of people on Earth today are absorbed by a basic concern for their daily bread. In many countries with a developed modern economy, not to mention developing ones, the bulk of the working people can hardly make ends meet, while the richest country, the United States of America, has not yet been able to heal such social ulcers as mass unemployment, cultural backwardness, poverty, and homelessness.

While not, by any means, denying that concern for material income is the driving force of work in both the West and the East, and will play a leading role for a long time yet in socialist countries as well as capitalist ones, one must however note that it is not the sole one. It is incompatible with life experience or with the data of science to ignore that point. Man is essentially more complicated and many-sided from the standpoint of modern, i.e. dialectical, materialism. This materialism does not stop at considering the economic the sole motivation of man's actions and considers its higher forms that are beginning to function particularly actively in the new formation when the needs of physical existence are mainly met. It is extremely important for an understanding of the trends of the present and for development a reliable conception of the future to analyse these forms of motivation.

Let us turn to the history of this matter.

One of the objections against communism that used to bother utopian socialists was that, if the principle of distribution by needs were introduced, society might die from idleness. 'Who, then, would work?'—bourgeois theorists put their traditional question.

Back in the eighteenth century the progressive English publicist William Godwin remarked in his *An Inquiry Concerning Political Justice* that a system of equality could only be established given a considerable intellectual improvement of people. A stable system of that type was possible, in his opinion, only with 'a calm and clear conviction of justice, justice mutually to be rendered and received.'¹ If work were distributed amicably among all, the amount of work done by each member of the community 'is so light a burden as rather to assume the appearance of agreeable relaxation and gentle exercise, than of labour. In this community scarcely any can be expected in consequence of their situation or avocations to consider themselves as exempted from manual industry. There will be no rich men to recline in indolence and fatten upon the labour of their fellows'.² That, according to Godwin, would promote both a strengthening of the activity of the social spirit as a consequence of human consciousness's having attained a high degree of perfection, and an increase in leisure, which was a condition for the enlightened mind for great affairs capable of bringing fame and respect.

As will be seen, Godwin built his position on a foundation of the growing role of education and enlightenment and moral principles in people's behaviour. His book appeared in a me-

morable year of the French Revolution, viz., 1793. Paradoxical as it is, this approach has come down in essence from the eighteenth century to the twentieth.

While living in quite a different historical age, whose content is a world's turn to a new, communist, socio-economic formation, we naturally note the development and spread in socialist countries of a new, collectivist morality. This has found a singular reflection in the literature. An 'ethicising' so to speak of the problem of inculcating a new attitude to labour has often been observed. With the growing of socialist society into a communist one, as it is sometimes claimed, moral stimulation will remain, while direct material remuneration for work will cease to be necessary. For all the lapse of time (nearly two hundred years) that point of view is very close to Godwin's.

Truth [he considered], the overpowering truth of general good, then seizes us irresistibly... It is impossible we should want motives, so long as we see clearly how multitudes and ages may be benefited by our exertions, how causes and effects are connected in an endless chain, so that no honest effort can be lost, but will operate to good, centuries after its author is consigned to the grave.'

There is also now a view that personal material interest will wither away under communism. I consider that one cannot agree with such a view. The 'reciprocal feeling of duty to society' that is appealed to here and that is proclaimed in the spirit of an *apriori* imperative cannot in itself become a sure, vigorous successor to material interest, or serve as a permanent guarantee for centuries (for communism is thought of as the boundless future of mankind) of a positive attitude of the individual to work. A middle link has to be found capable of linking personal moral and social material interest firmly together. My paper is devoted to the quest for this link.

It is usual to speak in the philosophical and economic literature of the action of material (economic) and spiritual factors stimulating work under socialism.¹ The comprehended character of these and other stimuli, which contains an element of consciousness, is recognised as their common feature. The difference between them is therefore brought down to another attribute, viz., the purposefulness of the interest in work, whatever the object of the individual's aspirations. But an inexactitude sometimes creeps in here: either material values as the individual's remuneration for his labour (material stimulus), or social good or benefit, the striving for which is linked with heightened moral evaluation of the individual (moral stimulus) is treated as the object of incentive to work. At the same time

a fact of cardinal importance is often lost sight of, namely that the object of personal interest is also the *work itself*.

Since time immemorial mankind has known examples of enthusiasm for work. The appearance of works (cliff and cave paintings, statuettes, etc.) already in primitive society is difficult to explain just by the community's utilitarian needs. Creative activity, is one of man's noblest, primary, deepest, and ineradicable needs.

In each species of animals, we know, there is a special need to perform a certain activity, by which, in normal conditions, the animal's existence is ensured... During anthropogenesis a need also has been formed in man to perform activity that insured maintenance of his existence. Since labour is specific to man this determines all the rest of his specific traits, this need acts as the *basic, specifically human one*.

Absorbing work according to one's aptitudes evokes personal interest, the nature of which has not yet been adequately studied, an interest that obviously grows depending on the personal reward and on the social significance of the work, and that at the same time undoubtedly plays a relatively independent role. This type of personal interestedness underlies the qualitatively special, *creative* stimulus to work and has a particularly concrete, individually purposive character.

Unlike the creative stimulus, material and moral stimuli are often relatively indifferent to the content of the work done by the worker. There is a category of persons who start from the principle 'any work is good if it is paid well'. In a sociological survey in the Moscow Spetsstanok Machine Tool Works, the Grinder Works, and the Stankoagregat Works, that was the opinion of between a quarter and a third of the workers. At the same time a considering fraction of the workers of these enterprises were guided by considerations of social benefit and moral interest, proceeding from the principle 'that work is good where you do the most good, and where you are needed'. There were more of them—between 36 and 56 per cent. Many workers preferred various combinations of these two stimuli. Finally, there was a group of workers who were interested in the work itself; between 29 and 37 per cent shared the view that 'work is good when you give something of yourself, something new, and display ingenuity, skill, and effectiveness'.

The interest of this last group could not be met by any form of work presenting personal reward and yielding social benefit. Here the work itself and the opportunities it presented for versatile application and display of personal capabilities operat-

ed as a factor attracting the individual and as an 'independent value'. That conclusion was obtained not only by asking direct questions (the sociologist always runs the risk, when asking a question in a certain way, of thereby partly determining the answer), but also indirectly (in the works concerned there was a greater urge among those wanting a transfer to other work to get a more interesting job than higher earnings. There were even people who were ready to change their job for one with less pay but which gave greater creative satisfaction). It was found that workers drew a line in ordinary life between work to earn money, work for the general good, and work for the sake of creative self-assertion, but it is not always the case in science.

While recognising the merging and simultaneity of the effect of all work stimuli, it is hardly correct, at the same time, for example, to reduce the stimulating power of innovation unconditionally to moral factors, explaining it simply by a striving for the social benefit and social effectiveness of the work. Creative interest differs from moral interest in 1) its *exclusively personal character*, 2) its *wealth* of content. Moral interest is 'poorer' than creative in the sense that it is only linked with the results of the work, i.e. with use values and material or moral satisfaction, while creative interest is directed not to the result, i.e., to something already finished and fixed but rather to the *making* of the result, to the whole *content of the work process* perceived by the worker as one of enjoying the interaction of his own intellectual and physical powers, as the desired content of his personal life process and as a happy experience. A need inherent only in man, often not fully conscious, that has to be awakened and developed, is expressed in creative interest. Like any other need it has no moral content in itself, though man's attitude toward it may and should be an object of moral evaluation.

What can be concluded from that? It is said that if material values function as the object of an individual's aspirations, as the reward of his labour, we are dealing with a material stimulus, with personal material self-interest. That would seem to be self-evident, but before agreeing with it one must clarify what is meant here by material values.

The point is that the goods concerned may be both daily bread and works of art, clothes and a theatrical performance. Some, obviously, will satisfy a material need (for food, protection against cold, etc.), while others may be intended to meet spiritual, intellectual needs (for example, aesthetic ones).

although the one and the other are acquired for money. Is interest in satisfying a spiritual need in itself material? Or does the money form (cash nexus) mediating the connection between labour and needs that exists at the present time make it such? We are accustomed to calling interest in an economic reward a material one, but a person may use it, for example, both to buy food and acquire books. The point calls for clarification.

The irresponsibility of the contested view of the stimulating of work is called in question by the fact that the abstract formula 'material value' may conceal both things and processes. And both again may satisfy either spiritual or material wants. What does such an undoubtedly material process as the creative work that is its own reward count as? A material or a spiritual value?

If we recognise work as a material value, and we cannot do otherwise without disputing the facts, it turns out that under communism people will be stimulated to work not solely by moral stimuli. The need for such a material 'good' as work, and for an interesting, absorbing activity, is confirmed by the fact that a personal material stimulus is preserved in transmogrified form even in the highest stage of the new society. Because when the stimulating of labour by things and its products dies out its stimulation by its content will still be preserved. In that connection *personal interest in the product of labour will be transformed in the course of labour itself, being an eternal companion of man in that form*. So we reach a conclusion that differs sharply from the premiss that we began with.

I may be reproached with having 'blasphemously' included a cherished lamp from the temple of the human spirit, and its sacred monopoly—the sacrament of creation—here among phenomena of a not so 'lofty' order. And I cannot deny that it is psychologically almost as difficult to present the creative process as a vehicle of any form of material interest whatever as to reconcile oneself to the possibility of parallel lines intersecting. But why not try this as a hypothesis?

The answer to this problem is closely bound up with one of the topical problems of historical materialism, viz., with grasping the specific nature of the social form of the motion of matter and of the new form of the *material* that is possible only in the context of society. The point primarily concerns social relations, some of which are sometimes called material, not because they consist of matter (there are no such relations

and cannot be), but because they arise with regard to things or use values.

Marx himself pointed out the difficulty of analysing 'social matter':

'The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it, whilst, on the other hand, to the successful analysis of much more composite and complex forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that body. In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.'

These two reasons, viz., the relatively undeveloped character of the subject of our discussion, creative stimulus (the psychology of creation is still almost wholly limited to the psychology of artistic creation) and the absence of material, visible means of bringing it out, explain why the stimuli of creativity escape researchers' notice. There is a most essential social relation, without which not a single social organisation can manage.

Labour is above all a material process of changing an object in accordance with a conception existing in an idea determined by human (personal or social) needs, to satisfy which the product is made, and by the properties of the material and the tools. As a process of satisfying a certain human need it may be arbitrarily equated for clarity with the process of satisfying aesthetic needs, when a person watches a play, listens to music, looks at a work of representational art. But this analogy, like any other, has its limits. The great difference between the one and the other strikes the eye; as a process of satisfying the need to work, labour is perhaps the sole form of consumption that has an active, constructive character. It is seemingly not possible to say that as definitely about the 'consumption' of aesthetic values (though there is also a 'building' of the personality here). The need to create is a need to leave one's objectivity outside oneself to disclose the human mind's capacity to embody itself in things by means of the hands.

A 'labour-like' individual tool-activity is inherent, of course, in many higher animals, but it is not converted into labour in them and does not raise them to the level of man, since it does not pass into the acquired habits of the collective literally from the moment each individual is born, and imposed on each individual from the moment of birth, beginning with the advent of the human horde and ending with modern civilised societies.

No few cases of the raising of children by animals are known to science and each time an already adult living creature with a human physical constitution, found by people and snatched out of the environment to which it was accustomed, has proved incapable of labour because it had not become the bearer of the *set of social relations* that a person begins to accumulate in childhood, even before the beginning of labour activity. *The active relation to nature only emerges as human labour when it is developed through contacts among people.* Only through these contacts, by making them a permanent source of one's social 'feeding', are human qualities formed.⁶

It is incorrect to reduce the basic component of 'social matter', i.e. relations of production, simply to property and industrial and economic relations, i.e. to people's contacts in regard to the *appropriation* of the products of labour. The relations between worker and worker during productive labour are more important for society—that comes out especially clearly under socialism, largely because these relations do not include the roots of acute social conflicts, and direct study of them only begins after the elimination of class antagonism. Marx gave a convincing explanation of this.

Marx called a relation, any form of which corresponds regularly each time to a certain level of development of the mode of labour, and so to its social, productive force, a direct relation of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers. He saw in it 'the hidden basis of the entire social structure' and of political forms and institutions, etc.⁷ Under capitalism, when the owners of the conditions of production and the direct producers are different, opposed classes, there is no practical need, of course, to present the worker in his relation with other workers. 'Man and his labour on one side, Nature and its materials on the other' suffice.⁸ Under capitalism the radical social problems are concentrated in the sphere of the relations between labour and capital, relations that are primarily economic at bottom as regards appropriation of the means, object, process, and product of labour.

What changes does socialism make in that? First of all, it unites the classes of owners of the conditions of production and the direct producers in the person of the working people. Ownership of the means of production, on the one hand, and labour on the other, previously estranged, cease to be the property of (function, privilege, etc.) different social groups. What Marx called the 'hidden basis' of the social structure gets a quite new form. The relation between exploiter and

exploited disappears, many-sided relations develop among workers (between worker and collective farmer, between worker and intellectual, between intellectual and collective farmer, etc.). Directly labour, production-technical, production, and working relations proper that border closely on the productive forces begin to play a special role in social intercourse along with property relations (economic relations).¹⁰ It is understandable why, while displaying immense care for the protection, proliferation, and development of public property, socialist countries pay so much attention to perfecting the forms of the organisation and management of industrial and farm production, and to arranging the most rational forms of connection between the different contingents of the working people of socialist society.

'The essence of man', according to Marx, 'is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social conditions'.¹¹ Here he had in mind economic, political, national, labour, ideological, social-psychological, family, and other relations singled out on various grounds and by no means playing the same role.

From the standpoint of dialectical materialism the nucleus of the ensemble of social relations that constitute human essence is the material relations between people. But what is their form in the first place: economic, the succession of which leads to a new social system, or labour, working, organisational and technical that are essentially common for several socio-economic formations? It seems to me that it is the latter.

The essence of man undoubtedly undergoes a process of development, but that does not prevent it from retaining a *qualitative determinacy* throughout its history, the grounds for which should be sought *not in the transient economic structures* that determine the essence of classes and the inner image of class individuals, but in the eternal natural condition of human life, i.e. labour, which 'is independent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such phase',¹² and in the direct working relations of production, which function as relations of the use of tools and of the organisation of work. *Work is the essence of specifically human life activity, and the direct labour relations common to many ages are the basis of the material social relations that determine human essence.*

When need to work, the nature of the creative impulse, and interest in work as such are examined from these angles, it will readily be noted that they are nothing other than the in-

dividual's striving to reproduce 'social matter', i.e. direct human labour relations, in his life activity. This material need differs from others in owing its origin to man's social being, rather than to his natural character.

The individual perceives the reproduction of human essence in each creative act, creation of the new, and discovery of his own capabilities as pleasure or enjoyment. But 'the enjoyments themselves are indeed nothing but social enjoyments, relations, connections'. Marx said.¹² Enjoyment of the creative process is, moreover, not a simple relation. The role of the eternal drive by which the most essential social relations, (on which all others depend) must be reproduced without any external influence whatsoever, and by which the functioning of the whole social organism, and of the various forms of social life will be reproduced, is prepared for it in history. Communism therefore can also be called real humanism, because it is based on the power of emancipated labour inherent only in man, and has the mission of revolutionising the social 'energetics' of the future. As Engels wrote to Marx:

And it is certainly true that we must first make a cause our own, egoistic cause, before we can do anything to further it—and hence that in this sense, irrespective of any eventual material aspirations, we are communists out of egoism that we wish to be *human beings*, not mere individuals.¹³

Here he posed an important question of the very close link between the advance of communism and the active development of personal interest, about the inadequacy just of moral considerations of a social order as the main, constant drive of individual activity.

The work stimuli operating in society must always be orientated on some need or other of people.

What needs of men are known to science?

There are various points of view on that. The attempt to distinguish the following main categories of needs, for instance, was seemingly unsuccessful:

- 1) material needs (needs for material goods);
- 2) needs for movement and activity (need for work, games, sport, hunting, etc.);
- 3) needs for communion and intercourse with other people (need for love, comradeship, friendship, etc.);
- 4) cultural needs (needs for knowledge, medical care, etc.).

This classification in the main reflected lack of study of the problem. Above all the grounds of the division, the mode of satisfaction, did not stand up. What, for example, distinguished

the way the need for material goods was satisfied from the way the need for movement and activity was met? We know, furthermore, that there are things among material goods, like television sets, that satisfy spiritual interests and not physical ones; at the same time a 'cultural' need like that for medical care or such a need for intercourse as the need for love (bearing in mind its physical aspect), is in the same rank with physical, material needs for food, protection against cold, etc. Nothing remains of the category of 'cultural' needs, because the need for knowledge can be reduced to one for intercourse and communion with other people (for the reading of a book is indirect communion with its author).

No one would think of denying the category of *material* needs, of course, but one cannot understand it too narrowly (reducing it to physical needs) or counterpose it to any other category of needs (and all the more to all three), except *spiritual* needs.

One could suggest differentiating needs as well according to origin, into *natural physical ones* inherited by men from their animal ancestors, but having a social form, and *social ones* that are purely human needs. The need to work belongs precisely to the latter.

Since we consider this need an essential one of man, a sign of the individual's assimilation of social relations, it is legitimate to ask: Why is the individual capable of being the bearer of human essence?

The answer is given by Marxism, to which it is foreign to counterpose man's objective conditions and activity to one another. In the course of labour, which is the basis of social and historical practice, man 'opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces'.¹¹ The essence of the historical process is the practical interaction of the independent subject's socially determined activity (which, however, is peculiar to him) with the social and natural medium. There is no non-human, suprahuman history.

History does nothing, it 'possesses no immense wealth', it 'wages no battles'. It is *man*, real living man who does all that, who possesses and fights; 'history' is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve *its own aims*; history is *nothing but* the activity of man pursuing his aims.¹²

Any association of people—from the maximum (some concrete historical society or even world system) to the minimum (Robinson Crusoe and Man Friday) is, in its own way, a mode of existence of the human essence at some level. Perso-

nalities function as individual bearers of social relations.

Above all [Marx warned] we must avoid postulating 'society' again as an abstraction vis-a-vis the individual. The individual is the *social being*. His manifestations of life—even if they may not appear in the direct form of *communal* manifestations of life carried out in association with others—are therefore an expression and confirmation of *social life*.¹²

When we examine this we encounter certain difficulties. So long as it is a matter of society, everything should be clear: it is inconceivable without social relations. The same can be said, with certain reservations, of any social group. By its very existence it guarantees preservation of the social (group) basis. But how does the individual acquire such a capacity? Where are essential social connections 'written down' in him?

Social relations are divided into material and ideological ones. They permeate all society, like invisible magnetic lines of force. They are not discoverable directly, but indirectly, by generalising particular cases of people's activities and deeds. Moreover, in order to be conductors of social 'lines of force', people themselves have to become little social magnets, as it were, or nodes in social networks, to be the sole entity (potential and actual) of these connections, which no one except them can effect. But does that mean that an individual, as a 'social atom', cannot help possessing an independent social 'charge' and becoming one with social relations, both spiritually and materially?

The human individual in his protogenic being is first and foremost a biological specimen of the human race. There are therefore no few difficulties in understanding the proposition formulated above. It depends on how an individual's natural and social nature is united in him, and on how the biological carries the social load. Unfortunately sociologists seldom pay attention to that aspect of the matter, although Soviet psychologists (for example, L. S. Vygotsky and A. N. Leontiev) have provided historical materialism with interesting supplementary material on this.

Satisfaction of the need to work, 'essential' for man, has its psychophysiological aspect. To recognise that is not, by any means, to 'biologise' human needs, as some authors think, but means to allow in scientific analysis for the effect that the constant reproduction and satisfaction of the social need to work can exert on the performing of all normal people's vital functions. The rhythm of the processes taking place in a person's organism is dictated by the rhythm of work to a considerable extent. The satisfaction or dissatisfaction with work affects

the state of the nervous system and through it even a person's physical condition. The social organisation becomes one with the biophysical basis in man more strongly than it seems at first glance. The fact that we know little about this is no argument for denying the psychophysiological basis of the need to work, which has been moulded by social conditions as a product of the social individual's social evolution.

The example of children that have grown up in an animal environment argues that the man's specific faculties and functions are not passed on by heredity, but are acquired separately by each individual of the human race in a social environment. The process is usually called that of assimilating culture (employing 'culture' in the sense of the aggregate of the achievements of civilisation essential for mankind that can exert some practical influence on the individual's life activity). In that sense the mastering of culture is the assimilation of an aggregate of social relations, and acquisition of a capacity to take part fully in the human community, above all in the production of vital goods.

If we treat mastering culture as a passive absorbing of cultural values, the moulding of an individual as a person is presented to us as an endless quantitative accumulation of truths, a process of enriching the mind. Assimilation of the most essential social relations will be interpreted as mental mastering, as a function of memory; the need to work as a spiritual (moral) need; the essence of man as a product only of his mental and spiritual development.

But another approach is possible, viz., to regard certain of man's capabilities and needs as functions of certain organs. The conditions of the task are as follows: there are no special, morphologically particular permanent organs in man (like, for example, the lungs, heart, stomach, ear, leg, etc.) with which the specific character of human activity could be associated; the elementary physiological functions of the brain are common to human individuals raised by animals and who are not people, and to normal people. Quests in either direction do not promise positive results. It is consequently necessary to look for an answer to the problem in the transformation of those possibilities that man has from nature through the influence of social conditions. Leontiev pointed out a *third* path, citing Wundt, Pavlov, and Ukhomsky as authorities. It proves (and here historical materialism actively invades the field of psychology) that the peculiarities of human behaviour proper are determined by brain structures formed in the course of indi-

vidual development in a social milieu, and by unique connections of the elementary functions of the brain that play the role of *special organs* of a person's nervous system making the formation of any new organs whatsoever unnecessary.

Answering the question what such 'functional organs' of the brain were, Leontiev wrote:

These are organs that function the same as ordinary morphological organs; they differ from the latter, however, in being *neoformations* arising during individual (ontological) development. They are also the material substratum of those specific capabilities and functions that are formed during man's mastery of the world of objects and phenomena created by mankind, i.e. of the creations of culture.

We now know enough about the features and mechanisms of the forming of these organs to create experimental laboratory 'models' of them in man. On the other hand, we can now picture more clearly what the humanising of the human brain was expressed in that enabled man's further development to be subordinated to the action of social and historical laws and so accelerated it beyond measure. It was expressed in the cortex of the human brain, with its 14-17 billion nerve cells, becoming an *organ capable of forming functional organs*.¹⁷

Knowing that, it would be strange to pretend that it is simply a matter of scientific and not sociological matters. The conclusions cited above were formulated by psychologists on the basis of experimental research and proper application of the Marxian methodology of the social sciences. It is also important to take into account the reverse influence of psychology on philosophical comprehension of the development of society. The theory of functional organs of the brain eliminates the last possibilities of treating human activity in the spirit of pre-Marxian materialism, when things, reality, sensuousness were conceived only as the *object*, or *contemplation*, but not as *sensuous human activity*, practice, not subjectively.¹⁸

The spiritual treatment of the essence of man is becoming a thing of the past. The relation of consciousness to being is not only a question of man's relation to the external world but also one of man's relation to himself, to his organism, to his actions, of the relation of higher forms of man's reflection of reality to lower ones, of ideological reflection to psychological, of the ideological and psychological to the psychophysiological, and about *Homo sapiens*' relation to himself as a feeling man.

We see how the history of *industry* (Marx wrote) and the established *objective* existence of industry are the *open book* of *man's essential powers*, the perceptibly existing human *psychology*. Hitherto this was not conceived in its connection with man's *essential being*, but only in an external relation of utility, because, moving in the realm of estrangement, people could only think of man's general mode of being—religion or history in its *abstract-general character* as politics, art, literature, etc.¹⁹

Ignoring of the role of material production in the life of man and the moulding of his psyche, and exaggeration of the significance of abstract-theoretical activity, prevented psychology from becoming a real science with an effective content. Many of its divisions bore a descriptive character for decades, while some categories differed little from everyday concepts. Only the Pavlovian theory of the physiology of higher nervous activity, and allowance for the sociological basis, i.e. the theory of the aggregate or ensemble of social relations as the essence of man, finally put psychology on the scientific road.

The theory of men's psychophysiological assimilation of the human essence in cerebral organs and structures formed during activity in turn confirmed the correctness, wholeness, and uncontradictory character of historical materialism. On that Vygotsky wrote:

Altering Marx's well-known proposition, we might say that man's psychological nature is an ensemble of social relations transferred inside and becoming functions and forms of the structure of the personality. I do not mean that this is the meaning of Marx's statement, but I see in it the fullest expression of everything that the history of cultural development leads us to.²⁰

We are dealing here with a form of the subject's reflection of the social object. Whereas Lenin called sensation 'indeed the direct connection between consciousness and the external world' and 'the transformation of the energy of external excitation into the fact of consciousness',²¹ in the case of the formation of functional organs of the nervous system there is a transformation of continuously 'operating' social relations into a function of the human organism restructured by their action during practical activity. The analogy with sensation is broad, so to say, but not profound. The functional organs are not simply a direct link with the world of social relations external to the individual but are part of that world, in which the social is imparted to the biological and transforms it.

In contrast to sensation, which only lasts while an external irritant or stimulus affects the sense organs, functional organs once formed also determine the form of man's behaviour as a human outside the social medium. Having become functions of the living being, social relations acquire both an ideal and a material form in each individual of his singular existence, just as the individual becomes a more or less full, more or less complete embodiment of social relations and affirms himself in communion and intercourse with other individuals as a moment of social being. The individual measures all his contacts

with the outside world by a yardstick of the social relations he has assimilated during ontogenesis. Reinforced psychophysiological they do not die out in the individual before he himself dies.

The social medium organises the functions of the brain 'granted' by nature to the individual as a special physiological apparatus. The needs of the organism arising together with it and corresponding to it are not natural, physiological ones, but socio-physiological. An attempt to explain the latter from concrete, historical social relations by an analysing the basis and superstructure of one society or another usually leads to conclusions of an ethical order. For its part the 'naturalisation' of all man's needs entails, as it did with Feuerbach, loss of the notion of the specific character of social principles. Both sides must be taken into account, in order to find a bridge from the psychophysiological (the sole natural aspect that the social can solidly penetrate), to the system of existing links between people, and to see the reverse effect of these links on the psychophysiological, leading to a reconstruction of it that makes it capable of being the natural vehicle of the socio-creative principle, and of those capacities that are not given to man in the biological basis.

We know from experience that talks about the usefulness of labour and the amorality of sponging cannot evoke a taste or bent for creativity (at best a person will perform the job entrusted to him within a limited range), or a need that is not only and not so much a phenomenon of moral consciousness as a feature of the individual's psychophysiological organisation.

Let me recall that Lenin defined communist labour not only from the standpoint of moral factors but also as

labour performed because it has become a habit to work for the common good, and because of a conscious realisation (that has become a habit) of the necessity of working for the common good—labour as the requirement of a healthy organism.⁷²

In the light of that approach, which differs qualitatively from Godwin's, it is necessary, when posing the question of the scientific organisation of labour, to study the psychophysiological and social-psychological nature of creativity thoroughly. It is in this way that a truly Communist transformation of the main sphere of people's life activity will be possible.

Can we count only on the moral factor as society advances towards communism? It would seem not. And that is not because anyone underestimates the very great significance of the moulding of a communist moral consciousness, but because

it is impossible to treat communism in the spirit of idealism. The problem of material incentives for labour will always be an urgent one for society. Under communism, moreover, it will be resolved differently from today. When man is already ensured his needs for material and spiritual goods, only more interesting work, with a fuller creative content, can stimulate his interest and stimulate labour as such. We have no right to be idealists under communism, ignoring people's needs, and not just their non-labour needs (for foodstuffs, clothing, housing, medical care, cultural entertainments and relaxation, rest, etc.) but also creative needs, by whose level of development one can judge the development of truly human social relations. *In that case labour will not only perform the function of creator of use values but will also make itself a use value.*

Labour, whatever level of socialisation it achieves will always have a personal, individual, concrete character. Its stimulation solely by social interests and moral considerations will not be able to take the place of stimulation by personal enjoyment and the satisfaction of individual needs, which will cease to have a selfish character but will remain and certainly develop. Personal needs, whose satisfaction will be guaranteed by society, will cease to influence man's attitude to work.

Social interest, in the form of a moral stimulus, has already been called, and in the future will also be, to exert a definite influence on the work of the members of the new society, who will perceive it as personal. But the individual will not be lost in the collective. On the contrary, he will endlessly reveal his difference, above all in creative work, which will bear the stamp of individuality and at the same time bind man to society, communicating to him the secrets of his own essence and those of other human beings. The need for each person to *galvanise social relations continuously by his activity in personal life activity*, and to constantly tend the fire of his social being, and a living link with the whole human community, will be manifested in that.

NOTES

¹ William Godwin. *On Property*. In: *An Inquiry Concerning Political Justice*, Vol. II. Book 8, J. Robinson, London, 1793, p 820.

² *Ibid.*, p 821.

³ *Ibid.*, p 828.

⁴ The concepts 'principled', 'ideological', 'moral', and 'ideological-moral' are employed as synonyms of 'spiritual'.

⁵ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. I. Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward

Aveling. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 19.

¹⁰ 'The senses of the social man differ from those of the non-social man'. Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 95.

¹¹ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. III, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, p 791.

¹² Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. I, p 179.

¹³ See: G.V. Plekhanov. *A Critique of Our Critics. Selected Philosophical Works*, Vol. 2, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, pp 494-495; 500-502.

¹⁴ Karl Marx. *Theses on Feuerbach*. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 4.

¹⁵ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. I, p 179.

¹⁶ Karl Marx. *Wages*. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p 422.

¹⁷ See Engels' letter to Marx of 19 November 1844. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982.

¹⁸ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. I, p 173.

¹⁹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Criticism*. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 93.

²⁰ Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp 92-93.

²¹ A. N. Leontiev. *Nauka i chelovechestvo* (Science and Mankind), Vol. 2, Znanie, Moscow, 1963, p 71.

²² Karl Marx. *Theses on Feuerbach. Op. cit.*, p 3.

²³ Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp 96-97.

²⁴ L. S. Vygotsky. *Razvitiye vysshikh psichicheskikh funktsii* (The Evolution of Higher Psychic Functions), Moscow, 1960, pp 198-199.

²⁵ V. I. Lenin. *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 38.

²⁶ V. I. Lenin. *From the Destruction of the Old Social System to the Creation of the New. Collected Works*, Vol. 30, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 517.

MAN AS A CREATIVE INDIVIDUAL

I. S. Kulikova

The great creations of culture in all spheres of life were and are made by people, but far from everybody (and not all people) has been and is drawn into creative activity. The very possibility of drawing a broad circle of people into creative activity is governed by two main factors: (a) the character of the social formation in which the individual lives, and (b) the character of the individuals themselves. Their level of development and, specifically, their creative capabilities.

The possibility and necessity of drawing people into creative activity, and harmonious development of the personality have been decided differently in different ages. The views of scholars on this are divided. The humanistically inclined advanced minds of mankind have considered it possible and necessary to draw people broadly into creativity and active participation in the cultural process. But, while advocating free manifestation of man's creative abilities and harmonious development of the personality, they inevitably came up against insurmountable obstacles in the conditions of reality itself. The humanists' good impulses were utopian.

Many scholars who have expressed the ideas and ideals of dominant exploiter classes have declared its elitist character to be desirable, inevitable, and even, allegedly, fruitful for the progress of culture, and have seen in activation of the masses a danger of a lowering of the level and tempo of mankind's cultural development and even a threat of annihilation of previous achievements and memorials of culture. The founders of Marxism-Leninism—Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and V. I. Lenin—paid much attention to the problem of the creative moulding of the personality, and to the bringing out and developing of man's creative capacities. The Marxist-Leninist philosophy has not only made an invaluable contribution to understanding the essence of man, and has not only brought out his significance and leading role in the course of historical, social progress, but has also revealed and creatively substan-

tiated the real prospects for further development and perfecting of the personality, and the real roads for discovering and actively moulding the creative capabilities of every person.

The division of labour was an essential step in the development of society and of man's creative capacities. Marx noted its positive, progressive aspect:

In consequence of the separation of the social branches of production, commodities are better made, the various bents and talents of men select a suitable field, and without some restraint no important results can be obtained anywhere. Hence both product and producer are improved by the division of labour.¹

But the division of labour operates contradictorily in bourgeois society, and has an opposite side suppressing man's creative capacities. Marx analysed the change in the character of work under capitalism in detail and concluded that alienated or estranged labour lowered free activity, and reduced it to a simple means necessary to maintain the physical existence of the producer. Work thereby lost its creative character.

The commodity fetishism inherent in capitalism suppresses an unselfish attitude to the objects of nature. Marx regarded it as an ideological form of contemporaneous society; it generated cupidity, practicalism, a tendency to fraud and deception, and hypocrisy. He fiercely condemned the cupidity that was an unfailing accompaniment of the bourgeois world outlook. He saw in private property the causes of the decline in morality, and of the soullessness inherent in bourgeois society; it

abolishes all natural and spiritual distinctions by enthroning in their stead the immoral, irrational and soulless abstraction of a particular material object and a particular consciousness which is slavishly subordinated to this object.²

The dominant minority's avid striving for profit and enrichment, like the whole way of life under capitalism, stipulates not only material impoverishment of the masses of the working people but also robbing them mentally and spiritually. Capitalism thus turned the division of labour, itself necessary for the development of society, against the interests of the working people, thereby holding back the natural development of the personality, i.e. free revelation of man's creative talents as a human being.

The process of estrangement inherent in bourgeois society extends to man's senses as well as to the material products of labour: 'The *sense* caught up in crude practical need has only a *restricted sense*.... The care-burdened, poverty-stricken man has no *sense* for the finest play'.³

Under capitalism the division of labour introduces a contradiction between the productive force and social state and consciousness--

because the *division of labour* implies the possibility, nay the fact, that intellectual and material activity, that enjoyment and labour, production and consumption, devolve on different individuals.'

This split leads to a profound difference in individuals' level of intellectual development. Social conditions that hold back development of the personality become the determinant in an individual's activity rather than personal essential powers and personal capabilities. The working man was deprived of the possibility of normal, all-round development, was converted into a 'detail worker' (*Teilindividuum*—Marx), simply the bearer of a partial social function.

It would only be possible to give man the chance of all-round development, and to restore attractiveness and creative character to work, by a resolute revolutionary transformation of the world, i.e. by abolishing private ownership of the means of production, and eliminating exploitation of man by man.

Marxism defined the goals of the revolutionary reforming of reality and demonstrated its inevitability. Marx treated the building of a new communist society 'as the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e. human) being.' Marxism-Leninism treats labour in that connection as a means of broadening, enriching, and improving the working people's creativity.

Lenin considered development of people's creative abilities and discovery and support of their talents as the prime, urgent task of the Communist Party:

Capitalism stifled, suppressed, and killed a wealth of talent among the workers and working peasants. These talents perished under the oppression of want, poverty, and the outrage of human dignity. It is our duty now to bring out these talents and put them to work."

Labour has ceased to be forced as a result of abolition of private ownership of the means of production. Everybody is granted the right to work by law in socialist society. Every member of socialist society is guaranteed the right to education. A creative attitude to work and the creative activity of the masses are encouraged in every way.

Naturally, however, it is impossible to convert all work in society without exception into creative labour. Man's needs increase with his development, and the 'realm of physical

'necessity' is extended. But the productive forces directed to meeting these needs are also expanded in that connection. Marx called the process of satisfying man's natural needs his 'interchange with Nature', and related it to the 'realm of necessity'. He saw freedom in this realm of labour activity in

socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature.¹⁰

Marx did not consider labour expended on making objects needed to satisfy wants that came into the realm of necessity to be truly free labour and did not reduce labour to the making of objects needed to satisfy material wants. Furthermore, he considered that excessive growth of material needs and conversion of man into their slave led to his impoverishment.

He counterposed the realm of necessity to the freedom of creative activity, which disclosed the possibilities of all human powers for development as such, and for absolute discovery of man's creative talents. The founders of Marxism regarded the free realisation of man's capabilities precisely as the real path to returning his lost wholeness to him, and to transforming him from a simple bearer of a partial social function into a harmoniously developed individual capable of performing successive modes of life activity.

Marx and Engels resolutely opposed hemming man within the narrow confines of any profession, and opposed the limitedness of a narrowly-professional development, and dependence of the personality, and manifestation of its capacities, on the existing division of labour. They considered free realisation of man's capacities his inalienable right, not as a 'detail worker' but as a man engaged in certain work as a type of his activity.

They expressed their understanding of man's free activity in a concrete example of his performance of artistic activity—one of the most creative types of human activity.¹¹ They often turned to art when analysing matters connected with man's creative activity, and treated great works of art as the highest creative achievements of the human race. Marx linked the development of both intellectual and practical human feelings, 'humane feelings', with art. He considered art irreplaceable for disclosing man's capacities and essential powers: 'only beautiful music has no sense for the unmusical ear'.¹¹

For all the specific features of art and artistic activity, Marxism does not separate them off into some closed sphere but treats them as a specific type of human activity subordinated to the laws and patterns inherent in human activity. Marx did not treat the development of artistic creation and the creation of a work of art in isolation from social phenomena. When analysing the development of artistic activity he considered the creative artistic activity performed by the subject to have a social character: during the making of works of art their creator constantly interacted with other members of society in whom perception of the *object d'art*—work of art—generated a need for it.

An *object d'art* creates a public that has artistic taste and is able to enjoy beauty—and the same can be said of any other product. Production accordingly produces not only an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object.¹¹

In that statement, a fundamental one for understanding the character of creative activity, Marx singled out art as an example, as expressly creative activity.

While examining the place and role of people in social development, Marx noted that social history was often only the history of their individual development, whether or not they were conscious of it.¹² Correspondingly, progress in transforming and improving reality in accordance with the advanced social ideals of communism depends on the level of development of each member of socialist society and his/her contribution to social practice.

While participation in production processes and qualitative work has a forced character in capitalist countries and is dictated by competition for the employers and for the workers by the threat of unemployment hanging over them, the stimuli to high-quality work in socialist countries are quite different, being based on the workers' consciousness rather than compulsion, on a creative attitude to work, and on socialist emulation. That is because, in socialist countries, acceleration of social development is linked first and foremost with a remoulding of workers' consciousness and depends on constant growth of a conscious, creative attitude to the performance of work. The individual is moulded as a social person rather than just in a narrow professional respect, as a creative person, through labour activity. At an early stage of a young person's becoming familiar with work, his/her instructor and counsellor in the process of acquiring a trade has an essential influence. The teacher's task in socialist society is broader than just the simple

passing on of a sum of professional knowledge, skills, and know-how. It includes fostering a socialist attitude to work, as well as the passing on of his/her professional experience, i.e. love for one's profession, a creative attitude toward it, and a striving for improvement. The eminent theatrical producer, K. S. Stanislavsky, when drawing young people into the difficult, responsible profession of the actor, demanded of them a perfect command of their profession and clearly outlined the path to achieve that, viz., to make the difficult a habit, the habitual easy, the easy beautiful. The highest aesthetic verdict, 'beautiful', is applied to the process and result of any work, not just that of an actor or an artist. It is no accident that a person who has achieved perfection in his profession and in his activity is called a master and an artist, because every kind of work can be done variously, from 'badly' to 'beautifully'. That is why the example of the master, the instructor, and the force of personal example are no less essential in work than the force of example is in art, and are perhaps even more effective. The characters of a work of art have an emotional effect on perception of it, and only then can the results of this effect be realised. Only personal example has a direct effect during work. An ideal arising during personal production contact can immediately stimulate its materialisation. That is why the most worthy people are selected in socialist society as instructors of young specialists, not just masters of their craft and professional creators, but people with high moral and ethical standards.

Elements of aesthetics, constantly being displayed in a striving for a harmonious combination of the functional and the beautiful, are integrally present in a creative attitude to work and in improving the quality of the product. A developed aesthetic consciousness promotes realisation of purposive activity according to the laws of beauty. The aesthetic aspect is present in every creatively conscious piece of work.

Socialist emulation opens up a very broad path for aestheticising labour and for aesthetic assimilation of reality. The task of the competing persons, work teams, groups, and enterprises is not only to make more and faster, but also to do it better, and make it more beautiful. The competitors make no secret of their achievements; they gladly share their experience and successes, the fact making it possible not only to accelerate labour processes and increase production, but also to raise its aesthetic qualities.

It is precisely in the constant, personal, creative intercourse of the emulators that socialist emulation is counterposed

to the bourgeois principles of jealously guarding 'industrial and trade secrets' during cut-throat competition. The very conditions of capitalist reality deprive people of opportunities for creative exchange of experience through free personal intercourse, and make for alienation in people's relations, thereby impeding the process of mutual creative enrichment of people and of perfecting their capabilities.

The new socialist society took the very course of man's development under control, i.e. discovery of his potentialities, the bringing out and development of his capabilities.

At all stages of the moulding of a personality and of its consciousness and self-awareness, realised in a variety of ways and by a variety of means, communion or intercourse plays an essential role; during it, individuals 'make *one another*', as Marx and Engels put it.¹¹

The change and perfecting of men's consciousness, growth of the individual's consciousness, and consolidation of his/her creative potential, call primarily for raising the culture of thinking, i.e. the training in each individual of an ability to cognise the essential connections and relations of objects and phenomena and to think creatively when posing and tackling practical and theoretical problems. All forms of raising specialists' qualifications and the standard of education in colleges are directed to realisation of this pressing task in socialist countries. The school reform and improving of the network of political education being carried out in the Soviet Union serve the same goal.

A broadening of people's interests is being effected by various ways and means in the implementing of this task. The individual's range of interests may thus extend to art, sport, and various kinds of amateur activities like model-making, and activities of an applied-art character.

A bold combination of forms of indirect intercourse (reading, going to the theatre and exhibitions, watching films, TV, etc.) with active personal activity in a freely chosen field (various forms of amateur activities, sport, etc.) naturally yield the maximum effect for creative development of the personality. Such a combination extends the range of objects of a person's intercourse, both indirect and personal, extends the range of his personal interests, and stimulates and develops an interest and capacity for creativity in him.

Contacts with other people play an essential role in everybody's life. The reality experienced finds expression in it, and social relations are concretised and acquire a personal

form; and it is during intercourse and communion of people that activity, information, and experience are exchanged. A person's consciousness and self-awareness is shaped in it, a capacity for mental activity developed, emotions and feelings deepened, concrete principles and forms of behaviour moulded, and needs arise for the individual's self-expression and creative activity.

Individuals' emotional and volitional interactions arise during intercourse; concrete historical ties (class, group, and individual) are established that promote the integrity and wholeness and functioning of the social system. As Marx and Engels noted, it was

precisely the personal, individual behaviour of individuals, their behaviour to one another as individuals, that created the existing relations and daily reproduces them anew.¹¹

They paid considerable attention to intercourse on both the personal and social plane, and resolutely opposed both individualism as the foundations of human existence, and the conviction developed by bourgeois morality that

the world will be set to rights, if everyone by himself tries to get as far as possible and for the rest does not trouble his head about the course of the world.¹²

Engels directly counterposed individualism to the possibility of attaining happiness:

Only very exceptionally, and by no means to his and other people's profit, can an individual satisfy his urge towards happiness by preoccupation with himself.¹³

Marxism considers universal intercourse a *sine qua non* of the individual's achieving spiritual wealth, of a creative attitude to reality, and of a many-sided development of the personality; 'modern universal intercourse cannot be controlled by individuals, unless it is controlled by all'.¹⁴ Only with that does the individual's self-activity coincide with the conditions of material life. Only then will all natural limitations be cast off in the individual's development, and individuals develop into complete individuals. With that the necessary intercourse of individuals that arises through the division of labour will be converted into free communion and felt by the individuals as such.¹⁵

But the transition to this 'highest stage of self-activity' cannot be brought about spontaneously; only revolution can open up this road, and the transition requires a 'community of revolutionary proletarians', which Marx and Engels defined as an

which puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control—conditions which were previously left to chance and had acquired an independent existence over against the separate individuals...¹⁹

This transition must be made during the building of communism. In that sense Marx and Engels defined communism as the 'production of the form of intercourse itself'. They saw the difference between communism and all earlier movements in its overturning 'the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse', striping 'all naturally evolved premises' of intercourse of 'their natural character' and subjugating 'them to the power of the united individuals'.²⁰

Intercourse through art has an essential place in this process. Since it has a spiritual, intellectual character, an increasing striving for art as an object of intercourse promotes spiritual enrichment of the individual and growth of his intellectual, aesthetic culture. The intercourse of individuals in and through art fosters a broadening of their interests and development of common tastes and views. People's spiritual communion and mutual understanding, grow through personal intercourse in and through art, and a feeling of collectivism is strengthened by it.

Contact with a work of art that reflect reality not only has cognitive significance, and not only promotes development and perfecting of a person's feelings and emotions, but also actively encourages growth of his/her aesthetic consciousness. The perception and appreciation of a work of art in accordance with one's personal aesthetic ideals gives the perceiver the chance, so to speak, to compare his ideals with those of the artist, and to correct, refine, deepen, and broaden them.

Constant contact with works of art furthers development of a person's aesthetic taste and a raising of his general culture, which provides the necessary premises for employing art as a means of moulding and shaping his creative attitude to reality. The force of art's action and the breadth of the audience lay a special responsibility on socialist art workers, who are called upon to create universally significant works capable of performing the lofty functions of educating working people in accordance with socialist socio-aesthetic ideals.

It is the art of socialist realism that not only discloses the acute conflict of modern times in its works but is also capable of indicating effective ways of resolving them. It shows the role of the personality in involved social processes, and the dialectic of the personality's interaction with society, and that can have a

very strong effect on a person, on the formation and moulding of his world outlook, emotions, tastes, aspirations, and interests, i.e. on the shaping of his creative attitude to reality. Naturally only truly artistic works that contain lofty ideals, works that aspire to the future, can have such a positive effect.

Through contact with a work of art the reader, viewer, listener not only perceives the phenomena, objects, subjects, embodied in it, and the images the artist creates, but also the position of the artist, his vision of these phenomena, and his attitude to and appreciation of them, also expressed in it. The viewer of a work of art recognises its creator's socio-aesthetic ideals through it.

Marxism-Leninism has armed the art workers of socialist realism with a possibility of scientifically cognising and understanding social phenomena and the laws of social development. The actually existing and possible, profoundly comprehended by the artist, enter a work of art in a dialectical unity. The conversion of the possible into the real, which happens both in life and in art through the active work of individuals, reveals the finding of social significance by individual activity. The lofty humanism, and faith in people's powers, mind, and feelings, and in the person who knows how to defeat and overcome evil, expressed in the works of art of socialist realism, inevitably gets a response from viewers, arouses lofty feelings in them, and inspires faith in progress and a better future.

It is especially vital to attract young people to art during the active moulding of their personalities, world outlook, life stance, and character, and not, as is sometimes written, because the positive characters of works of art are an example to be imitated. It is quite difficult to image a person in our time dressed and behaving, for example, 'like Chapaev'. The characters of works of art, their deeds, and the actions they perform in acute conflicts involuntarily bring people to evaluate their actions, to 'check' them with their own views, life stances, and ideals, and encourage them to seek powers and faculties in themselves and (what is very important) possibilities to display them in contemporary conditions, i.e. foster the moulding of an active character and a person who aspires to creative display of his essence.

Lenin remarked that 'the popular writer leads his reader towards profound thoughts, towards profound study ... leads him, helps him over his first steps and *teaches* him to go forward independently'.²¹ That wise observation not only applies to literature, but also to all progressive works of art that include

advanced ideals embodied in heroes in reality through real actions.

The striving to transform reality in accordance with lofty new ideals, and to change it for the better, is a creative attitude to reality. And it is this that true art teaches people.

Present-day bourgeois art performs diametrically opposed tasks. An absence of positive ideals of social development, and of ideas capable of attracting people, robs it of the chance to create works of high spiritual value. The very concept 'ideal' has lost sense for bourgeois theoreticians and practitioners of art. It has been replaced by a concept 'image' that expresses not the essence but only the appearance of man ('idol')—the fashionableness of his clothes, hair-do, pose, and manner of holding himself. Tiresome, importunate advertising of portrayals of such a kind induces a drive to imitate and to reject one's own individuality in a constant chase after fashion and striving to be 'no worse than the others'.

The chance to buy such and such a hat, to have a hair-do like the 'idol's', to adopt such and such a pose, gives the aesthetically underdeveloped person an illusion of his similarity to a fashionable film star or pop singer, an illusion of the acquirability of the widely advertised 'world of chosen'. In that connection an 'instinct of identification' is being produced that has already been common for many years in bourgeois art, which leads to a levelling of the individual rather than to his development.

The ability of art to evoke a striving to identify (for some illusory 'equating of self' to another person) is the basis of the success of numerous 'Cinderella'-type articles of 'mass culture' that have maintained the myth for decades of the alleged existence of 'equal chances for all' in capitalist society. 'If he (she) is lucky, why can't I be if I copy him (her) in everything?' the young spectator often argues, eagerly luxuriating in attractive pictures of episodes played in de luxe hotels and restaurants, and millionaires' villas. The flashing frames inspire glowing hopes, make humdrum work and the hopelessness of existence, and uncertainty about the morrow bearable. Art performs compensatory functions here, giving rise to apathy and passivity and making one set all his/her hopes upon chance.

The tasks of socialist art in the involved process of the moulding of the personality, i.e. art that belongs to the people, to the masses, were clearly defined by Lenin: it should unite and heighten the feelings, thought, and will of these masses; it should inspire and develop the artists in them.²²

Marxism-Leninism understands the inspiring of the artists in people broadly. When making the aim of social development the creation of conditions for harmonious development of the individual, and of each person, Marx and Engels did not consider that everybody (figuratively speaking) should become a Raphael, but suggested that 'anyone in whom there is a potential Raphael should be able to develop without hindrance'.²³

But it is by no means socialist art's sole task to discover and educate Raphaels. Active drawing of a person into art promotes awakening of his personal creative inclinations. The earlier and more actively that process is (i.e. artistic and more broadly aesthetic education), the more effective it will be and the more firmly an interest in and need for art and creative activity be 'laid' in the person. Special attention therefore needs to be constantly paid to aesthetic education in school years, both in the school itself and in extracurricular occupations and activities, and, of course, in the family.

Life has brought out two concrete, effective ways for the aesthetic education of schoolchildren: 1) inclusion of aesthetic problems and propositions in children's artistic training in literature, singing, and drawing lessons; and 2) accenting the aesthetic aspects during the teaching of all other school subjects without exception. The shaping of aesthetic needs in early years, and a desire for creative activity, should not be interrupted in subsequent years, particularly in family life; a high level of a married couple's spiritual interests creates favourable conditions in the family for inculcating a creative attitude to life activity in the children.

The paths of art education are broad and varied. Involvement of the broad masses of the working people in art has an important place in this age of the second industrial revolution, and during the shake-up of consciousness in accordance with the requirements of the times. This is not possible without raising the people's general standard of culture. It involves all the parameters of people's life activity. It is based on raising people's ideological maturity by means of science, and art has to play an essential role in this.

One must realise, in this connection, that art does not replace science or competes with it in the process of remoulding consciousness: each of them has to perform its own, inherent function in socialist society and decide its own problems. The subjects of their study are different on the philosophical plane—the science has long had as its subject-matter 'appearing essence'

and art 'essential appearance'. The dialectical nature of the subject-matter of art is based on a proposition formulated by Lenin in his *Philosophical Notebooks*: 'Here, too, we see a transition, a flow from the one to the other: the essence appears. The appearance is essential'.¹ Comprehension of this dialectic is important for the transition of forming individual traits and appearances into essential ones, and for bringing out the dialectic of the individual in his social relations. It is the dialectical interaction of the individual and society inherent in life that constitutes the central object of art studies. Science can embrace social phenomena, and man himself, even more deeply, definitely, and universally than art, but art, for all that, retains priority in the sphere of bringing out the 'building' of the individual personality in the social process.

All the preconditions for man's development have been created in socialist society, for the first time in human history, for free discovery and realisation of the capacities of each member of society, and for free development of each human individual. For that purpose all the means of discovering, moulding, and developing the individual's creative faculties (instruction, education, vocational training, intercourse, and the organisation of leisure) are being brought under the control of society. Development of everyone's creative faculties, held down and repressed for centuries in exploiter societies, is acquiring a planned character in socialist countries.

Realisation of the possibilities offered by socialist society for the varied, creative development of the individual, and of everyone, (which is being brought about for the first time, and on a hitherto unprecedented scale) naturally requires time and great effort. The foundations are being laid at present in socialist society for moulding the man of the future communist society, a free creative person and all-round developed individual.

NOTES

¹ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. I. Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, pp 344-345.

² Karl Marx. *Proceedings of the Sixth Rhine Province Assembly (Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood)*. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 262.

³ Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 96.

⁴ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 51.

⁷ Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p 90.

⁸ V. I. Lenin. *Results of Party Week in Moscow and Our Tasks. Collected Works*, Vol. 30, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 30.

⁹ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. III, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p 820.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ See: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology*, pp 441-442.

¹² Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. III, p 301.

¹³ Karl Marx. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 197.

¹⁴ See Marx's Letter to P.V. Annenkov of 28 December 1846. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p 96.

¹⁵ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology*, p 59.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p 463.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p 405.

¹⁸ Frederick Engels. *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Selected Works* in three volumes. Vol. Three, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 358.

¹⁹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology*, p 97.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p 89.

²² *Ibid.*, pp 89-90.

²³ V. I. Lenin. *The Journal Svoboda. Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 311.

²⁴ See Clara Zetkin. *Erinnerungen an Lenin*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1957.

²⁵ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology*, p 416.

²⁶ V. I. Lenin. *Conспектus of Hegel's Lecture on the History of Philosophy. Collected Works*, Vol. 38, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 251.

ELLEVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

G. G. Kvasov

The dialectical-materialist methodology of man's knowledge singles out as priority trends an investigation of problems of the social essence of the individual and of the real, practical processes of the transformation of the world of man during which man changes himself.

The complexity of studying the human factor in its specific essence is due to the single system of the interaction of several interconnected aspects of man's being: personality; the individual and his natural properties; the subject of social activity, knowledge, and intercourse; individuality.

The historical experience of the socialist social system in overcoming social and class antagonisms witnesses to the genesis of dialectically important trends in the development of the human personality. According to the sociological data, the leading tendency among these trends is that of raising the personality, which has an integral systems character, which reflects the line of socialist man's progressive development and consistent movement toward fullness of social significance and inner wholeness, toward heights of culture and civilisation of a new social type. Its disclosure presupposes unity of the natural-history and value aspects. The real process of the rise of the personality covers a long period of development and a number of phases and metamorphoses characterised by a definite dialectical interconnection, hierachism, unevenness, and specificity of manifestation at the general social, collective, and individual levels. A feature of development already noted by Marx becomes clear:

When a product is considered in its final form as a series of phases of production *following one after the other on an ascending line*, so that a later one takes the earlier one forward and conditions it.¹

The fullness of the dialectical truth of the moulding of the new man finds expression in an objective analysis not just of the ascending movement in the development of the personality predominant in society but also of the facts of a descending

movement, cases of the degeneration and moral corruption of individual people. The truth of the socialist way of life lies in active struggle and surmounting of negative phenomena alien to the new society.

Let me note the main levels of the typological breakdown of the process of the rise of the human personality: general-historical (common to humanity), concrete-historical (social), micro-social, and individual.

On the general historical plane, the rise of the personality appears as a problem of the origin of man common to mankind and of his rise above the animal kingdom under the determining influence of the process of the development of labour and means of labour.

On the concretely historical plane, this rise, being based on the creative essence of work and labour in general, called higher activity by Marx, and connected with free time as room for the development of the human personality, develops as a social process determined by social conditions and subjective factors.

The social and moral scale of the social interest realised by the individual is extremely important for the rise of personality, i. e. measuring of the coincidence, combination, and accumulation of the personal interest by the social is the most profound criterion of the rise of personality.

The kernel of this process is the law of increasing requirements contained in the Marxian notion of the development of society and the personality² and first formulated by Lenin.³

The social typology of the rise of the personality that underlies the division of human history into socio-economic formations, and the social and class approach to all phenomena of the development of society and man is methodologically significant.

The socialist (communist) type of heightening the personality contains all the decisive features and historical advantages of the new social system. The transformation of conscientious, creative labour into a prime, determinant vital need emerges as a systems-forming factor in the social-psychology mechanism of rising, and in the hierarchical structure of needs, interests, stimuli, motives, precepts, convictions, aims, ideals, values, capacities, abilities, and the corresponding moral and aesthetic qualities of the individual. It is on that basis that a correct ratio of the principles of creation and requirement is established, corresponding to the socialist trend of social, intellectual, and moral values.

The socialist type of the rise of the personality is manifested

as a mass process inherent in all strata and groups of the working people and characterising the truly democratic character of the new society, which is realising the loftiest aims of social reforms and transformations for the good, happiness, and all-round development of the working man. Its historical promise and purposefulness are commensurate with the communist social ideal of the individual. In that connection the ideal plays the role of an active means of intellectual and practical mastery of the world and the highest criterion of system of values, performing the function of the final goal of life activity, of a sublime norm (or rather, norm of sublime activity), and characterising the maximum possible degree of perfection of social activity and behaviour, moved by the root interests and prospective requirements of an all-round, harmoniously, integrally developed social subject.

The mass process of elevating the working classes in the society of the future (in accordance with the scientific forecast of the founders of Marxism confirmed by the practice of today's socialism) is necessarily connected with free development and elevation of the personality of the working man, with the raising of universal well-being and prosperity, and the achievement of heights of a truly human enjoyment of life.¹

The socialist, collectivist type of the elevation of the working man, in reflecting the class contradiction of the two world social systems, entails an active principled opposing of the bourgeois, individualistic type of elevating the individual and its antagonisms inherent in private property society, and above all its phenomenon of alienation and estrangement, and one-sided, contradictory development of individuals of the dominant class through socio-economic and intellectual robbery of the working majority. The conversion of human individuality and morals into an object of commerce in the conditions of the capitalist mode of production and of commodity fetishism had already been recorded and characterised by Marx in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* in the early 1840. When dissecting the laws of antagonistic bourgeois progress with the scalpel of cognising thought, and expressing the protest of revolutionary democratic opinion against enslavement of the human personality, he wrote:

Instead of money, or paper, it is my own personal existence, my flesh and blood, my social virtue and importance, which constitutes the material, corporeal form of the spirit of money. Credit no longer resolves the value of money into money but into human flesh and the human heart. Such is the extent to which all progress and all the inconsistencies within a

false system are extreme retrogression and the extreme consequence of vileness.

A special level of the elevating process—the micro-social (i.e. that of a small social group, collective, or family)—requires special analysis, when one takes into consideration the determining role of the labour collective or work force in the all-round development of the personality and conquering of the heights of universal freedom through consistent ascent. The distinguishing of a micro-social level of man's social elevation is also necessitated by the fact that the micro-socium (labour collective, family, everyday association of persons, etc.) is relatively independent in relation to society as a whole and realises the historical gains achieved by the latter with a varying degree of fullness.

The concluding aspect of the survey of the tendency to elevate the human personality consists in analysing it as an individualised process. The dialectic of the universal, general, particular, and individual is manifested on this plane in the development of human individuality. I remarked above that the communist ideal is a free, rich, harmonious individuality of a collectivist type, the conscious subject of socially significant life activity and highly moral, civically responsible behaviour.

The concreteness of the disclosure of the features of real process in raising the personality at the level of human individuality largely depends on solving the complex methodological question of the dialectical relationship of the laws of the functioning and development of the personality.

In regard to that it is necessary, at the level of human individuality, to allow for the specially important role of the joining-up interaction of the theory of materialist dialectics with social and general psychology and the whole system of social sciences.

An important point in tackling the methodological problem of combining the laws of the functioning of the personality and those of its development at the level of individuality is the dialectical phenomenon of a social and individual scale that we denote as the phenomenon of 'dynamic pyramiding', which organically unites the functional and genetic aspects.

The dialectical materialist basis of a systems survey of this phenomenon was laid in the Marxian conception of production and reproduction, within which functional re-organisation of structures and their foundations take place that are fixed in a necessary chain of development and serve it in a definite way.

Reproduction in a higher phase is always dependent on the

preceding phases of the functioning and development of the process proper. The rising hierarchical sequence of these various phases and processes is the key to passing from a series of functional laws to a series of development ones. In that connection it is also important to take into consideration the general trend from the very simple to the complex, which corresponds to the real historical development in which last form in time regards the preceding forms as stages to itself.

The dialectical sense of the phenomenon of 'dynamic pyramiding' is precisely that the functional systems of the individual's life activity, individualised in its style and way of life, are 'crystallised' in a certain way in corresponding structures to the extent of its step-by-step, at first materially developed formation and successful action, as if 'convoluting', making itself into a whole, and bearing in itself new levels of mastery of the world and freedom and new ranges of participation in resolving vital contradictions. They signify qualitatively new phases of development and new scales of the potentials of social action, and are a *sine qua non* of mastery of the 'pyramid' of new achievements in the functioning and development of the personality.

A consolidation takes place, as it were, and a continuous, intensive re-organisation of the base of the 'pyramid', viz., transfer of the achieved into a kind of development fund, i.e. into culture, everyday life, the accustomed way of life, into traditions, warmed by the flame of creative concern.

A characteristic feature of the development of functional systems themselves that are of fundamental significance for raising the individual is the different degree of their regulating influence on the social subject's life activity and behaviour: the structures higher and richer in development, and more socially significant, become the guiding factor in the regulation of less developed, elementary levels and the preceding phases of the functioning whole. The marked pattern is inherent in all levels of the biosocial and social human essence proper, viz., from the physiological to the psychological and highest structures of intellectual and practical values. Their development has, at the same time, a spiral-like character ('negation of the negation') of a dialectical ascent to the heights of progress with separate moments of regression, movements 'back', and temporary retreats.

Study of the raising of the personality on the plane of an individualised process faces us squarely with the problems of allowing for the various stages (periods) of the life

path and their uneven contribution to this process.

A person's early childhood plays a paramount role in the moulding and elevation of the personality. The so-called primary socialisation of man (in that connection the social typology of the process of socialisation necessitates a singling out of the features precisely of the socialist type; they are brought out in the work of Soviet and other authors on social and age-group psychology) not only lays the foundations, in an extremely plastic form, of the structure of the mature personality but also creates the potentials for its future achievements and perfecting. The conception of 'sensitive peaks' (critical periods) of development presents considerable interest for both the science and practice of upbringing and education since it discloses the most favourable age 'zones' for the forming of certain capabilities or complexes of capabilities and psychic qualities, and for the whole moulding of the personality. It is in these periods that specific, adequate educational actions are especially effective on the moulding of a person; and for certain groups of capacities (musical, linguistic, etc.) the utilisation of available possibilities has a unique, unrepeatable, and perhaps even irreversible character for getting high-quality and outstanding results.

Adolescence and early youth, which retain a continuity with childhood and signify a colossal qualitative leap, during which a new aspect of the personality is born, play a particularly responsible role for moulding of an 'adult' personality, and for its political, moral, and aesthetic development.

The moulding of an adult personality, maintaining continuity with the metamorphoses and social and moral achievements of youth, has its own inner logic and specific social and temporal rate of development, which has a peculiarly uneven, leap-like character. Discovery of the regular features of the course of raising the personality to this plane must necessarily allow for the unique turning points, nodes, and measures of the living line of behaviour that intensify human being.

The dialectical materialist understanding of the tendency to raise the personality as a social process presupposes a realistic, truthful vision of the whole panorama of developing reality and its vital contradictions, both harmoniously resolvable and unresolved, that lead to disharmonies, discrepancies, and conflicts, and in extreme cases to elements of antagonism. The dialectical antinomies and alternatives of personal development may also give rise, in the conditions of socialist society, to chance individuals deviating from the traditions and patterns

of socialist life and the norms and ideals of the socialist way of life.

A specific methodological problem for investigating the process of increasing requirements is that of defining their socially substantiated level of a normative sense. The initial concept usually employed here is that of 'rational needs', i.e. those needs whose satisfaction furthers a person's health and intellectual possibilities, and presupposes a careful attitude to material and cultural values, and increase of social wealth.

In a certain sense, the historically established term 'rational needs' is narrow, since it does not wholly convey the systems character of social man's needs. It is a matter, in fact, not just of the ennobling influence of reason, and the overcoming of negative phenomena by means of it, but of the comprehensive culture of man's needs. What is usually characterised as the rationality of needs is a multidimensional phenomenon whose essential aspects form a unity of political, moral, and aesthetic criteria.

When we speak of rational needs, we consequently mean a socially given measure of needs; the concrete level of mastery of the forces of nature and its own powers attained by society is its historical limit. The horizon of needs is constantly changing. The main milestones of progress in this field are movement from the very great injustice of exploiter society, when the needs of some are satisfied at the expense of others, to the social harmony and abundance of communism, when the satisfaction of needs will not know any limitations except the needs themselves of a highly conscious and cultured personality and of society as a whole.

The process of raising needs, interests, motives, aims, sense of values, and other components of a dynamic (active) social continuum, and the elevating of the whole personality by means of and within this continuum, is a global process of social development during which there is a

cultivating [of] all the qualities of social man and producing [of] him in a form as rich as possible in needs because rich in qualities and relations—producing man as the most total and universal social product possible (for in order to enjoy many different kinds of things he must be capable of enjoyment, that is he must be cultivated to a high degree)."

The socialist type of socialisation of the personality contains all the essential features of the new society, converted into a process of personal development, among which one must note the following: consciousness, collectivism, scientific validity, and ensuring of the full flowering of such powerful institutes

of socialisation (and consequently of raising the personality) as education and upbringing; reliance on the increasing labour and socio-political activity of the masses, and on their independence and innovative experience of historical creation of new, ever more perfected forms of human society; increase of the specific weight of self-education, and of the socialist moral fund in the system of the motive forces and inner mechanisms of the development of the personality; internationalism and genuine democracy in the whole process of developing the new man; achievement in everyday practice of an ideological, political, social, and moral unity of the subjects of socialisation of all structural levels, from society to the collective. The socialist type of socialisation ensures predominant development and favourable objective and subjective conditions for heightening the importance of the personality.

Raising the place of the personality is a necessary moment in the progressing reproduction of socialist society. The whole dialectical wealth of real development is inherent in this process, viz., multilevel, contradictory and harmony-achieving resolution of contradictions.

When we talk about global criteria of the process concerned we are thus referring to a system of concepts, a 'constellation of ideals'. The absolute disclosure of man's creative talents as the supreme sense of real wealth; mastery of universal freedom through creative work and all-embracing social creativity as scientifically substantiated and practical dominance over nature, social development, and man himself; a supreme level of culture, achievement of full equality and true justice, flowering of the brotherhood of people and international friendship of nations; everbroadening extended reproduction of the harmony of human being and so a continuous rise of creativity by the laws of beauty are all generalised criteria that concentrate progress of the history of society and man, and serve as essential orienters of the social process of heightening the importance of the human personality.

The communist type of this process, which appears value-wise as the communist social ideal of the personality, presupposes developed, more concrete requirements of society for all-round, whole, harmonious development of man:

(1) ideological, theoretical maturity, and a Marxist-Leninist world outlook as a guide to everyday conduct and social activity;

(2) versatile labour development through the transformation of labour into a prime vital need as the basis of the whole

system of the creative personality's intellectual and practical values;

(3) all-round political development presupposing a politically highly cultivated personality and high legal culture;

(4) all-round moral development and a high moral culture;

(5) all-round aesthetic development and high aesthetic and artistic culture;

(6) all-round development of the individual's intellect, emotions, and will;

(7) all-round physical development and high physical culture.

The active life stance of the builder of the new society presupposes a scientific world outlook, i.e. mastery of Marxism-Leninism as a system of philosophical, economic, and socio-political views, high political, moral, and aesthetic development, which, as a system, forms the determinant ideological content of raising the importance of the socialist personality.

A high political, moral, and aesthetic culture of the human individual is a key, systems, resultant expression of raising the place of the individual and a real guarantee of further fruitful and progressing development of this process. The integral unity of these three aspects of human culture forms an active, valuable, intellectual and practical state, social and moral in substance, embraced essentially by such a concept as 'cultural level', 'culture', or 'education'. The dialectical subtlety of the application of this concept envisages not only its bearer's basic attribution of 'education' to a corresponding social stratum (there are also the paradoxes when intellectuals by social cachet or diploma prove to be insufficiently cultured in the above-mentioned sense), but also an ever broadening reproduction of really intellectual people in the working class and among collective farmers, and in various social categories of the population.

As a social and moral phenomenon and as a human formation of special complexity, education or culture includes the dialectic of the universally human and the social-class. It would be legitimate to designate the socialist type of cultural level by the lofty name of culture of a Marxist-Leninist type. Soviet reality provides many arguments for characterising this type of education from the example of members of all the social groups and strata of Soviet society.

In the individual aspect the process of heightening the role of the personality discloses both a vigorous development of all the capacities, creative gifts, and talents of a given person

moulded and developed in ontogenesis through the effect of the social medium, and the attainment of higher levels of activity and productiveness of creative activity, and above all of labour productivity, quality and efficiency of work, humanisation, harmonising, and enrichment of human life and relations between people. This process appears as the all-round development of the dynamic social continuum of a given individual and his system of social qualities in the stream of historical time, in a concrete-historical life situation that express the ascending movement and whole change of the individual in their law-governed connection with the dialectically occurring social process.

NOTES

- 1 Karl Marx. The Process of Circulation of Capital (*Capital*, Book Two). Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 49 (Politizdat, Moscow, 1974), p 483.
- 2 Marx wrote: 'the extent of the so-called primary requirements for life and the manner of their satisfaction depend to a large degree on the level of civilisation of the society, are themselves the product of history'. See: Karl Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-1863. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1988, p 44.
- 3 'This law of increasing requirements has manifested itself with full force in the history of Europe'. See: V. I. Lenin, On the So-called Market Question, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p 106.
- 4 See: Frederick Engels, Speeches in Elberfeld. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 263.
- 5 Karl Marx, Comments on James Mill. *Éléments d'économic politique*. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 215.
- 6 Karl Marx. Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858). Translated by Ernst Wangermann. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p 336.

MAN'S HEALTH IN TERMS OF PHILOSOPHY

I. N. Smirnov

The trend, character and particular circumstances of modern life put man in a set of complex conditions which are not quite usual in biological terms. Man today has to adapt himself to the fast-moving pace of civilisation and to learn—very rapidly as a rule—to get in step with ever new changes in his lifestyle. This calls for a revision of the accepted notions of the capacities of the human organism and for a deeper understanding of certain aspects of man's existence and those of his properties which, until some time ago, were seen as matters of no scholarly or practical interest. Among the fundamental properties of man is health. For a long time health was seen as a natural gift, and although it was recognised to have considerable impact on man's social potential and to be significant in terms of a fuller expression of his natural potential, scholars were not always prepared to see health as a matter of social value.

Dostoyevsky's 'man is mystery' is a dictum of profound meaning reflecting an unfailing interest in the study of man. All of man's conscious history is, in fact, concerned with just that—a search for a solution to that mystery—the story of the emergence of man, his basic properties, and a definition of the meaning and essence of human life. Now, that mystery is by no means seen as a single property definable in just one particular way, which once solved would offer the key to all and every problem related to man. The mystery which knowledge seeks to disclose includes all the various aspects of human nature, a unique phenomenon created by the evolution of the objective world out of the complexity, contradiction and variety of forms of existence. One of the components of that mystery is health.

Health is a basic property in the set of human qualities which must be taken into account if our understanding and explanation of man is to be complete or at least correct. Human health, however, has far from always occupied the minds of scholars; nor was it always considered as having a bearing on the urgent

aspects of social practice. This approach stems not so much from the possibility or desire to get a full insight into the subject of health and relate it to the various aspects of man's activity as from the historically conventional view of health as *sine qua non* and a kind of axiom of human life. For ages health was seen as a gift—maybe not natural but divine in any case. This idea was fully in line with common sense and with ordinary thinking which saw health, *inter alia*, as an empirically given entity.

We are now witnessing a dramatic rise in universal interest in health-related problems. Let us make no mistake about it—it is health we are concerned with, not health disorders or pathological conditions which are, of course, not to be dismissed in any discussion of the subject of health. A lot has been done both on the theoretical and practical levels to discover the nature of disease, the mechanisms of sickness and to define what is normal and what is pathological. In its search for efficacious ways to control diseases society has long since ceased to rely on individual healers and medicine men and built up a ramified public health system, creating a sort of health industry which absorbs enormous funds not likely to be reduced in the future. Yet the achievements are patently insufficient. So society is faced with the need for a multiple increase in public health expenditure. Dissatisfaction is growing with the existing medical care, stimulating a search for fresh ways to protect and improve human health. Hence arises the need of getting a better insight into the health-related phenomenon as it is seen at the levels both of ordinary thinking and of science. And that is what lies behind the desire to unravel the mystery of one of man's essential characteristics. The time has come to develop a concept of health in scientific theory, drawing on advances in both the natural sciences and Humanities.

Stated in these terms, the problem is not limited to general policies even though it is important enough to be justified by immediate goals. It is doubtlessly related to a broader range of problems that have an immediate bearing on man generally and, particularly, on philosophical analysis of him. Complicated as the problem is and obviously requiring recourse both to the natural-scientific principles of human life and to the social conditions of man's evolution, it cannot but exhibit a clearly philosophical overtone and have significance for one's world outlook. It would be hard at this point to state or provide a philosophical definition of the meaning of health without recourse to the findings of the physiology of higher nervous

activity, genetics and, generally, of human biology. On the other hand, where the concern is individual and, even more so, public health, advances in social science and an understanding of the human essence, could not be dismissed.

The commonly held and widespread view is that man's health falls under the purview of public health and its ramified and complex system of services and is the prerogative of medical science. That view, as far as it goes, is correct. On the other hand, an effective solution to the related problems closely involves philosophers and scholars in other fields. Many research works on medicine-related philosophy testify to this. Their authors, who represent philosophy as well as medical science and practice, discuss a broad spectrum of social and philosophico-methodological aspects of the history and evolution of medicine; the progress in health protection, the principles of research into disease; interaction of different scientific fields in defining pathological processes, etc. In most cases, however, these articles, reviews and papers mostly deal with the analysis of, research into, and ways and means of controlling disease. We are mostly concerned with health—original human property. In other words, we raise the problem of the health of a healthy human being.

As a scientific and social problem human health now ranks among what is described as global issues. The problem of health increasingly figures in discussions of national wealth (including national income), labour potential and labour resources, labour productivity and, in the final analysis, the effectiveness of the entire system of production and social framework. In practical terms and by degree of urgency, human health is given top priority, along with such major social issues as environmental protection and improvement and also war on famine. It is this problem that forces mankind to understand and appreciate a broad range of questions of theory and practice and the need to find a solution conducive to the future of human society and, probably, the continued existence of humanity.

The evolving ecological situation urgently demands solutions to problems concerning human health. Of late this particular aspect of health has come to the fore and its discussion has produced the concept of ecological health—a concept closely related to the philosophical analysis of Man, which advances and streamlines it.

The changing human conditions and lifestyles, dictated by civilisation's impact on the environment and also occasional and irreversible evolution of nature as the underlying basis of

man and society, create a host of conditions under which the human organism is faced with a choice: *either* to develop a suitable reaction and adapt itself to them *or* surrender some of the achievements made in the course of evolutionary and social progress, the consequence of which would be functional disintegration, destrueturing, disease and death.

We are becoming increasingly more conscious of the need for broader research into an integrated approach to health. This re-orientation stems, to a considerable extent, from attempts to take the fullest possible account of the many aspects of man's life and the various levels of human relations which constitute his social life and activity. It also stems from the desire to consider health as one of the economic, social and moral values. The absence of such equal consideration makes the planning and forecasting of man's future an increasingly more difficult exercise. Studies analysing these complicated issues at the appropriate theoretical level are, regrettfully, all too rare.

It is increasingly felt that further steps towards health improvement will depend not only on the implementation of the existing and anticipated public health programmes, based on the progress of medical science and practice; it also depends on the provision of a fuller and more precise definition (including philosophical) of human health that is not only the health of the sick but also of the healthy in terms of his capability to fulfil socially useful functions. To put it differently, what is needed is a more comprehensive definition of the scientific concept of health and a clearer idea of just what health is. In this connection it is appropriate to reiterate Karl Marx's statement that "all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature".¹ With this in mind we can correctly appreciate both the need for a constant appraisal of the human evolutionary process which is accompanied by changing health conditions in ontogenetic and phylogenetic terms and the chances for making such an appraisal subject to the proviso that the available social experience and scientific advances will be put to use.

The concept of human health is reflective of the results of the centuries-old effort by scholars in different academic disciplines to provide such a definition. Within the limits of mankind's current advances, the present definition is comprehensive in reflecting the requirements of practical life and of human activity, in meeting the criteria and standards of a fully established civilisation. The existing scientific definition of health brings us closer to an adequate identification of man's various normal and pathological conditions and also provides methodological guide-

lines for using the various preventive and curative methods to maintain human health at the necessary level. Science, like life itself, is ever advancing and this alone necessitates further endeavours in the sphere of philosophico-methodological definition of health. This work cannot, obviously, be effective without close liaison with practical fields of knowledge and specific fields of practical endeavour. In the final analysis, it is a matter of lending more weight to, and enhancing the responsibility of, social science in formulating and resolving health-related problems. This is particularly true of sociology, psychology and law, without which the role of philosophy would be rather limited.

Regretfully, arguments calling for the substantiation of the problem of health—its socio-philosophical, methodological and other aspects—mainly proceed from the rule of contraries. What happens is that causes of diseases are analysed first, followed by an analysis of what is good for health. For example, it is often noted that social factors are more and more becoming the causes of cardio-vascular and oncological diseases (which rank first among ailments), invalidity and deaths among the adult population. Social conditions are also major causes of nervous, psychic and psychosomatic disorders. Some WHO experts are concerned that the modern world is facing a pandemic of chronic insufficiency and psychosocial disorders. Among the causes of the latter two are uncontrolled urbanisation, increasing migration, dwindling sizes of families in industrialised nations, growing numbers of unhappy families both in industrialised and developing countries, etc. The limited and incomplete quality of this class of studies, in our view, is traceable to the fact that health is narrowly defined and emphasis is laid on its relative quality and on the idea that good health can be postulated only subject to the precise purposes for which such postulation is necessary. The result is that, despite all the positive efforts to define health, there does not exist even today a strictly scientific approach to the problem of effective public health protection. Past attempts of Malthusian, eugenic, and psychoanalytical description showed their futility and have had a reactionary, regressive effect. As a result, these attempts contributed to the spread of pessimistic and nihilistic attitudes and also of the idea that the contradiction between progress in science and technology and human health was insurmountable.

Health is a multi-dimensional concept that cannot be taken out of the philosophical context of man, the fundamentals of which are to be found in the Marxist concept of man. As a

product of a natural biological and social evolution, man must have optimal adaptability to the natural conditions in which he lives and also to man-created civilisation—his second 'environment'.

Like any scientific concept reflective of particular natural or social processes, conditions or states, the concept of health is certainly a historical one. That is to say, in response to the development of human society, and as a consequence of the ever complicating relations that make man dependent on what we term civilisation, the concept of health has changed. It has acquired fresh content, a new meaning and novel implications. Underlying this transformation are multiple causes of which the following need be specially stressed.

First, the natural environment of man's life, character and structure of his activities change while unprecedented conditions and nature-transforming factors in his environment take shape. Their consequences could not but have an effect on man's physiological and psychic processes and, in the final analysis, on the way man feels, both objectively and subjectively. Second, advances in science, of which man is the top priority, have added to the ability to identify and assess disorders, changing the perception of disease, its nature, processes, curative methods and hence, of man's health. The Marxian idea of socio-historical practice—the underlying basis for Man's improvement and scientific knowledge—has had a tremendous impact on the growing importance of science as a factor for man's self-perception and self-awareness—a factor that has direct bearing on his health.

In order to get a clearer notion of man's health as an indissoluble unity of the natural and the social, of body and mind, we must turn to the natural history of man's emergence since the problem of health is closely related to man's standing vis-à-vis nature. This subject should be considered in its effective and active aspect rather than as one to be contemplated for its own sake and to be regretted as irretrievably past and gone. Having arrived at the notion of creative man, philosophers have traditionally wondered about the relation of health to activity, the nature of the causal factor in this equation, the manner in which health affects production and creativity, and, in turn, whether the latter contribute to the improvement or weakening, decline or loss of health. In the history of science this problem has developed into a standing challenge of identifying the humanistic foundations of society and of rationalising the sources of human life and its underlying fundamental principles. It may be noted

at this point that, despite the seeming obviousness of the subject, there have been different formulations of the problem. The causes of this diversity are many and varied, including differing first postulates, the role of culture at the time the problem was tackled and, finally, different social aims and purposes. The most widespread approach in all this inevitable diversity of views, however, is the one fairly accurately stated in our days by the Soviet philosopher M. A. Lifshits: 'Can there be a return to nature without a sacrifice of developed thought and of the more modern type of humaneness?'² What is implied, of course, is the condition of man himself and his 'natural' feeling, i.e., the feeling of health.

Expressed in mythological-poetic, religious and philosophical terms, this diversity of approaches and solutions was not only reflective of the stage in the development of a particular social formation but, to some extent, of the human spirit, inextricably tied in as it is with health in its application to human corporeality. While exhibiting varying degrees of optimistic fervour, all the answers nevertheless implied a return to nature in terms of an ideal. It goes without saying that such ideals carried a shade—if not necessarily explicit then more or less implicitly idealistic—of theological treatment since human health was inevitably subordinated to divine volition and the will of God. Even those philosophers whom the objective process of cognition led to a materialistic concept of health ended up, through inconsistency and contradictions in their world outlook, trapped in this school of thought.

It is generally accepted that the cultural patterns developed in classical times provided the happiest example of man's unity with nature. It was assumed that the concept of health as a kind of mental condition was possible only if the primary natural factor was made part of man's existence. Yet, even at that time (and this trend developed more consciously and purposefully at latter stages) there emerged the idea that the level of culture, as well as individual and social consciousness were important conditions both for social progress in its most general forms and a very real and effective regulatory agency for the emergence and evolution of functions bearing on man's health.

The various specifically human qualities—in the sense of their biological and psycho-physiological conditionality—have played a predominant role in specific historical contexts in controlling man's emergence as personality, with health being far from the least important of its aspects. As a case in point, impressionability (emotionality) has been and continues to be an important

factor behind man's psychic condition, affecting—and sometimes actually dictating—his health. Progress in culture and civilisation, man's growing knowledge, the effect of education and upbringing—all these elements have combined to transform this quality to a certain extent, providing fresh evidence of the empirically high degree of variability and changeability of human characteristics.

Society has developed methods and ways of exploiting this quality as well as the means to make progress in the desired directions; it has come a long way in the application of its more primitive forms, compared with classical times. Today, we look on the epidemic of insanity caused by the scenes and conflicts of Euripides' *Andromache* only as a historical anecdote.

Even in those distant times society moved to take what to us would be a strange kind of concern for its members' health, guided, of course, by contemporary ideas of health. Some examples suggest that creativity and, therefore, art were discouraged if they tended to undermine good health through excessive action on the nervous, mental and physiological conditions of viewers. Thus, another ancient playwright, Phrynicus, was fined a thousand drachmas for his play *Capture of Miletus*, which caused sobbing among all its audiences.

On the other hand, the consequences of bourgeois mass culture can be all too clearly seen from their effects on human health, destroying the psychic balance as it does, particularly among the young; causing mass departures from the healthy way of life, and giving rise to an unstable attitude to human life as a value in its own right. Among the constantly growing causes of psychogenic disorders are horror films, the poeticising of the darker aspects of the human soul, the propaganda of violence, and other forms of anti-humanistic culture.

The foregoing is intended to emphasise more and more the obvious truth that health is inseparable from the problem of man, that it emerged concurrently with man, and that it is subject to change in accordance with the changing directions of human culture. Talking about man's health we inevitably refer—frequently without actually conscious thinking about it—to the unity of brain and consciousness, of body and mind. Throughout human history difficulties in defining man's health have stemmed from the multiplicity of manifestations of human intellectual and material life. This is evidence also of the fact that the treatment of health as a social condition holds the best promise in establishing precisely what health is all about.

Health is a sanguineous condition of man, which causes him

to see his life and activity as a natural development of his inherent properties and qualities. Hence the determination to eradicate the obstacles in the way of health, i.e. diseases.

Progress in natural science has provided a certain stimulus to the development of the concept of human health. Philosophers could not bypass advances in getting to know human nature and, to the extent that they were prepared to apply them to their concepts descriptive of man's essence, sought to marry naturalistic views with a metaphysical analysis of his nature, a situation that was particularly typical of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Progress in the knowledge of man's psychological properties and of the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious, as well as attempts to analyse and influence the human psychic condition had an early impact on medical practice and, consequently, on the interpretation of health, health-preservation methods and propaganda approaches.

In advocating a sound mind as an inevitable condition of a sound body (Platonian dualism of body and mind), idealistic philosophers assumed that disease was an evil for man and that the vexation caused by disease was another form of disease aggravating the original disorder. Spinoza's adherents saw one of the attractive aspects of his philosophy in the fact that it touched on matters of mental health. Spinoza's recipe was seemingly simple and accessible: he whom reason leads is always guided by the good.

In idealistic philosophy the problem of health is closely related to man's self-awareness, the desire to understand his fate and his own predestination. Presenting these rather vital problems as challenges to be met, idealistic philosophy has, however, proved unable to feel or give expression in its concepts to the true dialectics of man's integral life and its inextricable ties with intellectual and practical activities. What could this philosophy offer man, how could it give courage to the suffering? In arguing for man's inability to resolve problems vital to him, idealism actually doomed him to eternal suffering and to an impossibility, in principle, of gaining freedom for his mind and body in this life. It could offer nothing more encouraging than the dictum of the Ecclesiastes, the 'destiny of the sons of men and the destiny of beasts is the same destiny'. No matter how hard man strives for knowledge and health, beyond everything there is the horrible phantom of all-consuming death and omnipresent darkness.

Yet the history of philosophy also has been marked by other trends that emphasised the social function of health in a clearer

manner, and sought to picture it if not as the mainspring of social progress then at least as its essential causal element. These attempts did not always contribute to the consolidation of the life-asserting principles of health, the discovery of man's true potential, and to the rationale of a society in which the ideals would correspond to the aspirations and expectations of all its members, who are born to be free, healthy and happy. In their effort to establish an anti-humanistic idea of health, philosophers of this school attacked science first and foremost. The brunt of M. Nordau's notorious work, 'Degradation', is directed against science. It criticises advances in materialistic medicine with all the ferocity of the primitive age. And can one accept the definition of disease as man's natural and necessary condition as advocated by such boundless pessimists as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche?

This type of philosophy runs contrary to, and rules out, the humanistic trend in the philosophical cognition of man. It destroys the eternal principles of humanism—good and justice. The examples cited above point to the negative role of philosophy in the retrospective (naturally incomplete) within the context of which attempts were made to analyse the principle of health and to define its place in the characterisation of human personality. Even so, the negative experience of idealistic philosophy like the successful attempts, must be critically analysed and overcome with the help of a scientific philosophy and reliance on scientific achievements and practical application.

Everyday reality, social planning and investigation of the process that centers on man constitute the primary impetus for this effort. It will be seen then that the need for this effort comes not so much from the course of the progress of science but probably to a greater extent from the demands of social practice and production.

The challenge facing philosophy necessitates the use of all the means and possibilities open to it for a comprehensive analysis of the manifold variety of factors involved in an integrated definition of the concept of health, the question of method being paramount. This situation is neither unusual nor exceptional in the history of science. The attempts to define life are a case in point. Unable yet to come out with a universally accepted definition, scientists tirelessly continue to investigate its individual manifestations and processes and they uncover ever new laws. The problem of health provides a sort of parallel. If today no clear-cut scientific definition of health exists which could be broadly used as a basic guideline for the range of medical studies

and social practice, then herein lies additional proof that science has one more tough challenge to meet.

The problem of human health can be the object of an effective solution-oriented effort in a broader context of scientific-philosophical concept of man. Health is an inherent quality and property of an individual. Also it addresses a specific subject that calls for specific methods of research. The gamut of health-related questions is extremely broad and the aspects of its manifestations are practically infinite. Even so, there is need for greater clarity and certainty in the understanding and analysis of the essence of this subject. In other words, it is a question of developing a specific conceptual vocabulary and scientific mechanism.

Scientific methodology has gained immeasurable significance now that the context of the philosophical knowledge of man increasingly embraces both social sciences and Humanities, on the one hand, and—to a considerable extent—the findings of natural science. That is to say integration of natural science and philosophy in the cognition of man is becoming increasingly typical of modern culture.

NOTES

¹ Karl Marx. *The Poverty of Philosophy*. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 192.

² Mikhail Lifshits. *Mifologiya drevnyaya i sovremenaya* (Mythology, Ancient and Modern), Moscow, 1980, p 13.

MAN AS AN OBJECT OF STUDY IN PHILOSOPHY AND APPLIED SCIENCES

A. G. Myslivchenko

The history of philosophical studies, just like that of specific natural sciences and Humanities, points to continued efforts by thinkers of the past to gain an insight into man's nature, the meaning of his being and his further evolution. The late 19th and early 20th centuries were marked by a revolution in natural sciences heralded by the discovery of the electron, radioactivity, the dependence of electron mass on its velocity, etc.—a revolution that enhanced interest in the theory of scientific knowledge and brought philosophy around to the theory of epistemology. Seen against the impressive background of the theory of natural phenomena external to man, advances in the cognition of man—especially his inner self—were very modest, indeed.

The result was a sort of cultural gap between progress in special knowledge made available by natural sciences and technical arts and the obviously inadequate understanding of the phenomenon of man. Another complicating feature was the fact that the special sciences provided but a fragmentary idea of what was man, focused as they were on particular aspects of his biological functioning, consciousness and behaviour, rather than on man in his totality. Attempts made by many scholars to develop a single, comprehensive theory of man always met with serious obstacles. Helvetius had in mind the manifold nature of this problem when he remarked that man was a model viewed by different artists, each of whom saw but a few of its features but none had so far been able to see it in its entirety. This problem of cognising man is characteristic not only of past history but of contemporary research as well. In this context, there has arisen an increasingly urgent need for an integrated conception of man's being, one in which man is not a mere item among so many others, nor a partially conceived, but the subject of social, cultural and historical activity, a unity of the natural and the social, an active and feeling entity with its own complex and unique inner self.

The mid-20th century, marked by an unprecedented progress

in science and technology, heralded a peculiar development that has come to be known as 'back to man'. This development contributed to the 'humanisation' both of the various philosophical schools of thought and of many specific sciences. Unlike the preceding philosophical interest in the problems of epistemology, which stemmed from progress in natural sciences—especially the 'science crisis'—at the turn of the century, the 'back to man' proceeds from broader causes. These are rooted in the fastly growing sciences and technology as well as social relations, in the rise of the human factor in every economic and intellectual field and in the whole range of cultural endeavour.

The important changes occurring in humanity's current and future natural and social environment have a profound impact on the range of problems in social, natural and technical sciences, contributing to a certain reorientation of the latter towards a study of the multiple aspects of man's existence. In contrast with the previous period, modern study of man is characterised by a greater multiplicity of treatments, identification of fresh aspects of investigation and new questions to be resolved and, subsequently, by the rise of comparatively new academic disciplines as well as interdisciplinary ties and problems. The older sciences (anthropology, psychology, biology, physiology, medicine, etc.) have been complemented by new disciplines and fields such as human genetics, differential psychophysiology, typology of the higher nervous activity, somatology, sexology, axiology, euristics, characterology and others. The emergence of cybernetics, biophysics and biochemistry opened up fresh opportunities for the application of mathematics, physics, chemistry and technical sciences to the study of man as the most sophisticated, self-regulating and self-adjusting entity; for the 'mathematisation' of anthropological sciences as well as for the reverse process of humanising exact and technical sciences.

The range of the ongoing scientific research, broad as it is, steadily produces a wealth of diverse empirical data on man, leading to attempts to systematically arrange and bring together unrelated facts on the level of individual disciplines and within an interdisciplinary framework. Even so, the process of cognising man is not free from significant problems and shortcomings. The reason for this is not to be limited to the exploding store of particular scientific facts; it can be attributed to the difficulties involved in the comparison and generalisation of the available data belonging, as they are, to different fields of science with their own peculiar conceptual frameworks and research methods. Even where the concepts would appear to be the same in

the terminologies of different sciences (e.g., individual, man's personality, structure, nature, integral quality, etc.), on closer examination they prove to vary widely in interpretation and in what the practitioners of particular disciplines thought they mean. This condition adds special importance to the analysis of the special characteristics of the levels and methods of cognition of man by different sciences, their interrelationships and the extent to which they lend themselves to the process of synthesising.

Progress in man-related sciences necessitates the breaking of barriers dividing the many empirical data so as to create a unified system of comprehensive knowledge of man—a system that will, as far as possible, provide a generalised picture of the findings of both natural and social sciences related to man.

The accepted Marxist idea of the need for a comprehensive approach to the study of man assumes that man cannot be effectively studied in depth by just one or a few special sciences (e.g., psychology, anthropology, etc.) but requires the joint efforts of all natural sciences and Humanities and their reliance on the whole range of modern scientific methods. The need for a comprehensive approach stems, in the first place, from the nature of the class of entities which include man as a particular bio-social system. This system functions as a complex dynamic entity of a number of subsystems and of a plurality of individual parts which, in turn, are characterised by a structure as sophisticated as the entire system.

In the last few decades individual scientists have attempted to integrate all man-related knowledge around a single discipline—generally psychology—or on an interdisciplinary level. However, experience demonstrates that, if the science of man is to be successfully developed then, to quote the French Marxist Paul Boccardo, 'it is necessary to discard the polydisciplinary approach with a weak relationship between the man-related sciences as well as the predominance of any one discipline or the practice of opposing one discipline to another'.¹ The answer lies in transdisciplinary study, i.e., in the development of the whole range of sciences in every field of knowledge.

The whole history of the cognition of man through natural sciences (biology, physiology, neurophysiology, etc.) suggests that they are good only to account for the biological causes of those specifically human characteristics which provide the essential demarcation between man and animal and which come from the social definition of his activities. In the words of the Polish philosopher Tadeusz Jaroszewski:

Accordingly, occasional attempts to reduce the development of man's economic, socio-political, artistic and other activities to categories, scientific analysis and theoretical models borrowed from neurophysiology, the biological theory of 'natural needs' (and of the different ways in which they are 'suppressed' by modern civilisation) or to the concept of conditional reflexes should be put down as absolutely futile. This treatment is especially typical of psychoanalytical as well as of behaviouristic anthropology regardless of any differences between the two.²

Soviet psychologist B. G. Ananiev has made an important contribution to the integrated approach to the subject of man within the framework of particular sciences. Ananiev suggests that modern science is headed for the integration of all man-related knowledge and the emergence of a general theory of man. He believes that it is psychology that provides the component for integrating all the fields of knowledge: '...It is psychology that provides the link between all the fields of man-related knowledge and the means to integrate the different natural and social sciences into a *new synthetic science of man*'.³ Ananiev recognises, however, that philosophy must provide the basis for a general theory of man, that philosophical generalisation of all scientific data on the relationship between man's social and individual development is among the major tools for developing a general theory of man, and that it is only through the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of man that the diverse sources of scientific knowledge of man can be fully integrated.

Ananiev, however, failed to substantiate the proclaimed role of philosophy as an integrator of the different sources of scientific knowledge of man. Accordingly, it would be erroneous to describe his contribution as an attempt to develop a 'theory of man'. The scholar's intent was not, in fact, to develop a theory of man in philosophy but rather in the context of particular sciences by integrating existing advances in natural and social sciences insofar as they are related to the knowledge of man.

In methodological terms, an integrated method was postulated as the key to the construction of the 'synthetic man'. Many researchers, however, point to the existing experience in the application of this method and put in doubt any glowing hopes for its integrative capacity to develop a general theory of man. These scholars are correct in pointing out the basic shortcomings of the integrated method, which stem primarily from the difficulty of integrating—to say nothing of synthesising—the diversity of man-related information and also from the virtual impossibility to develop a comprehensive theory of man through the use of this method. The terms 'all-round' and 'integrated' should not be treated as synonymous. In the words of A. N. Leontiev,

B. G. Ananiev's attempt at an integrated approach to man ended up in a multiplicity of study projects, ranging from the characteristics of metabolic processes to individual differences in selected psychic functions. Clearly, though, no collection of varied man-related knowledge can replace the requirement for an integral understanding of the psychology of personality seen as an entity of a special kind.⁴

In this context, while sharing the idea that an integrated method of studying man generally and, in particular, of problems at the interface between different academic disciplines, there is serious ground for doubting the underlying feasibility to give effect to the idea of developing a unified science that will synthesise many sciences into a general theory of man. The idea of such a science, it seems, can hardly materialise, because man is a highly sophisticated system that is studied not by just one but a complex of social and natural sciences, each doing so by its own methods and from its own vantage point.

The proponents of a unified science of man place their hopes in the integration of sciences interpreted as a process purportedly leading to amalgamation of different man-related information and to the emergence of a synthesised picture. True, currently underway is a growing process of science differentiation and integration (including man-related sciences). Even so, it is correct to argue with P. N. Fedoseyev that

any such integration of knowledge is not a mere amalgamation or mutual dissolution of sciences, but rather their interaction and mutual enrichment in the interest of providing a joint solution to integrated problems, particular aspects of which are studied by individual sciences. It is this form of cooperation of different 'sovereign' sciences in providing a joint solution of the overall problem of man that can yield positive results.⁵

Attempts to bring together different man-related sciences through the use of specialised methods—systems structure, structure-functional, logico-mathematical, modelling etc.—have often ended up in a fragmented, eclectic description of features, properties and relations, both relevant and irrelevant. The result has been a mechanical piecemealing of assorted information, instead of a comprehensive portrait of man. What is obvious, then, is that at this point no attempt to systematise and add up man-related information developed by particular sciences can be successful in portraying man as an entity (such as it actually is) that possesses not merely a multiplicity of unrelated biological and social qualities but a unified complex of integrative socio-

The view put forward in this connection by I. T. Frolov

appears to be well taken. I. T. Frolov, although a proponent of a unified man-related science is careful to say that at this point

there is no truly integrative solution with the result that, among other things, man comes through as an object of 'fragmented knowledge' of which we can know everything except what makes him an integral bio-social being and personality subject to many integrated laws and 'system forces' produced by the interaction of multiple biological, psychic and social factors.⁶

Also, any discussion of the need for a unified man-related science should focus not so much on the current research practice as on the general trend in research. In other words, the idea of a unified man-related science is seen today as the formulation of a unified long-term programme of human studies to be followed by natural and social sciences.

It follows from the above that the methodological and integrative potential of the integrated method calls for a more careful and balanced analysis. Whether the idea of a unified man-related science eventually proves to be viable or not, within the context of particular man-related sciences the integrated method cannot, admittedly, replace the development of a philosophical conception of man as an integrative entity. The challenge here is one of philosophical and sociological interpretation and that, in turn, can be effective only if special scientific subjects are studied in maximum depth and a close relationship between philosophy and particular sciences is assured.

The logic of the study of man by social and natural sciences is placing an increasingly higher priority on generalising and systematising the multiplicity of man-related information secured by specialised sciences and on continued positive development of the purely philosophical aspect of the problem of man, on an integrated philosophy of man, to rest on advances in particular man-related sciences and the practice of social history.

Philosophical studies, for their part, provide a methodological and fundamental conceptual point of departure for individual natural and social sciences to analyse and find solutions to the special problems of man's manifold activities and, in the final analysis, to develop an integral system of man-related knowledge.

To sum up, the experience of both philosophical and specialised scientific studies of the problem of man demonstrates that the two trends must not be allowed to degenerate into a process of divergent development. To marry the concept of either the philosophical or the specialised scientific approach to the exclusion of the other would be to raise the danger of slipping into ab-

stract philosophical anthropologism of the existentialist variety in the former case or into positivistic scientism, in the latter. Both approaches would lead to one-dimensional deficient accounts of what man actually is.

What dictates the need for an integral philosophical theory of man is the fact that man is not a mere conglomerate of diverse parameters—anthropological, physiological, psychic, social activity-related, etc. He is a certain integrity which at this level of integration possesses novel specific qualities which may not be properly reduced to the quality of any particular component or to their sum total. The novel quality of the whole entity is that objective underlying basis which necessitates identification of the philosophical level of cognition, a level at which the inherent limitations of specialised scientific approaches to man as a totality is to be overcome.

It is common knowledge that advances in particular sciences and progress in the philosophy of dialectical materialism are inter-related and reciprocally stimulate one another. While acknowledging this general statement, however, analysts not infrequently reduce philosophy to a methodological function vis-à-vis studies in particular sciences destined to be a mere interpreter of individual sciences or to sum up, classify and systematise their findings. A scientific philosophy, however, is not just a by-product of knowledge accumulated by particular sciences. Its growing importance in the modern world is dictated by more than just its significance for progress in particular sciences: in the complex and ramified system of society's intellectual culture philosophy plays a universal integrative role, bringing together particular sciences and all other forms of human activity.

In addition to the methodological, fundamental conceptual and integrative functions of philosophy in the process of cognising man, mention should also be made of its euristic role. Indeed, however deeply they may study man as an empirical fact, no single particular science or any combination of them have the potential of providing solutions to such problems as man's essence, freedom, activity, subjectivism, alienation, meaning of life, etc. And that is only too natural, because to arrive at these solutions means going beyond the limits of particular sciences studying man as an empirical fact to the level of philosophical generalisation which allows man to be seen as the 'world of man', as a dialectical unity of the common (all-human) elements, particular (class-related, ethnic and other) elements and individual elements, as an entity of biological, psychic and social

components. A peculiar feature of the philosophical level of the study of man is that it employs a special categorial apparatus and a dialectical method to provide an all-round theoretical interpretation and integration (as opposed to a mere summation) into a total conception of the findings of specialised sciences and of the achievements of human civilisation. For this reason, development of a total conception of man and of a general theory of man's integrity is up to a scientific philosophy supported by the findings of particular sciences and by the analysis of the totality of social history rather than to a complex of particular sciences supported by philosophy.

This is not to say that philosophy, and philosophy alone, is that form of theoretical reflection which has the potential to generalise the findings of particular sciences and recreate man as a totality. It will be remembered, firstly, that philosophy synthesises particular sciences in more than just one way, but does so from its own vantage point to provide the solution to its own problems, viz., to create the most all-embracing universal conception of man. Secondly, what particular sciences are concerned with is not just selected aspects of man but—up to a point—part of his universal properties as well, the universal, or the general, having no existence *per se* but only through the particular and the individual. This latter condition opens up the possibility of principle to develop a theory reproducing the man's integrity at different specific levels of particular sciences—psychology, social psychology, human genetics, etc. In other words, different forms of totality may be construed, which will differ in the degree of generalisation and in the academic field they come under. The potential existence of such forms of totality, however, far from obviating the need for a philosophico-sociological theory of man actually requires such a theory. Unlike conceptions of totality in particular sciences, the challenge facing a general theory is to provide a complete, all-round description of man as a bio-psycho-social being. This challenge is to be met not by a general philosophical theory but by a complex of the science of man—an ever growing body of man-related natural sciences and Humanities, complete and all-round.

However, what is a total philosophical conception of man? What problems, principles and parameters may be regarded as basic to the system? Soviet authors have different answers to that, none of which has so far won universal acceptance.

In any case, historico-philosophical and present-day experience indicates that attempts to develop a total conception of man built around a single basic principle (e.g., consciousness,

activity, generic essence, freedom) have failed and been limited to unilateral interpretation at best. At the same time, each of these principles is of such paramount importance that no comprehensive theory of man on the philosophical level would be thinkable without any one of them. What is needed, then, is an effective way to bring these principles together and make them work.

Human subjectiveness interpreted as a subjective aspect of practice is an important basic link in an integral theory. Born of social existence as a practical human activity and of the subject-object nature of social reality, the nature of human subjectiveness is manifested, first of all, in man's creative self-fulfilment. Subjectiveness is defined as a subject-organised inner content, a modus of existence and activity, which are responsible for man's totality and particular direction of activity. Human subjectiveness includes, but is not limited to, consciousness, thought and sensitivity; it possesses an integrative quality formed by the social development of man as subject.⁷ This synthetic quality of subjectiveness as a form of totality may and must play a constructive role in the development of an integral theory of man.

The integration and in-depth treatment of system-forming problems and principles (these being limited statements), if taken separately at the philosophical level of cognition, contributes to a sort of totality or of what Hegel referred to as 'dispersed completeness'. Studying Hegel's *The Science of Logic* Lenin copied out this quotation: 'The one-sidedness of the philosophic principle is generally faced by its opposite one-sidedness, and, as everywhere, totality at least is found as a *dispersed completeness*.' From this Lenin concluded 'totality = (in the shape of) dispersed completeness'.⁸

It would appear from the foregoing that development of an integral theory of man must lead to an indivisible homogeneous monolith in the form of some spurious abstraction of man. Totality consists of system and structure. The integrated approach, far from ruling out problem analysis, presupposes it. No integral theory of man would be thinkable without a specific analysis of problems. An integral theory is unity in multiplicity of aspects and problems. For this reason the development of an integral theory must involve structural compartmentalisation, and the fundamental approach must go parallel with morphological treatment. Obviously, problem analysis must not be reduced to a mechanical stringing up of the problems involved, of which the totality produces a mere sum of loosely related statements. These statements need to be incorporated into a total system

and made subordinate to system-forming tasks. More important, they must not just generalise the findings of various sciences, but raise the entire human problem to a qualitatively new level of cognition, produce additional knowledge and offer new solutions and definitions that must go beyond the limits of those peculiar to specialised (particular) natural and social sciences. In other words, an integral philosophical conception of man must be reflective of the total nature of man *per se*, and that does not come about by merely adding up components (e.g., physical, chemical, biological, social) but in the course of historical social formation of man as the subject of activity.

In recent years Soviet writers and conference participants have been active in discussing this question: which philosophical discipline—dialectical materialism, historical materialism, etc.—has the potential to recreate man as an integral system in conceptual-theoretical terms? These deliberations have inevitably led to a discussion of the definition of the subject and structure of Marxist philosophy generally and historical materialism, in particular.

One reason for doubts in the ability of historical materialism to provide a theoretical conception of man is in the fairly widespread idea that social philosophy is concerned with an impersonal system of social relations and with the theory of the social organism only. Proponents of this school of thought rely on the methodological principle of proceeding from the individual to the social, claiming this to be the all-embracing method of historical materialism. This method, however, represents just one of the available approaches to the study of social relations. The other method of cognition is the reverse procedure—from the social to the individual. The individual and the social being in a state of dialectical unity, both procedures can be employed to provide solutions to different problems in social philosophy.

The principle of unity of the individual and the social implies the possibility of employing—depending on the objectives of theoretical study—either the method of reasoning from the individual to the social, as in the study of the laws of social development and of the unity of the social organism, or the reverse procedure of arriving at the individual from the social, as in the study of individual forms of social existence.

The general conception of the materialistic interpretation of history implicitly contains the humanistic idea that history is the story of man's development and that social and human history are, in the final analysis, one.

As labour activity, productive forces and social progress surge

the process of differentiating interrelationships among men (and individuals themselves) become ever more vigorous in the course of contradictory evolution of man's socialisation (through alienation of man's social essence from his individual mode of existence in antagonistic formations). This condition provides the underlying basis for individualisation and improvement of human beings, formation of their abilities, needs and interests, and the development of man as a subject of various types of activity.

It should be remembered that the problem of man is not studied by historical materialism in full and in all its aspects, but rather from a particular vantage point. Here, the problem is seen against the backdrop of the general theory of social development and plays an important role for a thorough and all-round development of society, social relations and laws in their humanistic dimensions and application. The purview of historical materialism includes the emergence and rise of man; the laws of the historical process of individualisation and formation of man as a personality, the dialectics of social essence and of the individual form of existence, of the natural and the social in man; types of society's relations with the individual in different social formations; social types of individuals, man as the subject of social and cultural creativity through history; relationship between objective laws and conscious activity; motivations and aims of human activity, and many other subjects.

While staying primarily within the context of historical materialism, the problem of the general theory of man in some selected aspects does go beyond the methodology and the problems of historical materialism as a discipline to spill over into other fields of philosophy—dialectical materialism, dialectical logic, methodological support for the study of man by natural sciences (biology, human genetics, anthropology, etc.) As a case in point, in order to answer questions as to man's place in the world and in the single patterned world process, the special nature of man as a material phenomenon, the relationship between the social and the biological in man, one must first address the general philosophical basis on which these questions are to be dealt with, viz., the dialectical materialistic doctrine of the relationship between the subordination of matter and its motion in the inorganic, organic and socially organised worlds.

Some writers rely on the definition of Marxist philosophy as the philosophy of dialectical and historical materialism and on the current practice of teaching the two as separate disciplines to argue that Marxist philosophy should be concerned with two

differently weighted conceptions of man—a dialectical-materialist and a historical-materialist one—the former and the latter being claimed to be the general and the particular, respectively. While admitting in principle that man can be described in terms of dialectical materialism, it should be noted that such description cannot provide a total and full conception of man. This can only be done by going specifically to the higher form of existence of matter—society—and, consequently, to an analysis of the problem of man in terms of historical materialism. For this reason, attempts to develop a conception of man in terms of dialectical materialism *per se* may be described as one of the possible theoretical statements of the problem of man, but not as a comprehensive, all-round philosophical conception.

By limiting the conception of man to the terms of dialectical materialism and divorcing the study of the subject from the historical materialistic perspective, the picture of man is made significantly less complete, with man coming through as the 'highest form of matter', the 'flower of matter', etc. A theoretical reflection that sets out to provide a comprehensive conception of man must, on the other hand, include such system-forming inherent properties of man as freedom, subjectivity, activity, axiological aspects, etc.

For these reasons, it would be wrong to accept the point of view of those who argue that the development of a general theory of man is the responsibility solely of dialectical materialism just as to side with those who argue for historical materialism alone. Insofar as real man represents a unity of the general and of the particular (individual) the theoretical conception of man as an entity must be fragmented into the purely dialectically materialistic (general) and the purely historically materialistic (particular) conception. The continuous formulation of the general theory of man is the responsibility of both dialectical and historical materialism, i.e., the entire Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

The problem of man is peculiar to the entire body of Marxist-Leninist thought, including philosophy. The various objects and natural processes, society and consciousness are studied in philosophy within the context of a definite relationship with man as the subject of cognition, repository of consciousness and socially active being. Accordingly, in the Marxist viewpoint philosophical knowledge also produces, in the final analysis, knowledge of man, his abilities and outlook for development.

The need for a comprehensive theory of man has necessitated a separate branch of study of the problem of man. Progress in

science and social practice indicates that the problem of man has grown in importance in every field of social endeavour to an extent where there is an increasing need for continued purpose-oriented development of a single general theory and comprehensive conception of man. The experience of modern philosophical schools suggests that the problem of man has essentially developed into a relatively independent field of study, a field with its own particular subject of study within the context of a unified but internally differentiated science of Marxist philosophy.

The need for continuous development of man-related philosophical problems generally, and particularly of a comprehensive conception of man, is dictated not merely by the requirements of philosophical self-reflection but primarily by the pressing needs of modern progress in science and social practice. The philosophical cognition of man has a duty to make its own contribution to the formulation of a theoretical basis for a scientific management of social processes and to help achieve the long-term objectives of forming an all-round, intellectually rich personality.

NOTES

- ¹ See Paul Boccardo. *Le projet d'anthroponomie*, 1983, No. 232.
- ² Tadeusz M. Jaroszewski. *Traktat o naturze ludziej*, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa, 1980, p 203.
- ³ B. G. Ananiev. *Chelovek kak predmet poznaniya*. (Man as an Object of Cognition), Leningrad State University Publishers, Leningrad, 1968, p 13; *idem. O problemakh sovremennoego chelovekoznaniya* (On the Problems of Modern Conception of Man), Nauka, Moscow, 1977, pp 15, 41.
- ⁴ Cf. A. N. Leontiev. *Deyatelnost. Soznanie. Lichnost.* (Activity. Consciousness. Personality), Politizdat, Moscow, 1977, pp 162, 165-166.
- ⁵ P. N. Fedoseyev. *Filosofiya i nauchnoye pozhaniye* (Philosophy and Scientific Knowledge), Nauka, Moscow, 1983, p 257.
- ⁶ *Problemy kompleksnogo izucheniya cheloveka (Tezisy dokladov Vsesoyuznoi konferentsii 29-31 marta 1983 g.)* (Problems of Integrated Studies of Man [Abstracts of Papers Presented to the All-Union Conference. March 29-31, 1983]), USSR State Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1983, p 40.
- ⁷ Cf. I. V. Vatin. *Chelovecheskaya subjektivnost* (Human Subjectiveness), Rostov State University Publishers, Rostov-on-the-Don, 1984.
- ⁸ V. I. Lenin. *Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic*, Collected Works, Vol. 38, Progress Publishers, 1981, p. 156.

MAN AS THE OBJECT OF COGNITION IN ARTS SUBJECTS

L. I. Novikova

The heightening of the world scientific community's interest in man and his inherent essential powers is explained by the mounting role of the human factor today. On this soil there has been a revival of hermeneutics of a Diltheian flavour in Western philosophical literature. The Club of Rome made allowances for 'man' in its global projects of the world. Contemporary 'Marxologists', while criticising Marxism for a 'loss of man', undertake 'rescue measures' to 'consolidate' and 'supplement' it by humanism. Pluralism, which (in its ideologists' opinion) provides an unprogrammed interpretation of human existence, is declared a leading principle of social philosophy. To all these trends Marxism opposes the materialist monism of its philosophical orientation, which is the methodological foundation for a humanist understanding of man's life-world, as well as for explaining the patterns of history.

By bringing out the role of social practice in the development of history, i.e., of the history of man as a social and, in that sense, human being, Marxism thereby brought humanist knowledge into the stream of the social sciences.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin differentiated between the social-philosophical, historical, and humanist approaches to social science on the methodological plane, and at the same time resolutely insisted on their unity. The fundamental task of social philosophy and the cognitive procedure corresponding to it is to reduce the whole diversity of the single, seemingly unique facts and events of human history to a single objective basis. Reduction is understood here as substantiation of the interaction of complex social, historical processes by disclosing their subordination to fundamental laws of social development. On the plane of formal logic it can be taken as an explanation of a nomological type. Lenin, stressing the cognitive value of the principle of reduction so productively employed by Marx, wrote:

People make their own history, but what determines the motives of people, of the mass of people, i.e., what gives rise to the clash of conflicting ideas

and strivings? What is the sum total of all these clashes in the mass of human societies? What are the objective conditions of production of material life that form the basis of all of man's historical activity? What is the law of development of these conditions? To all these Marx drew attention and indicated the way to a scientific study of history as a single process which, with all its immense variety and contradictoriness, is governed by definite laws.¹

In that connection the materialist conception of history is naturally not just its reduction to the dialectic of the productive forces and relations of production. It is also a singling out of the whole ensemble of social relations from their dialectic, taking into account the inner interaction and mediations, i.e., explanation of the whole richness of history. It is, finally, understanding of the motives of individuals' behaviour, sense of values, and life dispositions, proceeding from the significant context of the ensemble of social relations that form man's life—world, bearing in mind that man himself is not only the object but also the subject of these relations.

It has become a commonplace in Western philosophy to accuse Marxism of losing man as a result of reducing social relations to material and, ultimately, production relations. The accusation has no basis whatever. When defining the essence of man as an ensemble of social relations Marxism quite realises that human subjectivity is by no means reducible just to them, because, having suggested that the human personality is determined by existing social relations, we do not stress man's role as a subject of social relations capable of, and actually introducing, innovations in them. The richness of the human personality is not exhausted by objectified results of activity that can become the subject of objective social-science knowledge. It is also latent in the creative powers and capabilities of man himself, which are manifested not only in practical activity but also as free play, creating a world of intellectual values (in intercourse with others) full of meanings, values, and senses that reproduce and anticipate existing social relations, elevating them to ideals. In this connection Lenin wrote:

The idea of determinism, which postulates that human acts are necessitated and rejects the absurd tale about free will, in no way destroys man's reason or conscience, or appraisal of his actions. Quite the contrary, only the determinist view makes a strict and correct appraisal possible instead of attributing everything you please to free will. Similarly, the idea of historical necessity does not in the least undermine the role of the individual in history: all history is made up of the actions of individuals, who are undoubtedly active figures.²

Marxism thus sees the uniqueness of the human personality in overcoming its natural and social limitations through its active

involvement in comprehensive social relations and the development on that basis of man's essential powers, unrelated to any previously given scale whatsoever. It is the development of these essential powers capable of going beyond existing relations, and stimulating their improvement, that is the limitless source of innovations, and, in the last analysis, of social progress.

The social sciences have the job of understanding not only objective laws but also the aspect of their development through innovations introduced by human subjectivity, the aspect of the 'result' of qualitatively new regularities and patterns in the course of the revolutionary transforming activity of people armed with consciously advanced aims, and also by motives of behaviour not always clear to them. The methods of social philosophy analysis are inadequate, of course, as regards single objects, and in particular for bringing out separate individuals' motives and the motives of their conscious activity and aspirations. But Marxism has never regarded them as a 'universal master-key' for explaining all the phenomena of society's life. The methods of reduction (substantiation) and deduction (explanation) supplement and compensate the individualised methods of arts subjects and the social sciences when these aspects of the functioning and development of social, historical reality are being investigated.

Marx's main sphere of scientific interests was concentrated on the general theory of the course of history and the political economy of capitalism. But, while consistently guided by the idea of the socio-economic determination of the behaviour of individuals belonging to certain classes of society, he stressed that this did not exhaust the whole fullness and value in itself of living phenomena that were realised 'only with this realm of necessity as (their) basis'.³ In accordance with that methodological principle he widely employed 'individualised' methods and techniques of analysis of the humanities proper, even in his exclusively theoretical works like *Theories of Surplus-Value*, and *Capital*. In works like *The Civil War in France* and *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, individualised methods played a decisive role in determining the reasons for the success of the coup d'état carried out by an 'unknown adventurer', the 'most dull-witted man in France', completely lacking in personal principle.⁴ Application of these methods to the leaders of the republican regime as to members of various circles of the bourgeois class enabled Marx to bring out their personal responsibility for the fall of the republic and for France's national shame connected with Louis Bonaparte's coup. The notion of personality that

Marx started with here presumed that man is objectively responsible for his convictions and the consequences of acting on them, as well as subjectively responsible for his convictions. He not only applied this method to the leaders of the Second Republic, and the leaders of the opposition but also to the various groups and cliques of the class of the bourgeoisie that they headed, and to the bourgeois class as a whole. As a result the concept of class was given a face, and consequently responsibility to history.

From the standpoint of Marxism, humanitarian knowledge can be taken, in the social sciences, as an orientation of it on an empathic explanation of the behaviour of individuals and social groups, starting from their natural tenacities and tempers and objective circumstances. The subject-matter of these disciplines is, according to philosophic tradition, man in his social connections, the wholeness of which is disclosed as the world of man objectified in culture. As we see, the Marxian approach does not contradict the general philosophical intention but gives it an objective basis.

Knowledge of man became an object of philosophical reflection only during the Renaissance; since then philosophical thought has repeatedly turned to determination of its specific qualities.

When A. M. Batkin was analysing the sources of Italian humanism he distinguished the forming of a new type (style) of philosophising, viz., humanist thought (*studia humanitatis*) which, in the understanding of its founders, meant approximately the following (as he interpreted it): 'zealous study of everything that constitutes the wholeness of the human spirit'. Literature is an objectified expression of it, or the spirit itself coded in words. Understanding of it calls for profound concentration of the humanist's thought, which is thus included in a single, continuous process of development of the mind. As Batkin stresses, humanists included two basic thoughts *inter alia* in the very concept *humanitas*: 'learning', which presupposed universality of knowledge through assimilation of literature (*literae*),⁵ and 'virtue', which enabled man to rise through learning above others and himself.

That line in the Humanities, orientated on treatment of man in his cultural, linguistic context, was fundamentally developed, and is being broadly developed in various versions at the present time. But the limitation of this on the whole very productive line is that it is locked in its special subject-matter and does not rise to the level of universal generalisation. In short, it itself has

to become the object of methodological analysis so as to explicate its specifics.

Man's cognition has a multilevel character. It is realised at the level of ordinary, everyday consciousness, in the sphere of various extrascientific forms of social consciousness (mythological, moral, aesthetic), and attains its definiteness at the level of philosophical reflection. A specific feature of cognition in arts subjects is to be seen in the organic connection of these levels.

The primary, direct form of this cognition is ordinary consciousness which provides a direct orientation of the social individual's activity during the practical making of decisions. This 'switched-in' character of ordinary consciousness in practical activity is attained through its flexibility and unspecialised character, which distinguishes it from theoretical activity. When man tries to achieve the aims he has set himself, he in fact meditates, on the basis of past experience, on the circumstances that could promote or prevent success. He has to learn to allow for the possible effect of other participants in the events, by putting himself in their place and stepping into the role of the other person, and to sketch out a scenario of sorts of behaviour that might, in his opinion, lead to success. By being already 'involved' in the events, he learns 'on the hop', while being successful or failing. But ordinary consciousness, however adequate in domestic use, proves narrow and limited when transferred to the sphere of scientific cognition.

This orientation of cognition in arts subjects on ordinary consciousness has received very distinct expression in phenomenology and Weber's interpretive sociology closely associated with it, which claims to be a true reflection of man's 'life-world'. In contrast to the scientific conception of man and culture of, say, the Baden School, or of structural anthropology, which takes the world of man as predestinated and, as it were, resistant to investigation, interpretive sociology starts from a 'natural maxim' of the unity of man and his life-world, i.e., the world of his sensations, aspirations, desires, doubts, beliefs, and convictions. The 'life-world', according to interpretive sociology, is a sphere of directly experienced pre-reflex reality in which the researcher is immersed as an empirical Ego. But having adopted a cognitive stance he concentrates attention and interest on his experiences of the life-world. The actual experience acquires meaning through a reflex, itself becomes a fact of the life-world. The spokesmen of interpretive sociology, however, realise that introspection is not a reliable means of knowledge of man and of his identity with himself, because it is not a lived experience ('here

and now') that is grasped at in the autoreflex but the past, snatched from the stream of experiences and prepared. They therefore pay attention mainly to problems of understanding the 'other', *alter ego*. The existence of the other, like the existence of my life-world, stems from the natural set-up. What is more, my 'self-dependence' or 'independence', becomes the real existence of my Ego only through the other. Understanding therefore includes a capacity for empathy with the other's life-world, for singling out some fragment in the intentional act, and includes interpretation of this fragment in the context of the meanings of the 'other'. Only on that basis is it in context of the meanings of my life-world. Interpretive sociology calculates on overcoming solipsism in that way and substantiating the inter-subjectivity of the life-world.

The problem of understanding as understanding, primarily, of the 'other', and of my own Ego only through the other, embraces a real element of cognition in arts subjects. But it is important to note that it had been brought out clearly by Marx long before 'interpretive sociology'. Since man

comes into the world neither with a looking glass in his hand, nor as a Fichtian philosopher, to whom 'I am I' is sufficient, man first sees and recognises himself in other men. Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind.'

In contrast to 'interpretive sociology' which reduces understanding to the communication 'I-other', Marx saw in the 'other', i.e., 'Paul', a member of the human race in the whole complexity of his social relations. 'Peter' therefore recognises his own essence and existence through 'Paul', because he enters the world of man, the world of human culture, together with 'Paul'. The limitation of interpretive sociology and of the phenomenology that it is close to, lies in ontologisation of the mode of cognition. Within this conception understanding as a mode of cognising the world of man through the 'natural set-up', i.e., ordinary consciousness, is converted into the foundation of this world. The world itself proves to be constructed on the 'I-other' model, i.e., is a kind of epistemological 'robinsonade'.

Man, being involved in practical activity, cannot be in an objective relation to it because he himself is at once not only the subject but also the object of social action. He therefore tends to ascribe to reality his inclinations, needs, and expectations, i.e., to mythologise it in a certain sense. This opinion does not, by any means, denigrate the role of ordinary consciousness in arts subject cognition as a direct form of the link between consciousness and man's life-world. But the notion of ordinary con-

sciousness itself requires explanation from the standpoint of scientific theory. Interpretive sociology tries to raise ordinary consciousness to the rank of a meta-theory of social science cognition; as a result ordinary consciousness loses its directness and is mystified in a certain sense.

Forms of social consciousness specially orientated on the human mind, above all art, prove to be a means of catching the pulsing of the human spirit that is constantly altering under the impact of circumstances. Although, as G. O. Vinokur has correctly noted,

the experiencing personality as a thing and a poetical theme as a thing are frankly incommensurate things... yet their foundation remains common all the same!... The real is transformed in poetry, but the transformation itself would not be if there were not something to be transformed. That means, in practice, that the interpretation of a poetic image ... necessarily presupposes understanding of the meaning of the real object that is symbolically transformed in it.¹⁹

Art addressed directly to man reproduces his life-world as regulated and consummated around man, as his value environment. As M. M. Bakhtin puts it:

aesthetic activity gathers the world, dispersed in thought, and condenses it into a legitimate, self-sufficient image, finds an emotional equivalent for the transient world that enlivens and enriches it... finds a value position from which all the transient acquires weight and gets significance and a stable determinacy.²⁰

In contrast to ordinary consciousness, immersed in the life-world, the artist is concerned with some degree of involvement (non-involvement) that enables him to pass from the world of objective reality to his co-being represented by the work of art. The stance of participant helps the artist to grasp and represent the position of man (himself—'the other') in the world, his auto-reflex in regard to his own position in the world, the reaction of 'others' to this position, and the reaction of these 'others' to his self-evaluation. But the artist can only tie up such different projections of the world into an integral whole by passing to a stance of non-participation, by appearing in relation to the world as its impartial judge and transformer, passing judgment on the event recorded by him or erecting it into an ideal.

In a work of art myth, image, idea, and value are synthesised into an artistically whole world. The basis of its aesthetic value is the polysemy and dynamic character of the image, and the high degree of freedom when various planes and perspectives co-exist and throw light on one another. The limitedness of the cognitive activity of the artistic image is often seen in this feature.

by analogy with a concept, but when it is examined in comparison with a system of arts cognition rather than with a concept, it then turns out that the diversity of the properties of man himself, as an object of this cognition, the dynamic character of his intellectual states and qualities of his disposition, and the dependence of aesthetic judgment on the subject's cognitive orientation correspond to the polysemy of the image and its throbbing indeterminacy. Art yields us knowledge not only of the object of the artistic representation but also of its subject. Even when the subject is anonymous, when it starts from an orientation on objective reproduction of events, it reproduces a system of functioning values, in one way or another, and the existence of social structures, in the style of the work. Because of that a work of art proves accessible to the direct perception of contemporaries. But in order to convert understanding of art into cognition it is necessary to explicate it by the methods of artistic criticism, artistic and scientific interpretation, and philosophical, aesthetic reflection. A brilliant example of such explication is provided by the German literary critic Erich Auerbach in his book with the characteristic title *Mimesis*. Through a fine, stylistic analysis of the text (it is quite enough, moreover, Auerbach claimed, to take a representative extract from it), he showed the conditioned character of a change of style that had tendencies to stability by a change of non-artistic, ultimately social relations. By analysing an excerpt from the works of the fourth century B. C. Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus about the revolt of the plebs in Rome, and comparing it with the style of Tacitus' description of the revolt of the German legions (1st century B. C.), Auerbach demonstrated how new social 'material'

begins more and more to master the stylistic intention and a style aspiring to a reserved nobility of character is forced to adapt itself to the content, so that the choice of words and the syntax in which the gloomy realism of the content presses hard on the unrealistic, will for preserving style in a contradictory way, begin to alter and become inharmonious, overcharged, and shrill.¹¹

Scientific arts cognition is orientated on explaining the unique sense and social significance of the results of human activity. This task can be transformed and refined; from the social significance of the existing situation to a unique sense of events or creations of the human mind, and from that to their potential social significance. It functions as a necessary aspect of all social sciences, which, while studying the laws of social development, cannot ignore the real subjects of a historical action.¹²

It is also inherent, in a certain sense, in the natural sciences because, as Michael Polanyi justly remarked,

into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is known and ... this coefficient is no more imperfection but a vital component of his knowledge.¹¹

But arts cognition finds concentrated expression in the subdivision of the humanitarian disciplines of cultural studies. On those grounds a methodological definition of its cognitive status and the methods of research adequate to it (whose development enriches the cognitive stocks and reserves of the social and natural sciences) seems more productive. Today the development of the Humanities depends in turn on the generalising methods and means of the exact sciences and is inconceivable without them.

It would in fact simply be naive to deny the significance of structural and functional methods of research and of mathematical models in linguistics, textual studies, ethnography, and art criticism, and even in poetics. Academician D. S. Likhachev, to whom we owe much in the discovery, understanding, and explanation of the texts of Old Russian literature, who has a fine feeling for the specific character of ideographic methods of research, and who has himself broadly employed them, insists on the need to integrate the specific methods of research of the Humanities and the generalising and even 'exact' methods traditional for natural science. But these methods by no means exhaust the specific content of the subject. In Likhachev's view, if we arrange all the disciplines of art studies and criticism in the form of a rose with those in the centre that deal with the most general matters and the interpretation of literature, we will find that the further a discipline is from the centre the more exact it is. The 'rose' of disciplines of literary studies has a certain stiff periphery and a less stiff core; when, however, we pull all the 'soft' petals off, he says, the 'stiff' ones lose the sense of their existence. We come up against a similar situation in history and ethnography, where there is also interpretation of events along with analysis of structures.

Arts cognition always deals with the results of human activity and self-expression, objectified in cultural values and texts that are also the direct object of scientific cognition by the Humanities. According to M. M. Bakhtin, a text is the primary value and starting point of any social science discipline. When man is studied without a text and independently of it, we are no longer dealing with the Humanities.

As the direct object of cognition a text is speech objectified in external symbolic form, organised in accordance with the requirements of the language's general grammar, the functional-genre purpose of the text, and the stylistics of the cultural and historical context of the period.¹⁴ In that connection, of course, the external objectified form of expression of the motivated sphere of people's behaviour cannot be fully adequate to it. Thought and all inner life are potentially richer than language. At the same time every original text, according to Bakhtin's profound remark, always contains an author's revelation not predetermined by empirical necessity, the sense of which can only be discovered in the general context of the culture. Cognition in the Humanities also has to do with this opposition. By context, here, we mean the established system of meanings, values, and style of thinking of the culture within which the text was drawn up and functioned. In its content, the context is a more or less adequate reflection of the social relations and social structures.

Two situations are differentiated in scientific cognition: (1) when the text and context are in a single time-space continuum; (2) when the text is taken out of the context of the culture in which its significance and sense were formed, and is included in another space-time continuum, to which the investigator belongs.

An identical understanding of a text within the limits of a homogeneous culture is determined by the rules of syntax and the semantic meanings common to its language, which form a stable system of value orientations and style of thinking by deep mental and linguistic structures that reproduce the universal structure of social practice with more or less isomorphism. The understanding of a text takes the form of a dialogue. 'The word wants to be heard, answered, and again to answer the reply and so on *ad infinitum*. It enters into a dialogue that has no semantic end.'¹⁵ Ordinary understanding of a text that does not go beyond the given culture occurs at an intuitive, automatic level, and is limited as a rule by self-evident meanings and senses. The task of scientific cognition in the Humanities is to decipher and reconstruct the hidden deep meanings and senses, tasks that are complicated by the new senses and meanings generated in this dynamic process.

The play of senses arising in this way in a text and the sliding between structural ranks and orders of various kind give a text greater semantic possibilities than those a language taken by itself provides.¹⁶

This puts the researcher in a special position, requires him to get out of the dialogue while remaining within it. Hermeneutics

envisages such a cognitive procedure; it was developed and is broadly represented in modern art studies in the techniques of 'estrangement' (Brecht), 'distancing' (Shklovsky). In sociology the technique of involved observation corresponds to it. Use of these techniques makes it possible to break out of the hermeneutic circle and give objective knowledge about the content of a text and a comprehensible explanation of its sense-forming motifs.

Situations of the second type, characteristic of historiography, call for special cognitive procedures, among which a reconstruction and interpretation of a text reciprocally passing into one another have decisive importance. Any text of a foreign culture is presented to the researcher as a fragment of it, many of whose links with the context are lost or incomprehensible. And sometimes the context itself is lost, i.e., understanding of the culture as a whole. In any case, however, the existence of the text already gives grounds for suggesting the existence of a cultural context of which it is a fragment, or of other fragments of it. A paramount task of the Humanities is to reconstruct a text, which presupposes restoration of its structure and sense in the context of the culture that gave rise to it and their transformation in accordance with the stereotypes of the apprehension of contemporary culture, because it is only possible to understand them on such a basis. In this connection the deciphering of a text of a foreign culture also takes the form of a kind of dialogue, in which the investigator interrogates the text, as it were, puts his questions to it, and seeks the answers to them by way of correlating the text and context, or other texts of the culture and selecting senses corresponding to the text from the several alternatives arising. Understanding is thereby deepened, and new senses are generated corresponding to a contemporary, more developed state of the culture. The researcher proves, in a certain sense, to be an informed direct participant in the cultural dialogue, since he possesses, in addition to the unknown structures and senses of the studied text, isomorphic structures and senses of his culture that serve as the basis for a comparative analysis, and is equipped with understanding of the problem as a whole. All this provides objective grounds for a scientifically substantiated reconstruction of the text. But that is only a preliminary cognitive task whose essence is a comprehensible explanation of the text through interpretation of it.

In logic and mathematics, i.e., in systems of a closed type, by interpretation is meant adducing sense to the symbols of a formal system. The Soviet scholar S. V. Krymsky treats scientific

interpretation, in particular, as a logical operation, counterposed to abstraction, i.e., as a concretising, the cognitive function of which boils down to interpreting an abstract formal theory through an isomorphic depicting of a scheme functioning in it (terms and the relations of the terms) in the object-field of another, more concrete and meaningful theory that can function as a model of the initial theoretical system. There is a great temptation to transfer this definition to other texts of culture because of its simplicity. But then we immediately come up against a number of difficulties. (1) The initial culture text cannot by any means be treated as formal and closed. It is discovered in the context of a culture, sending roots and senses, on the one hand deep down into tradition, and into the future, on the other. It is always a message, a word, directed to a future reader or hearer. (2) A simpler, more concrete 'theory' (or subject-field) by no means emerges as interpretive, nor does the contemporary culture which is also provided with senses and discoveries as regards both the past and the future. Finally, the interpreter is far from indifferent to the content of the interpretation. He experiences subjective biases, supported (as it seems to him) by real understanding of the text in which he is immersed. But these difficulties are not insuperable for scientific knowledge.

The interpretation of a text in the Humanities is built up on the basis of research programmes and under the influence of paradigms of scientific cognition accepted by the scientific community. But its cognitive value depends on the scholar's personal knowledge and capacity to penetrate into the context of a foreign culture, and on his capacity for productive imagination or synthetic judgment, i.e., to see the whole (context of the culture) in the fragment (text), which in turn becomes the explanatory basis of the fragment (text). The foreignness of the text poses him a problem situation similar to the principle of 'estrangement'. He can therefore see more in it than its contemporaries, in particular its 'strangeness', 'otherness' compared with texts of his own culture. As a result of the problem (purposeful) clash of texts of different cultures, there thus arises not only a reconstruction of the structure and sense of the initial text but also the forming of new senses of it that make it possible to put it into the context of contemporary culture, enriching the world of man. This effect of cognition in the Humanities has been described by Bakhtin as growth of sense.

An example of the reconstruction and humanist interpretation of a text is N. Konrad's translation into Russian of the classic mediaeval text of Japanese culture *Isa Monogatari*, his

scholarly commentaries on it, and interpretation of it.¹³ He emphasises that only deep study of the culture of the Heian period, to which the studied text belonged, and comparison of it with the similar period of European culture with its characteristic texts of polite, refined literature, enabled him to understand this extremely complicated work of Japanese classical literature and make a translation of it comprehensible to the Russian reader. And that, in turn, served as a more profound explanation of the historical period itself. In contrast to art, whose images have independent value, the idea of productive imagination must, in the social sciences and Humanities, be brought out in a system of theoretical concepts and descriptions, starting from general objective laws, in order to acquire scientific significance.

In history a historical source (document, the testimony of participants in events and their estimate of same, memoirs, etc.) functions as a 'text', and the current state of the subject as the context, including the fullness of its knowledge about the social and cultural medium in which the source originated and functioned, and also the general methodological level of historical studies which serves as a precondition for understanding and interpreting (comprehensible explanation) of the new source. In the definition of the eminent Soviet mediaevalist A.I. Neusykhin, historical cognition 'is man's thinking about social man of the past in terms of that past and of the present to which the understanding subject belongs'.¹⁴ Historical explanation naturally thus retains a 'trace' of knowledge of the arts and history on the part both of the object and the subject. A historical event cannot be fragmented; it is genetically prepared and conditioned by the past and tends to the future. As the outstanding Russian historian Klyuchevsky noted in his time, we find out about ourselves by studying our forebears. Without knowledge of history we would have to acknowledge ourselves fortuites who do not know how and why we have come into the world, how and for what we live, how and for what we should aspire. The researcher immerses himself in this historical stream. The subject of knowledge therefore becomes a co-participant, as it were, of the event itself even when it has already occurred. The historian cannot be indifferent to the event he is analysing. It is not a matter of modernising history but of an objective and epistemological time link—of the present with the past and the future. The historian knows more about what happened than his contemporaries did, because he knows how it ended up and what trace it left in the general chain of events. He can therefore,

with every right, assume the role of judge of the past. And if he understands (and he must understand this) that the fate of the present was laid down in the past, he must also realise that the future depends, in a certain sense, on his interpretation of the link of the past with the present, and that he is responsible to history for the future.

True, objective knowledge, which furthermore, acquires an objectified form of being (in theories, publications, calculations, schemes, etc.) that gives it a universal, instrumental character, is undoubtedly a productive result of scientific knowledge, including knowledge in the arts subjects. That gave Karl Popper grounds to relate it to a 'third world', the world of the objectified mind, independent of subjective knowledge. Objectified knowledge, according to him, has its own laws of functioning similar to biological laws. The Soviet scholar B.A. Lektorsky, noting the productivity of the idea of objective and objectified knowledge as a special subject of science studies, stressed that objectified knowledge, at the methodological level of research, has sense, as regards its origin, content, and mode of functioning, only when it is included in human cognitive activity. Knowledge, even computer knowledge, cannot exist 'in itself', quite unrelated to people's cognitive activity. Its use is always potential, of course, but it is important that there is always this possibility. It is necessary, furthermore, to remember that cognising people themselves are also not shut in 'on themselves' but are in constant touch with each other, forming a scientific community that has temporal as well as spatial extent (a scientific school). 'Cognition and knowledge exist only while activity of a special kind of a collective subject is kept up, which also means the activity of the individual subjects forming the latter.'¹⁹ The scientist's personal knowledge has a substantial role in this dialectical process: a qualitative leap takes place precisely at that level, beyond the established bounds of objectified knowledge. The 'biological', and in general the naturalistic approach, Lektorsky remarks, yields nothing when this culminating moment in the development of knowledge is being investigated. In it epistemology, especially as based on natural science, has to appeal to the specifics, techniques, and methods of research of arts subjects.

One of the special methods of this research, which acquired scientific and social recognition, is the biographical one. The reconstruction of the biography of a great thinker, politician, or scientist helps fix the very moment when a new idea or principle arose and to explain the grounds and conditions for

its objectification in the form of intellectual values or in people's practical activity. Unlike hermeneutics of a Dilthey hue, which claims to discover the real 'self-dependence' of an individual lost in the schemata of world history, and in contrast to psycho-analysis, which sets scientific biography the task of exposing the libidinal, secret sense of man, the biographical method, when based on a Marxian methodology, is orientated on an empathic explanation of the social significance of the life of a specific individual, starting from the social and cultural context.

Biography brings out clearly the subjective character of the socio-political process and the active personal sense of human cognition. E.Y. Soloviev has shown this in regard to social-philosophy cognition from the biographies of a number of outstanding thinkers, and demonstrated it in the biography of Luther.

The need for scientific biography [he wrote] arises when research in the history of philosophy faces the task of *posing the reverse problem* of some conception (system) in which one is forced to come back to the very discussion and reasoning from the final formula in which the philosophical discussion was cast, i.e., to the dramatic, questing, individual thought, making mistakes and correcting itself.²⁰

The role of personal knowledge, visibly manifested in scientific biography, retains its importance in actual cognition. Personal knowledge and cognition are based, of course, on objective knowledge and operate by formal models. But a true researcher-discoverer boldly introduces them into the context of his life experience, and not just to explain its separate fragments; he seeks objective supports in experience itself for deepening his knowledge and 'detection' in the reality itself of true new knowledge, for which corresponding models have not yet been developed. The new view that thereby arises, is not yet knowledge, Polanyi remarks.

It is *less* than knowledge, for it is a guess; but it is *more* than knowledge, for it is foreknowledge of things yet unknown and at present perhaps inconceivable.²¹

A most important result of scientific cognition is undoubtedly growth of the body of objectivised knowledge, the formalism of which may be employed in practical activity, but it would be a gross error to limit its value to that. A very important sphere of its realisation is its emergence into the process of communication in culture, which makes a general rise of people's intellectual and creative potential possible.

Each new generation relies, in its actual activity, on a system of values and ideas developed by its forerunners. And although

its activity, especially cognitive activity, is governed by the existing world of culture, it is not confined to it and is born anew in the course of universal labour, which animates the 'materialised' products of people's preceding activity by its flame, and fires the creative capacities of individuals, translating them into actual reality. And the more the people who are drawn into this process, the more universal is the character acquired by its combined result as regards both the product and the subject. Although at first,

the development of the capacities of the *human species* [Marx wrote] takes place at the cost of the majority of human individuals and even classes, in the end it breaks through this contradiction and coincides with the development of the individual.²²

When we are investigating the transition of the individual's unalienated essential powers to the system of universal labour, the knowledge of arts subjects and that of social philosophy supplement each other.

NOTES

- ¹ V.I. Lenin. Karl Marx. *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p 57.
- ² V.I. Lenin. What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats. *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 159.
- ³ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. III, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 820.
- ⁴ See, for example: Karl Marx. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978.
- ⁵ A. M. Bakhtin. *Italiyskie gumanisty: stil' zhizni, stil' myshleniya* (The Italian Humanists: Life Style and Style of Thinking), Nauka, Moscow, 1978, p 6.
- ⁶ The problem of the cognitive potential of mythological and moral consciousness is a disputable one and therefore calls for independent consideration.
- ⁷ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. I. Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p 59.
- ⁸ Translator's note: 'robinsonade' is a term coined by Karl Marx for the Robinson Crusoe stories the old economists had a passion for. See Karl Marx. *Das Capital*, Vol. I, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1977, p 90.
- ⁹ G.O. Vinokur. *Biografiya i kul'tura* (Biography and Culture), The State Academy of Arts, Moscow, 1928, pp 76-77.
- ¹⁰ M.M. Bakhtin. *Estetika slovesnogo tvorchestva* (The Aesthetics of Verbal Creation), Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1979, p 186.
- ¹¹ Erich Auerbach. *Mimesis*, A. Fracke Ag. Verlag, Berne, 1946, p 62.
- ¹² We have seen this in the example of political economy (*Capital*) and political science (*Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*).
- ¹³ Michael Polanyi. *Personal Knowledge*, The University Press, Chicago, III, 1958, p VIII.

¹¹ Products of people's material activity that have definite social significance (correspondence of aim) and retain traces of exclusively human, including 'disinterested' thoughts, can serve as a text. For archaeologists, for instance, the technique and motifs of the ornamentation of pottery are such 'texts': not only can the way of life of a people be constructed ('read') from them but also its emotions and beliefs.

¹⁵ M.M. Bakhtin. *Op. cit.*, p 306.

¹⁶ Y.M. Lotman. The Text in a Text. *Trudy po znakovym sistemam*. Vol. 14. Uchenye zapiski Tartuskogo universiteta, No. 567 (Tartu, 1981), p 8.

¹⁷ N.I. Konrad. *Isa monogatari. Perevod, vstupitel'naya stat'ya i kommentarii* (Isa Monogatari. Translation, Introduction, and Commentaries), Nauka, Moscow, 1979.

¹⁸ Neusykhin, A.I. *Problemy evropeiskogo feodalizma* (Problems of European Feudalism), Nauka, Moscow, 1974, p 518.

¹⁹ V.A. Lektorsky. *Sub'ekt. Ob'ekt. Poznanie* (Subject. Object. Knowing), Nauka, Moscow, 1980, p 285.

²⁰ E.Y. Soloviev. Biographical Analysis as a Form of Research in the History of Philosophy. *Voprosy filosofii*, 1981, 9: 128. See also: *Idem. Nepobezhdennyi eretik. Martin Luter i ego vremya* (Unvanquished Heretic. Martin Luther and His Time), Molodaya gvardiya, Moscow, 1984.

²¹ Michael Polanyi. *Op. cit.*, p 135

²² Karl Marx. *Theories of Surplus-Value*, Part III, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p 118.

ON THE HUMANISM OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

V. I. Shinkoruk

Marx was the first to comprehend the historical development of mankind as the forming of conditions for realising man's essence in people's life activity. The stages of this process are the following: 1) the formation of humanity through forms of activity that are alienated forms for the masses, i.e. forms of their oppression and of hostile, antagonistic relations ('the pre-history of mankind'), and 2) the development of mankind through forms of activity that are forms of self-activity for the mass of individuals.

As the means of production developed and the productivity of labour grew there was an accumulation of material resources in human society, namely social wealth that became a means of man's social development, of the shaping of civilisation, and of the progress of culture. But this process was realised through alienation of material goods from the direct producers through the exploitation of man by man in conditions of private property and class antagonism.

With the rise and consolidation of private property, the human mode of life activity, i.e. labour, took on an inhuman form for the majority of mankind, and became an alienated form of activity. Marx pointed out, when characterising the self-alienation of the worker in the labour process, that this self-alienation was manifested in the fact

that labour is *external* to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself.¹

In labour, as it has figured in working people's life activity for thousands of years, the human individual has not, in many cases, affirmed his human essence, the essence of a creator, but on the contrary has alienated it.

Marx demonstrated the historically transient character of the

antagonistic division of labour and its social consequences in his writings, above all in *Capital*. He established that the development of society's productive forces reaches such a level under capitalism that the existence of private property and the monopolisation of social wealth in the hands of a few not only lack any historical sense but also become a brake on further historical progress. The accumulation of material resources through monopolisation of social wealth in the hands of a few has been converted from a condition of mankind's social development into a source of colossal waste of its physical and mental powers. Unemployment, crises of overproduction, colonial expansion, militarisation of the economy, wars of conquest, etc., are evidence of that. And Marx's conclusion that the very course of history, the immanent laws of social production, and the colossal growth of the productive forces on the basis of modern technical progress were leading mankind to the necessity of a decisive restructuring and reorganisation of all social affairs, and the building of a new, communist society, was fully justified. The essence of his conception of communism consisted in the idea of a radical change in the character of human labour, overcoming of the alienated character of human life activity, and the conversion of production activity into creation and independent activity. The revolutionary abolition of private property and its replacement by social ownership was only a *necessary condition, and social means* of attaining this social state. When characterising the difference between the communist revolution and all previous ones, in *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels wrote:

In all previous revolutions the mode of activity always remained unchanged and it was only a question of a different distribution of this activity, a new distribution of labour to other persons, whilst the communist revolution is directed against the hitherto existing *mode of activity*, does away with *labour*.²

By 'doing away with labour', they had in mind overcoming man's self-alienation or estrangement in labour, conversion of man's production activity into creative activity, into "self-activity".

Only at this stage does self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off all natural limitations.³

Mankind will undoubtedly always work, i.e. engage in material production, but that does not mean that human individuals will always be the means and direct physical agents of this production. The immense technical revolution now taking place

before our eyes is more and more transferring standardised forms of production activity to machines, leaving man the function of creator of standards, models, programmes, algorithms, etc. This is the general trend of modern technical progress, which is forging its way ahead in contradictory social conditions and operating in a very contradictory way. The emancipation of man from mechanical, uncreative forms of work, and the conversion of labour into self-activity obviously are not reducible just to elimination of economic exploitation and consolidation of social ownership.

The emancipation of man from standardised, slavish, repetitive forms of activity by transferring these functions to machines, and the masses, mastery of creative forms of activity in accordance with each separate person's inclinations and individual talents, do not, of course, presuppose abolition of the differentiation of forms of activity itself. On the contrary, it is impossible really to reveal human capabilities in accordance with each separate person's talents without progressive development of this differentiation. The differentiation of activity will not disappear in general, but differentiation into creative and non-creative and into activity full of profound human thought and unthinking, mechanical activity will.

Such a change in the character of labour and work will completely alter the idea of the sense of life. Whereas alienated labour had as its consequence the idea that the supreme goods of life were in the sphere of consumption, the conversion of production activity into a creative art will have as its consequence the idea that the true sense of existence lies in man's active life itself and in creation.

Communism posits the creation of a full sufficiency of material goods as its first and necessary prerequisite, but that is not its essence. The principle of distribution by needs is first and foremost a principle of distribution of forms of activity by needs.

Marx called communism the real history of mankind, mass appropriation of their human essence by individuals, the realm of real freedom, and a social state corresponding to man's essence. Man can and does do much in the interests of society, nation, and class, and for science and art. But if he does it only for the sake of something lying outside his real life, through duty, or consciousness of social and human necessity, he sacrifices something very essential for it by so doing. Abolition of the alienation of labour leads to a decisive revolution in the very mode of man's life activity, in the relationship between the sense of human existence (as fixed in people's conscious-

ness) and the individual's empirical existence. Life for society and mankind, and activity to create social values are then no longer a sacrifice made for the sake of merging human existence and its true sense in the 'future' but a direct realisation of this merging in the present. Human existence without sense will only disappear when life for humanity and for human duty is at the same time life offering supreme enjoyment and genuine *joie de vivre*.

The socialist revolution is the first step in mass conversion of man into a creator. When Lenin was developing and realising the ideas of Marxian humanism in practice, he pointed out that the socialist revolution differed from all previous ones primarily in raising the oppressed masses to creative building of new social orders. It 'awakens' the working man's creative faculties, smashes all the old obstacles, strikes off the now delapidated chains, and 'leads the working people on to the road of the *independent creation of a new life*'. Socialism creates a broad range of conditions for real emancipation of the human personality when the yardstick of a person's social significance and value is not his wealth but his capabilities and work. This is expressed in the principle 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his work'.

Only socialism, Lenin wrote, would provide an opportunity to draw

the majority of working people into a field of labour in which they can display their abilities, develop the capacities, and reveal those talents, so abundant among the people whom capitalism crushed, suppressed and strangled in thousands and millions.'

The experience of building socialism has fully confirmed Lenin's prediction.

As a result of the victory of socialism in the USSR, as *The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* says,

a socialist way of life which gives working people confidence in the future, spiritually and morally elevates them as creators of new social relations and of their own destiny has taken shape on the basis of social justice, collectivism, and comradely mutual assistance.'

But socialism, as the first phase of the communist socio-economic formation, still does not resolve all the problems of humanism, yet the alienation of man in his mode of activity and labour has been decisively overcome in the main. Labour is no longer 'the Lord's punishment' and not just the means to keep alive, in the mass consciousness, in the consciousness of millions of human individuals, members of socialist society, but is a means of creating values for social development, and in order to tackle

the cardinal problems of humanism, and especially to ensure peace and the prosperity of mankind.

The CPSU attaches special importance to further development of the creative potential of labour and to consolidating its socialist humanist character. Its Programme stresses this.

The Party attaches special importance to enhancing the creative content and collectivist character of work, improving its efficiency, and encouraging highly skilled and highly productive labour for the good of society. All this will help make work a prime, vital necessity for every Soviet person.

The task ahead is to continue to carry out a series of scientific, technological, economic and social measures aimed at ensuring full and effective employment of the population, and granting to all able-bodied citizens the possibility to work in their chosen sphere of activity in accordance with their inclinations, abilities, education and training, with due account of the needs of society.

Human life, however, is by no means reducible to labour as material activity to transform the conditions of life. Man lives an intellectual, spiritual life as well as a material one.

When the spiritual life of the individual and society is being surveyed it is very tempting to reduce it to intellectual life and consciousness to knowledge. But spiritual life is not just the life of the mind: it is also the life of the heart in which *human feelings and emotions, and social human inclinations* play a very important role.

Human emotions embrace a very broad range of human affections from such an intimate attachment as the love of mother and child to such an overt civic feeling as love for the motherland. They are civic, family, moral, and aesthetic emotions and feelings, friendship, love of one's work, diligence, etc. A feature of the objects of human emotions is the unity in them of the ideal and the real, the spiritual and the material. The concept 'motherland' is a material reality, an image, and an ideal.

When concepts and images acquire the significance of ideals they become the objects of human feelings—objects for which a person is ready for self-denial to the point of self-sacrifice. Spiritual life is inconceivable without satisfaction of spiritual feelings. Here dissatisfaction or satisfaction figures as experiences—joy or suffering, grief or delight, pride or pangs of conscience, etc.

The immense superiority of the socialist way of life is that it cultivates spirituality in human life, and profound attachment to the humanist values of this life, i.e. love of the motherland and internationalism, love of near ones, friendship, comrade-

ship, 'a feeling of fellowship', a sense of duty, lofty moral and aesthetic feelings, etc.

Human life is full-blooded only when it is lived in accordance with lofty moral aims and brings great joy of being. Happiness is achieved then not at the cost of morality and not through wounding others, but through realising one's human essence. Every human achievement then brings moral satisfaction and enjoyment at the same time. The individual's life is accordingly lived as a dynamic unity of the creation of living conditions, enjoyment of life, and self-realisation of the individual in it.

Marxism-Leninism is a theory that becomes a direct stimulus of working people's practical activity, of the movement of millions, directed to a revolutionary re-organisation, restructuring, and perfecting of society. The fact itself is already a proof that Marxist-Leninist theory, being a theoretical picture of the world and a scientific analysis of the natural history of the development of society, no less organically includes certain axiological positions, reveals to mankind its environment as a world of human activity realising people's notions about duty.

In creating and transforming the conditions of his life, man at the same time creates and transforms himself. His life is therefore, essentially, creative activity and consequently his creation.

In all the conceptions of the old, pre-Marxian materialism man figured as a contemplative, passive creature. Marx was the first to put forward and substantiate the idea that man is essentially a creator, both of himself and of the world humanised by him. The essence of the human mode of being also consists in this creative activity, which is self-activity, and the self-affirmation of man in the world.

That is one of the radical differences between Marxism and the theories of utopian socialists. The fathers of utopian socialism (Saint-Simon, Fourier, Robert Owen, and others) gave a brilliant critique of the social conditions of bourgeois civilisation. It was they who demonstrated that the world created by bourgeois civilisation was profoundly hostile to man and inhuman in its very basis. Their critique ultimately grew into one of private property as the basis of social antagonisms and inhuman relations between people. But, having put forward the idea of humanising social life by abolishing private property, the utopian socialists naively suggested that the way to this lay through man's reason and goodness of heart, which would induce people to renounce private property and enter into truly human relations with each other. The paradoxical nature of the situation was that the utopian socialists saw the means to

attaining the final goal in what this goal was in fact, viz., reason and kindheartedness.

Marx demonstrated in his works that a real transition from the world of inhumanity to the realm of freedom and reason was only possible when the sources of the future humanist relations were laid in society itself. He concluded that the world of private property itself, bourgeois civilisation itself, gave rise to a social force, and put it in conditions that made it have to fight the domination of private property and capital, and that this force was the proletariat, the class deprived of ownership of the means of production, the class of hired labourers and wage-workers. In the light of that conclusion the humanist ideas of the emancipation of mankind from its enslavement by social conditions acquired a concrete class sense and real soil for their practical existence. In his youth Marx's views had already been shaped in the stream of humanism, but his humanism became real humanism only when refracted through the prism of the historical aims and tasks of the proletarian revolution.

Such an approach called for broad philosophical comprehension of all world history, clarification of the essence of man, and of the true sense of his being and of the goals of his life, and determination of the social conditions in which man's free development would become possible in accordance with this sense and these aims. Marxism formed as a broad philosophical conception of humanist content that derived its arguments from the real class struggle of the millions of the proletariat and appealed to their masses, and counted precisely on their perception and practical realisation of its ideas. The development of this conception and its comprehensive sociological and economic substantiation constituted the basis of the theoretical work of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

NOTES

- ¹ Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 66.
- ² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 60.
- ³ *Ibid.*, pp 67-68.
- ⁴ V.I. Lenin. *How to Organise Competition. Collected Works*, Vol. 26, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p 410.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, p 404.
- ⁶ *The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A New Edition*, Novosti News Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, p 12.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, p 41.

II. Man and Culture

PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND MAN

V. V. Mshvenieradze

One of the most important premises for philosophical study of man, and his role, place, and purpose in today's world is the application of a new political thinking that will help, first and foremost, to allow for the new, real social and political situation that has taken shape in the latter half of the 80s of the present nuclear-space century. The methodology of scientific analysis on which the new political thinking is based includes the following elements: (1) consideration of each person, and of humanity as a whole as the supreme political, cultural, and philosophical value of civilisation over which now hangs a threat of annihilation as a result of the arms race; a critique of the various technocratic and scientist conceptions that degrade the role of man and make an absolute of the development of science and technology as the end in itself of social affairs; (2) allowance for the fact that, irrespective of the division of countries into various groups, blocs, and alliances, they constitute an integral system in which each state must coexist peacefully with the others in order to exist.

The security of mankind can only be *common*; the security of one nation depends directly on that of others.

(3) This is a conception of all people and of each person separately as beings that belong to a single human species. Each person as a member of a social organisation belongs to a certain class, party, ethnic or national group, has a certain ideology and world outlook. But the concept of 'man' or 'person' is acquiring paramount importance in conditions of nuclear opposition.

Finally, (4) there is the need to be aware of the indisputable fact that today an intensive politicising of literally all areas of human activity is taking place. The world of political realities has been exceptionally broadened, and more and more new objects, phenomena, events, and forms of human relations are acquiring a political quality and are measured by a political 'system of reference'. Our grim, tense time has brought forward

political settlement of existing or maturing conflict situations, and a resolute rejection of the use of armed force. The rationalisation and humanising of polities and political relations, and their subjection to the vital interests of man and humanity are playing an important role in this. Realisation of this task will also help strengthen the relationship between philosophy and politics.

The new political thinking has arisen as the most adequate means for analysing and appreciating the objects and phenomena of reality, and for comprehensive allowance for man's interests at the point where philosophy and politics overlap. It is the logical result of the politicising of philosophy, and meets the need for fundamental philosophical approach to politics. New forms of the relationship between philosophy and politics corresponding to today's reality are thus a problem with two closely connected aspects: (a) raising the practical significance of philosophy, and (b) a far-reaching rationalisation of politics. This will enable both philosophy and politics to be given a humanist content, to bring out more profoundly the philosophical essence of man, and to make a significant contribution to performing the most important tasks of survival of humankind, and ensuring the political freedom and all-round development of the individual.

The philosophical investigation of politics is one of the essential features of Marxist-Leninist theory and a vital component of its very rich intellectual heritage. While developing the best traditions of the preceding philosophical and political thought, Marxism-Leninism raised both to a qualitatively new level, giving them a truly scientific character, and establishing an organic relationship between them, based on a materialist conception of history, and a dialectical interpretation of the phenomena of social and political affairs.

The link between philosophy and politics is quite clearly traceable in the whole history of the former from antiquity to our day, though its context has undergone changes with the passage of time. Philosophic and political views either existed undifferentiatedly and as one or were mediated, or now one aspect and now another was brought to the fore, the link between which was now strengthened and now weakened.

Antique philosophy, for example, included all branches of natural scientific and social knowledge. The hiving off of the latter from philosophy was only beginning, while the rise of elements of the separate sciences was in the course of becoming. Philosophical and political views were so closely and insepa-

rably interwoven in the doctrines of the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle that they can only be arbitrarily separated from one another. And if Greek thinkers have come down in history primarily as philosophers, that can be explained by two main causes. (1) Philosophy then objectively played the role of an all-embracing system of knowledge. Its undivided sway was due to the bringing to the fore of philosophical matters proper (the essence and knowability of the universe, the place of man in the world, the sense and meaning of life, etc.), and the weak development and undifferentiation of other areas of knowledge. (2) Philosophers usually turned to analyse the doctrines of these thinkers, which quite naturally led, by force of the professional nature of their approach, to an unfolding of precisely the philosophic aspects.

Yet a profound, all-round study of the political views (and equally the legal, sociological, economic views, etc.) of the Greek thinkers, and especially of Plato and Aristotle is no less important and topical than investigation of their philosophical conceptions. Furthermore, their philosophy (no more than any other) cannot be correctly understood and appreciated fully in isolation from the political reality of their time and its theoretical reflection by the thinkers of antiquity.

No more or less great philosopher can be named, perhaps, in the history of philosophy, who did not touch on problems of politics in his studies, i.e. the power relations in society, or whose conceptions were not employed in interpreting the political process or discovering certain objective patterns in it. Philosophers tried to surmount everyday consciousness by means of wisdom, which was limited by an empirical stating of the obvious diversity of things, and thereby to penetrate their essence and find the substance, 'the general in the particular', and to demonstrate the *unity* of variety, i.e. the regular connection of phenomena and appearances, including political relations. It was not by chance that philosophers, thinkers like Confucius, Plato, and Aristotle were counted the founders of political science, true, in so far as one can speak of the scientific character of the investigations of that time.

This tradition was continued in Rome and associated with such outstanding names as Cicero, Lucretius, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius.

What I have said above also largely applies to the political thought of the Middle Ages, modern times, and the recent past. The relationship between philosophy and politics in the Middle Ages was mediated by religion, which almost wholly absorbed

the whole sphere of social consciousness and activity. Nevertheless, there are several great names in the religious literature and the philosophical and political writings opposed to it whose ideas in political philosophy are well known. Suffice it to name Augustinus, St. Anselm, Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham.

The flight of bourgeois political philosophy was to be classed in modern times, when political thinking split off from philosophy and acquired full independent significance. The process had several special features. Three types of work began to appear in the realm of philosophy and political thought. (1) There were predominantly philosophical works, whose authors like René Descartes or Francis Bacon, Soren Kierkegaard, Ludwig Feuerbach, or Alfred Whitehead strove to occupy themselves with 'pure' philosophy, ignoring political problems. This trend made itself quite strongly felt in Western philosophy right down to World War II. Today the position has altered. One can hardly name a Western philosophic trend that does not directly or indirectly touch on the political problematic. The politicising of philosophy, irrespective of the degree of awareness of the process among its spokesmen, is an indisputable fact. A typical example is the philosophical biography of Bertrand Russell. Having begun with logical and logico-mathematical studies at the beginning of the twentieth century, he had already published his famous work *Power: a New Social Analysis* in 1938, which has been republished many times.

(2) There are studies that bear a predominantly political character and which can be classed as political philosophy. Here we must note such writers as Niccolo Machiavelli, Tommaso Campanella, Nicolas Malebranche, Charles Louis Montesquieu, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Edmund Burke, Claude Henry Saint-Simon, Alexis Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill. (3) The third type of works had at once a philosophical and a political character; their authors did not stand apart from politics, supposing that it was impossible to separate politics from philosophy and vice versa. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and German classical idealism in the person of its main spokesmen Kant and Hegel, the French materialists, the Russian revolutionary democrats (particularly Herzen and Chernyshevsky), Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper. These thinkers and others more or less equally combined philosophical and political approaches in their works, though in varying degree and with different, sometimes opposed aims.

The hiving off of politics from philosophy, which was not of course a single act, but took time, posed the problem of the link between philosophy and politics, of this link at a new level that ruled out their coherence and inseparability and presupposed maintenance of the independence of quite developed branches of knowledge. To resolve that problem it was necessary for both philosophy and politics to rise to the level of a true science, and to define the special sphere of the objective regularities of reality for each of them, study of which constituted the subject-matter of research and converted them into a science.

The rise of Marxism was a revolutionary turn both in philosophy and in political thought; both philosophy and politics were converted into a united, consistent science, each with a field of investigation characteristic only of it.

Law, political economy, sociology, and all social studies went through a similar process. The subject-matter of Marxist philosophy is study of the most general social laws of the motion and development of nature, society, and thought, the relationship between being and consciousness, man and nature, the individual and society. The subject-matter of Marxian political science is study of the objective patterns and regularities of political relations, i.e. primarily relations of power and of the whole political process. The order and pattern of political relations are more particular compared with philosophical relations. The philosophical categories of being and consciousness, for example, when refracted in politics, are embodied in categories of political being and political consciousness. Other philosophical categories also have to be listed, viz., form and content, essence and appearance, freedom and necessity, etc. In contrast to philosophy, which is a general methodology of the scientific and cognitive process of investigation, political epistemology, which deals with the specific methods and means of cognising phenomena of political life, is a special part of political science. In addition, there is a whole number of concepts and categories proper to political science: political system, order, power and authority, regime, democracy, bureaucracy, culture, language, thought, analysis, symbolics, behaviour, responsibility, confidence, control and regulation, etc.

The conversion of philosophy and politics into scientifically substantiated forms of cognitive and practical activity mainly transforms their functions and purpose, and furthers a scientific interpretation of a whole number of old categories

and the introduction of new ones. Both philosophy and politics have ceased to be the business of individuals only or, at best, of a narrow group of professionals. They have become an intellectual weapon of the million-strong masses. Lenin stressed that 'politics begin where millions of men and women are; where there are not thousands, but millions, that is where serious politics begin'.

The dialectical materialist conception of reality (including the political process) has made it possible to understand and explain the most important categories of political science. New political paradigms have replaced the traditional interpretations of power and authority, based on the principle of an estate and hierarchical structure of society, aristocracy, monarchy, or elitism, and on avowal of the stability of the dominance of private property: viz., through socialism to social self-government and self-management.

The materialist answer to the basic philosophical question meant, at the same time, a profound revolutionary breaking up of political theory and practice. Engels noted in this connection:

Closer consideration shows immediately that already the first consequences of the apparently simple proposition, that the consciousness of men is determined by their existence and not the other way round, spurn all forms of idealism, even the most concealed ones, rejecting all conventional and customary views of historical matters. The entire traditional manner of political reasoning is upset.²

The relationship between philosophy and politics is dialectical, historically concrete, and undergoes change depending on the established conditions; now one aspect, and now another pokes to the fore, and the need either for a political substantiation of philosophy, or a philosophical substantiation of politics is more strongly stressed. Such a correcting is natural, and is objectively dictated by the changing conditions of the distribution of class and political forces and the need for an adequate reflection of social and political reality in the forms of social consciousness and activity. In order to understand this relationship properly, its features must be clarified each time both through study of the political problems of philosophy and through investigation of the philosophical problems of politics. Marx, demonstrating the necessity of the indissoluble link between philosophy and politics, wrote as follows about Feuerbach's *Eine Reine humanistisch-philosophischer Aphorismen*:

Feuerbach's aphorisms seem to me incorrect only in one respect, that he refers too much to nature and too little to politics. That, however, is the only alliance by which present-day philosophy can become truth.'

Marx's appreciation of the decisive influence of politics on philosophy was not a phrase thrown off haphazardly. It expresses the very essence of his understanding of the role and purpose of philosophy: truth only acquires real sense when it is embodied and materialised in practical affairs. His famous thesis that 'the philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways, the point is, to *change it*' presupposes not only and not so much a conviction of the self-sufficient character of the old philosophy as an indication of the need to lend philosophy social reality, real sense, and purposefulness, i.e. to direct it to conscious socio-economic and political transformation of reality, and an active, effective outlet of philosophy in politics.

Lenin also noted that it was extremely important in all conditions to allow for the interdependence of political actions, and a profound philosophical substantiation of them. Returning to this theme again and again, he recalled that the 'political line of Marxism is inseparably bound up with its philosophical principles'.⁵ Politics that is not guided by the verified principles of a scientific and philosophical world outlook, is not based on a comprehensive understanding of the objective dialectic of social being and social consciousness, and does not take into account the material regularities and patterns of the political process, is blind politics, fraught with adventurism. It is incapable of performing a forecasting, productive function of truly reflecting political phenomena, and consequently of having a claim to manage the political life-activity of the state and society.

A clear orientation on bringing out the political significance of philosophical studies and consolidating it, and no less on deepening the philosophical substantiation of theoretical and practical political activity is particularly topical and urgent today. It has acquired a new, vitally important dimension. In today's conditions of the social and nuclear opposition of two world systems politics embraces an ever-widening field of international and inter-person relations. It has not only been brought to first place by the course of history itself compared with other forms of social consciousness and activity, but has politicised the latter to a considerable degree, while political settlement of the conflicts arising

and other acute problems has been converted into the determinant form of relations between states, alone capable of countering and deflecting the danger of nuclear disaster hanging over civilisation.

There are three main reasons for singling out the philosophical problems of politics as a special form of scientific, cognitive activity: (1) the accumulation in the realm of politics of enough empirical material requiring philosophical generalisation, and also the rise at the interface of philosophy and politics of a number of new problems relating to clarification of the relationship between political being and political consciousness, and to political epistemology; (2) the need to reject old traditional modes of comprehending phenomena of political affairs in our nuclear age, the urgent need to develop the new political thinking, a new philosophical conception of politics corresponding to the objective tasks of today's political reality; (3) the fact that the political decisions being taken in our day go considerably beyond political relations proper, and have far-reaching consequences that sometimes decisively affect the most varied spheres of people's consciousness and practical life-activity, and sometimes the very possibility of preserving life on Earth.

Underlying the politics there is always a certain form of philosophical understanding of the world. This is either a subjective-idealistic outlook leading, as a rule, to overruling of the subjective factor and therefore always containing an element of voluntarism and adventurism, or an objective-idealistic outlook linking up with theological doctrines, treating religious faith as the sole lever for moral renewal of the individual, or, finally, a dialectical-materialist outlook adequately reflecting the material regularities of the political process and developing the main lines of politics in accordance with them. In addition to the main outlooks, there is a host of marginal and eclectic ones, of course, combining separate elements of them in various proportions.

Today, as never before, a scientific-philosophical comprehension of political actions is required in the system of laws, concepts, and categories of the theory of materialist dialectics. That will enable the new political thinking to be developed, the validity of political actions to be brought out in accordance with the objective logic of politics, and the development of undesirable political phenomena to be prevented. Marxian materialist dialectics is a source of the scientific, methodological precondition of research confirmed in prac-

tice (including study of political relations) which calls for any object to be studied historically, in development, in connection and comparison with other objects and phenomena that all together, as a whole, reflect the single process of forward movement. It is extremely important to be able to bring out concretely the context of the interaction, concretely not only in space ('horizontally') but also in time ('vertically'), relying on the principle of the unity of the historical and the logical.

The history of human society is a complicated, contradictory, and at the same time single, regular, forward process of development united in its diversity, a transition from lower forms to higher ones, a gradual perfecting of all aspects of life (material and spiritual: economic, scientific, cultural, and political). Underlying the unity of the diversity are the objective, material laws of the development of reality, both of nature and of social and spiritual reality.

Socialism is the highest form of the political organisation of society attained by modern civilisation. Analysis of its most developed forms, in this case of political organisation, makes it possible to bring out its preceding stages comprehensively and quite deeply, to discard the chance and fortuitous in history that may affect the regularities and perspectives at some time, and to get a more or less rigorous, logical substantiated line of progressive movement.

A starting point of the scientific methodology of the theory of materialist dialectics is the principle of the unity of the historical and logical, which has a universal character because it helps trace the history of any object of study scientifically. Only with strict observance of it can a substantiated theoretical conception of origin and development, free of subjective influence, be traced which would combine depiction of the course of the *object's historical development* in diverse concrete forms with the need to reproduce it theoretically.

Each successive historical form by no means wholly includes the preceding one. The new form negates the old, preserving only those of its properties, attributes, and features that are necessary for further development. Its other properties are rejected and discarded as transcended or fortuitous. The preservation of the necessary and liberation from the chance is an objective process and is not controlled by the subject. The principle of the historical and logical consequently expresses the objective connection (also objectively

logical), in expressing the relation of the object's development to its evolution (in the sense mentioned above), and calls not only for analysis of the object on the basis of the facts that characterised the preceding historical forms, but also its comparison with the facts arising at its higher degree of maturity. The logical method of investigation, Engels remarked, is 'nothing but the historical method, only stripped of the historical form and diverting chance occurrence'.

We employ this principle in study not only of socio-political or economic phenomena but also of the thought process itself, and of the theoretical knowledge in which these phenomena are reflected.

An ideographic approach predominates in Western studies of the history of political ideas, in which ideas of the past are evaluated as self-sufficient, without a real logical connection and historical development. It is supposed, moreover, that not only must one turn one's mind to the content of the process itself, in order to reveal the real sense of some conception of the past, but also to *stay there*, without linking the sense characteristics of ideas existing then with the present day. Any projecting of today's values onto the past is said to be only capable of distorting history, because the historian in that case (1) evaluates the ideas and conceptions being analysed from his own limited, subjective point of view, and (2) inevitably tears them from their proper historical context, modernises them, and consequently distorts them.

Views like that have been long ago quite common in Western historical, historico-philosophical, and political works. Quite often they get an agnostic hue and contain statements about the unknowability in principle of historical phenomena. The American political scientists Nimmo and Combs, generalising the conceptions of Western philosophers about history, stress the main feature, viz., an emasculating in them of the objective patterns of movement and development.

Academic philosophers of history vigorously debate how history works. Most scholars speak of history as blind, as a chaotic succession of events over time, as a process of impersonal forces and chance elements that propel history onward toward no discernable goal.¹

The problem of adequate reflection, appreciation, and cognition of historical fact (in the real eventful or ideal-spiritual field) has always been, and is now, an unsurmounted methodological difficulty in Western social theories.

Political scientists have formulated the typical situation in

which Western historical and political thought finds itself roughly as follows: the task is to cope with the problem of historicism in a well-informed way, to answer how the historian can avoid the influence of his own subjectivity and historical circumstances, get an adequate understanding of the past, and in fact reveal the real meaning of historical texts, rather than simply evaluate their significance in today's perspective.

An adequate understanding of historical fact and equally an unambiguous reading of texts is in fact a difficult business for the scholar. But there can be no real research without tackling it. At the same time one must note that the real difficulty is not only that. This very proposition also needs to be evaluated on the plane of the theoretical posing of the matter and in a definite socio-political aspect.

Western political scientists illegitimately counterpose understanding of the past and reading of historical texts to appreciation of their significance from the standpoint of today. When the matter is approached scientifically such a counterposing is not correct. When however it is examined in the context of contemporary Western ideology, and the preconceived appreciations of the facts of history dictated by it, it has some sense. Let me elucidate these two elements.

Any historical phenomenon (including texts) can be correctly appraised (1) by analysing it in comparison with phenomena (and theories) that preceded it; (2) by clarifying how far an idea or theory truly reflected the object it claimed to understand; (3) by establishing the degree and depth to which the object's essential links with other phenomena have been revealed; (4) when a fact is examined in movement and development; (5) when an integrated approach is employed based on recognition of the objective material pattern of history and the socio-political process (and also of corresponding ideas). It is this pattern that functions as an objective criterion, reducing as far as possible to nought any manifestation of subjectivism.

The lower forms of development can only be correctly elucidated from the standpoint of today, i.e. through the investigation of higher forms of development. This approach, it is true, presupposes, as it were, a breach of the natural course of history, but that is not surprising, since a scientific analysis does not boil down to a simple chronological descriptiveness. As Marx remarked in *Capital*,

Man's reflections on the forms of social life, and consequently, also, his scientific analysis of those forms, take a course directly opposite to that

of their actual historical development. He begins, post festum, with the results of the process of development ready to hand before him.'

Let me also cite Marx's analysis of bourgeois society, which is of great methodological importance, an analysis in which the principle of the unity of the historical and logical is irreproachably applied.

Bourgeois society is the most developed and many-faceted historical organisation of production. The categories which express its relations, an understanding of its structure, therefore, provide, at the same time, an insight into the structure and the relations of production of all previous forms of society the ruins and components of which were used in the creation of bourgeois society. Some of these remains are still dragged along within bourgeois society unassimilated, while elements which previously were barely indicated have developed and attained their full significance, etc. The anatomy of man is a key to the anatomy of the ape.'

These judgements of Marx's are of fundamental importance for research in the history of political relations.

Western political scientists' propositions referred to above are also indicative in another respect. One can understand the anxiety of many soberly-thinking Western political scientists when they come up against a subjectivist juggling with historical facts at every step, and with a large number of deliberately apologist theories, especially in the political sphere. In these theories historical facts are arbitrarily adjusted to fit to a political line of today, and the ideas of, say, Plato or Aristotle are quoted very nearly as an argument allegedly proving the correctness of the political line of the administration of one president or another. Much literature like that is published in the USA and other NATO countries.

It causes no surprise that such a line of pseudoscientific analysis often leads to the rise of opposing views. The stronger the apologetics is, the stronger the opposition. But the latter often finds expression in another extreme, viz. in complete rejection of the treatment of history 'in today's perspective'. A demand is made in quests for objectivity to 'get away from politics in political science'. These intentions are understandable but the ways of realising them concretely cannot be justified. One must not get away from politics in science but rather approach politics itself scientifically. The ideographic approach to history, which reduces it to chronology and refers only to the past, is also not acceptable. Facts and concepts relating to the highest stage of matter being investigated already in themselves contain the history of their origin, shaping, and development.

History must not be reduced simply to chronology and refer

only to the past. In the strictly scientific sense the course of history is measured not so much by time as by the processes of change themselves, i.e. the development of phenomena of reality which in turn takes place in space and time. Human society is too complex, many-sided, and multiplane a formation for it to develop only evenly, and in a straight line, on one front, so to say, without bringing separate aspects forward or pushing them aside, without zigzags, deviations, and even temporary retreats. Advanced and historically outlived forms of the socio-economic and political organisation of society have existed simultaneously in all periods, and exist today. It would be wrong to study different societies and social phenomena without recognising the general pattern of historical movement, which has definite degrees and stages of the development of a single, internally contradictory, heterogeneous, and diverse, yet still whole system.

The prevailing dialectics of present-day development consists in a combination of competition and confrontation between the two systems and in a growing tendency towards interdependence of the countries of the world community. This is precisely the way, through the struggle of opposites, through arduous effort, groping in the dark to some extent, as it were, that the controversial but *interdependent and in many ways integral world* is taking shape.¹³

Knowing the truth in some area of reality (whether nature or society) always calls for definition and determination of specifically true ways of cognition, i.e. concretising the main epistemological categories of philosophy in respect of the matter studied, and also the creation of new ones. The idea put forward by Kant about the need to investigate the possibilities of human cognition and knowledge, and for a careful development and perfecting of the very means of cognition, contained a valuable rational kernel. The methods of cognition are dictated by the object of investigation itself which means that the general laws and categories of Marxian philosophy, which are the quintessence of the achievements of human reason, and of the whole scientific, cognitive process in various fields of science and life, and which have fundamental importance by virtue of that, require, for its effective application, a corresponding specifying and concretising, and allowance for the features of the field in which they are being applied. One and the same general laws and categories are manifested differently in various areas of nature, public affairs, social life, and science. Determination and definition of this specificity, and finding of the true path of cognition, is a very important aspect of the Marxian meth-

odology of research because 'truth includes not only the result but also the path to it'.¹¹

Disclosure of the dialectic of the general, particular, and individual in a concrete cognitive process is a *sine qua non* of adequate reflection of a given aspect of objective reality. That means, as regards study of political phenomena, (1) determination of the general, fundamental, methodological position, and (2) clarification of the peculiarity of the field being studied. In this case we are limited only to one problem of political relations, that of power and authority, because they are linked most of all with man and define his position in the sphere of political relations.

Politics, more perhaps than other things, is subject to the influence of chance. That is due to a political situation's involving a much greater number of variables, and ones, moreover, that belong to other, non-political fields, and not just to the political sphere proper. In addition, political relations embrace an extremely broad range of matters, on which decisions are taken at various levels. And these levels comprise a host of components often of a subjective quality. In other words, there is a multilevel 'inner' political space, as a rule, between the taking of a decision and its direct execution. In a normally functioning political system the position comes about as follows: the higher the level at which a decision is made, the greater is the scope of the executants, the deeper the degree of their involvement, and consequently the broader the space. Each level has inherent and definite modes of operation, which means that each of them has its own interpretation of the general decision, the concrete aspect of it, in which the possibility of distortion of the true sense of the decision cannot be excluded (sometimes by chance because of a wrong interpretation, and sometimes, for some reason, deliberately) which leads to deformations in practical politics. The more intermediate levels there are, the greater is the probability of mistakes, for which the direct executors should far from always take responsibility.

It is an exceptionally difficult business to co-ordinate the content of all decisions without exception, and furthermore their execution according to a preconceived single plan. And one must add that decision-making and determination of a political line by no means always start from the principles, laws, and categories of political science. One must note, at the same time, that the application of political science in practical politics is a necessary but not sufficient condition for correct and

effective actions. A high art of political leadership and its 'personal influence' is also needed at any level.¹²

The immense weight of the subjective factor broadens the area for the operation of chance many times over. That is due, not least, to the fact that Western political science is not essentially concerned with science (which by definition should contain objective laws) but with theory in which chance plays the main role. Politics is often called a 'game of chance', a field in which only probable propositions are admissible.

The fundamental importance of the question is how does one relate to politics. As a game of chance forces not amenable to rigorous theoretical generalisations? Or as a specific field of social activity in which objective regularities are manifested that can be known, and, when necessary, their elemental, spontaneous action curbed, by subordinating them to the interests of society and the individual? That is to say, as a science? A great deal depends on that: whether one seeks out certain objective principles that will help rationalise political relations, government, and behaviour, or whether each one makes his own rules of the game, imposing them on the other party, which leads to endless, potentially dangerous struggle.

Lenin had no doubt that it was necessary to start from a 'materialist theory of politics',¹³ i.e. from the dependence of politics on objective laws of political relations. He stressed that politics had its own objective logic, irrespective of what persons or parties had planned in advance.¹⁴ This vital methodological proposition of genuine political science means that one can and must relate to politics as a science, in spite of its exceptional complexity and susceptibility to various hazards and chance circumstances (and possibly and most likely that is so, precisely for those reasons).

Most contemporary Western political scientists and politicians hold an opposite point of view. There is sometimes a divide among them of great importance. It is one matter when a political scientist who is not directly involved in political decision-making, regards politics as a game, giving as reasons for his position a simple reference to the often-repeated empirical fact of the actual political activity of Western governments and political parties which often carry out an adventurist policy of playing with fire, not justified by rational arguments, and almost not subject to effective control, and pursue it to attainment, with more or less success, of narrowly selfish aims and interests of the moment, while their leaders perpetually dabble in various internal and external political machinations, trust-

g to luck, like a reckless gambler, not to be exposed, and aiming chance when they are. Here it is usually a matter of theoretical fallacies and delusions of academic political scientists.

It is another matter, however, when decision-making leads themselves, or their close advisers and experts treat politics as a game. The position is sharply altered. Because they begin to speculate actively in politics, deliberately playing it as a game, set unsubstantiated and unattainable targets, the sole justification for which is narrow-class and selfish interest. Political reality is perceived and evaluated not as it is in fact, objectively, but in accordance with the changes taking place in the political subject's consciousness, dictated by his will and esires. Such a subjective vision of the world is fraught with real danger.

Take, in particular, Zbigniew Brzezinski's latest book *Game Plan*.¹⁵ But let me specify in advance that it is not my intention to analyse all the matters touched in it. The reference to it is not due primarily to the depth of the theoretical elaborations and realistic forecasts (for they are absent) but is due to his undoubtedly and quite strong influence on the American administration and consequently on its development of foreign policy. Many politicians look on the Soviet Union and its history and policy through Brzezinski's eyes. His views and evaluations, it can be said, have become typical for the political 'hawks' grouped at the helm today in the USA.

Let me single out just a few of the main aspects of Brzezinski's arguments: namely, the question of his methodology of political analysis and possible practical consequences; the conception of world politics and his attitude to a nuclear conflict; his treatment of the problem of power in international relations expressed in the concept 'world domination'; the role of ideology and philosophy in the contemporary political situation. His main aim is to find as real a path as possible for achieving US world hegemony.

This book is based on a central proposition: the American-Soviet contest is not some temporary aberration but a historical rivalry that will long endure. This rivalry is global in scope but it has clear geopolitical priorities and to prevail the United States must wage it on the basis of a consistent and broad strategic perspective."¹⁶

In spite of the fact that this thesis has the character, at first glance, of a statement of 'fact', it will not stand up to criticism either from the logical angle or the methodological or the

political. The proposition advanced, which is to serve as the basis for building a certain system of judgements (conceptions, theories), is logically incorrect and stimulates further methodologically incorrect theoretical constructions, because it leads ultimately not to a probing analysis, and not to new knowledge, but to the originally invented, predetermined result, inserted into the thesis in advance.

In fact, as his initial, and consequently, supposedly already substantiated thesis, Brzezinski takes the proposition (on which the whole book is built!) that in itself is by no means a self-evident truth and the truth of which still has to be demonstrated. That applies in particular to any of the assumptions explicitly contained in the theses that perpetuate a contest between the USA and USSR.

For such statements to be able to *underlie* the investigation they should be first demonstrated and proved. Otherwise the whole system built on them can easily collapse.

And what if there have been promising periods of co-operation? On what basis is the present situation frozen? Anyone is free, of course, to put forward any proposition if he ignores the strict requirements of building a scientific system of knowledge. But if a mistake is laid in the foundation itself, then the edifice cannot be considered viable, it rather resembles a house of cards. In other words, the absence of incontrovertibility and groundlessness are manifested right at the start both in the semantic sense and in the structure of the thesis adopted by Brzezinski as fundamental. A false thesis as a rule dictates a false system of proof. That is why Brzezinski sets about a long, unconvincing, often simply formal argument and so to say *post factum* hunts up various 'arguments'.

In making a retrospective analysis he claims that 'Soviet intentions derive from the historical Russian desire to achieve a preeminent global standing'.¹⁷ Brzezinski, in tune with the Western mass media, avoids the fact that socialism represents qualitatively new international relations, that peace and socialism are inseparable, and keeps silent about the peace policy inherently characteristic of the USSR and about its peace initiatives. He deliberately ignores the great revolutionary changes in the social, political, economic, and cultural spheres through which czarist Russia and its backward outlying areas were converted into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. He needs his peculiar appeal to history only so as to introduce into Americans' consciousness an idea of an innate 'aggressiveness' of the USSR, of the unavoidability and eternity of a conflict between the So-

viet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union invariably figures with him as the aggressive party.

Brzezinski does not recognise objective patterns of historical development. He even tries to be ironical about it: the 'ideological component of the Soviet world view emphasises the notion that all of humanity is governed by certain "iron laws of history":'¹⁸ All history and politics are a 'game'. The same can be said of the contest between the USA and USSR. 'Each side plays according to its own rules and keeps its own score'.¹⁹ Brzezinski explains, when baring his thought, that the game is by no means an end in itself. 'Not to lose is the first objective; to score points according to one's scoring system (or values) is the second; to prevail is the ultimate but remote goal'.²⁰

Treatment of international politics, in particular the relationship between the USSR and USA, as a game brings to the fore the problem of finding means by which the opponent can be 'outplayed' outwitted, deceived, driven into a corner, and ultimately beaten. To win in the nuclear age by means of the nuclear weapon and putting it into outer space! 'In our age, military control over space,' he writes, 'is ... becoming a potential source of decisive leverage for exacting geopolitical compliance on earth'.²¹ Consequently it is necessary to adopt the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme, because it will be useful 'for asserting US preponderance in space'.²² World politics is reduced to a global contest of the 'two superpowers'. Developing countries exist only as an object of manipulation or as an object of direct aggression if that is dictated by the 'national security' interests of the USA. In short, a subtle political game is needed.

This approach has another, no less dangerous side: everything the presumed opponent does is also declared a 'game', a trick, deceit, etc., without going to the heart of the matter. Many spokesmen of Western governments treat the vital initiatives of the Soviet Union in just that way. True, they sometimes try to cover up this clumsily by rhetoric of peace in which they scarcely believe themselves.

Since the core of world relations is the 'contest' of the USA and USSR, Brzezinski proposes a definite plan of a 'game' for the United States, and sees that as the purpose of his book, which, he says, 'is not an argument about the evils of the Soviet system compared with the merits of American democracy, but a practical guide to action'.²³

Not one of the twelve scenarios of Soviet-American rivalry proposed by him in the past ten years counted on or was intend-

ed to develop peaceful coexistence, detente with any elements of partnership, good neighbourliness, or co-operation on mutually beneficial terms. He also does not think of proposing a solution to the most acute and vitally important problems of the present day, like how to avoid a nuclear collision. He only considers and plays different scenario-models of nuclear and non-nuclear clashes. He suggests intensive carrying out of measures promoting economic exhaustion and ideological degeneration of the USSR and other socialist countries. In that connection, of course, he does not entertain the thought that any changes could or should be made in the political and economic system of the USA and other NATO countries.

To assert the power of the USA over the whole world he calls for carrying out the following steps. (1) To reject arms control. He believes that US world domination can only be ensured by force, which is what underlies the functioning of imperialist power. It is, therefore, necessary, in his view, to moderate the ardour of those who stand for banning the arms race, i.e. for arms control, and to cool the zeal of the masses who are fighting for universal disarmament. 'The contamination of strategy by pacifism is the key danger for the United States inherent in crusading and control'.²⁴ Intimidating Americans with the 'danger of disarmament', he writes that even the idea of arms control might 'someday render the United States strategically impotent'.²⁵

Meantime, more and more Americans are freeing themselves from the influence of political 'hawks' who are pushing the world to nuclear disaster, and are more and more actively demanding an end to the arms race and the establishing of effective control. According to a Gallup poll, the number of such Americans reached 80 per cent in March 1987. The gulf between the official policy of the US administration aimed at getting military superiority over the Soviet Union and the desire of an overwhelming part of Americans to arrange peaceful relations with the USSR is deepening. In recent years alone several international and national organisations have sprung up in the USA that stand for ending the arms race, averting the danger of nuclear war, and reaching friendly, good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union: for example, International Philosophers for Prevention of Nuclear Omnicide, Concerned Philosophers for Peace, Beyond War, and many others carrying on an active struggle for peace. How does Brzezinski react to that? While opposing rejection of a first nuclear strike and freezing of the arms race, he quite plainly would like to revive

the notorious slogan 'the best Red is a dead Red'. In essence he revives it, but only in a disguised and indirect form, when speculating on a falsely understood feeling of patriotism, he declares that the 'most simplistic manifestation [of pacifism] is represented by the willingness to disarm unilaterally in the proclaimed belief "better red than dead".'²⁶

(2) Brzezinski calls for activating Western mass media, especially the radio stations broadcasting to the USSR and other socialist countries in order to undermine the people's faith in socialism, intensifying anti-Soviet moods, and inflaming nationalistic tendencies among the peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union. This advice has a two-fold aim. On the one hand, it ought to weaken the Soviet Union's foreign-policy opportunities, and on the other, increase the internal pressure in it. It is such a course that the United States should actively support and encourage, and prevent the carrying out in the Soviet Union of the 'economic reforms that might enhance the Soviet capacity to compete with the United States'.²⁷

The main one is that Brzezinski objectively opposes the logic of peaceful coexistence, and survival of mankind in the nuclear age. By defending and 'developing' the traditional old imperial thinking, he does not even want to get out of its framework. Only irresponsibility can explain his call 'to prompt a contraction of the bloated Soviet empire'.²⁸ From that follows the political language of his book: 'to neutralise', 'to negate', 'to block', 'to counter', etc. In each of his phrases, Brzezinski directly or indirectly decides the *problem of power*, the creation of conditions for US domination over the world community.

Despite the opinion and vital interests of the American people, and in opposition to many soberly thinking politicians, philosophers, and political scientists, Brzezinski is by no means concerned with searches for ways of increasing confidence between the USSR and USA and strengthening political, trade, economic, scientific, technical, cultural, and other ties. He considers the nuclear arsenals accumulated in the world and the possibility of a thermonuclear war not as common enemies of civilisation today but as potential allies in the context of a long geostrategic rivalry of the two great powers counting on 'historical exhaustion'.

Meantime, all today's countries, including the great powers, face a host of very important *general* strategic problems that can only be tackled by joint effort. They are, above all, to save civilisation from the threat of total extinction hanging over it, the transfer of industry, and the entire national economies and

science onto peaceful rails, raising their citizens' standards of living, unfettering social creation and intellectual activity from the chains of militarism, the common struggle against illiteracy and disease, preservation of the habitat, and a host of other social, economic, cultural, and ecological problems.

Brzezinski takes as his starting point for formulating the position of the USA the proposition, false at bottom, of an allegedly existing 'Soviet military threat', and pictures the Soviet Union in various combinations of ideological and political characteristics not only as a rival but precisely as a multidimensional enemy, although he makes a special reservation that the USSR is a 'one-dimensional' enemy, developing only militarily. The 'difference in ideologies' does not suit him. While not regulating his judgments by any requirements of science and scientific ethics, he calls for changes in the 'Soviet philosophy', decentralisation of political power, and the introduction of 'pluralism' (understanding by that a spontaneous development of the system and ideological anarchism).

Philosophy has a first place among the ten distinctive features listed by him, characteristic of the rivalry between the USA and the USSR. The two powers, he writes, differ 'in the philosophical values that either shape the national outlook or are formalised through an ideology'.²⁹ If we ignore unclear expressions like 'national outlook', why does a man who calls for 'pluralism' not admit the possibility of philosophical and ideological differences? Can't these differences be overcome by philosophical and ideological means? Why must they lead to nuclear disaster?

The situation established in today's world, not to mention the deep historical roots of the democratic traditions of nations (including those of the USSR and the USA), urgently demands a 'peaceful' approach to any differences and contradictions, especially in the ideological field. Other countries need to be treated as partners in world economic, cultural, and other relations, resolutely opposing everything that could lead to a nuclear clash.

True, today the two great powers—the USA and the USSR—emerge as opponents. But surely it is in the power of the peoples and governments of these countries to transform relations for the better by good will, towards mutual understanding and friendship. For there have been periods of co-operation. The 'contest' is consequently not dictated by some superhuman power, but has taken shape, besides, through definite human actions. Everything done by people can be changed by them. Further-

more, a turn for the better would promote world progress and meet the objective needs of political relations.

A political subject (leader, government, party, class) that is in power can, of course, ignore the laws of political science through incompetence or irresponsibility. There are many examples of that, leading to a crisis in society (domestic policies) and in interstate relations (foreign policy). History takes revenge for a scornful attitude to science. Not every mistake is accompanied, it is true, by the immediate onset of a crisis; a crisis has its stages: origin, development, deepening, etc. The art of the political subject is to note the elements of an arising crisis in time, not to let it get out of hand, and to change its policy. Every political crisis is first and foremost, in principle, a crisis of power and authority, of the power relations in society, and consequently leads to a collapse of democracy and to spiritual and political enslavement of man.

An attitude to politics as a science presupposes deep study of the objective patterns of political relations (internal and external), the functioning of society's political system, of the state-machinery, parties, public and social organisations, the machinery of power and democracy, political culture, etc., and of the modes of interaction between governments, parties, states, systems, blocs, alliances of states, and with international organisations and movements.

In addition, one must be fully aware of both the link between politics and other elements of the 'superstructure' and of its dialectical interdependence with the economy. The very complicated character of politics can only be understood in the entirety of its components. A scientific methodology of studying politics excludes fragmentariness and substantiating a theory by reducing it to separate examples (or a mechanical aggregate of them), however significant they may be. Such an approach holds a possibility of absolutising their role and neglecting the single line of development, and the objective historical pattern. As Lenin stressed:

What this calls for above all—and more so than in any other sphere—is a picture of the process *as a whole*, with all the trends taken into account and summed up in the form of a resultant."

Politics, like any other sphere of administration and management, calls not only for knowledge but also know-how, skills, will, and an art. The political subject's art consists in knowing how to unite the most important components of political relations (leader, political leadership, parties, social groups, classes, masses) in a single rational purposive interaction, 'into

one indivisible whole'.¹¹ Ability to enlighten the masses is required of the politician who is in office, ability to convince them, organise them, draw them after him, and to concentrate their effort on performing the urgent tasks posed by a situation, being guided in that by scientific principles of political theory. One needs again and again to stress Lenin's just appraisal: 'politics is a science and an art'.¹²

Marxist-Leninist political theory makes it possible to plan political development scientifically and foresee it, to act in accordance with the objective laws of political relations and of governing them. Real political freedom is a cognised political necessity, and an ability to take correct political decisions on the basis of this necessity.

NOTES

- ¹ V. I. Lenin. Speech at the Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B), March 6-8 1918. *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 100.
- ² Frederick Engels, Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. In: Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp 220-221.
- ³ Karl Marx, Letter to Arnold Ruge, March 13, 1843. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 400.
- ⁴ Karl Marx. Theses on Feuerbach. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 5.
- ⁵ V. I. Lenin. The Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion. *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 405.
- ⁶ Frederick Engels. *Op. cit.*, p 225.
- ⁷ Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs. *Meditated Political Relations*, Longman, New York, 1983, p 211.
- ⁸ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. I. Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p 80.
- ⁹ Karl Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p 42.
- ¹⁰ Mikhail Gorbachev. *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, p 24.
- ¹¹ Karl Marx. Comments of the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 113.
- ¹² See Lenin's letter to A. V. Lunacharsky. *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p 325.
- ¹³ V. I. Lenin. The Bloc of the Cadets with the Progressists and Its Significance. *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 554.
- ¹⁴ See Lenin's article 'Concerning an Article Published in the Organ of the Bund'. *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p 379.
- ¹⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski. *Game Plan. A Geastrategic Framework for the Conduct of the US-Soviet Contest*, The Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston-New York, 1986.

- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p XIII.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p 99.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p 21.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p XIV.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p 147.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p 185.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p XIII.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p 148.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ *Ibid.*
- ²² *Ibid.*, p 237.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p 145.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p 13.
- ²⁵ V. I. Lenin. *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Collected Works*, Vol. 22, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 72.
- ²⁶ V. I. Lenin. *'Left-Wing' Communism—an Infantile Disorder. Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 50.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p 20.

PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS AND POLITICAL MORALITY

V. V. Denisov

It is a specific feature of public affairs that many problems that seemed to have been settled long ago, indisputable truths and approved values are once more the centre of heightened attention, acquiring a new ring and special topicality and becoming the subject of bitter polemics. The reason does not lie in subjective wishes or misconceptions but in the complex, contradictory character of social history, in the continuous renewing of social reality itself, and in the logic of the development of social thought.

The relationship of politics and morals and of ends and means in political activity have occupied the minds of thinkers of all past ages. One can trace development of the theoretical foundations and principles of political ethics and culture from Herodotus to the forerunners of modern scientific thought. A heightened interest in these matters is also observable in our day, as is evidenced by the growing number of studies and publications on this theme, and the discussions both in academic circles and among the broad public. There is an explanation for this. It is a paradoxical fact, noted by many Western theorists, that the higher the level of civilisation becomes the more significantly does the sphere of morality diverge from that of politics. Marxists have also pointed this out. Mikhail Gorbachev, drawing attention to the known divergence of politics from the general human standards of morality, called for an 'ending of politics's isolation from the general ethical standards of humanity'.

Problems of political strategy and tactics, and their moral and ethical aspects, are not just an object of theoretical discussions but also one of ideological struggle, which is inevitable because lying behind them are the class positions, real interests, and concrete aims of definite social groups, states, and world social systems.

What are the theoretical and practical aspects of political ethics that are drawing the attention most today of spokesmen

of the various ideological trends and philosophical schools, agitating world opinion, and causing legitimate alarm?

One can undoubtedly give first place to the tendency to 'pragmatise' political ethics observed among certain of today's politicians, a tendency that is devaluating traditional moral values in this connection and causing a slipping into a sort of 'moral relativism'. It is also a matter of the facts of a scorning of the generally recognised principles of political morality, and of a breach of the general human standards of political intercourse, and of the traditional ethics of political behaviour. This tendency finds expression, in particular, in the escalation of violent actions and acts of aggression observed in the world today, in the mounting wave of terrorism, the manipulating of social consciousness for narrow-selfish, egoistical ends, political speculation on people's natural feelings or their lack of information, deliberate misinformation of public opinion, treachery, and perfidy.

The mounting arms race, the creation of newer and newer means of mass annihilation of people, the striving for world hegemony and superiority over others, and at their expense, militarisation of the advances of science and engineering, the policy of 'deterrence' (or 'balance of terror'), and many other facts of that kind, which are having a demoralising effect on human consciousness and are generating a lack of faith [in it] in man and his future, are 'hardly compatible with human morality'.

An inevitable consequence of political pragmatism and its initial thesis ('everything that is profitable is moral') is the 'moral emptiness' more and more inherent in the political morals and political consciousness of Western society, which is inevitably having a negative effect in turn on citizens' individual consciousness and morality and on the means they employ to decide their own personal problems. A scorning of ethical values and application of the laws of the jungle at the level of state policy have as a consequence a devaluating of moral criteria and standards at the individual level.

The number of ethical problems of politics besetting modern society is growing with the speed and force of an avalanche. It is urgently necessary, in order not to be buried to decide the matters that are on the agenda today for world social philosophy: How to make politics moral? How to force politicians to follow the moral principles of human society? How to overcome the terrifying gulf between the frail authority of morality and the immeasurable dominion of technique?

What to oppose to the excessive greed altering with a mania for power of certain leaders responsible for taking political decisions?

Everyone naturally seeks the answers to these urgent questions in his or her own way, taking into account his or her own knowledge, ideas, and experience. Marxists are guided by the dialectical materialist theory of the laws of the functioning and development of public and political affairs when investigating the circumstances and factors that determine people's political consciousness and behaviour, and the political aims and interests of classes, parties, and states. While stating the exceptional importance of moral and ethical problems of political activity today, Marxists consider it urgent to develop new political thinking and a new morality and psychology.

In the current international situation, when the political thinking of many statesmen, remaining 'prenuclear', lags for a whole epoch behind the profound changes taking place in the affairs of modern society, and when scientific and technical advance has outstripped social and moral progress, mankind proves to be in a dangerous position. Prenuclear political thinking obviously lost its significance on 6 August 1945. The modern world is in need of new moral imperatives of political activity and a new political philosophy. New political thinking presupposes new moral criteria and new approaches to world politics, and above all genuine realism and mutual responsibility and equal and general security, and is incompatible with the premise that 'might is right'. Mankind's survival, the future of civilisation, and the fate of present and future generations depend on whether it passes its main 'historical examination' in political maturity.

In this connection great responsibility also rests today with scientists, and above all with philosophers. Much in today's world depends on their ideological and political stances, on their theoretical and methodological approaches to the treatment of urgent problems of public affairs, and on how adequate are their estimates of the possibilities and paths of civilisation's advance. Political ethics also largely depend on scientists' professional ethics, and primarily, on their understanding and explanation of 'the 64-dollar question' of modern times, that of war and peace. It is seemingly no accident that the theme 'man and aggression' has become as popular perhaps as the problem of political ethics with which it is closely and inseparably linked. It is being actively studied by spokesmen of all the social and natural sciences as well as by philosophers. And this interest

undoubtedly has real grounds; it is evoked by the very acute need of public life and the dramatic situation that has taken shape in the world.

When we turn our mental gaze onto the whole preceding history of mankind, it appears as a history of continuous wars and armed clashes, bloody struggle and violent actions, acts of aggression, and terrorism.

The goddess of history is apparently the cruellest of all,² as Engels noted.

And although many are still convinced of the inevitability of armed conflicts and even the naturalness of man's aggressive behaviour, regarding force as a decisive factor of historical development and the 'stimulator' of civilisation, people have never been reconciled to it. It was no accident that thinkers of the past persistently tried not only to get to the bottom of the nature and the roots of aggressive acts but also to find ways and means of preventing them, and put forward the idea of a grand contract between people for a lasting peace without wars, and of excluding the use of force in relations between individuals, groups, nations, and states. There has likewise been no lack of ideas such as 'prescriptions' for curing mankind's 'social sickness'. There have been and still are more than enough various points of view on this score. But, at the same time, the problem itself has not disappeared; it has been aggravated, and acquired an increasingly global tragic tone.

In the distant past armed actions had a local character and concerned separate groups, tribes, and peoples, yet dozens, hundreds, thousands of people became their victims. Later they took on a global character, and two world wars were provoked; the cost in human lives reached millions, and the material losses and destruction were incalculable. Today, in the nuclear-missile age, mankind faces the real possibility of complete self-annihilation. Death of civilisation and of life itself on Earth could happen, in the unanimous opinion of scientific authorities, if the 'atomic jinn' escaped. Mankind has been faced with such a 'categorical imperative' for the first time, but no longer as a philosophical theory but as a practical reality, and with the need to renounce use of atomic and other types of weapons of mass destruction, and the use of force to decide the conflicts arising in world politics.

There is one alternative—either to live in peace or to die and burn in atomic fire. Everyone understands, however, that it is the first and inalienable right of every individual and nation to live. 'Men must be in a position to live in order to be able to

"make history", Marx and Engels remarked.¹ In order to live, to produce material and spiritual goods, to create and develop civilisation, men must have appropriate conditions to maintain their vitality, and so need peaceful coexistence and co-operation. Peace among people is consequently a prime, historical need of man. There is hardly anyone who would now contest that thesis.

So, let us accept that everyone is pro. It remains to settle one single question: how is it to be achieved? Is peaceful coexistence of people and states possible? Is a human community without wars and aggressive actions real in principle?

For an answer, people turn in our 'enlightened age' first and foremost to scientific and, in particular, philosophical thought. But there is no unanimity today on this, there are different interpretations and approaches to explaining and tackling the problem. A comparative analysis shows the direct dependence (apart from everything else) that exists between one interpretation or another of the nature and roots of aggressive behaviour and the very possibility and ways of overcoming it and gradually getting rid of it in international practice.

The length and breadth of our Earth has been travelled, gone over, and explored in past centuries, so that there are practically no 'blank spots' on it. People have so thoroughly mastered its surface that there is sometimes apprehension now about preserving the natural environment itself. Man has broken out into outer space and is swooping onto other planets. But can we say that we are mastering the secrets of the 'human soul' as rapidly and successfully, or have disclosed and scientifically explained all the enigmas and peculiarities of human nature, consciousness, and behaviour? It is generally recognised that we are still far from that. There is more that is unknown than already known. And not the least reason, obviously, is that mankind is not always able today to cope with the scientific and technical power it has created, to bring its 'sideeffects' on nature and man himself under control, and to counter-balance the results of scientific and technical progress by a qualitatively new standard and the much sharper feeling of people's responsibility for everything that is happening in the world today.

Inquisitive human reason is turning one page after another, of course, in the endless book of knowledge of the natural and social environment and of man himself. What was unknown and not understood yesterday is becoming known and explained today. By pooling the knowledge and exertion of all the

sciences, and of social and individual practice, man is slowly but surely unravelling the enigmas of his own nature and essence, and advancing along the road of self-knowledge. Yet much remains unknown, hidden from scientific understanding and explanation.

And that makes for the appearance now and again in one field of knowledge or another of vulgar, irrationalistic, and mystic conceptions that interpret some phenomenon of social and historical reality and of human nature in a pseudoscientific way. The complexity of the cognitive process, and its contradictory character, the feeling of helplessness and pessimism before the ocean of the unknown, and consequently enigmatic for human consciousness, pushes some people onto a path of searching for the easiest 'way out' of the scientific labyrinth, and of developing artificial theoretical constructs and sheer speculations, especially on the latest achievements of the natural and social sciences.

All that, in combination with a frequently displayed class subjectivism and the methodological imperfection of the cognitive process, and sometimes also with a conservatism of ideas, leads to the tree of knowledge not only yielding healthy fruit but also developing shoots dangerous for social progress.

An example of that, it seems to me, is the development and quite wide dissemination of anthropological philosophical conceptions of the nature and roots of aggression. The theoretical and methodological foundation of these views, in spite of certain differences and nuances in the approaches to treating these phenomena, are biological-ethological or psychoanalytical interpretations of human aggression as a display of a genetically conditioned instinct. The assertion of the natural inevitability and perennial nature of people's aggressive thinking and behaviour, and consequently of the ineradicability of wars and other armed conflicts and violent actions from the life of society, follow from this as a logically inevitable conclusion. Whether or not the supporters of socio-biological and psychoanalytical views want it, they in fact provide a theoretical basis for the thesis of wars as 'inevitable companions' of the human race. Because, if the 'aggressive instinct', the 'thirst' for violent behaviour in people, unquenchable in its genetic nature, has a biologically innate character, and constitutes an organically inseparable part of man's nature, every deliberate effort of people to prevent and avoid military conflicts becomes groundless, and all their strivings to ensure a peaceful life are doomed in advance to failure.

There are also claims that the aggressive behaviour of animals is an absolute prototype of corresponding human behaviour and that the laws of the animal kingdom are manifested to the same extent in this respect in the affairs of society, and in relations between individuals, nations, and states. Some of the Western ethologists consider that according to the data of ethology the action of certain genes governs the behaviour characterised as aggressive, which therefore has identical roots both in man and in other members of the animal kingdom.

Furthermore, man proves to have surpassed members of the animal kingdom in his aggressive behaviour and emerged as a unique 'superkiller'. Certain Western writers, while recognising that his relation to nature is governed by the higher centres of the brain, claim that endogenous mechanisms on the contrary play a major role in relations between people. In their view, this is a barrier that man does not have the power to overcome in his attempts to settle social problems by peaceful, non-violent means. The West German theorist Kosiek, waging a polemic against Marxism and defending a thesis that hereditary, genetic factors and not the social medium are decisive for man's consciousness and behaviour, wrote that social conditions may influence man and promote his development, or retard it, but that the decisive factor is always the endogenous one.⁴ If certain contexts that control relations of mutual struggle and enmity are retained instinctively by all species of the animal kingdom, as Kosiek considered, these retarding mechanisms are considerably weakened in man because of the specific features of social life, or are completely absent, and that is why man is the sole living creature that does not obey any limiting contexts and is capable of killing his own kind.

Hence the pessimistic, sometimes even apocalyptic character of forecasts of the future of mankind, and the idea that people's striving for universal equality, peace, and justice are allegedly useless, because the root of all social evils is to be found not outside man but in himself, in his immutable, depraved nature. Daniel Bell, for instance, wrote:

What does not vanish is the duplex nature of man himself—the murderous aggression, from primal impulse to tear apart and destroy; and the search for order, in art and life, as the bending of will to harmonious shape... Utopia has always been conceived as a design of harmony and perfection in the relations between men.⁵

But how far in fact do these views correspond to the scientific data on the nature and needs of man, the mechanisms of the

functioning of his consciousness, and the factors that govern his psychology and behavioural reactions?

To get an understanding of this it is best to turn directly to science itself and to mankind's social and historical practice, and to the already established scientific data and facts of objective reality.

Man's emergence in the evolution of the world signified the development of a quite new quality, viz., social life. Society is not only a new form of the evolution of the objective world but also a higher one, the social form of the motion of matter. Social laws and patterns of a specific character that have no analogues in nature, and that are not replaced by biological laws, operate here.

People function in social affairs not as biological creatures but as social ones. The main feature of social ties, in contrast to natural relations, is that they have taken shape on the basis of and in accordance with people's social activity.

Man is immersed from birth in a varied, complex world of social relations and ties formed before him, and of traditions, standards of law and morality, ideological views, aesthetic tastes, etc., that have taken shape and are dominant in a concrete society. Assimilation of all this 'humanised nature' also plays a decisive role in forming man's consciousness and behaviour, a certain way of life, world outlook, culture, and psychology.

It is not legitimate to equate people's social activity and animals' instinctive behaviour. Animals' instincts, which are a definite reaction to the environment, have an unconscious character, have been reinforced in the course of natural selection, and are a most important condition for their physical existence and survival. But one cannot ascribe to them the role of regulators of social behaviour and of the social relations inherent in human society. Wars and various types of social conflicts are a form of expression of the relationships of conscious individuals pursuing definite aims and interests. Any identification of these phenomena with the behaviour of animals and their display of various types of instincts is therefore not only not legitimate but also leads the researcher up a blind alley.

When stating the decisive influence of social conditions in the forming of man's consciousness and behavioural reactions, Marxism does not (in full accordance with the data of contemporary science) leave man's biological properties out of account, or the degree of influence of genetic factors on a person's individuality, and stresses the necessity of studying the biology

and genetics of man in order to deepen understanding of the mechanisms of his psychic activity and mental and spiritual life.

The dialectical combination of the social and the biological in man means that his aspirations and activities are at the same time the result both of the social conditions of his life and of his biological peculiarities. The decisive import of the social factor does not lie in its absolute determinant role but in its being a *sine qua non* of the moulding and development of man as a personality and individual. It is not a chance affair that the ratio of the social and the biological as determinant factors in man's behaviour can alter in accordance with the individual's level of development and his physical condition and psychic state.

One must not underestimate the fact, demonstrated by psychology, that natural individual peculiarities determine the character of a person's reaction to external effects, his 'individual style', and also the character of people's definite kind of inventiveness in relation to the external world. Pavlov put it as follows:

It would be stupid to deny the subjective world. It goes without saying, of course, that it exists. Psychology as the formulating of phenomena of our subjective world is a quite legitimate thing, and it would be absurd to dispute that. We act on that basis, and build all social and personal life on it... The point is to analyse this subjective world."

Making this analysis by means of Marxian methodology likewise makes it possible to establish that any subjective behaviour and thinking of the individual are based on quite material factors, and are primarily determined by social conditions through appropriate psychological mechanisms. When Marx employed the concept of man's 'second nature', he meant by it the social characteristic of man whose content was governed by a system of connections and determinants that directly determined a person's psychic make-up and social behaviour.

Certain inner, innate, and life-acquired models of behaviour can, of course, be guiding factors of the motivation of human behaviour in some concrete life situation or other. But social factors are decisive in the moulding of these inner models of a person's behaviour. The highest motivations of human behaviour are qualitatively different from the instinctive motivations in animals' behaviour and are incomparably more varied than the latter. And although so-called mechanisms of main bents may underlie the higher motivations of human behaviour, they are, as a rule, the first to be substantially altered. It is the social medium that shapes those motivations in man that are altogether unknown in the animal kingdom.

During man's historical evolution there has been a consistent accumulation of certain socially useful qualities and properties that have been laid down somehow in his genetic programme or psychic constitutions, and that have had an ever increasing reverse effect or feedback on his natural character. Thus, despite the claims of the proponents of social ethology, man's progressing capacity to control, limit, and repress undesirable manifestations of his 'natural' character, and to coordinate them in accordance with moral standards and notions of human intercourse, is an undisputable fact. Man has long had the possibility of dissociating himself from implicit obedience to the pressure of biological needs. As Engels wrote,

Man is the sole animal capable of working his way out of the merely animal state—his normal state is one appropriate to his consciousness, one that has to be created by himself.¹

A philosophico-sociological treatment of the problem of man and study of his social behaviour is impossible, of course, without allowing for the facts of research in the fields of biology, psychology, genetics, and neurophysiology. But any attempt to treat social life and the motives of man's social behaviour, his moral principles, standards, and values as the consequence exclusively of biological laws, inevitably leads to a distorted picture of reality.

The authors of the conception of the 'instinctive aggressiveness of human nature', when trying to substantiate their theoretical propositions, in essence perform the methodological trick that Engels recalled in his day when criticising the anti-scientific views of the exponents of Social-Darwinism. First of all, they transferred Hobbes' thesis of 'war of everyone against everyone' from social affairs to the animal kingdom, and then with the same ease performed the reverse, extracting this doctrine from the history of nature and again sticking it into the history of society. When disclosing the scientific fallaciousness and reactionary character of Social-Darwinism's methodology of this type, Engels wrote:

The interaction ... of living bodies [includes] conscious and unconscious co-operation equally with conscious and unconscious struggle. Hence, even in regard to nature, it is not permissible one-sidedly to inscribe only 'struggle' on one's banners. But it is absolutely childish to desire to sum up the whole manifold wealth of historical evolution and complexity in the meagre and one-sided phrase 'struggle for existence'. That says less than nothing.²

If it is suggested that aggressiveness is actually characteristic of human nature, and is a congenital quality of it, it should fol-

low, by the logic of things, that the more aggressive some person's behaviour is, and the more he succeeds in that respect, the more consequently he is 'human' and the more the essence of human nature is concentrated and expressed in him. In other words, it would follow that aggressiveness and violent behaviour are equivalent to humanity and human essence. In fact, the progress of civilisation, the development of all essential human powers and of human essence itself, and the process of man's acquiring physical and spiritual freedom are not stimulated by displays of hostility and violence today but on the contrary are held back by them.

One cannot help seeing that the idea of the biogenetic determination of man's aggressive behaviour, imposed on social consciousness by the media of Western mass culture and propaganda, not only promote an inflation of sorts of notions of the essence and character of contemporary violence but also give rise to a certain scepticism in people's minds about the possibility of preventing aggressive actions, let alone complete exclusion of the use of force in international practice. Some Western anthropologists consider that nothing can so effectively maintain bellicosity in man as the conviction that aggressiveness is a biological instinct. The undesirable cultural heritage can be extirpated quite quickly and easily but if people are persuaded that aggressiveness is an inborn instinctive striving there would be no stimuli to shake it off.

By treating man essentially as a potential tyrant, biogenetic conceptions of violence reproduce in pseudoscientific form the old theological myth of the original sinfulness of human nature and the baseness of all human emotions and designs, and doom people to eternal enmity and hatred of one another. By starting from a thesis of the inevitability and naturalness of violence in relations between people, these conceptions express an ideology of passivity and fatalism, and indirectly assert the uselessness of taking measures of any kind to decide this socio-political problem, so serious for all mankind, in a radical way.

The *biological theory* of aggressiveness is similar in important respects to other theories that require an assertion that some or all men are inherently evil, violent, depraved, or monstrous in some respect. Each of these theories (riffraff of outside agitator, for example) has its own particular devil. A ready-made theoretical matrix, simple and dramatic, is available. Each group identifies the devils in question as 'the cause of all our troubles', personified by whomever they are against... These are not theories at all, but rather ideologies of antagonism and fear.³

The real problems of today are not the 'zoological' ones of

human nature, and not the cultivation and propagating of base instincts and passions, but those of peace and humanism, co-operation and prevention of a world-wide military conflict. Today, therefore, as never before in the past, it is important to give a philosophical substantiation of the necessity for observing all the standards of international law and political morality in the interests of universal security and, in the last analysis, of the survival of the human race. It is also important to oppose any ideology that leads to passivity and capitulation to the real threat to peace and social progress. Some Western writers see the danger of the theory of instinctive aggressiveness in its imposing on man a reactionary ideology that there is allegedly a biological need for an authoritarian social system to exercise domestic and external coercion.

Since man is the product of concrete social circumstances, it is necessary, in order to change him, to alter the circumstances themselves, and to make them 'human'. Marxists have never concocted hare-brained schemes in regard to the real opportunities for and ways of reorganising human nature and moulding a new historical type of personality. They have never idealised man and his nature, have objectively appraised the concrete, historical capacities of the individual, and have perceived them in all their diversity and contradictoriness, reflected by the existing social reality. At the same time, science-based optimism and faith in the unlimited opportunities for all-round development of the human personality and in the future of the human race have been characteristic of Marxists.

They are also realists in regard to the political reality of today.

Marxists start, of course, from the prevalent political reality and from the existence of different social systems and political regimes, world outlooks and ideological orientations, class interests and national peculiarities, and differing ways of life. But, at the same time, it is no less indisputable that the main premise of the existence of all these differences and peculiarities of the life of states and of their very viability and functioning as subjects of international relations, is their capacity to peacefully coexist and to reject the use of force in international politics. That can undoubtedly promote unreserved observation of the universal moral standards and principles of political ethics, maintenance and development of the ethical heritage left to us by preceding generations, with due account for today's realities. For when we know how to handle past history it is not difficult to establish that, in spite of the contradictions and hos-

tility of the various groups, tribes, and states that existed then, there unfailingly also existed ethical laws, and principles in politics, recognised and maintained by everyone, whose action extended even to such an extreme manifestation of political antagonisms as war. The instinct of self-preservation inherent in all living organisms was undoubtedly expressed to some extent in that. Furthermore, care is needed to preserve the human race as a biological species in the complex, dangerous situation we are in today, especially by everyone's recognising and observing certain moral standards and ethical principles in political activity.

Homo sapiens who is capable of logical thought and analytical cognition of phenomena of the reality around him, and of taking and executing his decisions consciously cannot be 'more stupid' in this matter, and more incompetent than his 'lesser brethren', animals that are doomed to instinctive behaviour but avoid suicidal intra-species struggle.

For all its heterogeneity and differences, rendering contradictions and struggles, mankind lives on one planet, and is linked by a common fate as never before. The struggle of opposing social forces, historical trends, and class interests is an obvious and markedly expressed feature of present-day socio-political affairs. But we must not only allow for and analyse the nature and roots of the opposing principles but must also consider the nature and source of mankind's unity and the various links and dependencies immanently inherent in it, the opportunities for co-operation and development of all-round relations on a mutually beneficial basis, and the pressing need for joint effort to tackle global problems. Mikhail Gorbachev expressed this as follows:

The prevailing dialectics of present-day development consists in a combination of competition and confrontation between the two systems and in a growing tendency towards interdependence of the countries of the world community. This is precisely the way, through the struggle of opposites, through arduous effort, groping in the dark to some extent, as it were, that the controversial but *interdependent and in many ways integral world* is taking shape.¹⁰

Precisely in the context of such integrated and contradictory development of human society, on the basis of a common human interest, viz., to survive in the nuclear age, do arise the new political and moral thinking, in a certain sense, and the new philosophy of peace that expresses the objective reality and needs of the current period.

Certain socio-economic relations are the objective basis of

any ethical concept and moral principle. They therefore have a definite historical character. And although moral concepts and standards of behaviour have altered from age to age in the course of historical development, they have always expressed the material interests and political aims, in their specific form, of some social group or other, have reflected its own way of life and thinking, and have been ultimately the product of the dominant social relations. As Engels put it,

Men, consciously or unconsciously, derive their ethical ideas in the last resort from the practical relations on which their class position is based—from the economic relations in which they carry on production and exchange.¹¹

A dialectical-materialist approach to the theoretical comprehension and practical solution of problems of political ethics from a standpoint of humanism and justice, and social progress, based on a scientific analysis of the material premisses of the phenomenon of morality itself, makes it possible to bring out the general human and class content of the ethical standards of politics, and to establish the dialectical interconnection of the aims of people's political activity and the means of achieving them. And when the rise of various moral and ethical standards in the realm of politics is analysed, starting from a materialist understanding of world history, it becomes obvious why and how far lofty political moral principles and the ethical means of realising them have always corresponded to the political activity and aims of the classes that were progressive in a given historical period. The point is that the historical necessity of society's progress, the interests of the broad masses, and the demand for a new quality of life and degree of freedom have found expression in them. So it was in the age of the early bourgeois revolutions whose ideologists and politicians formulated the universal slogans of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice, and first put forward the thesis that all men were born equal, and that the relations between them at all levels should be built on lofty moral principles. This historical pattern has also been manifested in the socialist revolutions that opened up the way to the building of a new social system without exploitation and alienation of man, and on that basis created a higher type of human ethics which proclaimed the principles of collectivism and co-operation of equal people, free from all forms of social oppression, peace and friendship among nations, as the moral standards of human intercourse.

The politics of socialist society expresses the ideological and moral principles of the masses of the working people, and is class

politics. But the political principles of socialism, while class principles, have at the same time absorbed universal moral values, and contain moral and ethical standards and laws that are the result of mankind's historical development, and were born of the age-old struggle of the masses for freedom, equality, happiness, and peace. Marxism, having absorbed universal ideals and humanist and moral values, has never confined itself in its political practice to the framework solely of purely working-class interests; communism is not just the cause of the workers but of all mankind. The interests of social development are higher than those of the proletariat, Lenin said, opposing a narrow conception of class interests.¹²

Marx pointed out the need to be guided in international relations by 'the simple laws of morals and justice' common to humanity, and to make them 'the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations'.¹³

The peace policy of socialism is imbued with a universal content primarily through consistent, unswerving adherence to Lenin's principle of the peaceful coexistence of all nations and states. This principle can be interpreted variously, but however interpreted, it primarily presumes precisely the existence of mankind without wars. The principle not only means the absence of wars but also envisages rejection of the use of force to resolve international conflicts, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, development of economic, political, and cultural relations between them on an equal footing, and mutually beneficial co-operation to ensure their equal security and progressive development.

The humanist essence and moral orientation of the politics of socialism do not have a passive, contemplative character, are not manifested in abstract, utopian dreams of 'class harmony' of oppressors and oppressed, and of aggressors and their victims, but mean active struggle for lofty ideals and moral values against all who flout and reject them. Highly ethical means of implementing them also correspond to the progressive, peaceful aims of communist policy. Communists constantly base their political practice on the Marxian thesis that 'an end which requires unjustified means is no justifiable end'.¹⁴ The opposition of Lenin and of the party of Communists led by him against the ideology and policy of 'left' extremism, which regarded individual terror and wars as acceptable and expedient means of political struggle, is well known; so, too, is the Soviet Union's uncompromising condemnation, at the present time, of all manifestations of international terrorism, and the Soviet call to

end the arms race, begin universal, complete disarmament, and repudiate the use of force to settle international conflicts. This stance of Communists has its roots in the Marxian scientific, materialist interpretation of social history, and therefore does not have a subjective, expediential nature but rather an objective, ideological (*Weltanschauung*) one. 'Our ideal,' Mikhail Gorbachev says,

is a world without weapons and violence, a world in which each people freely chooses its path of development, its way of life. This is an expression of the humanism of communist ideology, of its moral values.¹⁵

Since the policy aims of a socialist state and the socio-political reforms being carried out by it correspond to the radical fundamental interests of the masses of the people, Communists do not need to pursue a secret policy and to hide anything. They follow the principles of openness, truthfulness, and honesty. Lenin put it as follows:

Sincerity in politics ... that is, in that sphere of human relations which involves, not individuals, but the *millions*, is a correspondence between *word and deed* that lends itself to verification.¹⁶

One of the first political and moral acts of the Soviet Government in 1917 was to condemn all the imperialist secret treaties concluded behind the nations' backs, and to refuse to honour the obligations assumed in them at the expense of the interests of the working people. The socialist revolution put an end forever to the practice of 'secret diplomacy' and the traditional attitude to politics as the 'art of deception'. Mikhail Gorbachev, stressing the open, deeply principled and moral character of the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, has said:

We have no dual policy here. We pursue an honest and open policy. We have been doing so and we shall continue to do so.¹⁷

In the final count, only man himself, only the humanistic gist of his non-transient values—notions of community, justice, morals, good—can ensure the free and peaceful future for the whole of mankind, and its survival.

The new philosophical vision of the real world, the new political thinking, and the new moral code common to all mankind should become the theoretical and methodological basis of human intercourse and ensure the non-violent world and upgrade the civilisation to a new step of development.

NOTES

- ¹ Mikhail Gorbachev. *For the Sake of Preserving Human Civilisation*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1987, p 9.
- ² Engels an Nikolai Franzewitsch Danielson in Petersburg, London, 24. Febr. 1893. In: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 39, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1973, p 38.
- ³ Marx and Engels. *The German Ideology*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 47.
- ⁴ See R. Kosiek. *Marxismus? Ein Aberglaube!* Neckargemünd, Kurtvowinkel Verlag, 1974, p. 17
- ⁵ Daniel Bell. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, Basic Books, New York, 1970, p 448.
- ⁶ See *Pavlovskie sredy* (Pavlov's Wednesdays), Vol. 2, Moscow, 1949, pp 415-416.
- ⁷ Frederick Engels. *The Dialectics of Nature*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p 195.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p 307.
- ⁹ H. L. Nieburg. *Political Violence. The Behavioral Process*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1969, p 37.
- ¹⁰ Mikhail Gorbachev. *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, p 26.
- ¹¹ Frederick Engels. *Anti-Dühring*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 114.
- ¹² See V. I. Lenin. A Draft Programme of Our Party, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 236.
- ¹³ See Karl Marx. Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 13.
- ¹⁴ Karl Marx. Debates on the Freedom of the Press and Publication of the Proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates. In: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 164.
- ¹⁵ Mikhail Gorbachev. *Op. cit.*, p 80.
- ¹⁶ V. I. Lenin. The Laugh is on You! *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 574.
- ¹⁷ Mikhail Gorbachev. *Selected Speeches and Articles*, Second Updated Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1987, p 267.

PHILOSOPHY AND MAN

B. T. Grigorian

Consideration of the relations existing between philosophy, this fundamental field of man's intellectual activity, and man himself, as the subject and creation of the contemporary historical period, leads to a need to throw light on the nature of philosophical knowledge and its predominant function in the modern world, on what philosophy can and does provide for solution of the world's vital problems, and finally on man as a problem of philosophy itself.

As self-awareness of the culture of a certain historical period philosophy develops its theoretical principles and scale of values in accordance with the features of the period's development of science and its social practice, and the relative weight and social significance of the various spheres of spiritual culture. It is therefore quite acceptable and justified to explain the functions and character of the philosophy of our day primarily in the context of its relations with science, the weight of which has grown extraordinarily in the life of modern society. No one will deny the growing importance of the methodological and critical-reflective functions of philosophy in regard to scientific knowledge, and its role in promoting interdisciplinary co-operation. The immense value of specific scientific knowledge, as the substantive source of philosophical cognition, affecting philosophical activity and enriching its notion of the world, is just as obvious. The organic inclusion of thought standards and criteria of rational and scientific character, conceived in the womb of specific scientific knowledge, and its theoretical constructs, in the fundamental principles and methods of philosophy must and does have a positive effect. But philosophy defines its propositions by working up the generalised, concrete material of the most varied areas of culture (science included). For all their genetic links with and dependence on these cultural areas, philosophical principles and methods cannot be reduced to concrete methods and principles characteristic of those areas but have their own special nature. Philosophy has its own means

and modes of cognising and assimilating reality and its criterion of rationality and scientific character, which embodies a certain specific, historical organic unity of value and ideological, practical and intellectual, and scientific and theoretical elements. When we speak of philosophy's methodological and critical-reflective obligations in regard to science, it is therefore important to clarify the nature of the means by which these functions are realised. It is one thing when philosophy functions as an independent form of theoretical activity, clarifying, substantiating, and criticising scientific knowledge from the standpoints of its own tasks and criteria. It is another matter when it contents itself with the same logical and theoretical means and criteria that took shape within the science itself and which can be interpreted and applied by the scientists themselves with the same aim and no less successfully.

The nature of philosophy is treated and characterised in Western philosophy (especially in its logical positivist and post-positivist conceptions of the philosophy of science) in its extraordinary and extreme dependence on science, and is reduced in fact to the position of a methodological and theoretical-instrumental servant of specific sciences and various particular forms of human activity. The authors of these conceptions, while stressing the actually existing dependence of philosophy on concrete scientific knowledge, deny it the right to be an independent, specific form of knowledge. In fact the philosophic theory of the world (when the possibility of such is recognised) is treated and evaluated as an interpretation of reality that does not produce new knowledge of reality, while the philosophical methodology is reduced to a metascientific methodology of sorts that employs the theoretical and methodological means of science itself for critical-reflective purposes. Philosophy, as a general theory of the world and man and the methodology of all his theoretical and practical activity, and as a means of critical self-reflection born not just in the groove of logico-theoretical and scientific research and comprehension of the historical paths of scientific progress and science's functional mechanisms, but also through generalisation of the whole aggregate of mankind's social and cultural experience, remains outside the field of view or is not taken into due account.

Wittingly or not, science is regarded as an autonomous, self-sufficient force in human existence. The known fact that it functions within a certain culture, within a system of concrete social relations, is left out of account; so, too, is the fact that use

of the creative possibilities of science and engineering, and elimination of the negative, disruptive consequences of their development, depend directly and essentially on the character and trend of development of individual societies, and on world socio-political development as a whole. The mounting importance of science in modern life therefore does not call simply for methodological assistance to scientific cognition and improvement of its means. Social, intellectual, and moral support of modern scientific and technological development, and likewise the need to subordinate it to definite values, ideals, and humanist principles of our time are even greater and incomparably sharper problems.

The necessity of just such an attitude of philosophy to science springs from the fact that science, in spite of its unusually increasing role in modern society, does not itself contain the criteria and imperatives of appropriate cultural and social application of its achievements, and can therefore be employed for both the good and the detriment of mankind. A philosophical orientation on creating forms of social practice, international economic and political collaboration, and cultural relations by which mankind can ensure reliable control over the powerful forces of its own scientific and technological creativity, and solve global problems vitally important for it (and above all the main one, that of achieving firm, lasting peace) is therefore becoming specially urgent.

While recognising the importance of these tasks we cannot be satisfied simply with specific, scientifically substantiated forecasts and projects designed to ensure optimum functioning of already existing socio-political and economic mechanisms. Today, as never before, it is necessary to develop general projects of social and cultural renewal and revival, and to create qualitatively new forms of national existence and international relations. But such projects can only be developed within the context of a social philosophy and by specific means of philosophical, scientific, and theoretical forecasting and substantiation. Understanding of science as a vital fragment of modern culture and social practice enables one to realise the one-sidedness and inadequacy of such a methodological interaction with it. Quite obviously, problems, values, and demands evoked by the general policy of socio-political and cultural development, and the harsh and urgent necessity of dealing with the crucial problems of contemporary human existence, are becoming immensely important for philosophical support of modern scientific and technological progress. The development of practically

effective and humanist standards of human activity in the age of science and technology requires, to an even greater extent than ever before, that philosophy comprehend and absorb, in its generalised, fundamental precepts, all the cognitive and creative possibilities that exist in the extra-scientific areas of human culture and in man's social and spiritual life. It is along these roads that philosophy can most fully realise its obligations to science.

While treating philosophy not only as a theory explaining the world but also as a mode of assimilating it practically and intellectually, and altering it in the spirit of mankind's advanced ideals and values, Marxism has always attached great importance to the worldview-shaping function of philosophy, to the most general principles and standards of human activity that it has developed through scientific cognition of the objective laws of nature and social and historical development, and to the intellectual and moral precepts and imperatives that it has postulated in accordance with this knowledge. And now Marxists are guided, in their theoretical and practical activity, and in the major and minor areas of present-day socio-political practice, by strategic concepts and perspectives that follow from a philosophical cognition and vision of the tasks and paths of further historical development. In face of the scepticism and pessimism dominant in Western philosophy as regards the possibility of objective philosophical and historical knowledge, the culture of rational philosophical thinking, of an integral philosophical cognition and interpretation of the world, of the essence and purpose of man, and of the direction of human history itself, is most consistently and meaningfully preserved only in Marxism.

By its nature philosophy is actually a theoretical form of world outlook, an extremely general theory, which means that it substantiates the laws and principles of its understanding of the world logically and by specific, theoretical means, so disclosing its definite fundamental community with science. At the same time it comprehends the material of all existing culture, of all social experience, and of the various forms of man's practical intellectual activity in its ideological principles and appreciations. Philosophy formulates and expresses its understanding of the world in objectively impersonal and universal theoretical propositions based on the facts of science. But it also assimilates reality by generalising and comprehending the process of man's conscious, purposeful activity, and by its emotional and psychological, value and moral orientation in the world determined

by concrete forms of moral and aesthetic opinions and various types of ideological convictions, and by factors of everyday consciousness. When describing philosophy as a theoretical expression of concrete, historical scientific and social experience, and of a value and ideological approach to reality, we must allow for the fact that it has its 'eternal' themes and problems reflecting certain paramount and basic principles of human existence. The special position of the history of philosophy as an important theoretical basis and subject-matter of any philosophical thought, in particular, is due to that.

The complex, synthetic character of the object of philosophical cognition and knowledge, and the specific theoretical means by which philosophy cognises and explains the world and man, determine its specific nature. Philosophy is not a general theory of the world or of man, but rather a general theory of the world and man in their organic connection and interaction, a philosophy of human life activity in the world. Philosophy is based, in its generalisations, on scientific knowledge and on a value-mediated attitude to reality that expresses the worldview of a person, social group, or class. Philosophical laws and principles, irrespective of what they refer to, are not simply 'objective' truths but also 'subjectively' experienced propositions and indicators of a person's definite attitude to the world, and his own life, and at the same time embody both truth and value, scientific knowledge, understanding of man and the world, and comprehension of their meaning and significance. The philosophical truth of life (I employ this, in my view, broader concept in contrast to scientific truth) combines (or should combine) truth and justice in their possible harmonious unity. Philosophy speaks to man both about his real position in the world and about his life purpose, not only about what he is but also about what he can and should become. Correspondingly, the essence of a philosophy is largely determined by how it combines scientific and value-spiritual elements. In order to affirm the truthfulness and justice of its principles and basic propositions, it has always employed (and still does) both scientific-logical constructs and value standards and concepts. And since it not only substantiates something scientifically and theoretically but also postulates it having to be, it employs various methods of persuasion, affirming faith in the justice and validity of the postulates advanced. For that purpose it selects certain principles of faith and conviction. Greek philosophy, for example, was based on belief in the rationality of the cosmos, nature, and an objective world order; the Middle Ages lived by a metaphysical belief

in the rationality and justice of the divine order, and of the world order stemming from it; in modern times the 'objective truth' of nature, and of the absolute spirit and scientific knowledge, served as the grounds for philosophical principles. Contemporary philosophy employs both a scientific and a value, spiritual-moral substantiation of its propositions. In that connection, both the scientific and anti-scientist conceptions of Western philosophy have been developed, as a rule, and still are, by counterposing these two methodological principles, interpreting them as incompatible and mutually exclusive concepts.

Such a solution contradicts the actual dialectical inter-relation and mutual conditionality of the objective and subjective, scientific and value-mediated theoretical and practical aspects of philosophical cognition of the world. For the value orientation, despite the peculiarity of its mediated nature, has objective, scientific knowledge as one of its sources, just like scientific knowledge is always a vision of the objective state of things built up under the direct or indirect influence of a certain practical, value orientation. At the same time the dialectical synthesis of the objective and subjective, scientific and value-mediated must not be reduced to a mutually absorbing merging of these different principles. While expressing their essential interconnection and interdependence, such a synthesis must preserve a constant presence and certain independence of these aspects within a concrete unity.

Philosophy is true to its purpose and its specific nature so long as it does not identify itself with any concrete form of scientific knowledge or with faith. While uniting scientific and ideological elements, it must at the same time, of necessity, have a certain sense of direction expressing the practical striving and progressive tendency of its specific, historical time. In other words, philosophy cannot be satisfied with the position of an abstract, dispassionate theory of the world, divorced from the vital tasks facing mankind, and the latter's present and future development, and cannot function as an invariable synthesis of its component elements. The dialectical and specific historical nature of each philosophical synthesis calls for a concrete, organic relation of its different aspects in which one of them inevitably has priority (either the scientific or the value, the ontological or the anthropological) provided that this 'tendentiousness' does not lead to some factor being made an absolute and fetish, and does not nullify the significance of the opposite principle. In the conditions of contemporary world development,



which is bringing to the fore maintenance and consolidation of peace on earth, and a humanist, spiritual, and moral support of social, scientific, and technical progress, the ideological, methodological, and regulative function of philosophy is acquiring paramount importance. A philosophical substantiation and affirmation of the primacy of practical and spiritual activity over scientific and theoretical is becoming a necessity in a peculiar and much deeper and broader sense than ever before.

As a general theory of the world and man, philosophy is not limited to scientifically comprehended reality, but addresses itself to culture as a whole, and to the most varied forms of man's practical and spiritual activity. It forms a whole system of views defining man's place and role in the world, develops and proclaims the most general standards and principles of his social and moral behaviour, and of his scientific and theoretical activity. Hence its natural striving to establish the ultimate grounds of man's practical and theoretical attitude to reality and to define its understanding of the meaning of the life of man and mankind, of the character and direction of historical development, and of man's truly moral behaviour. These ultimate grounds, which are closely linked, of course, with some culture, are concrete and historical in their nature, but at any given stage of history they embrace all the basic aspects of man's attitude to and relations with reality.

A philosophical world outlook thus cannot be reduced to the content of concrete sciences or to generalisations obtained simply by analysing scientific knowledge. As the self-awareness of a certain historical age it also comprehends and interprets the whole ensemble of human life experience, its moral, ethical, and religious practice, the facts and phenomena of everyday individual and social life, and man's direct relation with the world and himself. But such an unlimited extension of the field of philosophical analysis does not mean that the object of philosophy is directly that which has already been mastered in the scientific or other forms of social consciousness. Its object is not the subject-matter as it is given in a specific science or in ethics but the means by which this subject-matter is presented. For a philosophical analysis reality is not simply the world and man but man's theoretical and practical attitude to the world, and his mode of orientation and life activity in the world. A vital function of philosophy comes out in that it compares types of world outlook and orientation given by science and by value-mediated and practical forms of consciousness (morality, art, religion, and everyday consciousness). As self-awareness of a

culture and of a definite, historical age as a whole, philosophy fixes the most general laws and principles of intellectual activity as a whole rather than a certain type of it, and is consequently also the methodology of scientific and any other cognition. This distinctive feature of philosophy is reflected in quests for and determination of the ultimate principles of human cognition and activity, in a peculiar unity of its theoretical and methodological content.

It is this specific feature of philosophy as a general theory of the world and of the ultimate principles of any human practice that makes it possible to compare the various forms of spiritual and practical activity, scientific knowledge and value forms of consciousness, theoretical activity, and social practice. The task, in that connection, is not to unite these various spheres by some *a priori* universal principle, but to find the elements and principles of this universality in each of them.

Analysis of the value forms of consciousness brings out the real existential and social reasons that make it necessary to compare the different forms of man's spiritual and practical activity with one another and to determine the role and significance of each of them in the general philosophical understanding of the world. It is on the soil of the 'ultimate principles' determined by philosophy, of the so-called eternal philosophical questions about the meaning of life and nature and purpose of man, about freedom, goodness, and justice, about man's fundamental orientation in the world and his relations with concrete, historical forms of social life, that philosophy adjoins and is related to moral, religious, aesthetic, and legal consciousness in their non-institutionalised and unofficial form.

In its propositions and principles philosophy not only provides a definite, integral understanding of the world but also interprets social reality in a corresponding way, thereby appearing as a specific form of ideology. In other words, a strictly logical, scientific, and theoretical substantiation of the laws and principles of philosophy demonstrates its scientific nature, while its value-mediated world-outlook attitude to reality discloses the special form of ideology in it. The forms of consciousness (diametrically opposed in some of the conceptions of Western philosophy) reveal a dialectical interconnection, and in certain conditions approach a state of fundamental mutual correspondence in which an ideologically expressed value approach not only does not contradict scientific objectivity but becomes an important condition of it.

In its vision and understanding of the world and man phi-

losophy thus does not just base itself on scientific knowledge; other forms of spiritual culture, and the whole aggregate of mankind's experience also find expression in its propositions. It functioned in the past, and still does, both as a theory of the world and of human cognition, and as a science of living wisdom, as a means of orientation in the world, as a practical, intellectual means of mastering and transforming reality. In this humanist ideological function (extremely topical for our time), philosophy can and must formulate the most general laws and principles of man's practical, spiritual and theoretical attitude to the world and himself that meet the demands of contemporary socio-political and cultural practice, and reveal and substantiate the highest values and initiatives that will determine the character and direction of human activity in today's historical situation.

In accordance with its specific nature, expressed above all in the theoretical and general ideological character of its knowledge, philosophy (both in the past and now) has as its subject-matter and purpose a certain generalised concept of man, a certain image of him formed by a specific historical age and social culture, rather than a concrete man in the liberal sense. And today, in the conditions of our time, philosophy deals with a generalised image of man in which both the specific and most general vital problems of the time are linked, in the form in which they arise in the different social systems and cultural regions of today's world (and first and foremost in industrially developed socialist and capitalist countries) in the course of the many-sided rivalry and struggle of the socialist and capitalist systems.

The human problems arising today, about which these world social systems dispute and clash, and the various mutually struggling forces and social and religious movements, are diverse and complex. But in one way or another they boil down to problems of contemporary human existence in the broadest sense, to problems of man's social and spiritual emancipation, optimum and just satisfaction of his material and spiritual needs, and to disputes about the ways and means of maintaining peace and human life and the conditions of man's creative and harmonious development. It is here, in the theoretical and practical solution of vital problems of human existence that socialism and capitalism (and the social and philosophical alternatives that they put forward) clash. In the last analysis it is a dispute about which of the two social systems provides the most favourable opportunities for man's development, happiness, and well-

being. In that connection it is a dispute, too, about which philosophy serves the interests of man and social progress, and is a reliable and effective guide for dealing with the urgent problems of contemporary mankind.

The concept of man that I employ thus envisages (depending on the context) a generalised image and an individual, concrete man, and other subjects of modern social and cultural life represented by social classes, political parties, nations, or humanity as a whole, and primarily as they emerge and act as free subjects of historical creation aware of their aims and tasks. In other words, it is a matter of the potential and tasks of the social forces that personify the subjective human factor of cultural and historical development. A true understanding and treatment of the subjective factor in history are closely linked with the problem of the relation of the objective and subjective in the life of society and the people's historical creativity, and with how the character of their interaction is seen and understood. Any action of people is an action of conscious subjects, but it is by no means always an expression of the subjective factor. Conscious activity in general and the subjective factor are not identical. People's everyday production activity, for instance, is aimed at satisfying their needs, and is itself a part of the objective conditions of society's development, and functions as the objective creation of history. As often happens, those involved in this activity may not be aware of themselves as creators of history. People become real subjects of history only when they act as a force conscious of their selfhood, position, and purpose in the world, their interests and tasks, and as a force consciously and purposefully striving for its aims, and to some extent foreseeing the social consequences of its activity. The physical existence of different human communities in itself does not make them subjects of history. They become such only at a certain stage of their development, as when humanity takes shape to some extent or another as a single community of people aware of its activity and the unity of the destinies of the peoples forming it, and when mankind, both on the plane of the individual nations and nationalities comprising it, and as a whole, becomes conscious of and tackles tasks of a universal character. That applies equally to a nation, class, social group, and the individual. A party has a special position in this series of vehicles of the subjective factor since the very fact of its emergence and activity presupposes the existence of conscious class interests and aims, and a concrete socio-political programme directing its efforts towards attainment of these aims.

A description of the objective and subjective factors, while bringing out and stressing their relative independence must take account of their dialectical connection and interdependence, and the correlated nature of these two principles and the motive forces of historical development. That approach guards against unjustified attempts to tie these factors rigidly to some particular aspect of social life or form of human activity. An important condition of a proper treatment of the problem is a concrete, historical approach to defining the objective and subjective nature of any socio-historical factor with due account taken of the peculiarities of a certain socio-economic system and the specific stage of development it is passing through.

The concepts of the 'determining role' of the objective factor and the 'decisive role' of the subjective factor employed in the Soviet literature to some extent help bringing out the real nature of the inter-relations of the objective and subjective factors of social development. In fact, concrete objective tendencies expressing the need for and possibility of different kinds of changes are built up and revealed in the course of social and historical development, tendencies that generally *determine* the real conditions of human activity, but do not preordain its character and direction, since the *decisive role* in realising the existing objective possibility belongs to the subjective factor. On the whole this understanding of the interaction of the objective and subjective factors is correct and justified as long as the *decisive role* of the latter is not reduced just to a choice of and assistance for some one of the available possibilities. The *decisive role* of the subjective factor, in my view, must not be limited to choosing between a strictly limited number of possibilities; it consists also in this factor's capacity to create new objective preconditions for its activity, in certain aims and tasks that are not just dictated by existing conditions but arise in the practical interaction of the subject and object as the result of the subject's creative activity. The subjective factor must therefore not only be described as the decisive but also as *creative, key force of historical development*.

Thus, when posing the philosophical question of what man is and what his purpose in the world, we are thereby asking and speaking of what he is today, what his objective and subjective possibilities are, and what the natural, social, personal preconditions of his contemporary life activity, and also what he may and should become tomorrow, i.e., whether he can, following the progressive ideals and values of the time, make himself, and

create his own life, in both his individual and his social existence.

The problems of man are posed and treated differently in the conditions of different social systems, in Marxian and non-Marxian philosophy. But along with the existing essential differences between the peoples of the world of a socio-political and cultural character, their community of historical destiny, and community of a number of global, universal problems, born of the radical social transformations and cultural changes of our time, and of both the positive and the negative consequences of the second industrial revolution, are manifesting themselves more and more clearly. We can list many traditional problems of man's individual and social existence as largely universal problems. These are the problems of man's inter-relations with nature and society, the inter-relations between the state and independent forms of economic and social activity, including the individual person's life, his or her role and place in historical development and cultural creation, his or her emotional, spiritual and moral experiences, and attitude to himself or herself and to other people. The problem of social and moral responsibility, and that of the meaning of life, have acquired special urgency today both for the individual and for various social communities.

In today's world, as never before, the close interconnection and interdependence of the most varied social phenomena and processes have been revealed and the organic inner linkage of the objective and subjective factors of life, of the universal and individual, of the international and national, and of the social and personal, has been discovered. An acute need for philosophical comprehension of these complex relations of reality has arisen.

For many centuries mankind made good the lack of its own powers and opportunities by faith in suprasensory and superhuman forces (divine providence or the rational necessity of nature realised in history, etc.). In modern times, with the advances of science and engineering, faith in the unfailing forward movement of civilisation itself, as a reliable objective guarantee of social progress, has been strengthened and confirmed in mankind. And it is still alive today in some of the West's technocratic and scientific philosophical conceptions.

The historical development of the past century has strongly undermined man's faith in the objective 'kind disposition' toward him of these external factors. All too often appeals to these objective factors have been answered by destructive wars and systems and circumstances enslaving man. The ca-

lamities of the First World War and the broad sweep of the postwar revolutionary actions of the masses were perceived by bourgeois consciousness as signs of a universal crisis of reason and humanity, and of a decline of all human civilisation. War, in its senseless and inhuman destructiveness, was represented and explained as the onslaught and triumph of the dark, unconscious element in human nature, and by the impotence of reason and spirituality. In conditions of social crisis, and of the crisis of bourgeois society's political and spiritual values, man lost faith in the objective foundations of his existence, in the universal philosophical and religious principles and standards that maintained his faith in universal, self-constituted systems, and in objective material and ideal factors firmly ensuring historical progress. The human individual slipped from the protective systems erected above him, was deprived of criteria and values that gave his life sense and meaning. He found himself abandoned and neglected, left on his own.

This pessimistic, apocalyptic perception of the world was not simply the groundless product of the sick consciousness of bourgeois civilisation, which had outlived its time. Many real, general problems of contemporary human existence found reflection in it in altered form. The critical, revolutionary character of our age, the problems of dynamic scientific and technical development, ambivalent in their consequences, the radical social and cultural changes accompanied by a precipitous breaking-up of old forms of life, and revaluation of values and ideals and accustomed habits and notions, and by quests for new life principles—all these and much else were real problems of the people of different cultural, political, and geographical regions. These problems of people's ideological and practical orientation in conditions of a substantial weakening and disruption of archaic ethnic, national, and religious institutions and traditions, and of the once automatically regulated life processes of various communities that guided their activity and behaviour, were posed in a different way and called for a different solution in these regions. People's emancipation from the power of these institutions, and from authoritarian secular and religious consciousness, and the spread of a critical way of thinking not only promoted affirmation of the new opportunities for man's free, creative development, but also, by laying the whole responsibility for his decisions on his own shoulders, presented many opportunities for spontaneous, elemental forms of his individual self-expression, fraught with actions of an

anarchic, subjectivist character. The problem of the relation of traditional and modern forms of social life was sharply posed in that connection, a relation by no means interpreted and dealt with synonymously in the modern world.

A mood of dramatic disenchantment with history and the possibilities of rational cognition and building of the world, reinforced by the tumultuous events of recent decades, and the destructive possibilities of modern science and technology, has been expressed in Western philosophy in a kind of philosophical confession of the crisis consciousness of bourgeois society, in attempts to integrate man ideologically in the traditional social and spiritual institutions of bourgeois society. By contrast, Marxist philosophy has brought out the economic principles of these crisis phenomena and indicated the real possibilities and forces existing in modern society by which man can tackle unresolved problems and ensure effective control over the processes of contemporary social development.

The need to solve the unusually difficult and wide-ranging tasks of the present historical epoch poses with special acuteness the question of man's creative possibilities, and of his active, profoundly responsible and creative involvement in social action. As always at crucial moments of life that call for immediate, decisive action, man relies least of all on natural and supernatural forces and factors inaccessible to and not dependent on him, even when he still believes in their existence and favourable character. In these conditions he cannot and does not want to be a blind tool in the hands of forces independent of and incomprehensible to him. He cannot reconcile himself to a social necessity born and taking shape behind his back, without his knowledge, with only his automatic involvement. Today, when the time factor has acquired fundamental importance, especially in the solution of problems of peace and protection of the environment, it is impossible to wait indifferently until the objective course of history itself overcomes all the complexities and contradictions of modern life and creates a firm basis for universal peace and prosperity. And there is no objective course of history that would operate of itself, independent of us, in favour of progress. It is quite natural, too, that man turns first of all to himself in this critical situation, to 'strictly human' forces and possibilities. This need and orientation of his finds reflection in the Marxist and non-Marxist philosophical conceptions of man, in how this area of strictly human reality is determined and employed.

This problem of the specifically human aspect of existence,

had been answered in terms of fundamental principles in Western philosophy of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth, and in Marxism already in the middle of the last century. A certain community in the posing of this problem, and the difference of principle in the answers to it that are found in Marx and certain bourgeois philosophers, and which to a considerable extent predetermined the treatment of the problem in contemporary Marxist and non-Marxist philosophy, are well worth noting in that connection for an understanding of the modern philosophy of man.

One can agree with the idea common in contemporary Western philosophical literature that Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud developed their theories of man as a counterweight to traditional speculative metaphysical and theological conceptions according to which man's nature was predetermined by certain essential substantial, prehuman and suprahuman, ideal and natural principles, and that each of these thinkers defined his own understanding of the truly human sphere of being, from which man's real nature and essence was explained. It is also true in principle that, in striving to overcome the one-sidedness of the traditional, rationalistic ideological notions of man as a rational and spiritual creature, they developed their own conceptions of the wholeness of man in which, at the same time, the basic spheres of existence that determine his life and are immanent in him were revealed. Marx distinguished as such society, culture, and above all the material conditions of the reproduction of human life, Nietzsche biological cosmic-irrational life forces and impulses, and Freud the biopsychological sphere of unconscious inclinations and instincts.

While rejecting the point of view of objective-idealistic and natural philosophy that the essence of man and the meaning of his life and history precede his existence, and that the cultural forms of human existence are predetermined by the laws of absolute ideal and material principles, Marx brought out the specific nature of social and cultural life, and of man himself. He showed that the laws and principles of human existence cannot and should not be reduced to laws of objective precultural and extrahistorical realities, whatever man's relations with them. At the same time, in contrast to the spokesmen of several non-Marxian subjective conceptions of man, he recognised the essential significance of the natural preconditions of human life, stressing that culture, for all its specific nature and independence, was the product of man's meaningful, determinant interaction with nature, and material production the fundamen-

tal sphere of this interaction. For him the sphere of material production, in contrast to Nietzsche's and Freud's irrational, instinctive, unconscious anthropological factors of human nature, was not some other-worldly, extrahistorical, and extra-cultural reality but a truly human reality created by man and accessible to his social and rational influence. That definition of the sphere of truly human existence is correct in essence and important in practice, since it brings out the character of man's inter-relations with it and the real forces and possibilities of socio-cultural reality accessible to him, by using which he can tackle his vital problems.

Theoretical analysis of the problem of man's nature and his purpose in the modern world presupposes an initial definition and description of the tasks, values, and methodological approaches that indicate the practical goals and motives of the analysis and also the means needed for its objective scientific realisation.

The brief description I have given of the state of man's temporary existence helps single out and formulate the tasks and values of our time that are recognised today by the overwhelming majority of mankind, in their most general features, and that can serve simultaneously as imperatives and standards of sorts for any theoretical and practical activity.

The unquestionable values of our time are peace, man, democracy, and social progress, not however taken each by itself, but all together in their organic connection and inseparable unity. Peace in conditions of democracy, and democracy serving the cause of peace; man as the highest value and democratic society built on socialist principles, possessing social impulses and relations humanist by nature, as the form of human community best suited to resolve mankind's vital problems—these values function today in close connection with a number of the generally recognised urgent tasks of our time.

Affirmation of peace and the value of man largely depends on positive answers to the pressing problems of the spiritual, moral, and social support of scientific and technical progress, which presupposes employment of all scientific and technological possibilities in the interest of man and for his good.

Maintenance and reproduction of the natural foundations of human life (both of the environment and of the biological, bodily, intellectual and emotional structure of man) has become another important task of our time. Man himself (including his biological nature) is altered in his labour activity aimed at mastering and transforming nature. But the con-



sequences of industrial and other pollution of the environment and man's purposeful influence on nature have led in recent decades to a situation in which serious danger has arisen of changes in the biosphere and in the biological organisation of man himself that are undesirable for humanity.

Man is an active creature who has mastered the forces of nature and created a world of culture different from it, a 'second nature', but in this creativity he cannot and must not forget about the concrete, historical form of his natural existence through which his theoretical and practical creativity has proved possible. The requirements of a careful, attentive attitude to the environment and man's own capacities, are connected with that, and also the need to preserve the primordial forces of nature and human biology and their systematic reproduction by means of culture in the interests of mankind's normal existence and development. The global task of optimising society's relations with nature (which can only be resolved in certain social conditions, in which all social activity is subordinated to humanist principles and the interests of man) is becoming specially urgent.

The danger of thermonuclear war and the deepening of the ecological crisis, which imperil the life of all mankind, have fostered direct awareness of man's value not just as a rational spiritual creature. It seems to me that we must see in this, in particular, one of the reasons for philosophy's mounting interest, in recent years, in human biology and the striving to understand man in the wholeness of his spiritual and corporeal elements. In that connection his image arises in its integrity, in insoluble unity of the material and spiritual, when no one aspect of his essence (say, the rational and spiritual) is recognised as really human in contrast to the corporeal and biological, but his personality itself, which embodies their unity in its concrete, historical existence. True humanism cannot and must not make an *a priori* judgement of his value by one or other of his separate qualities, breaking him down into immutable, opposing essences ('exalted spirit' and 'base body', 'free will' and 'calculating reason', 'insightful mind' and 'blind emotion'). In the place of such an anthropological dualism of mind and body there stands an integral human essence, a single human personality, which does not manifest itself as good or bad, free or unfree, 'base' or 'exalted' in its separate properties but rather in its personal behaviour and actions, choice and decisions. The humanism of the spirit and nature is indissoluble today.

Philosophical study of man in all his essential manifestations and life relations, and the development thereby of a philosophical theory of man as a special branch of Marxist philosophy (dialectical materialism) are a pressing necessity today for dealing with one of the central tasks of the building of communism, the task of man's all-round, harmonious development, which can and must be tackled in present-day conditions in strict accordance with scientific, philosophical notions of his nature and life purpose. The guiding proposition for the whole communist formation, according to which man is the goal, in the last analysis, and material production and all social activity, the means of historical development, directs philosophical science towards investigation, discovery, and determination of the optimum conditions of man's individual and social life, and fullest realisation of his essential powers and possibilities. This will only be realisable when philosophy constructs, in its studies, a certain integral image of man, and formulates a system of concepts and ideas associated with this image by which it will be possible to actualise in new conditions the old philosophical principles that treated man as the 'measure of all things'. Man, in his multidimensional essence, in his vital needs and possibilities (biological, psychological, emotional, and intellectual), and in the ideal image of his Ego in socially significant features and qualities, is indeed an important criterion both of individual and all social creativity.

A profoundly reasoned scientific and theoretical substantiation is needed of the ideal of the new man itself, of the qualities and properties, world outlook, spiritual and moral, social and cultural standards and values that characterise him and serve as unique humanist criteria of social practice, and of the main principles, forms, and methods of all socially directed and regulated processes of the moulding of man. Study and determination of the conditions, means, and methods of man's successful self-education and self-improvement, of his social and cultural activity, and of his freedom and creativity, are acquiring paramount importance in this regard.

A scientific, philosophical examination and interpretation of man's nature and essence are justified and possible when his real, functional properties and features are also distinguished and studied, features that remain one and the same in certain parameters for different historical ages and races, in spite of the historical development and change of human nature. In other words, man is the object of philosophical study in the definite constancy and relative immutability of his nature.

and at the same time in the unique, concrete, historical wholeness in which his invariant, constant qualities and properties are actualised. The philosophical question of what man is, therefore, is one of his nature and essence, of the regularities and patterns and mechanisms of the functioning of the relatively constant life structures and qualities given to him by nature and acquired in cultural history, and is a question of the characteristic features and trends of his continuous change and development, or the unique features of his contemporary concrete, historical essence and existence.

The contemporary philosophy of man is a philosophy of his, creatively active and socially responsible life, of the determining role of the subjective factor in the solution of vitally important problems of both the individual and the entire mankind; it is a philosophy that calls upon man to become the master of his fate, and to order his life in accordance with the humanist ideals and values of our time. In this connection affirmation of the role of the subjective factor is not limited to defence of the value of man in himself and to the ideal of his harmonious physical and spiritual development, but presupposes its full coordination with defence of the value of the whole human race. The humanism of our unique age brings to the fore the problem of relations between people, and the problem of establishing of such criteria of human activity as would express the unity of the tasks and interests of both the individual and all mankind.

Man's diversity as the object of study, and the corresponding diversity of the sciences that study him, give rise to serious methodological difficulties as regards the organisation of complex studies, and determination of their main directions. The topicality of theoretical comprehension of contemporary knowledge of man, and the integral and methodological function of philosophy in establishing mutual understanding and co-operation of the various branches of scientific study of man, have risen extraordinarily. In other words, the problem of philosophical, methodological furtherance of contemporary scientific study of man faces us in all its magnitude.

NOTES

See T. I. Oizerman. *Filosofiya, nauka, ideologiya* (Philosophy, Science, Ideology). In: *Filosofiya v sovremennom mire. Filosofiya i nauka* (Philosophy in the Modern World. Philosophy and Science), 1972, pp 144-145.

MAN IN THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

I. A. Konikov

Social administration has traversed a long path during its lengthy history—from control by customs and traditions inherited from the distant past to scientifically substantiated management under socialism. Its foundations and principles themselves have altered a great deal in the course of this evolution, and likewise its structure, scale and effectiveness, i.e., all the main components of the system of administration whose main parameters are determined by the specific nature of the social organisation, and type of socio-economic formation.

For all the peculiarities of systems of administration linked in today's world with the distribution and balance of class forces and the features of the forms of state system and government engendered by them, man inevitably emerges as the object of government, and as its subject (although the institutionalisation of the subject of government is distinguished by the complexity of its structure and diversity of its forms). The object and subject of government are in constant change and growth, and the dialectic of their relation is a very vivid reflection of the historical evolution of social administration. The course of this evolution has been from the primitive forms of collective self-government in primitive society to the differentiation and then polarisation of the subject and object of government in antagonistic class formations, and later through overcoming of their antagonisms and then of the contradictions between them, to an ever closer coming together and subsequent complete merging of subject and object of government in the communist self-government of the future.

The change in the relationship between the object and subject of government is reflected, in particular, in a change in the proportions between the rights and duties (obligations) as regards each of the poles of this relationship. The subject of the social administration of a class-antagonistic society is a complex, multilevel hierarchical system, but it inevitably embodies government of the majority by a minority, based on

economic inequality. Political inequality is an inevitable outcome of economic inequality, whether openly exposed under totalitarian regimes, or masked by the varieties of bourgeois democracy that proclaim formal equality before the law. As a result law becomes the prerogative of the subject of government, and the governors themselves (at least in the upper echelons of this hierarchy) are in fact uncontrolled, while the whole burden of obligations is laid on the object of government (the bulk of the population) that is often left with a sole right—to be rightless.

The forming of a society of a new type, socialist society, which means passage from spontaneous social development that has dominated all previous history to conscious historical creation and, moreover, creative action of the masses themselves realisable only with scientifically grounded leadership of them, calls for a revolutionary restructuring and reorganisation of the whole system of social administration on principles of a systemic, balanced character, unity of economic and political leadership, and democratic centralism.

The establishment of genuine economic and political equality goes hand in hand with surmounting the contradictions between the subject and object of government. This poses a task of government of all (including the administrators themselves) and government by all, i.e., an ever more active and broader involvement of the whole mass of the population in administration of all the affairs of society. In the end, not simply society as a whole but also each of its members function as the object as well as the subject of government, and their unity is transformed into identity.

The achieving of these goals cannot, of course, be the result of a one-time act, however radical and revolutionary. The system of government and administration of socialist society, like its other institutions, has gone through several consecutive stages in its development, has been improved through assimilation of historical experience, and has been transformed in accordance with new historical conditions and the requirements of life. Socialism, as Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in his report to the June (1987) Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 'should not be seen as an ossified, unchanging system, or the practical work to refine it as a means of adjusting complex reality to fit ideas, notions and formulas adopted once and for all'.

During the restructuring being undertaken in the Soviet Union perfecting of the system of administration of all spheres

of public affairs is exceptionally important, while radical reform of economic management was characterised by the June Plenary Meeting as the most important link in the perestroika. The existing system of economic management corresponded to the historical conditions that gave rise to it: namely, the need to surmount technical and economic backwardness in an unprecedentedly short time; to make drastic structural changes in the economy; and to steeply increase the share of accumulation in the national income, etc. Those conditions also determined such characteristic features of this system as strict, rigid centralisation, detailed control and regulation, the directive nature of economic tasks and assignments and budget appropriations, and so on. With time this character of administration and management ceased to correspond to the needs of economic development, while mistakes of a subjective character deepened the contradictions between the operative system of economic management and its conditions and tasks.

In the present conditions characterised by the vigorous development of the scientific and technological revolution unprecedented in scale and pace, the rapidly growing complexity of the economy, the need to shift the centre of gravity from quantity to quality, intensification of the influence of social conditions, and a steep rise in the role of the human factor, radical reform of economic management has become an urgent matter. The June 1987 Plenary Meeting adopted a theoretically substantiated programme for building an integral, effective, flexible system of managing the economy, the aims of which are 'to change over from predominantly administrative to mainly economic methods of management of every level, to broad democracy in administration, and to activating the human factor in every way'.² The meaning and purpose of this radical reform, as Mikhail Gorbachev stressed, 'boil down to this formula: more socialism, more democracy'.³

The radical changes in social administration characteristic of today are clear evidence of this formula's relevance and topicality. The significance of the matter is expressed in social administration emerging as a paramount condition of ensuring normal functioning of the social organism.

It is not by chance that organisation and management are attracting such attention in our day as one of the cardinal problems of contemporary society. This problem has been theoretically grounded precisely in our scientific age while gaining a new dimension stemming from a new institution, namely, production of functionaries of various ranks and levels.

Yet this problem is not, of course, by any means a child of the present century. Administration and management are inherent in human society as a highly organised system. The need for management is generated by the systems nature of the social organism itself. It is determined by the interdependence of its components and subsystems, the needs for social intercourse, the interaction of the members of society in the sphere of material and intellectual production, distribution, consumption, exchange, culture, and daily life, i.e., in all areas of public affairs. The need for management stems directly from the character of social production itself, and precisely from the collective, social character of human labour.

All combined labour on a large scale requires, more or less, a directing authority, in order to secure the harmonious working of the individual activities, and to perform the general functions that have their origin in the action of the combined organism, as distinguished from the action of its separate organs.¹

Management is thus organic to social labour. It has been in the twentieth century, however, that it has become extraordinarily important. Management and administration are primarily characterised today by their exceptional scale, because it is a matter not only of managing separate industries or even social production as a whole, but entire areas of public affairs, such as economics, politics, culture, and ideology, and of course, of their whole aggregate, of the entire social organism, and of all its vital functions. In the end the character of management itself is being altered; in today's conditions it can only be a matter of scientifically substantiated, scientifically organised management.

This description of management is dictated in the first place by the appropriate parameters of modern production. Computers are making it possible, through a synthesis of mechanisms and electronic control systems (mechanotropics), to go over to instruments of a fundamentally new type, to automate both production processes and technology, and to control and adjust them without human involvement (technotropics), and to automate management in the broadest sense (information theory).

Not only are the physical elements of modern production directly dependent on science but also its human element, the working man himself. The qualifications and proficiency of the modern producer are directly proportional to the scientific potential available to him.

But not only does production require scientific manage-

ment but also the system of distribution and consumption, transport and communications, the whole system of services, the cultural sphere and everyday life, etc. And while the necessity of management is itself due to the complexity of the functioning of the various spheres of present-day society, its scientific character is dictated by the extraordinarily intensive and increasing influence of science which is being felt in every one of these areas today.

The science of our day is really penetrating all social spheres, and all social processes, so that the functioning of social agencies and the control of these processes are also more and more requiring application of science. Without that it is impossible either to transform man's habitat, or to provide normal conditions of existence for the population of the planet, or to ensure social progress in general. It is not only impossible to master outer space or the ocean without employing the instrument of science, but it is even impossible to ensure normal, rational functioning of an urban district's communal works; it is impossible, in short, to deal with either global problems or tasks affecting the private interests of the individual.

Traffic control, for instance, has no relation, at first glance, with science. But if we take into account the fact that several hundred thousand persons are killed every year in motor accidents on the world's roads, and the steady increase in the number of vehicles and in speeds, it becomes obvious that it is only in the power of science to solve the problem of road safety (and equally of atmospheric pollution by exhaust gases). The basis for the solution of these problems is first of all theoretically substantiated, exactly established facts, and a scientific forecast.

But if the high speed of modern transport raises the problem of scientific forecasting, planning, and control, the problem of swiftly advancing social progress raises it with infinitely greater urgency. Our age is distinguished by extraordinary dynamism and precipitous rates of social development. That is a most important factor calling for streamlined management today. Scientific prediction of the immediate and remote results of the developing processes and phenomena, determination of the trends and prospects of development, and a scientific forecast are indispensable for the rapidly progressing society.

The character of modern social production and contemporary social progress with science penetrating all spheres of life, and the rapid rates of development thus determine the need for scientific management.

People are passing more and more from the transformation of matter, which mankind has been engaged in for thousands of years, and the transformation of energy, which it has practiced for centuries, to a new kind of activity, and are exerting greater and greater efforts to transform information and to gather, store, process, and transmit it. The scale of this activity, which is characteristic of our time, will continually grow, not, however, because transforming matter and energy no longer plays its former dominant role but because the very success and effectiveness of this activity is increasingly determined by the ability to produce and transform information, on which man will concentrate his main efforts in the future, transferring other forms of productive activity to mechanisms. In other words, work to transform matter and energy will not be eliminated from the production process, but man himself will be eliminated from this activity (though that situation will take long to become a reality).

Management itself may be exercised in various directions: it may be aimed at subordinating the individuals' interests and aims as objects of management to the aims and interests of the subject of management (individuals, groups, or the entire society) or may be directed to maximum satisfaction of the aims and interests of the managed system.

In a class-antagonistic society the differentiation of its members into the managers and the managed has a rigid character. In a society free of exploitation, based on economic equality (as regards the means of production), and on equality of political rights and freedoms, whose members, in Lenin's expression, recognise 'no authority except the authority of their own unity', management and administration are exercised for the sake of a harmonious combination of private and public, individual and collective, national and international interests. They are directed to ever fuller satisfaction of each person's material and spiritual needs, and to his all-round, harmonious development.

In modern society there are, essentially, two types of social administration: (a) a spontaneously operating mechanism and (b) a mechanism of conscious action. The relationship of the two, the relative weight of each, and the parameters of conscious action (its scale, direction, aims and its very character) are determined by the socio-economic system of society and the type of the socio-economic formation.

In a society based on dominance of private property, the mechanism of conscious action, which performs the function of the main regulator of the

economy, controlling capitalist production and the entire system of social relations determined by it. At the same time widely ramified network of state administration is in operation, employing various instruments and bodies to control both the economy and the political, cultural, ideological and other spheres of social life. And a striving to set standards in, and strictly control all these vitally important spheres, and all aspects of social relations, is characteristic of the capitalist state.

The bourgeois state exercises control over and management of such spheres as education and public health (though not fully), culture and ideology (in all their manifold and diverse contemporary forms). But the most important sphere of public affairs, of course, is social production. In any formation the economy is the material base of all the social organism's vital functions that determines society's physiognomy. The spontaneous nature of economic development, free play of market forces, anarchy, competition and all the social excesses stemming from it, and the cyclic nature of development (including periodic slumps and crises) are characteristic features of the capitalist economy.

All this also puts a certain stamp on the character of administration, but does not deny, on the other hand, the existence of elements of scientifically substantiated management in the economic system of contemporary bourgeois society. The state monopoly form of modern capitalism gives rise (1) to a further and, moreover, very intensive concentration and centralisation of production and, consequently, a centralisation of production management and (2) ever more active and effective state intervention in the management of production and of the entire economy, and the etatisation of the very system of managing it.

The monopolisation of industry brought about through competition has long passed outside national frontiers. This finds expression both in the subordination of a host of enterprises, and even whole industries, to individual national corporations, and to the formation of powerful transnational corporations and special international centres and organisations that concentrate control of whole areas of the economy (organisations, for example, like the European Economic Community). Banks, insurance companies, etc., are involved in the drive for foreign markets, as well as industrial corporations.

The Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, which was at the tail end of capitalist countries in the first postwar decade, as regards investments abroad, is now among the

leaders; no small role in that has been played by the policy of the West German government. It grants the monopolies immense concessions and privileges in order to export capital, and frees entrepreneurs who do business in developing countries from taxes. West German capital has secured a firm hold in more than 100 countries. Siemens AG alone owns dozens of enterprises with an income of several billion marks.

This process is on an even bigger scale in the USA. US monopoly capital now embraces practically the whole capitalist world. Siffice it to say that the overseas branches of American companies have an annual production several times greater than the volume of American exports. Around two-thirds of the biggest 100 industrial corporations are American. More than half the total of foreign investments belongs to the USA; and more than three-quarters of the foreign assets are held by fewer than ten New York banks. It is important to note that only around 10 per cent of the capital investment in West European industry is financed by the USA (by direct transfer of dollars); the bulk comes from Europe itself (reinvestment of the profits obtained by American companies in Europe, and loans, credits, and subsidies granted by the European countries themselves). This is by no means due to short-sightedness on the part of the captains of the European economy but largely to the fact that the profits of American enterprises in Europe are much higher than those of European ones proper. This advantage of American enterprises is a direct result of their art of management, in which the USA, as Servan-Schreiber has justly remarked, are ahead of Western Europe. Concentration and centralisation still remain one of the most important means of perfecting this art and the whole system of administration and management.

As a result giant concerns are being converted into supergiants; it is very important to stress that monopolisation and concentration are now embracing agrarian production as well as industrial, a substantial part of the services sphere, and so on, i.e., in fact, all sectors of the US economy. It is also developing intensively in the sphere of finance; the US economy is controlled to a considerable extent by fewer than a score of banks.

The concentration of production, which goes hand in hand with fierce competition, and is leading to the merger and take-over of enterprises, concerns, and trusts, has been developing rapidly, especially in recent years. The fact that the number of mergers in the first 25 years after the war was smaller (ac-

cording to Victor Perlo's data) than in the three years following indicates the rate at which it is growing. It is very characteristic that mergers of direct rivals (i.e., mergers within a sector) are around 10 per cent today, while the bulk of mergers are a uniting of enterprises of very diverse character and line of business in a single conglomerate. Their range of activity is practically unlimited (from production of high technology to disposable baby's napkins) while the conglomerates themselves are an instrument of centralisation and improvement of the system of management.

Use of the latest advances of technology is an exceptionally important and effective instrument for improving management. These advances are not only being widely introduced in production itself but are also being intensively employed to modernise the management machinery. Special firms have been set up to investigate problems of production management, paying attention chiefly to developing corporations' strategy and determining their policy lines. Members of the firms (professionals of the most varied fields, from economists to psychologists) make concrete recommendations, after study of the state of a corporation's affairs, on programming and forecasting production (on the scale, moreover, of the whole sector or industry), determine the effect of introducing new technology and production processes and the expediency of changing the range of products, applying new forms of management, etc. Billions of dollars are saved annually, for example, just through automation of management.

Science is being converted through that into a kind of business and, moreover a business of a national character, a considerable part of the appropriations for research coming from the state budget. But state control is not limited to utilising scientific and technological advances in the interests of Big Business. The complex of state monopoly measures constitutes a broader programme that includes redistribution of the national income through the budget, by means of financial policy and appropriate programming, and by the placing of military orders, the granting of all kinds of benefits, and other levers of state intervention in economic affairs widely employed by capital. Efforts at government planning of economic development characteristic both of developing countries (Algeria, India) and developed ones (e.g., France) have no small place among these measures.

The results of all these measures, however, are very far from the desired effect. Even the most wealthy, highly developed

capitalist countries constantly experience economic recessions, stagnation, and crisis phenomena. In spite of the broad system of state monopoly measures called for by the usual adversities of the capitalist economy (growth of class struggle, unemployment, sharpening of competition on the home and international markets, the disruptive effect of market forces, etc.), and intended to eliminate or mitigate these adversities, and for all the significance of the measures of state intervention in economic affairs, the measures do not yield the desired results.

The system of state monopoly administration, which implements planning and regulation of public affairs on a certain scale, is able, to some extent, to counteract market forces and even weaken their effect, but it cannot abolish them. The possibilities and very character of each system are ultimately determined by the society's socio-economic system and type of socio-economic formation. When we are analysing and evaluating any system of administration we need to take account of many factors, such as the aims and principles of administration, its structure and limits, the relation of the subject and object of administration, and its scale and possibilities, effects and effectiveness, etc. In a general appreciation of a given system we can be guided by various criteria (degree of democracy, for example, or dynamism, scientific substantiation, conservatism, etc.) but it must have a concrete, historical character, however it is made. A society of antagonistic classes has an organically inherent, class-antagonistic system of administration adequate to it, which determines its specific character.

When appraising the system of administration of bourgeois society we should start from Marx's indication that

the control exercised by the capitalist is not only a special function due to the nature of the social labour-process, and peculiar to that process, but it is, at the same time, a function of the exploitation of a social labour-process, and is consequently rooted in the unavoidable antagonism between the exploiter and the living and labouring raw material he exploits.⁶

That circumstance governs the aims of the bourgeois system of administration, and they in turn determine the principles and very structure of administration, establish its limits, possibilities, scale, and results, give rise to an inevitable antagonism between its subject (the state and its agencies) and its object (working masses), i.e., puts its stamp ultimately on the whole system of bourgeois state administration.

The aim of this system is to safeguard and defend the in-

terests of the dominant class: it functions only within the confines in which it corresponds to the interests of the dominant minority. Its limited character is expressed in its not having a consistently scientific nature (which by no means rules out the use of science).

Scientific administration of society demands comprehension of the objective laws of historical development. In addition to specialised theories of management that study methods of carrying out managerial operations and procedures as a kind of mechanism for uniting knowledge with the conditions for applying it, or as a reflection of the formal, procedural aspect of the functioning of the system, scientific administration of society calls for a general sociological theory based on a solid philosophical foundation. And only the dialectical materialist world outlook is capable of performing that function. Knowledge of the objective laws of history is unobtainable from idealist and metaphysical positions.

Scientific administration of society, furthermore, calls for use of the known objective laws of historical development in the interests of society. It is only within the power of a revolutionary class to realise this task, i.e., a class whose interests coincide with the objective course of history. The state monopoly system of management and administration, with its class-orientated, antagonistic character, is unable to transform the nature of a society from which crisis phenomena of an economic, political, and ideological character stem with fatal inevitability. It only becomes possible to resolve the contradictions of such a society, and to organise a truly scientific and, moreover, integral system of administration of all social development, during the building of a new, socialist society.

The building of socialism means passing from the spontaneous social development predominant in all preceding history to conscious historical creativity, to a planned, goal-oriented development of society which necessarily calls for theoretical, scientific substantiation. That determines the special role of science in socialist society.

The very possibility and necessity of the rise of this society had already been predicted by science. Science substantiated the historical necessity of the new formation and defined the ways and means of realising it. Under socialism science comes forward for the first time as the theoretical basis of directed social development and consequently as an instrument for perfecting the whole system of social relations and all aspects of social life.

Socialism radically alters the very aims and character of social administration, and at the same time the structure and principles of the administration system, its scale, capabilities, and effectiveness, its results and effects, and all the other parameters that express its specific character.

One of the chief merits of this system of administration is its integral character. It embraces all social processes without exception, all aspects of social development, and the entire society. The building of socialism and communism is a process of planned creation the essence of which is expressed in a realisation of scientific ideas. This is why each step in the building of socialism and communism must be preceded by a theoretical investigation of the problems involved, identification of scientifically substantiated ways and means of achieving the intended goals, and determination of their effects and results.

The socialist system of administration (and this is its qualitative distinction) not only embraces the whole of society but is also implemented in the interests of all society. In other words, it can and must have a truly democratic character. The building of socialism and communism is not only a planned process but also a conscious one and, moreover, one carried out by millions of working people. 'Living, creative socialism,' Lenin wrote, 'is the product of the masses themselves.' The existence of a theory and of theoreticians, and the proclamation of principles and the adoption of corresponding programmes, still do not in themselves guarantee success if social consciousness has not absorbed these scientifically grounded programmes and principles. Both the practice of building socialism and the state of social consciousness, i.e., the objective and the subjective factors, call for the introduction of scientific theory into life. The socialist system of administration is really based on the genuine activity of working people who have assimilated scientific ideas; in that connection it brings out sharply the function of science as the dominant world outlook of socialist society.

The democratic character of the socialist system of government is expressed both in the functions it performs and in the role of the working people in the system itself, and also in the features of the system's organisational structure. Under socialism the relation between the subject and object of administration is altered; the old contradiction between them, peculiar to a class-antagonistic society, is replaced and succeeded by an ever fuller correspondence, which will be replaced in the course of social evolution by an identification of subject

and object in the highest phase of communism, when government will be replaced by self-government whose elements are being developed today.

The essentially humanist character of socialist government and administration is inextricably bound up with its democratic character. This system, which is aimed at providing optimum conditions of existence for people (both natural and social conditions), and all-round raising of material well-being and enrichment of the spiritual world, protection of health and growth of longevity, and all-round and harmonious development of each member of society, is orientated as a whole on man and on achieving the highest, finest human ideals.

This lofty humanist mission gives the socialist system of government international significance because, by serving the cause of peace and progress, it thereby serves all progressive mankind, all the people of the world irrespective of their race, religion, nationality, or citizenship.

Because of that the socialist system of managing social development should have an integral, systemic, democratic, humanist character; its distinguishing features, its viability and effectiveness, are determined in the last analysis, by the fact that its methodological basis is Marxism-Leninism, the truly scientific world outlook of today. Its genuinely scientific character is expressed not only in opportunities for maximum use of the latest advances of all branches of science, but also in the distinguishing features of this methodological basis.

The philosophy of Marxism-Leninism that generalised and creatively developed the rational content of the philosophical thought of preceding ages and enriched it with the latest advances of world science and social practice, provides knowledge of the objective laws of the development of nature and society, and of their reflection in human consciousness. This philosophy is an instrument both of scientific cognition of objective reality and of its revolutionary transformation. It is capable of performing its methodological function in relation to any branch of science and, moreover, in relation to all the diverse forms of human activity.

A scientific system of social administration is now being introduced not only in the first socialist country in the world but in the entire socialist community. By employing its advantages socialist countries are continuously developing and deepening their economic, scientific, and technical co-operation. They work out joint plans of socio-economic, scientific, and cultural development, following the road of economic integra-

tion and international division of labour on the basis of joint collective planning, which takes into consideration the possibilities and interests of each of them and of the socialist community as a whole. This collaboration clearly embodies relations of a new, socialist type based on principles of full equality, respect for the sovereignty and national interests of each country, mutual benefit, and mutual assistance of the member-countries.

A characteristic feature of this collaboration today is an ever closer integration of science and industry, the creation of research and production organisations and international scientific coordination centres, carrying out research, and development work embracing whole industries, and often taking on an intersectoral character and operating as international enterprises under multilateral agreements. The work of such centres and enterprises is coordinated by central organisations that concentrate all matters of direction and management. In this connection a Comprehensive Programme of CMEA Member-Countries' Scientific and Technological Progress Through the Year 2000 adopted in December 1985 is of special importance.

This programme is being carried out on the basis of Lenin's principle of proletarian internationalism, of a scientific analysis of the objective processes of the internationalisation of economy under socialism, and of Lenin's conception of the economic laws of socialism and mutual assistance of socialist countries. The socialist system of administration and management is an instrument for implementing this programme.

The advantages of this system outlined above and determined by its scientific character, are not realised automatically. That calls for daily, conscious, purposeful activity based on knowledge and use of the objective laws of social development, and, consequently, as its basis and prerequisite, on the study of these laws. In other words, since science is a most important instrument of the socialist system of administration and management, its effective functioning requires full employment of the scientific potential; a prerequisite of that, in turn, is acceleration of scientific progress, and improvement of the whole organisational structure of science to ensure effective functioning of all its components.

Further improvement of the system of administration and management is a basic task of Soviet society at its present stage of development. The main purpose of this stage consists in accelerating its socio-economic development. This line en-

visages a renovation of the material and technological basis through the latest advances of technological progress, improvement of the whole system of social relations, and sweeping changes in the material and spiritual conditions of life that would ensure harmonious development of each member of Soviet society.

Each of these tasks calls for improving the system of administration and management as a *sine qua non*. An important feature of economic strategy at the present stage, for instance, is streamlining of economic management with a view to ensuring organic unity and effective interaction of planning, economic levers and incentives, the organisational structures of management, and development of local initiative and enterprise.

A decisive condition for solving both economic and political, cultural, and other problems is maximum activation of the human factor, development of the masses' creative initiative, energy, and social activity, and their increasing involvement in both economic management and administration of society and the state. Perfecting of the socialist system of administration and management therefore means a further development of Soviet democracy. Only with maximum use of the democratic nature of the Soviet system will it be possible to improve the system of social administration, and more fully realise socialist self-government of the people. Socialist democracy is the political basis of scientific administration of society, the improvement and development of it is a condition for passing, at a certain stage of historical development, to the highest form of the organisation of society, namely, communist self-government.

NOTES

¹ Mikhail Gorbachev. *On the Tasks of the Party in the Radical Restructuring of Economic Management*. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1987, p 40.

² *Ibid.*

³ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. 1. Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p 313.

⁴ V. I. Lenin. *A Great Beginning*. *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 423.

⁵ Karl Marx. *Op. cit.*, p 313.

⁶ See V. I. Lenin's speech at the November 4 (17), 1917 meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p 288.

THE NATIONAL AND UNIVERSAL

E. A. Bagramov

Is there such a thing as national character? The question would seem superfluous. When we meet people of different nationalities, and become acquainted with their art, traditions, and customs, we inevitably become convinced that the members of any nation express thoughts and feelings characteristic of all of us in their own way, and that they have certain typical nuances in their perception of various things and phenomena, and a definite way of reacting to them, in short, everything that gives the intellectual activity of a nation and a national culture a certain colouring and specific character. The pages of many books, descriptions of various travels, and historical chronicles are full of stories about and impressions of other peoples' morals and characters.

The question of study of the features of the spiritual image of a nation arises from people's practical needs and their natural striving to know the character and customs of the population of countries with which they maintain relations.

According to the findings of ethnographic research, opposing tendencies have operated since time immemorial in the course of inter-tribal relations: both toward a coming together and an estrangement of ethnic groups. The estrangement arising during first contacts is overcome with an increase of relations. But this intercourse often sharpened people's sense of belonging to their own group.

Some sociologists regard this psychological state, known as ethnocentrism, as a universal feature of the human race, from societies without a written language to modern civilised nations. But this point of view is refuted by ethnographic observations, (among which we must mention above all the studies of the outstanding Russian scientist N. N. Miklouho Maklay and later investigations by Soviet and many other ethnographers).

Progressive scholars have not only smashed conclusions about man's perennial hostility toward members of other cul-

tures, but have also refuted the very view of members of 'primitive' society as creatures lacking human qualities, for whom mental infantilism was said to be characteristic. They have also demonstrated the source of such notions, which are rooted in the Eurocentrism still typical of many Western scholars.

Objective studies have shown that what has been called an irresistible psychological impulse generated by nearly congenital or deep-seated ethnocentrism, functioned, already at the stage of the break-up of the tribal system, as a justification of the selfish interests of dominant groups. Ignorance of other peoples, and a conservative distrust of everything foreign, which constitute the social-psychological content of ethnocentrism, are transformed and directed, as a rule, into a definite channel by ideological considerations.

The historical research of recent decades has destroyed unscientific notions about the isolated development of the peoples of the ancient world living on different continents. The tone was usually set here by preachers of the superiority of certain races or nations over others. Bourgeois academics, responding to capitalists' expansionist aspirations, composed legends about the spiritual character of the peoples who were the object of colonial policy. Reactionary ideologists, who ascribed physical and psychic defects of every possible kind to these peoples, usually explained their 'inferiority' by 'the will of the Lord'.

From the standpoint of the materialist conception of history it is quite legitimate to think that the distinguishing feature of a people is stamped on its spiritual character from generation to generation under the influence of the peculiar conditions of its social environment and historical fate, and that specific qualities and habits are built up that make members of one nation differ, to some extent, from those of another. It would be naive to suggest that direct observation of the behaviour of members of a nation is sufficient for understanding the national peculiarities of its psychology. The features of national character can be studied primarily from their objective manifestation in achievements and values of a truly national scale: in a people's art and folklore, in various spheres of its creativity, in its traditions, customs, morals, and habits.

Academics do not always, unfortunately, undertake a thorough study of a nation's spiritual culture, preferring intuitive, superficial speculations. Instead of real knowledge of the national psychology, various kinds of stereotypes are often

employed uncritically, i.e., conventional, trite descriptions of the spiritual character of peoples that are rooted in the consciousness of many people as very firm prejudices. There is no need to list these stereotypes in detail; they are often insulting to national dignity. Let me note only that just the fact of their commonness makes identifying real and not imaginary national features of psychology an urgent problem.

Marxism is opposed in principle to making an absolute of any psychological attributes. Marx and Engels wrote:

Man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life.¹

National character is not an exception. The special conditions of a people's existence, its social and class structure, economic activity, way of life, culture, beliefs, and historical fate, all leave their mark on its members' psyche, which is also expressed in their behaviour, tastes, habits, morals and certain features of their mentality and perception of reality. The character of a nation thus alters together with changes in its conditions of existence. At the same time it is sufficiently stable to give an individuality to a people's culture, manner of behaviour, and intellectual activity.

Marxism-Leninism rejects sociological inventions about alleged organic defects of nations. Negative features in the character of peoples are explained by social and class causes and are the consequence of exploiter oppression and a hard life. It is a favourite technique of reactionary ideologists to biologise this backwardness, and make it an absolute.

When Marx wrote, in his article 'The British Rule in India', about the village communities in the East, which rested on patriarchal, semi-barbarous social organisation, he brought out their disastrous influence on the peoples' consciousness. He stressed that these forms of social organisation

had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies.²

This historical approach helps one to understand that the social and spiritual emancipation of nations is a guarantee of the revival and development of the best national qualities.

More than a hundred nations, nationalities, and national groups live in the Soviet Union; before the 1917 October Revolution many of them were in conditions of a semifeastal.

and even tribal system. It is not surprising that then the consciousness of masses had been in the grip of absurd mediaeval customs and prejudices. There were scholars who tried to prove the incapacity of these peoples to absorb modern civilisation. But reality convincingly demonstrated that emancipated peoples are capable, in a very short time, not only of assimilating advanced culture but also of developing it in national forms peculiar to them. It is worth noting that many values of Russian, Ukrainian, and other cultures have been acquired by these peoples and developed on their national soil. There is thus no 'psychological' gulf between peoples, and cannot be.

Peoples are further drawing closer together through the increasing internationalisation of social life. In spite of the contradictory character of this process under capitalism, it is leading even there to the markedly increasing importance of common features in different peoples' national characters. It will be difficult to discover character traits in nations that live in conditions of one and the same socio-economic formation that would be completely foreign to another nation.

The task of the ethnographer, it seems to me, is thus not to stress psychological differences in a one-sided way, but to bring out the diversity of the forms in which the universal is manifested. At the present stage of social development the international, the universal is peculiarly manifested precisely in the specifically national. In the national, which is often depicted as unique, there is in fact a particle of the universal. The unity of the patterns of social development determines the universal content of the national psychology of any people.

The Marxian approach to the spiritual character of a nation in bourgeois society opposes nationalist conceptions that conceal the antagonism of classes and preach an illusion of single thoughts and aspirations and a single world outlook of the nation's members. On the other extreme, the very legitimacy of attributes of national character is sometimes fallaciously denied on that basis, since they allegedly contradict the initial premises of Marxist theory. But this is clearly a case of vulgar sociologism having nothing to do with the truly scientific Marxist theory, which takes the actual force of a host of social, ideological, and psychological factors into account and hence does not reduce them all to an abstractly understood class factor.

The fathers of Marxism often referred to national peculiarities and the national character of peoples, without in the least falling into an absolutising of them. When I employ the

concepts 'national character', 'national psychology' (which are widely employed in the literature), in spite of the conventionality of the terms, I have only national peculiarities of the character and psychology of peoples in mind.

In public life we undoubtedly come up against the psychology of classes, strata, and social groups. National psychology is not, however, a sum total of them. At the same time the national is incorrectly represented in its essence as something above class, lacking a definite social content. The difficulty and complexity of studying the peculiarity of national psychology lie precisely in an understanding of the relation of the social and class with the national that would exclude both a counterposing of them and a dissolving of the former in the latter.

The fact that, even in a class society, certain features characterise a nation as a whole, and not only separate classes, by no means implies that members of the struggling classes are indifferent to them. Each of the social classes strives to assert and perpetuate those features that correspond to its aspirations. In a certain period reactionary classes succeed in imposing features of their class psychology on the entire society while the progressive classes are not yet liberated from the alien influence and have not begun to fight to spread their own psychology and values throughout society.

When speaking of the complexity and contradictoriness of the features of national psychology, one must remember that, though sound folk traditions prevail, there are survivals among them, bad habits, and backward morals, and extraneous elements imposed by reactionary classes. While bourgeois writers often laud just these features, passing them off as time-honoured national peculiarities, progressive ideologists see precisely those qualities in the national psychology that a people is proud of.

In order to understand national peculiarities it is necessary to consider a people's spiritual character as well as the socio-economic factors influencing it in a concrete and comprehensive way. It is also necessary to take into account the character of the influence that different classes have on it. The class approach is the best guiding principle when we are analysing a people's truly national features at a given stage of its development and the alien elements that have been introduced into its spiritual life by reactionary classes. It is obvious that the unity of national character is a contradictory unity. It was not by chance that Lenin wrote about the two nations

in every bourgeois nation, and about the two cultures in every national culture.

An individual's class affiliation has a greater effect on his behaviour and system of value than his nationality. The psychology of the capitalist and that of the worker are opposite in their social sense of purpose and their essence. When it comes to general national attributes, these represent a community of form in the main rather than of the content of spiritual, intellectual activity. When Lenin exposed the reactionary nature of the slogan of national culture on the eve of World War I, a slogan that then reflected the interests of the landowners and capitalists, he had in mind the bourgeois content of the 'single culture' and not its national form, without which cultural community as a necessary component of the nation would have been a pure fiction.

Due regard for the national features of psychology does not in the least signify a slackening of attention to social and class motives. But it would be difficult, without it, to paint a real picture of the interaction of social forces and the morals, emotions, sentiments, and features of character typical of them that reflect the peculiarity of a people's historical fate. Leaving these factors out of consideration will inevitably lead to schematicism in sociological studies.

The ideas of the dominant class are dominant in society. That can be said in general as well about the psychology of the dominant class. But there is an essential distinction here. In their real content national peculiarities of character reflect the conditions of a people's material life within the compass of the long period of the nation's formation and development, and bear the stamp of only that which is most stable in this history. Since it is a matter of ideology and social psychology, one must first of all trace how far the ideas and morals of a certain class take hold of society as a whole.

In its essence national character is thus socially conditioned. But it is by no means the common features that are derived from the sum total of class psychologies and, moreover, derived in such a way that the class basis proper remains and the 'purely' national hovers above it. National character is built up in the course of real historical practice. National and social psychology, while being a unity, are not, however, identical with one another.

The practice of building a new socialist society over an immense stretch of the world, and of establishing truly fraternal and humane relations among peoples, completely refuted bour-

geois inventions about ineradicable race hatred and discord among peoples, and about the intellectual superiority of certain nations. The progress achieved by peoples of all continents in the development of civilisation has convincingly demonstrated that it is not people's natural peculiarities that determine their social fate, but the social conditions of their life. Only out-and-out reactionaries now resort to such concepts as 'race', 'national spirit', etc., when explaining the history and culture of peoples.

As to what national character is, and what is its structure, there are many opinions among non-Marxian sociologists. But most of these conceptions carry a load of old views.

In spite of the idea disseminated in Western literature that Marxists treat the people as a faceless conglomerate, Marxism-Leninism sees in the working masses bearers of definite views, ideas, traditions, feelings, and sentiments. Hence the conception that no significant cultural phenomenon becomes clear unless the specifically national forms of a people's creative activity are analysed.

Revealing the universal and the specific features in peoples' spiritual life, including study of its national-psychological elements is of great importance for consolidating ties between peoples, and their mutual understanding, friendship, and co-operation. It deals a blow to racist and chauvinist theories of various kinds.

When we speak of national character, we do not mean unique features of character peculiar to all the members of a given community, but totally absent in other national communities. The uniqueness of national character consists mainly in a peculiar combination of universal features common to all humans rather than in the existence of absolutely unique features. The tendency common in bourgeois-nationalist literature to counterpose peoples according to their spiritual character thereby lacks grounds, and equally any advocacy of national exclusiveness (the supporters of which deliberately exaggerate national peculiarities, on the one hand and the differences between nations, on the other).

When I speak of national character I am not, by any means, identifying it with the character of an individual, the aggregate of his key features that define him as a personality. The character traits inherent in members of a nation do not in general form an integrated character. The national does not conceal distinguishing class and individual, professional, and other traits. It is more correct to say that all these features find

unique national expression in the members of a nation.

The content of the concept 'national character' reflects the existence of accustomed forms of behaviour, emotional and psychological reaction to realities, and certain values and tasks. The national character of a people, as a concrete expression of the universal, is embodied and realised, of course, in the psychological features of the individuals that constitute the nation. But that by no means signifies that such a complex social phenomenon can be reduced to a simple sum of individual characters. On the other hand, it is impossible to find an identical embodiment of the features of the national psychology in each member of a nation. The national psychological type or types characterise a nation as a whole and are not necessarily characteristic of each of its members.

National character is a product of the interaction of many factors in a people's social development, including those that have a relative historical stability (the established division of labour in given social and geographical conditions, certain cultural traditions, and certain institutions of family and everyday relations). I start from the point that the features of national character, for all their importance and significance, do not, however, touch the foundations of people's psyches, the epistemological aspect of perception of the external world, the main forms of logical thinking, talents, etc.

But which psychological features should be considered national and which local, regional, etc.? The answer constitutes an essential element of the historical-materialist approach to the problem. We judge national character not according to chance impressions and superficial observations but by the peculiar historical and cultural traits stamped on objective forms of a people's life, traits that stand out sharply enough to characterise the nation as a whole.

The caution with which Lenin approached this problem was characteristic. In answer to the statement of the Italian socialist Constantine Lazzari at the Third Congress of the Communist International that 'We know the Italian people's mentality', Lenin said: 'I would not dare to make such an assertion about the Russian people...'.¹

Each time we speak of the psychological qualities of a people we compare them with its history and examine the national features as the product of a long social and historical development. There cannot be any talk about national character and study of it outside the social, historical environment, from which it follows that the problem of national character is not

a biopsychological one but a historical, sociological, and social-psychological matter. This complexity of the problem makes it obligatory to approach it from the positions of several related disciplines, and to distinguish among the psychological features themselves those that have a social and historical significance.

In a historical or sociological study one cannot ignore the role of the national psychological features of a people. Due account of them also has significance for the activity of the Marxist party and proletariat of a country.

Such a quality of the national character as a feeling of national pride is manifested differently among different peoples. Small nations, or ones that have long been subject to foreign oppression, are particularly sensitive as regards respect for their national dignity, and to the slightest offence. Special tact is therefore necessary on the part of the Communists of big nations as regards their comrades of other nationalities. Work to overcome national prejudices must naturally be organised with allowance for national psychology.

An important example of observance of tact in respect of other nationalities was given by Lenin, all of whose activity was permeated by a deep respect for the national dignity of each nation and nationality, and a striving to facilitate their rapprochement on a truly equal basis.

Today, when a family of equal socialist states has been formed and consolidated, these Leninist principles are of special importance. All the CPSU's international activity strives to confirm them in the practice of Marxists-Leninists' mutual relations, and of those of the broad masses of the people. It is not by chance that respect for the national dignity of other citizens is a duty of each citizen of the USSR.⁴

The experience of the development of the peoples of the USSR and other socialist countries has shown that the liquidation of antagonistic classes and consolidation of a socialist ideology and psychology among all their peoples does not entail a wiping out of all national features and peculiarities. On the contrary, it is precisely under socialism, when a single culture of the peoples of the USSR, socialist in content but varied in forms, has flourished luxuriously, that the best features of national character have developed and found clear expression. National seclusion and estrangement are receding into the past, and the peoples, as it were, are revealing themselves to each other in their best qualities. In place of the national arrogance and bigotry often characteristic of some of the population under capitalism has come peoples' respect for the customs and traditions of

other nations, and a readiness to share the best in their own culture and to accept the best in the culture of fraternal peoples.

But the coming together of the peoples of the USSR is not simply an exchange of material and spiritual values. It is the rise and consolidation of qualitatively new common features in economic and social organisation, and a strengthening of peoples' international contacts; it is a mutual enrichment of cultures and an affirmation in all areas of new, Soviet traditions; it is a consolidation of an international community of peoples, the Soviet nation—and the triumph of an ideology of friendship and fraternity of peoples in the consciousness of the overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens.

Socialism undermines the foundations of national difference and discord and rallies peoples in a fraternal family. The peoples of the Soviet Union, having adopted a single socio-political system, are becoming ever closer as well in character. This is fostered by joint work for the good of the homeland (*la Patrie*), and by the constantly developing and consolidating fraternal co-operation of the socialist nations and nationalities. It is not a matter of the levelling out of national features; features due to geographical conditions and the international division of labour will be preserved for a long time yet. It is a matter of a new stage in the development of national relations. Socialism creates socio-economic and spiritual preconditions for an ever closer coming together of peoples, and the attaining of a qualitatively new stage in this rapprochement. It is already a matter not only of the friendship of peoples (of which Soviet people are rightly proud) but of the steeled and unbreakable unity of all classes and social groups, nations and nationalities, a genuine internationalist fraternity of peoples composing a single historical community, the Soviet people.

The rise and consolidation of new historical community, the Soviet people, is fostering and consolidating such new qualities as Soviet patriotism and internationalism, collectivism and humanism, innovation in work and irreconcilability with everything that pulls us back. This is what we call the 'Soviet character'. What connection does it have with national character? The answer to that presupposes first and foremost a clarification of the unity of the national and international under socialism.

All the new, socialist in its social essence, is both national and international. As Acad. A. G. Yegorov has written:

It may be said that this is contradictory. I do not dispute it; it is contradictory. But it is a dialectical contradiction; the common that draws the

peoples of the Soviet Union together and unites them is international and at the same time national, because everything socialist and common for all the nations and nationalities of our country has penetrated all spheres of their being, consciousness, and culture and fused together in such a way that it is impossible to oppose the one to the other.'

For peoples that are building a new life or fighting for common ideals there is such more than unites them than separates them.

From the standpoint of a revolutionary world outlook, internationalism by no means contradicts national interests properly understood. True internationalism guarantees national interests more consistently and profoundly than, say, the nationalism that artificially cuts a nation off from others and shuts it up in its shell, which robs it politically and spiritually.

It is in this context that Marxists-Leninists examine the matter of distinctive national features and characteristics. Those who are in the crucible of life, who are united in joint struggle have to maintain a clear view of the concrete conditions in which the different contingents of the working class act. The world system of socialism covers countries at different levels of economic and political development, with dissimilar provision of national wealth, resources, and labour power. The socialist community comprises peoples divided in the past by profound differences in their historical paths and cultures. That is why the general patterns of the building of socialism are realised differently in these countries, at different rates, and with a different degree of intensity.

The process of internationalisation which, under socialism, does not meet the obstacles that it comes up against under capitalism, is gradually equalising the development, and is maturing socialist relations. That is naturally increasing the significance of the international principle as an expression of the common interests and needs of the development of world socialism as a system, and a direct expression of the essence of socialism as a new social system. Yet it would be wrong to conclude from this that the significance of the national factor is at the same time falling.

The point is that the nationally specific includes not only elements of the old set-up and traditions, connected with obsolescent, outlived forms of social life; these are gradually dying away, and giving way to a new, socialist way of life. But that does not at all mean movement to a 'uniform' socialism, as bourgeois ideologists try to present. The diversity of forms of social life is an inevitable result of peoples' free creation. Statehood, national culture, and the best traditions of a people

receive all-round development during the building of socialism. For it is under socialism and thanks to socialism that a nation gets the chance to really flourish, and to reveal its potential to the full. And a highroad to this flowering is free exchange of values with other nations, mutual creative assimilation of the achievements attained by fraternal peoples. A creative synthesis of everything valuable that socialism possesses as a world system means advance of the international principle. And it, in turn, enriches each individual nation.

The establishing of international relations of a new type both within and between socialist states is an essential aspect of the historical experience of world socialism. The struggle of Communist and Workers' parties to affirm Lenin's principles of the equality and mutual support of peoples, and for a proper combination of national and international interests is making the ideas of proletarian internationalism ever more attractive for the peoples of the whole world. Many of these peoples, setting out on the road of independent development, are becoming more and more convinced that their movement from backwardness to progress is impossible without assimilating the essential aspects of the historical experience of actual socialism in the development of national relations.

It is not possible to overcome age-old backwardness and master the gains of modern civilisation without a fraternal alliance of the national liberation movement with world socialism.

It is impossible to put an end to national oppression and strife, to the ideology of national exclusiveness, without absorbing the internationalist standards of relations between peoples developed by world socialism, namely of fraternal trust and friendship, comradely co-operation, and mutual assistance.

Use of the experience gained in the development of socialist relations between peoples and nations is an important condition for achieving the future worldwide fraternal union of free peoples.

In looking toward the morrow, Soviet social science has advanced a proposition about classless socialist nations. This new socialist quality will provide a basis for their closer union and further progress. Full unity of nations will take shape, through the consolidation of economic integration, full levelling up of nations' economic development, growth of their social homogeneity, and through consolidation of the internationalist consciousness of Soviet citizens, and overcoming of any national narrow-mindedness. This will happen, I believe, during the

transition to communism. This is a matter, of course, of social and not of ethnic unity. The road to a further rapprochement, and in the long run to full unity of nations, does not lie through the complete disappearance of national peculiarities but through a progressing synthesis of the national and the international.

NOTES

- 1 Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. In: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 503.
- 2 Karl Marx. The British Rule in India. In: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, p 132.
- 3 See Lenin's speech on the Italian Question at the Third Congress of the Communist International. *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 463.
- 4 *Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*. Article 64, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, p 36.
- 5 A. G. Yegorov, *Problemy estetiki* (Problems of Aesthetics), Sovetskii Pysatel, Moscow, 1974, p 298.

MAN IN THE WORLD OF CULTURE

A. I. Arnoldov

Culture expresses the spiritual character of society. Society manifests itself and realises itself in it. To paraphrase Hegel, writing on art, one can say that culture often serves as the sole key to understanding the wisdom of peoples.

Culture, bringing a people lofty spiritual values and enriching man's intellectual world, expresses the majesty and revolutionary aspirations and hopes of the human soul. As a complex social phenomenon it has its own specific 'field' of manifestation. It is the spiritual world, the creative activity, and world outlook of people. It helps comprehend man's vital problems more deeply, and helps deal with them more effectively—problems like individual and social self-determination in the modern world, and man's effective action to perfect society and develop his own powers. The level of development and realisation of man's essential powers, and the fruitfulness of his creative effort in the sphere of material and intellectual production, are reflected in culture.

In that light investigation of the problem of cultural progress merits special attention; the aim of this progress is to enhance man's spiritual values and interests, broaden each individual's access to the achievements of culture, and increase the people's active involvement in it. People's multifaceted activity is only progressive when it reflects the objective trends and needs of historical development, and expresses the objective character of the formation of advanced culture. That which opens up new opportunities for the flourishing of the individual is progressive in the development of society's spiritual life. Cultural progress is thus movement toward the spiritual, moral, and intellectual perfection of people, toward broadening of man's real possibilities of harmonising his links with the natural and social environment. Its main result is 'the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e. human) being—a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development'.¹

The social portrait of a culture is based on an examination of it as a specifically human mode of assimilating the world, as a mode of existence that has arisen historically and is characteristic only of man, and is conditioned by the regularities and patterns of social development. Spiritual culture is an open system sensitively reacting to all phenomena of a social character and to all the situations and collisions arising in life. That is what makes culture an important and active creative principle, and an effective factor of man's social and individual self-fulfilment, of the enhancement of spiritual wealth, and of the development of the personality.

The culture of a society begins with its attitude to man. Its purpose is to express his spiritual nature, his essence, the meaning of his life and of his social life activity. It is directed toward broadening the sphere of the individual's life interests and raising the value of human life. Only through man is its social message fully and clearly revealed. It is inconceivable without man, and man's life is inconceivable without it. Man manifests and affirms himself as a conscious, thinking, active being by means of culture. Culture, by affecting man and social development, displays its transforming function in relation to nature, society, and man himself.

Culture transforms the world, it contains mankind's immortal treasures, the fountains of human thought, creation, and action. It has a most direct relation with man's fate and, the eternal problems of being: the meaning and purpose of man's life, and his contribution to mankind's common heritage. For culture forms a person's spiritual character and directs it to transforming the world, which must be so built that all man's finest qualities blossom to the full.

In the conditions of class-antagonistic formations, the increase in society's spiritual wealth is accompanied by the spiritual impoverishment of the majority of peoples. The intellectual powers of individual persons grow at the cost of suppressing these powers in broad strata of society. The development of culture has been linked with class inequality, with exploitation, and with a privileged position of a chosen few. Only in socialist society does the level of spiritual development of each member of society become for the first time a direct indicator of the cultural development of society as a whole.

All-round development of the individual is linked in Marxian philosophy with the idea that it is self-fulfilment in activity directed to attaining high social goals that forms the fundamental meaning of human existence, and that man's all-round

development is only possible given such conditions of activity as would help bring out each person's creative potential. The stress is thus put on socially useful self-fulfilment as the main human aim, which means the 'spirit' of harmonious development lies in the shaping of the individual's activity as continuous and all-embracing social creation.

When we analyse the problem of man in the world of culture, we need to make the concept of the subject of culture more precise. Not every involvement of man in the cultural and historical process enables us, obviously, to speak of him as the subject of culture. The individual can only be characterised as the subject of culture when he functions in the cultural-historical process as a personality and as an active, creative, intellectual force.

Culture presupposes both the training of a person for socially useful, creative activity and his direct participation in this activity. It thus functions simultaneously as a process of man's development of his creative powers and capabilities, and as one of realising these capabilities in socially significant results.

It will be noted that the main stress here is on the development of a person capable of tackling the complex and difficult tasks facing society. The value of culture consists precisely in its being a necessary condition of the practical activity of the masses aimed at transforming both the environment and themselves. In other words it does not cultivate passive, contemplative, consumerist approach to life in man but rather his active, creative attitude. That is manifested in his creativity and cultural self-improvement aimed at revealing his inherent potentials. The world of culture perceived by a person is also his personal world, which determines his life principles and behaviour, and his dreams and ideals realised in everyday activity.

The human personality is the result and product of social and cultural upbringing. A person is what society's system of cultural education makes him. But he will be cultured in the highest sense of the word only if he is an integral, socially active personality. The moulding and education of a cultured person is therefore a lengthy and complicated process which forms an important element of the many-faceted process of a person's socialisation that should lead both to his adequate social self-fulfilment and profound inner self-improvement. The road to this goal lies within a person, and not outside him.

Unfortunately a person does not always fully realise his

spiritual and moral resources, and his inherent capabilities. Yet he is a whole world in himself which contains the wisdom of the ages, the experience of his personal life, a wealth of emotions, and an impulse toward the future. It is he who enriches, develops, and ensures the cultural process of mankind. The person who has accumulated great spiritual and moral values enriches both his own life and that of society. But the measure of his personal responsibility also grows in that connection. Today this sounds as an objective law, as an important quality in the spiritual world of contemporary society.

The 'measuring rod' of the present and of times to come indicates that mankind is on an ascending line of social, scientific, and cultural progress and, naturally, that its spiritual and intellectual powers are growing more and more. But the demands on man and on his spiritual qualities are also growing for he is called upon to realise society's potential in a rational way, to contribute to its improvement, and to lead a life worthy of this calling.

While maintaining his basic integrity as a personality, the individual is constantly changing. His character, his search for himself in himself, his growing demands and ability to find new reserves in himself in the sphere of social and cultural activity are determined and manifested in these changes. A person must learn to ponder over his life, enrich his spirituality, and develop his intellect and power over himself for cultural self-development and self-creation. Real culture comes to a person through his own activity, his aspiration to drink constantly at the well of spiritual life, and his persistent efforts to develop his inner world of ideas and feelings.

The road to this world lies through a person's courageous spiritual self-development, through strengthening of his self-consciousness, through overcoming difficulties and disappointments, conservatism of thought, and mental inertia. The social aim and active, truly humanist character of culture, find expression in this.

Theoretical comprehension of the concept of 'cultural activity of the individual' deserves attention in the light of that. Cultural activity is a process of man's purposeful transformation of both external and his own nature. In order to define the concept 'cultural activity' we must take into consideration the point that the source of cultural development is precisely that activity which has the development of man himself as its object, aim, and main result. Karl Marx often called this activity *Selbstbetätigung* (self-activity),² counterposing it to the

limited forms of labour in class society, in which the result is separated from the personality of its creator. In that connection it is expedient, when considering the concept 'cultural activity', to start by recognising its 'self-dependent' character, since it is aimed not only at achieving external, material results but also at a change in man himself and perfecting his spiritual and creative potential.

In its material and spiritual expression, culture is a necessary component of any activity of man to master and change the world in which he lives. It is quite legitimate, in that context, to differentiate between activity associated with simple reproduction of already achieved results and cultural activity that is creative. The latter includes not only the objective results of creating the new (machines, technical structures, scientific knowledge, works of art, standards of law and morality, etc.) but also those subjective human forces and capacities by which alone creative activity is possible.

Revealing culture as a process of creative activity means examination of the scope and forms of people's knowledge and abilities, of their productive and professional skills, of the level of their intellectual, political, aesthetic, and moral development, of their world outlook, and modes and forms of human communication.

Cultural activity is an intricate, complex, social phenomenon. It includes both the consumption of cultural values (perception, assimilation, evaluation, i.e. their 'de-objectification'), and creation, viz. the creation of new cultural values ('objectifying' a personality's cultural and creative capabilities and skills).

The man of modern society must possess 'historical memory', i.e. understanding of and ability to evaluate the past of his people and his country, and of other peoples and countries. The principle of historicism witnesses that one's attitude to the classical heritage is not only retrospection, or enrichment of one's vision of the future, but is also a deeper understanding of our day, an elevating of the present so as to improve it. The value basis of social existence is laid in this historical continuity. Without it value criteria are upset and culture inevitably loses its touch with history.

A person must know how to feel the pulse of the age, to master an ability to listen carefully to the music of the times (to quote Alexander Blok) so as not to be on the verge of life but to act vigorously and purposefully in it. Man often proves to be in a maelstrom of the commonplace. On the worldly plane

that is quite explicable. Important, real cares about family and daily life, the collisions of workdays, all now and then divert one from the crucial global problems and the danger of war. Great social anxieties do not affect one's deep consciousness and are perceived superficially as truths long known. There is a dangerous process of self-hypnotising of the individual that can only be overcome by converting significant global problems in human consciousness into personal ones through one's understanding that the problems of the world and all mankind have become one's own, personal, vital problems, one's vitally close interests that one has to solve himself. To surmount the boundary between everyday personal interests and those of a social scale, so that one can know what one must personally do to tackle the social problems arising, is the task of both education and self-education.

The spiritual life of society brings forward a number of problems linked with man as an integral being. What he is today, what he may and should be tomorrow, what he is capable of accomplishing by his activity. Culture cannot exist without man and outside his perception. The creations of Leonardo da Vinci lose their value and significance when locked away in the repository of a museum or in a safe-deposit box. And that applies to all the values of culture.

Under socialism, as it is today, culture is oriented on man's all-round development as the highest goal, and presupposes action on the individual that stimulates his self-development and self-awareness. The problem of one's clear understanding of the tasks facing society that enables one to take a more active part in their solution is acquiring special importance. For the subject of cultural development is by no means a faceless mass; on the contrary, it is an aggregate of concrete individualities and personalities. Such an approach is fundamentally important because it expresses a truly humanist solution of the problem of man in culture.

A very important feature of Soviet culture is unshakeable faith in the creative powers of the individual. This humanist ideal determines the moral climate of society and the general tone of all spiritual life. Socialism is the first system in the world to emancipate the whole people, rather than certain strata of the population, from spiritual poverty and limitation of the individual.

In assimilating culture, a person acquires not only a vitally necessary source of knowledge but also a stimulus to many-

sided development that activates his life and so makes him a socially active personality.

The fundamental meaning of the development of culture is undoubtedly the cognition and transformation of the world and perfecting of man. Man penetrates the world's secrets by constantly discovering it. Outer space and the microworld are opened up, and new scientific, artistic, and moral values emerge. But the most important discovery is man's cognition and discovery of himself as individual and personality. The efforts of many philosophers, thinkers, and revolutionaries have been directed to creating an ideal of a real man.

The attempts of critics of today's socialism to proclaim it incompatible with humanism and to liken the new society to a kind of universal barracks' levelling of individuality, standardising people's spiritual life, and presupposing a 'violent invasion' of the individual's spiritual world for the sake of material production, are quite groundless.

Marxism does not by any means counterpose spiritual culture to material production. On the contrary, the development of technology and economic relations is seen in Soviet society as a necessary condition of progress in all spheres of life. The realistic character of the humanist aims that socialist culture sets itself is built precisely on the development of its material basis (which makes it possible to satisfy the people's spiritual requirements more fully), and on the perfecting of the production relations in order to exclude all and every form of spiritual dehumanisation.

Together with the forming of a new culture there is the moulding of a new man who is characterised by social consciousness and activeness, a developed sense of collectivism, high moral principles, and wide-ranging intellectual and spiritual interests. He is by no means a standardised robot blindly obeying the will of the majority (as some Western theorists try to picture the man of socialist society), but is a quite independent critical-minded individual, endowed with his own unique character.

Socialist society has never set itself the task of levelling human individualities, reducing them to some average model. On the contrary, in advancing the slogan 'All for man', existing socialism has always sought to achieve harmonious development of the individual, and ever fuller realisation of his capabilities and inclinations.

Naturally, harmonious development of the individual presupposes a certain correspondence between the manifestation

of individuality and the interests of the collective and society as a whole. There may not be a full coincidence here, and certain contradictions may arise. But, while the social conditions in capitalist society make for the rise and predominance of individualism that expresses man's isolation and has a destructive effect on the personality, under socialism individuality and collectivism develop in one direction and in the common interests. Society on the one hand, has an interest in realising man's individual qualities which benefits both himself and society in general. On the other hand, a person linked with the people around him by a diversity of ties, and brought up in an atmosphere of mutual help, enriches the collective by his inimitable individuality and is conscious, at the same time, of his responsibility to other members of society.

The humanism of socialist culture is that it actively struggles for social justice, and for each person's right to spiritual development. Socialist culture leads to the forming, not of an impersonal, faceless, passive individual, but rather a courageous and noble person who is resolute in the fight against evil, for his own happiness and the happiness of other people, a socially active and creative man.

In working for its humanist goal—moulding a new man—socialist culture concentrates special attention on encouraging man as a socially active personality, on supporting his creative gifts, and his capacity for real activity. Society's attention is focussed on his creative activity, on stimulating those of his qualities and capacities that are most effective in helping him to create the new, to cognise the world, and perform actions permeated with a vigorous, creative impulse. Such an 'intellectual climate' and atmosphere constantly prevails in socialist society in which a person cannot help perceiving and grasping culture, and cannot do without it.

Marx said that the extent of a society's merit, the criterion of its absolute or objective achievements, was how far it enabled all the possibilities inherent in man to be revealed and developed. Socialist society has reached a stage today when one's attitude to work and socialist property, the level of the individual's consciousness and world outlook, and political and moral culture, have become basic spiritual values.

The current stage of socialism is distinguished by a concentrated intellectual life, intensive growth of its scope, which is very fruitfully affecting all spheres of the individual's life activity. Man, enriched by spiritual values, is not only changing his inner world, saturating his work with an active,

creative, intellectual principle. This gives rise to a real need for culture in working people, stimulates a wish to create it directly as well as to assimilate cultural riches actively. Such a union of man and culture is a chief social task under socialism. In the Soviet Union this task is not being tackled by separate organisations and private persons but by the whole system of ideological, educational, and cultural work organised on a society-wide scale, and is a most important sector in the activity of the Soviet state. Man's involvement in culture is being raised to the level of national, state policy and constitutes an essential element in it.

Soviet society is now concentrating its attention on the reforms and changes that have to be made in present-day conditions to deal with problems connected with a further rise in the general educational, cultural, and technical standards of the working people and their broad involvement in accelerating social, economic, scientific, and technical progress, and a flowering of artistic culture. The spiritual life of the people is growing more meaningful and varied with every year.

During the years of socialism the Soviet Union has made an immense leap from illiteracy of a considerable part of the population to general literacy, to peaks of spiritual creation, from the wooden plough to spaceships and the broadest spread of high cultural values among the whole people. In the Soviet Union a complex of theoretically substantiated measures are being implemented for continuously raising man's standard of education throughout his life. Existing differences in the educational level of social strata, groups, and nations are being eliminated.

A notable feature of the spiritual life of Soviet society is growth of people's very deep interest in proliferating the cultural wealth of socialism. There is a growing striving for culture. Young and old alike are studying, as in the first days of the Soviet Republic. But now they are not studying ABCs and primers, but are conquering the heights of science and art; an intellectualisation of Soviet society is coming about.

A vigorous social movement for a broad 'geography of culture' is now under way in the USSR. There are cultural centres in all towns and cities, and an amateur people's theatre in small towns. Touring professional theatre companies have been organised for country areas, and libraries with an extensive book fund.

There is a constant expansion of opportunities for a full cultural life under socialism, a life that society grants to every-

one. From reading newspapers and watching television to systematic education, from education to independent cultural creation within the compass of professional or amateur activity (artistic, scientific and technical, social and political)—such is the range of these opportunities.

In today's dynamic and complex world, assimilating culture is a difficult and involved process. That presupposes special training, and long and serious education. In order to get on freely and easily in modern culture, a person must study and find his bearings in it, and choose spiritual values for himself that accord with his personal inclinations and do not contradict socially-established standards. And although a capacity to apprehend cultural values is a universal human property, it needs to be specially developed. It is not enough to aspire to the beautiful; it is still necessary to know how to grasp and comprehend it.

I must note, here, that the constant perfecting of the system of people's involvement in culture in socialist society is directed to shaping rational needs and stimulating self-development and self-education, as a first step to acquiring culture. It is undoubtedly very difficult to succeed in making this training correspond to the whole existing socio-cultural medium. To mould a person capable of finding his bearings and living adequately in the varied world of culture it is first of all necessary for him to be personally interested and for all who are engaged in education and upbringing to have high qualifications. Only a person who has learned to understand his socio-cultural environment, to take independent decisions, to pass freely from the level of ordinary common sense to a capacity to think on a social scale, can cope with personal and social problems on the basis of acquired cultural values.

All spheres of socialist culture are aimed at increasing the individual's activity. The most important of these areas is high political culture of the people, which forms an organic structural element in the system of spiritual values. Man's 'social quality' grows during its development, and a new type of high-principled, socially active personality is formed. But it is not just a matter of the influence on man's inner spiritual world and his life; he sees himself in a new way, reveals his creative possibilities, and discovers himself as an individual through his world outlook. The individual thus develops a system of socially useful principles and does not simply assimilate elementary knowledge and habits of culture, but also takes part in creating them, and uses them in his daily life.

The political culture of socialism stimulates active participation of the working people in the management of socialist society, and develops in them an ability, as Lenin said, 'to build up a state'.³ Its values are a high standard of political and scientific knowledge, and development of the individual's civic qualities. In the Soviet Union more than two million persons are elected to the Soviets as people's deputies, and more than 30 million take part in the work of these Soviets.

The Communist Party, in treating culture not only as the ensemble of mankind's material and spiritual culture but also as man's process of self-development, and proliferation and perfecting of his essential powers and capacities, pays special attention to the moral values of socialist culture. In the Soviet Union culture serves as a school of humanism. Its moral potential is manifested in its contributing to moulding those qualities in man that aid his personal self-determination, and encourage him to have a considerate, careful attitude to other people and the environment.

The ideal of socialist culture is man fortifying his mind and spirit in truth and active good, in individual self-development, and in socially useful deeds. Culture moulds a morally mature, courageous, person with a sense of his own worth. Socialist culture does not counterpose reason to emotions but stands for a harmonious unity of the two. A high development of intellect and a high culture of feelings are essential constituents of a harmonious personality. The new man synthesises depth of thought and beauty of feelings.

A very refined sphere of human existence, that of human relations, is of special significance for modern life filled with diverse information and numerous collisions. One of the most important tasks of today's social development is to perfect human relations.

Developed social intercourse compels the individual fully, as Marx wrote, 'to experience the need of the greatest wealth—the *other* human being'.⁴ Progressive men of science and culture have actively opposed man's spiritual Robinsoniad, because human essence is only manifested in intercourse and communion, in man's unity with man. Spiritual culture has the task of uniting people. It is in human intercourse that cultural values are assimilated and spread. Human isolation, tragic in its essence, which not only destroys man's spiritual and moral powers but dooms him to social loneliness, is opposed to a high culture of human intercourse. Progressive culture is directed to uniting people and to their spiritual and emotional commu-

nion. Only such culture can unite the diversity of human individualities in an organic whole, join the spiritual wealth of separate personalities together and so promote social and spiritual harmony in society.

What can be better and more beautiful on Earth than good human relations founded on confidence? For man's tranquility and joy depend precisely on that, and his happiness and life, too. Without human warmth, and a high culture of human intercourse, life becomes unbearably dull and is converted into Dantean hell both in the family and at work, and even in such a global sphere as international relations. There is not perhaps a loftier and more needed value on Earth than that of human intercourse and confidence. In Soviet society this is really so.

* * *

Soviet culture is the child of a society that is showing the world that its goals are noble and humane, which possesses enormous creative forces, and which has been able in a very short span to achieve many successes and make much progress. The lofty spiritual values of every people are received with an open mind in the Soviet Union, which stands for an honest and free exchange of spiritual values, respecting human dignity, and opposes any kind of *diktat* and imposition.

The Soviet Union maintains cultural contacts with many countries, and takes part in the work of many international cultural organisations. Manifested in the development of the cultural ties is the noble desire of Soviet people to absorb all that is valuable from other peoples, and at the same time to pass its own spiritual values and achievements on to all countries and peoples. Equipped with a philosophy of historical optimism, socialist cultural workers are convinced that the peace policy of socialism, stemming from the very nature of this social system, the life-affirming force of peaceful labour, the masses' earnest desire for peace, and deep respect for the culture of all peoples are most important and reliable guarantees of a peaceful future for mankind. The humanist trend of Soviet culture is manifest in that works of Soviet literature and art, scientific thought, the system of education and upbringing serve the defence of peace as a necessary condition of the development of man's spiritual powers.

A time-honoured, organic peaceableness and striving for a peaceful life and good-neighbourliness, and hatred of war have

a vital place in the Soviet people's system of spiritual and moral values. That has always distinguished them and has been displayed everywhere, whether in the life of a small rural community or in state affairs. Grim, hard Russian history knows no few terrible wars and battles, that cost the people untold suffering and sacrifice, and imbued it with hatred of violence, war, and bloodshed.

Everyone working in culture, whatever his or her field of competence, cannot help being worried about the pressing problems of the contemporary world, and the fate of the planet's today and tomorrow. Our today's complex, contradictory world is giving rise to many alarming problems, is baring the harsh truth of the dangers that lie in wait for mankind in the thermonuclear age, and is appealing to mankind's responsibility, confidence in its powers and the possibility of preserving civilisation so that take the place of weakness and pessimism. The moral obligation of cultural workers today is to take on their share of universal responsibility for the fate of the world and their share in the defence of peace. The loftiest principle of the humanity and humanitarianism of world culture is displayed in just that today.

But the question arises, are scientists, artists, writers, and scholars able to prevent nuclear war? Is it in their power to do so? Have the very wise brilliant books preserved in the history of world culture ever stopped wars?

For sure, culture is not able to stop the explosion of falling bombs, but it can hold man back from the very concept 'war', and do everything to prevent it. And that obliges us to set ourselves this task. Writers and artists cannot stop the arms race directly but they can and should sound the alarm, and beat the tocsin, appeal to the reason of mankind, and impress on people that there is nothing more vital today than to maintain peace. That is their paramount universal moral obligation.

Men of culture must not isolate themselves from the global human problems of our time. They have always shared joys and griefs with their people. They have the social sensitiveness to clearly perceive the troubles of the age. The social and educational role of the values they create enable them to bring the realities of our time to the consciousness of people, thus making a positive impact on the world's development.

All progressive creators of cultural values, irrespective of their social position and ideological views, are united by a common perception of the world, a common striving to create and preserve mankind's spiritual values. It is only possible to do that

given lasting peace. War is hateful to them all as a denial of their humanist activity. Democratic forces are seeking more and more soberly and realistically to comprehend today's international situation. In word and deed, in all their creative activity they come out for peace on Earth. They are aware of their high responsibility both to their own people and to the progressive forces of the whole world, and are making every effort to save the material and spiritual values and future of mankind.

NOTES

- ¹ Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 90.
- ² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 96.
- ³ V. I. Lenin. Speech Delivered at an All-Russia Conference of Political Education Workers of Gubernia and Uyezd Education Departments, November 3, 1920, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 368
- ⁴ Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p 99.

THE CULTURAL ACTIVITY OF THE MASSES

N. V. Goncharenko

Culture is a great achievement of man's genius, an undying chronicle of its supreme attainments and brilliant victories over the elemental forces of nature, over savagery, ignorance, and evil, over himself, and over forces of reaction and darkness, victories he is rightly proud of. Among the host of driving forces, factors, and sources of the advance of culture, the creative activity of the masses is decisive. By directly or indirectly influencing them, it gives them all special power and significance. As the main component of the productive forces, creating, developing, and employing tools, and as the bearer of society's main labour potential, the masses are the creators of the material wealth without which the activity of any element of society is impossible, and the existence of any form of creativity is inconceivable. It is because of this fundamental, key role of the masses, expressed in the aphorism that the masses are the makers of history, that their creative activity is at the same time a condition of the development of culture, and its driving force and source.

The masses as the driving force of social and cultural progress are a broad generalisation, but concretely, in the historical context, they emerge as definite classes whose activity merges with that of their progressive classes. Advanced classes are 'levers of human development'.¹ But exploiting classes, on coming to power, change their aims and, consequently, the direction of their activity. The latter is no longer consonant with the activity of the masses but comes into conflict and contradiction with it. That is also reflected in culture, although the dominant classes also continue to produce people whose creativity may objectively coincide with the interests of the masses. But then it is already a matter of individual representatives who have not broken with the masses, but not of all the ideologists of the dominant class.

When we say that the masses create culture, we do not have in mind simply the counterposing of an individual to a host of people, but mean a new sense and new quality. The individual cannot create what the masses do. What is created by the masses

is something that in its essence can only arise as a fact of collective creativity, whether it is an Egyptian pyramid, a Greek temple, or an epic folk poem.

One can divide the values of the world's spiritual culture, more or less exactly, into things created by separate individuals or through collective labour—not so as to determine which is the greater and which the less, which is the better and which the worse, but in order to make sure that such a division is possible. The collective, of course, consists of a sum of the acts of individuals, but in the end it merges into an indissoluble whole. The professional literature of any people, while a whole, is divisible into the works of separate writers. But Notre Dame Cathedral cannot be divided into such parts when we think not only of the architect's plan but also of the structures made by the hands of stonemasons. We have not been able to establish the authors of the works of any national folklore of the past, not because there were none, but because the author was a collective one—the people.

Spiritual culture has its own specific nature. Its highest values may be created by one man (allowing, of course, for the fact that he drew on the experience of others), like Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, or the periodic table of elements created by Mendeleev. In the field of material production significant values are created in most cases by the masses of people. Nevertheless, someone's general project, scheme, intention, plan stand out in this mass creation. In social creation and the cultural stream the individual and the collective very often merge to greater or lesser extent either becoming separated from one another and growing into independent achievements or, on the contrary, merging fully into collective activity. In the latter case the soloists are no longer heard as a rule, drowned by the chorus.

In order to picture the role of the masses in the field of intellectual production more fully, one must recall certain of the features of this field that distinguish it from material production and affect this role in a certain way. One feature is that the element of mass character does not play the role in intellectual production that it does in material (the point does not concern mass, serial production of a ready-made intellectual product like printing a book, but of the primary artistic creation of cultural values). Individual creativity has great significance in this.

In material production physical labour is still important and in it there are more repetitive processes, and processes of the simple processing of an already made object or serial manufacture of various items. In culture standardisation plays an infinitely

greater role in material production, which makes it possible to automate the production process considerably, and that inevitably leads to a limiting of the role of individual creativity. In the field of intellectual production, however, inappropriate automation, stock forms and phrases, and standardisation inevitably lead to a lowering of artistic quality.

It is also a special feature of material production that it has a mass character in the nature of its product, which does not call for a new creative approach each time during its manufacture, as well as in the number of people involved in it. Improvements are introduced in the course of production, of course, and in special cases there may be features of individuality in it. But the ready-made formulas and instructions of the fabrication and production processes are often not altered for years. All these differences, and others, between material production and intellectual creation make it possible to bring out more fully the relation of mass, collective activity and individual without exaggerating or underestimating the one or the other.

The role and significance of the masses' creativity in the development of spiritual culture, the size of their contribution to the development of culture, and the extent of their influence on it have not been the same in the various stages of historical development. The reasons are various: the main one is seemingly determined by the degree of the working people's freedom, socially and economically conditioned, and by their opportunities for access to cultural values not only as consumers but also as creators.

The working masses, who are the main productive forces, and the chief creator of all social goods, provide an opportunity through their work and labour for the activity of all workers by brain. The truth that 'mankind must first of all eat, drink, and have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc.',² under whatever ideological accretions it is attempted to bury it, has no exceptions, and cannot have. It extends to all times and societies, to all people. The separation of mental labour from physical only created a possibility of masking this fact, and gave rise to an illusion among workers by brain of complete independence from the activity of the working masses. The point does not concern which labour, by hand or by brain, is the more valuable (society cannot exist without the one or the other), but rather that the activity of working people in the field of material production makes intellectual work possible. Thanks to the activity of the masses workers by brain (scientists, scholars, artists, poets, musicians,

ideologists, politicians, teachers, etc.) can perform their functions, irrespective of who created the material wealth, whether slaves, serfs, or free citizens. It does not alter the case whether some cultural worker springs from the dominant classes or from the working people, whether or not his activity has an effect on material production, whether he is rich or poor, whether or not he combines his intellectual work with physical. The dependence of workers by brain on the activity of the masses has a universal character as a general historical law.

The role of the masses' activity in mankind's cultural progress, however, is by no means limited just to creation of the conditions for intellectuals' creative work. The masses make an immense direct contribution to the development of spiritual culture. The inexhaustible riches of folk art are a treasure-house from which writers, poets, and composers draw subjects and themes, ideas and images for creative work. The people are the creators of the language in which writers, poets, scholars, and scientists write, the author of melodies feeding the creative work of composers. For the great composers the world folk melodies, songs, and dances have not simply been a means for re-creating national colour but an active stimulus of creative work, enriching their fantasy, giving them inspiration, and new thoughts and ideas. The Russian composer Glinka said that the people create music and composers only arrange it. Maxim Gorky expressed a similar idea when he said that the Greek people created Zeus and Phidias only embodied him in marble.

Folk art has fed the development of every national literature from its origin to the present day. Greek tragedy arose on the soil of Greek mythology. The songs and ballads of the Ukrainian people had an immense influence on the Ukrainian national poet Shevchenko. Maxim Gorky once said, with penetration, that the people 'are the first philosopher and poet in time, beauty and genius, who created all the great poems, all the tragedies of the earth, and the greatest of them, the history of world culture'.

Gorky wrote that many world famous literary heroes and types were created by the people before they were described by Cervantes, Shakespeare, and Byron. One must not, of course, consider that the subjects and personages of all great literary works were taken from folk art, like Aeschylus' Prometheus or Goethe's Faust. Masterpieces of poetry like Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin* or Shevchenko's *Gaidamaki* were not developed from any concrete folk legend or narrative. Shevchenko's poem is a highly artistic reflection of historical events that occurred

in the Ukraine in the eighteenth century. Yet the poem is linked with folk art, and folk tales, and with the people's thoughts about those tragic events. The evidence for that is not only the language and images of the poem, but also Shevchenko's attitude to the historical personages, and his evaluation of their actions, and the thoughts and words that he put into their mouths. An example of the complex intertwining and organic merging of folk and individual creation is Kotlyarevsky's poem *Aeneid*, which it is impossible to imagine without the Greek myths, without the works of Vergil, without the folk art and language of the Ukrainian people. Yet the Ukrainian *Aeneid* is an original creation of Kotlyarevsky's talent.

Thus, although the contribution of folk art, perhaps, stands out most sharply in art, yet everything in it must not be derived directly from folklore, not just because it leads to underestimation of the role of outstanding artists but also in the interests of truth.

The role of the masses is not identical in the various fields of spiritual culture. In the realm of artistic creation and morals it is incomparably weightier than in philosophy. The working class has a special role in the development of the culture of social relations and morality. The proletariat, Lenin wrote, 'creates new and superior forms of human society'.¹

We must bear in mind, when speaking of the development of science as a whole, that the basic principles of scientific knowledge in general, and of many concrete sciences, had their origin in popular experience (arithmetic, astronomy, agronomy, pedagogics, medicine, geometry, mechanics, etc.). But as the essential differences between work by hand and brain deepened and knowledge grew and became more complex, the concrete contribution of members of the working masses to the development of science naturally diminished. Because of the impossibility of their obtaining necessary knowledge in an exploiter society, they were in fact estranged from science. Individuals from the oppressed classes have, of course succeeded in getting an education because of their talent and favourable circumstances, and have enriched science by their discoveries. But on the whole, in class-antagonistic formations, as the sciences became differentiated and knowledge more complex and ramified, requiring many years to be spent in specialised institutions to assimilate and master it, science (especially at its higher levels) grew increasingly separated from the working people. Only socialism and communism are correcting this injustice.

But even in periods most unfavourable for the masses' creative

work, individuals from the people have reached the pinnacles of cultural creation, producing undying masterpieces in many of its fields (Horace, Lomonosov, Robert Burns, Shevchenko, and others), and so making a direct contribution to its development. On the whole, however, the number of creators of cultural values coming from the people is relatively modest in class-antagonistic formations.

Yet even in the conditions of exploiter societies, for various objective reasons, it has been impossible to shut the working people out from direct involvement in creative endeavour. An architect could not make his intentions a reality without workers, builders, painters, stonemasons; blacksmiths and carpenters were needed for a ship designer, etc. When implementing the schemes of individual authors men of the people contributed much that was new by themselves, by the power of their imagination, invention, and fantasy. The exquisite stuccowork of Notre Dame Cathedral, the beautiful ornamentation of St. Basil's Cathedral, and many other architectural masterpieces were made by the hands of simple workmen. The mediaeval mystery dramas were played in market squares and in church porches by simple folk who contributed their talent and imagination to them. And although working people were only performers or executants, their performance and execution, thanks to their talent and ability, gave life to monuments of culture and immortality to their authors.

Even in the age of slavery, the part of society most exploited and rightless, the slaves, contributed a not imponderable mite to the development of spiritual culture. The Soviet classical scholar E. M. Shtaerman writes:

When Rome was converted with nearly unprecedented speed from a small, mainly agrarian town with a quite primitive culture (the Romans long remained 'barbarians' for the Greeks) into the centre of a world power, the rapid growth of the need for intelligent, skilled work force could no longer be met by the Romans themselves. Slaves with a good education or high professional skills were imported from the Hellenic cities of Greece, Asia, and Southern Italy, and employed not only as skilful landworkers and craftsmen but also as farm managers and *hommes de confiance* of their masters, as teachers, doctors, musicians, and actors. Many Roman dramatists, scholars, and teachers of the time of the republic arose from freed slaves.⁵

Scholars have noted yet another extremely important aspect of the role of the masses in the development of spiritual culture. In critical ages and periods of deep crisis and decline of culture, when the dominant classes of exploiter societies, as Lenin put it, undermined the foundations of cultural life, not stopping at

deliberate destruction of culture and its values,¹⁰ the masses remained the social basis that preserved the cultural potential of a country and nation, the womb where the heritage of ages was accumulated, the soil from which new cultural shoots sprang with the coming of propitious times. Alexander Blok wrote with great insight about this:

It is therefore not paradoxical to say that the barbarian masses proved to be the guardians of culture, possessing nothing but the spirit of music, at a time when the dying civilisation, its wings torn off, had become the enemy of culture in spite of all the factors of progress—science, technique, law, etc., being at its disposal.¹¹

Yet ignorance and even illiteracy, exhausting labour, and a host of other social obstacles stand in the way of the working classes to spiritual culture in the conditions of exploiter societies. And no society whatever in the past, therefore, created favourable conditions for full realisation of the masses' creative potentialities, although many scholars and writers dreamed of it.

It will be obvious from what I have said above that culture has been created both by oppressed and dominant classes, by individuals and the masses. It is not always possible to draw a hard and fast line here. Nevertheless the criteria of what is created by the former or the latter are not all that blurred and indeterminate. A metaphysical 'either ... or' is impermissible here. Marxism-Leninism (for the first time) clarified the dialectic of the connection between the creativity of the masses and the individual, and showed not only that both create culture but also the interdependence of the two.

As Lenin wrote:

There are no 'pure' phenomena, nor can there be, either in Nature or in society—that is what Marxist dialectics teaches us, for dialectics shows that the very concept of purity indicates a certain narrowness, a one-sidedness of human cognition, which cannot embrace an object in all its totality and complexity.¹²

For the individual's creative work to be successful, he must know society's needs and the interests and tastes of its members, must respond in good time to the dictates of the time ignoring which leads to his activity's not finding a response either among contemporaries or posterity. An individual's activity is the more successful the more actively society supports and understands it.

The individual's creative power and the height of his rise, depend not only on his capacity, singleness of purpose, energy, and persistence in achieving his aims, and on his organising skills, but also on his links with the masses. A creative individual may consider himself subjectively to be independent of the activity of

the masses, and furthermore may think that everything he has done is wholly and completely original and his own from start to finish. But in fact, however far he is from the people, there are always links with them, conscious or unconscious, spiritual and ideological or material, latent or patent.

There have been many people in the history of world culture who, by virtue of their talent, energy, and industriousness can rightly be called creative individuals, but who went against the interests of their people, though not always consciously. There are many reasons for that, from ideological and material dependence on the dominant classes to aristocratic scorn for the 'rabble'.

While not denying the talent (and consequently its contribution to culture) of the creators of courtly poetry or of Mannerism in painting, and certain creators of decadent art or modernist music, I would note, all the same, that their reluctance to be understood and to come closer to the interests that were pursued by the progressive forces of contemporary society prevented them from enriching the culture of mankind to the full extent of their talent.

A close link of a creative personality with his people by no means presupposes a ban on going beyond national traditions, customs, and images. On the contrary, the truly outstanding cultural worker always strives to assimilate the best in other peoples' culture and to enrich his national culture by it.

Socialist society provides most favourable conditions for the creative personality's link with the people: in it the individual's all-round development is the highest measure of the development of society's culture and its chief wealth. Karl Marx understood 'wealth' not only as 'capital' and 'value' but gave it a broader, more philosophical sense. While 'production is the end of man, and wealth the end of production' under capitalism, Marx defined the wealth of communist society as 'the absolute unfolding of man's creative abilities, without any precondition'. Consequently, under communism, not only is man enriched by what he produces (although that always remains important). The main wealth of the new society is the people themselves, their thoughts, knowledge, abilities, and the whole aggregate of their mental and physical qualities. The people of communist society will consequently judge the values of spiritual culture according to its capacity to develop the wealth of human nature.

Scientific communism does not counterpose society's material wealth to its spiritual wealth because the latter can only grow

on the basis of a definite material-technical base. Asceticism is alien to communism. The wealth of communism cannot be reduced either just to the material aspect or just to the spiritual. It is an organic merging of the two.

When creative work becomes the masses' very own and when they, and not just a creative minority, create culture, does that not mean a supplanting of the most gifted creative personalities? Marxism-Leninism has answered that, and refuted the accusation that socialism allegedly leads to a dilution and depersonalisation of talents. Lenin, in a polemic with Tugan-Baranovsky, who identified social equality with all other forms of equality, wrote in his article *A Liberal Professor on Equality*:

When we say that experience and reason prove that men are not equal, we mean by equality, equality in *abilities* or *similarity* in physical strength and mental ability.¹¹

Our day is sharply posing the question of the relation of universalisation and specialisation in creative activity. Communism resolves the contradiction between man's striving to encompass an ever greater number of facets of reality and the need to deepen his knowledge in a concrete field. The dialectics of this process is that universalism does not oppose specialisation and does not exclude it, but rather that high professionalism is necessary for successful activity in any field. The scholar of a broad outlook tackles special, narrow problems on the basis of a universal approach. One can agree with the opinion of G. M. Volkov on this matter:

Man's universal development consists in each individual's arriving, in his individual development, at the front line of human culture, at the boundary between the known and unknown, the accomplished and unaccomplished, and being able to choose freely on which sector he will advance culture further, where to concentrate his individuality as a creative entity most fruitfully for society and most gratifyingly for himself personally.¹²

The universality of activity is one of the roads leading to the emergence of integrated personality, but the moulding of the latter is the result of actions and other extremely important changes, viz., ideological, ethical, aesthetic, etc., generated by socialism. And although the wholeness of the individual is not a synonym for the concept of the individual's harmonious development, the former is a necessary component of the latter.

The wholeness and integrity of the individual is not reducible simply to a unity or distinct determination of his aspirations or to correspondence of the character of activity to moral convictions. From the formal standpoint this integrity may also be inherent in everyone of whom 'splitting of consciousness'

and doubts in the achievement of aims (including base ones) are not characteristic. It is a matter of a deeper understanding of the wholeness of the creative personality whose activity is aimed at the lofty goals, and whose noble moral motives correspond to the humanist character of this activity. Wholeness and integrity cannot be understood as an individual achievement of a person as such, out of the relationship between his activity and the interests of the people. The creativity of the integrated personality should coincide with the interests of the people.

Only a society not rent by social contradictions, a society in which, as Marx and Engels said 'the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all',¹² can ensure that wholeness and the unity of aims and means, which will promote their harmonious development.

Only socialist society can create the prerequisites for full realisation of the masses' creative potentialities. It draws the workers into all spheres of material and spiritual production, granting them political rights, material possibilities, and time needed for that, providing the conditions for their training and education. As a result there is a nation-wide flowering of talents, a growth of the initiative and creative activity of the masses, the influence of the people, continuously growing in depth and scale, on the development of the spiritual culture of society. Socialism abolishes the social obstacles on the working masses' road to artistic achievement and other forms of creation. That does not mean, of course, that everyone in socialist society can or must become a poet, scientist, or composer. The existence of objective opportunities, and the dictates of social needs, and also the individual's subjective qualities (his aptitudes, desires, etc.) retain their regulating effects; in principle, however, everyone in whom there is a spark of creativity and a bent for it can prove his worth. Society is creating the conditions for that. Socialist culture itself, as the highest type of culture, can only be produced by the creative work of the masses.

The law discovered by Lenin, that the number of people drawn into historical creation increases with acceleration of social progress, and that 'the size of that mass of the population which is the conscious maker of history is bound to increase'¹³, is directly related to culture. Socialism, by throwing down the obstacles in the way of cultural creation, has opened the road to it for millions.

The qualitative aspect of the working people's cultural activity is no less significant. From that point of view one must note the broadening of the fields of their creativity. Before the October

Socialist Revolution their cultural activity remained within the compass of their own interests (folk arts, customs, and rituals, and applied art), and when they were drawn into direct creation of cultural values of significance for the entire society it was mainly as executants and performers. A number of fields of spiritual and intellectual culture (political activity, science, professional art, education, and, in the conditions of modern capitalism, the mass media) remained closed to the creative activity of the working masses. Socialism wipes out the barriers between spiritual culture and the masses. And, as the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has shown, the working people act not only as executants but also as creators in all the fields of culture previously inaccessible to them.

It is not simply a matter of the mass involvement, nor of the solution of problems of cultural development through endless discussions and meetings (as vulgarisers of socialism try to picture it), but of open access for the working people to education as such (free tuition, scholarships and grants), and, most important to the actual shaping of the system of public education. It is thus not only the right to enjoy cultural values but also the opportunity to take part in creating them. Socialism does not eliminate the specific character of intellectual activity in science or professional art, in which collective creative work is combined with individual, and in which the latter will always play an immense role, but it does open up access to them for all who have the requisite ability and inclination. Nevertheless there are also fields of intellectual activity (political activity), in which the principles of collectivity, mass nature, and people's involvement are always pivotal. The involvement of millions of Soviet people in society's cultural activity is characterised by a growth of the active, creative element.

Socialism also raises the professional standard of the working people's cultural activity. Universal literacy, growth of education, open access to cultural treasures, the assistance given to students by masters in the relevant fields (writers, artists, scientists acting as leaders and instructors of literary, artistic, and scientific study circles),—are all raising the general culture and professional standards of the working people and, at the same time, strengthening their influence on the development of spiritual culture.

In socialist society the audience of poets, writers, and scientists numbers millions. And this is an active audience. Its communion with the artist is built on the principle of co-creation. The standard and character of readers' conferences and other creative

meetings are evidence of this; at them the poet, actor, composer gets a lively, direct reaction to his creative work, advice, recommendations, criticism, and approval, that infuse him with new energy for and stimulus to creation. This new pattern in the relations of the creative personality and the working masses also expresses an aspect of the qualitative growth of the activity of the working masses in the field of culture.

The drawing of working people into cultural activity develops them, enriches them intellectually and spiritually, and moulds their aptitudes. Consciousness of the fact that the results of their work are to the benefit of all society provides an immense stimulus to the working people's creative work under socialism. Karl Marx said that in the capitalist conditions of production the worker could not enjoy the fruit of his own labour and of his own capacities because it was alienated from him as wealth not belonging to him:

The labourer therefore constantly produces material, objective wealth, but in the form of capital, of an alien power that dominates and exploits him.¹¹

Objectively the development of workers' aptitudes in the conditions of capitalist production is confined to the needs of capital, which puts limits to the worker's cultural development. The worker is not interested subjectively in the development of those aptitudes since the exploitation of them leads to his full physical and moral exhaustion with little benefit for himself.

Things are quite different under socialism where man's general cultural and professional development gives him great possibilities for self-assertion as an individual, and also for his greater contribution (which is the main thing) to proliferation of material and cultural riches that belong to all society. Personal interest in cultural development, as an inner need, thus coincides under socialism with the objective trend toward the entire society's cultural progress.

The objective logic of the development of socialist society and its culture leads to a levelling out of the differences between mental and physical labour, and between the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia. While not touching here on the question of the preservation of specialisation, the significance of talent, the inequality of creative capacities, I would emphasise only that socialism is altering the relations between the masses and the creative individual in both form and content. It is not only that in the new conditions the creators of culture come from the people. While coming from the people, they do not 'abandon' it, but remain an organic part of it. Under socialism an increas-

ing number of people develop into creative individuals. There will always be people, seemingly, who rise above the rest by their talent and genius, but 'the rest' have already ceased, under socialism, to be a faceless, impersonal background. The more active the masses are, and the more fully they are seized by a striving for historic creativity, the more they are capable of producing outstanding individuals. And in the future communist society the creation of spiritual culture will be the result of the direct involvement of all working people.

On the one hand the drawing of an ever greater number of people into creative activity makes it easier to bring talents to light and find application for them, because this means in socialist society that every person can test himself in some sphere of creative activity. On the other hand, however, with the dramatically increased complexity of production, scientific, and other tasks, which can only be implemented through a division of labour, the activity of one individual becomes directly dependent on the activity of someone else, with the consequence that it is not always possible to determine the contribution of either of them clearly. That is specially to be seen in science, and less so in the field of artistic creation, but there too things are not identical in all forms of creative work. The work of the present-day stage director is equally determined by the quality of the play and talents of the actors as much as it was in the nineteenth century; in the fields of poetry, painting, and music an individual style of creation remains predominant.

The tremendous tasks of modern science (such as space exploration and the use of the world ocean) are bringing the role of scientific collective to the fore. And it is no accident that we speak more and more often of the capable, talented, scientific team. Collective scientific creation has not lessened the number of outstanding creative individuals. It's another thing that the gap between the top and lower levels of science has been considerably reduced. Nevertheless, however high the general cultural standard, education, and scientific training of people may be, there will always be some among them who forge ahead, who best of all discern society's needs, and promote satisfaction of them better than others by their activity. Even if the gap between outstanding personalities and other people were reduced, that would not pose any threat to cultural progress. For our main job is not simply to cherish individual talents but to develop the capacity for creative work in all people, in all who have an inclination for it, and to achieve harmonious development of all the members of society, by drawing them into creative activity. The

rise of the most gifted and capable from the mass of creators will always remain the greatest stimulant inspiring a spirit of competition and creation in all the others. The torchbearer lights the road for those that follow. The more creative personalities there are in society, the higher its culture will be. On the other hand, a rapidly developing culture creates more favourable conditions for the moulding of creative individuals. The growth of culture and growth of creative personalities are mutually enriching processes of cultural progress.

NOTES

- ¹ Frederick Engels. Aus dem handschriften Nachlass. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Werke*, Vol. 21, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962, p 501.
- ² Frederick Engels. Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx. In: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 162.
- ³ Maxim Gorky. *Works*, Khudozhestvennaya Literatura, Moscow, 1953, p 26 (in Russian).
- ⁴ V. I. Lenin. The Position and Tasks of the Socialist International. *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981, pp 38, 39.
- ⁵ E. M. Shtaerman. *Krisis antichnoi kultury* (The Crisis of Antique Culture). Nauka, Moscow, 1975, p 18.
- ⁶ V. I. Lenin. Fourth Conference of Trade Unions and Factory Committees of Moscow, June 27-July 2, 1918. *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 460.
- ⁷ Alexander Blok. *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Goslitizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1962, pp 111-112.
- ⁸ V. I. Lenin. The Collapse of the Second International. *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, p 236.
- ⁹ Karl Marx. Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy. Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p 411.
- ¹⁰ See: V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p 144.
- ¹¹ G. N. Volkov. *Istoki i horizonti progressa* (The Sources and Horizons of Progress), Politizdat, Moscow, 1976, pp 288-289.
- ¹² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p 54.
- ¹³ V. I. Lenin. The Heritage We Renounce. *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, Foreign Language Publishers, Moscow, 1960, p 524.
- ¹⁴ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p 535.

CULTURE-PERSONALITY-WAY OF LIFE

E. A. Orlova

Whereas the objects of public recognition and admiration quite recently were primarily outstanding results of activity in the field of culture (masterpieces of world art, truly new discoveries in science, and so on), now interest in the processes of the activity itself is mounting rapidly, including interest in people's creative and personal peculiarities. This reflects, in particular, scientists' and practitioners' steady, intent attention to new scientific ideas in their genesis and formation, in other words, the singling out and examining of the mechanisms governing changes in cultural phenomena and the cultural milieu itself. This may be due perhaps to a broad interest in the phenomena of everyday life from which the large-scale facts of history and of social and cultural development are formed. The turn to these problems today is revealing much for understanding people themselves, history, and the modern life of humankind. An expression of this public interest can be seen in philosophy, art, and science, and also in everyday life.

Social scientists are trying to trace how new models of activity, behaviour, and intercourse are born in people's everyday life, how new values, standards, and aims are formed, what are the mechanisms of their effect on various people's life activity, and what are the intended and unforeseen consequences of their spread in socialist culture. It is proving possible to do this by an understanding of social and cultural processes in which man's personal characteristic, and life sphere, and the processes and forms of his life activity are examined in their interconnections. The images, values, and standards assimilated by the individual, and the transformation of individual experience into socially significant experience are then becoming accessible to observation and explanation. It is proving possible to investigate social affairs in movement from the angle of how people maintain and alter their cultural world, when one turns to their way of life.

The category 'way of life', by linking our knowledge of the individual and culture, reflects the dynamics of everyday life and fixes the individually peculiar or socially typical means of people's organisation of their life activity. This category has cognitive value at the level of everyday consciousness, and in everyday understanding of the world, as well as in science. It enables people to analyse and evaluate their position in society, their life stance, and their desires and possibilities.

One can define people's way of life in a general way, for instance, as the mode of organisation of their life activity in the socio-cultural milieu. But such a definition calls for certain reservations.

First of all, about life activity. Man has such fundamental resources as time and strength (physical and mental) at his disposal, and expends them over the whole period of his individual existence. These outlays of time and energy, directed to the world around, and to other people, are embodied in various forms of life activity; in the aggregate they constitute people's life activity. As for the way of life, however, one does not, by any means, have all its manifestations in mind. One pays attention only to what has or could have mass dissemination and which is consolidated in definite forms.

One can distinguish several organisational levels in the life activity of modern man, as follows:

(1) the organisation of the material and social foundations of life activity, viz., work in production, housework, activity linked with acquiring and consuming goods and services;

(2) personal development, i.e. the acquiring of an education and professional training, public activity, amateur activities (artistic, dramatic, dance, recreation and sport, etc.);

(3) social communication: professional, friendly, and family intercourse; travel, and moving about within the place of residence;

(4) recouping of energy outlays: consumption of food, observance of personal hygiene, passive rest and sleep.

Modern people also expend their vital resources in the main in these forms. But these culturally registered forms are by no means of the same order in the life of members of society. Everyone distributes them in his or her own way in time, by importance, and by expenditure of efforts. This subordination can be called the organisation of life activity (which is governed by both social factors and personal choice). In our culture universal education and labour are socially compulsory; so it is supposed that every member of society will spend a certain

time and effort on them. Other possible outlays will remain at the free disposal of the individual. Evidence of that is the fact that some people spend more time on reading and others on sport, and others still on seeing friends. The expenditure of effort is subject to individual regulation to a greater extent than that of time. Thus, with an obligation to work, how much effort each person will put into tackling professional jobs depends primarily on him or her.

One must note another aspect of people's organisation of their activity. It is linked with free choice of culturally established forms. In the USSR, for example, work and preparing for it or education (including getting a secondary education) are socially compulsory forms of vital activity. But given their obligation people have broad opportunities for individual choice. There is such a range of professions in the labour sphere in the Soviet Union today that everybody can find application of his or her capacities (from physical to mental labour; from monotonous work not requiring much effort, to creative activity; from the production of things and ideas to their distribution and dissemination). A wide network of general and specialised teaching establishments corresponds to that. In the sphere of social, public activity, the forms of which are not necessary components of the way of life, the possibilities of choice are also different (from work in elected posts associated with the management of society's affairs to the fulfilment of separate assignments of Party, trade union, and Young Communist League organisations).

A person's organisation of his or her activity, and distribution of time and efforts on the realisation of socially compulsory and individually chosen socio-cultural forms, thus constitute a way of life. This way of life provides each one with the opportunity to regulate his/her social ties. By consciously redistributing expenditure of time and efforts, this way of life can be switched either into the broad network of such connections, or withdrawn from it.

When anyone increases his/her time and effort spent on dealings with other people, he/she is drawn more actively into the processes of interaction that directly influence the dynamics of everyday cultural affairs. In this process there is an assimilation of knowledge, habits, ways of behaving, and judgments, i.e. the general elements of culture, on the one hand; and on the other, development of the elements of culture themselves, and their filling with a new content, only occurs in dealings with people.

In spending much time on individual activity (professional or amateur) and profound reflection on life, the world, and one's self, rather than on dealings with people, one in time withdraws as it were from one's milieu. The individual's link with cultural movement can also be traced in this process. Isolation helps a person to think over independently everything he has acquired during discussions with other people, and so to sense his participation and involvement in culture, and his direct inclusion in it. But it is also conducive to creative activity, to a search for answers to personal and socially significant problems, to attempts to realise these answers at the individual level. In that case seclusion or isolation can lead to a change in the elements of culture.;

Such a regulating of one's social ties is possible because of the specific nature of the structure of the way of life. When organising his life activity an individual introduces order into it through certain stable structural components. This may be a definite regime, when one, for example, eats, goes to bed, goes for a walk, engages in sport regularly at the same time every day. Or consistency in the forms of life activity may be stable: he devotes one free day at the end of the working week, say, to seeing his friends and the other to domestic matters.

These characteristics of the way of life are stable in relation to the numerous, constantly changing effects of the individual's environment. They form a kind of boundary or barrier fencing him or her off from the need to react all the time to the diversity of judgments, opinions, evaluations, and demands existing around him/her. Within these limits he/she may be and is free to organise his/her actions, and to try out new patterns of activity and behaviour. This kind of limit can be characterised in short and in general form as 'habitual'. It includes the stereotypes of a person's actions, judgments, and evaluations, i.e. stable, repeated components of life activity.

These stereotypes fulfil a special cultural function since they form bilateral boundaries of a kind. On one side they are turned toward the individual, being linked with his individual preferences. In fact each of us chooses oneself, how it is more convenient to do one's work, how to behave with acquaintances and with strangers, what to consider most interesting in art or what form of sport to go in for. But the other side of these phenomena is turned directly to culture, because they are not an invention of the separate person, but are built up and ac-

quire cultural significance during people's life together, in the course of their everyday practice, and so are objective, stable formations.

In certain circumstances, for example when new social problems arise, individual people or groups, of course, throw up new patterns of actions, behaviour, or evaluations. But while these help to cope with a problem situation, their spread in society may prove to be quite wide, and they become quite stable. In other words, whether it is a matter, in any case, of long established cultural formations of this kind, or just of newly arisen ones, they fulfil the function of an organising principle in accordance with which people build a stretch of their life path.

But, while noting that this aspect of the way of life is turned toward other people, one must also picture what cultural forms it is expressed in. One can employ the concept 'life style' to designate the outward manifestations by which the individual communicates socially significant information about himself to other people and affirms his membership of a certain group.

Life style differs from way of life as the mode of people's organisation of their life activity in being primarily associated with its socially and culturally distinctive aspect. Life style is the mode of organisation of the individual's behaviour, and of registering his concrete socio-cultural affiliation and preferences for himself and for others.

This is becoming particularly important today, when each of us performs a host of social roles (member of a labour collective, member of a social organisation, member of a family, spectator, passenger, client, customer, pedestrian, etc.). At work and in home life and leisure we have to allow for one another, and for our differences in behaviour, judgments, and habitual modes of address. That is why people must have recognisable attributes or signs that enable them to pass from role to role, and from one situation of intercourse to another, in complex modern life. The signs of this kind are patterns of behaviour and value judgments that form a component of the way of life. The stable manifestation of them in everyday behaviour is called life style. It is an established sphere of social life that fixes personal or group preferences for certain forms of life activity, modes of action, judgments, and people's attitudes to one another and to the world around. People's evaluation of their way of life as a whole is expressed consciously or unconsciously in their life style. It differs among people not only according to the peculiarities of their

habitat but also of their personal distinguishing features.

In a dynamic culture with rapid change of events and life situations the degree to which features witnessing to people's way of life and group affiliation are expressed is intensified, i.e. the identifying and culturally distinguishing functions of life style grow. The complexity and variety of life situations that we all experience today are promoting and spreading the most marked symbols of life style. Knowledge of the sense and meaning of these symbols facilitates orientation in socially significant situations, i.e. in intercourse with friends, with people in the services sphere, with fellow workers and employees, and so on. One can judge what people like and whom, and why, by outward symbols if one is attentive to them. It is not difficult to recognise them, for they are especially stressed, their meaning is constantly explained one way or another so as to be understood, and they are quite often reproduced in a stereotyped manner. Their value and social function in affirming certain preferences are obvious.

The stereotyped features of life style are much less stable in time, however, than the structural characteristics of way of life. That is also associated with the socially and culturally distinguishing function of the personal and group aspects of behaviour. For frequent use of certain turns of speech, manner of bearing or dress, a pronounced preference for certain places or ways of spending leisure, lead in the end to these features of life style becoming customary for people around and losing their function of singling out the special features of a person as a personality or as a member of a group. The identifying significance of such features is 'eroded', moreover, for another reason. Because of the mechanisms of imitation and fashion, people borrow one another's best liked words, gestures, features of appearance, modes of activity, and so on. The borrowing spreads from person to person, and from group to group; and a style feature that previously distinguished a person in his individualness or as a member of a certain group already becomes common and loses its culturally identifying significance, which all finds reflection, in particular, in art and in the work of the mass media.

As an example we can trace what changes have occurred, say, over the past twenty years, in the life style of such social groups as students and young workers, skilled workers, workers in the services sphere, scientists, women, and children. By comparing films, literary works, and pictures of today and twenty years ago, we can clearly observe what manners.

judgments, details of everyday life and dress, features of professional or social behaviour, etc., were fixed before and are accentuated now. We can also trace the direction the shifts took. All these outward signs and attributes are demonstrated in ordinary life, are used to effect especially in the cinema and literature and have already become quite stereotyped. The values expressed by them are well known.

For comparison, let us take the characteristic features of the personality and way of life of a skilled worker as he was depicted in fiction twenty years ago and now. We might take the image of Ilya Zhurbin, one of the characters of V. Kochetov's novel, *The Zhurbins*, as typical of the mid-50s and early 60s, and the film *Big Family* based on it. Ilya Zhurbin as many people like him is a middle-aged skilled worker who left school at 14 but is trying to complete his education despite his age; his dress is modest and stresses his indifference to fashion; he is indisputably recognised as the head of his big family although he submits to the authority of his father; his favourite occupation is angling; his speech is measured, and common; his manners are dignified, and in unaccustomed situations constrained; he is rather rough but good-natured.

In contemporary art the skilled worker is quite different. As evidence of that we can take the widely known TV film *Day by Day* scripted by M. Anchakov. The young skilled workers, Victor, Zhenya, and Tolich have a secondary education and are studying or are intending to study further; they dress in today's fashion, but not pronouncedly—it is habitual to dress and look so; they are young and therefore have not yet settled down into family life, or are only just beginning to; their favourite recreations are amateur performances, sport, and meeting friends; their speech is standardised urban, sprinkled with slang; they conduct themselves naturally in any circumstances, quickly find their bearings in domestic and work clashes; their style of intercourse is slightly ironical but friendly.

This comparison already enables us to judge that the real change in life style of skilled workers that has taken place in connection with their rising educational standards, with the intellectualisation of their work, and with their familiarity with a broader range of cultural values than before, has found reflection in art.

Life style is reflected in typical features of behaviour that facilitate the social interaction of people and of members of various demographic, professional and other groups. Cases of various rare in public affairs and social life when a person

manages to behave in standard situations just as he would like. In most of such situations he is dealing with rules and expectations specific for each of them and consolidated in culture that he must take into account. He becomes acquainted with them during the moulding of his personality, knows of their content from the talk of others, and from literature, and through the mass media. But not only in that way. He assimilates them through experience. Over his life path a person learns first to recognise the stylistic signs and symbols in the external manifestations of other people, and then to form his own manner of behaviour and life style.

A person demonstrates the value preferences of forms of activity and intercourse, habits and judgments that are common for him and other people, or that set him off from others, in life style and manner of behaviour. This helps him to enter quite easily into social interactions of various kind, or evade them, and avoid conflicts with other people. Singling out life style as a socially identifiable aspect of people's way of life thus helps us understand how people express their readiness to join, or to set one's self off from others at the level of outwardly stressed behaviour, and how people 'appear' to others, and provide a social evalution.

The categories 'way of life' and 'life style' help us investigate one of the most interesting and important problems of present-day culture, viz., the individual's self-determination and self-realisation in contemporary Soviet society. Study of the way and style of life of members of various social groups makes it possible to see how far they are successfully realising the opportunities of socialism in their everyday life. But it is only legitimate to pose questions of that kind when there are criteria by which to compare the types of way of life of members of society. These criteria have a value character. They are based on socialist cultural values, that are both real, already existing phenomena of social life, and socially significant goals of its further improvement and the ideas of social and cultural progress and individual development inherent in it. People's everyday life activity under socialism is correlated with the values and ideas of the socialist way of life and its features. They are common in society as a result of purposive propaganda. The concept 'socialist way of life', as a system of criteria, unites the real and the desirable features of the way of life of the members of society that correspond to socialist cultural values. In accordance with the various ways of life that exist under socialism, grounds emerge with this system for judging

how far the different modes of personal self-determination and use of one's own powers and capabilities correspond to the opportunities that are available in society at its present stage of development.

During the years of building socialism in the Soviet Union conditions have been provided and continue to be perfected that are favourable for the development of the individual's interests, capabilities, and habits, and individual self-realisation. But the degree to which the members of society employ the available conditions to these ends are not identical. What personal features help people to assimilate the cultural wealth around them today and to live an interesting, full life? The answer has to be sought in Marxist-Leninist social studies by bringing out the meaning of the concept 'socialist type of personality'. Its general characteristics will be adequately disclosed in the most essential features of personal appearance and display: in work, in social and political affairs, in the family, in dealings with other people, and in one's attitude to oneself.

The individual's socialist labour orientation has several aspects. In the professional sphere proper, it is a conscientious creative attitude to work, a high appreciation of skill and craftsmanship in one's job, a striving to raise qualifications and broaden professional outlook. In the collective this orientation determines the individual's readiness to take an active part in the deciding of management and production matters, and to help someone who needs it, and consciousness of responsibility for success of the common cause.

In the socio-political sphere a socialist ideological orientation is characteristic of this type of personality. First of all it means recognition of the basic principles and aims of the building of communism. In this case socialist civic activity and responsibility become a stimulus and fundamental principle of the individual's socially significant deeds and actions. Principles of internationalism and of solidarity with the progressive forces of our age in struggle against every form of exploitation and oppression, and dedication to the interests of the whole socialist commonwealth are characteristic of the socialist type of personality. These principles of internationalism are combined in the individual's consciousness with patriotism, respect for one's nation, language, and cultural heritage. The main aesthetic principles of such an individual are Socialist humanism and historical optimism.

An orientation on the principles of socialist morality is characteristic of the socialist type of individual's relations

with other people. It is first and foremost mutual respect, mutual assistance, and friendliness. High-mindedness and adherence to principle are an important personal feature because they help defend justice, overcome outlived cultural stereotypes, and correct previously committed errors. But it needs to be combined with correctness in behaviour and judgments, and with tact in decisions and actions. Ability to be guided by the principle of responsibility in one's relationships with other people is an essential personal characteristic of such an individual.

The moulding of personality is, of course, a social process, but that does not mean that the individual's position in society is that of a passive object of external social influence. One of the most important characteristics of the socialist type of personality is its orientation on purposive self-improvement. In that process the striving to develop one's capacities purposefully in combination with moral control, high principles, and self-discipline is directed to active assimilation of cultural values, and to acquiring a habit of applying them in the decision of life problems. The inner world of such an individual is rich in emotional experiences; a feeling of *joie de vivre* is characteristic of it; its aesthetic taste is highly developed. The socialist type of personality is guided in its choice of self-expression by a developed sense of social responsibility and citizenship, i.e. forms that do not create obstacles to other people's self-realisation.

The socialist type of personality is thus an individual who is guided in his actions by the values of communist ideology. Its characteristic features are high civic responsibility at work and in the socio-political sphere, public activity, and a striving to build his relations with other people on the principles of communist morality. An orientation on socialist cultural values in the process of self-realisation is characteristic of him. As I have already said, the individual's way of life is a mode of organising his own life activity. These personal distinguishing features, together with the peculiarities of the conditions and opportunities of socialist society and culture at a given stage of their historical development, determine the modes of organisation of the individual's life activity specific for all society, that have a positive social evaluation.

People's life in contemporary Soviet society is developing in conditions characterised by a high standard of dynamism and diversity, and a high degree of complexity. In these conditions one is faced with a need to perform a host of social

roles, and to pass rapidly from one situation to another, which presupposes a high level of activity, since one is constantly having to make decisions, and choose according to one's own will, in accordance with one's own knowledge, convictions, and ethical ideas. People differ in their occupations, inclinations, and tastes. Their fates are not the same. At the same time a person makes his/her choice of mode or aim of activity, mode of behaviour, or circle of intercourse in a definite cultural milieu. This choice has certain social and personal consequences, and promotes either maintenance or change not only of personality features but also of essential socio-cultural models and values. The concept 'way of life' helps us better to understand the individual's opportunities in present-day culture, to evaluate actions and preferences, and the behaviour of one's self and other people in accordance with quite clear criteria.

The way of life is a process of self-realisation of the individual in society. The distinguishing sign by which people judge each other's way of life is consolidated in culture as certain life styles. And it is precisely by these signs that we determine and evaluate the principal features of a person's life path in the first place.

Such an evaluation presupposes a correlation with certain standard models. In Soviet society the standard is the socialist way of life, which includes real and desirable, socially approved models of activity, behaviour, and dealings with people. The perfecting of the conditions of social life in the Soviet Union is oriented on people's socialist way of life, and on making their socio-cultural life significant, meaningful, and interesting. And that is a necessary precondition of personal development and the individual's socio-cultural self-realisation.

MAN AS THE SUBJECT OF AESTHETIC ACTIVITY

N. I. Kiaschenko

The philosophical aesthetic study of man, in contrast to the general philosophical or psychological study of him, necessarily presupposes a bringing out of the high level of his interaction with the world through harmonious development of his natural, biological basis and social, cultural nature. By 'subject' I understand the consciously acting individual personality setting himself, and realising, his own aims. It is at this high level of interaction, which I also call the aesthetic level, that the harmony of the biological and social elements of the consciously acting individual are most fully displayed and 'work'. For man's aesthetic-style interaction with the world occurs, as the whole history of the human race has shown, through full disclosure, shaping, and development of his innate abilities and talents. During his socially positive activity they grow into capacities, especially a faculty of cognising the world and transforming it creatively in accordance with the laws of beauty—in maximum conformity of the results with the ideal aims set in the *positing of goals*.

According to the view now generally accepted in aesthetics, creative work is aesthetic by nature, because it is always directed to a search for the new, more complete, harmonious, and consequently objective truth. And the comprehension of objective truth, according to the contemporary dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, is comprehension of the objective harmony of the world and its beauty.

It is not fortuitous, in this case, that we focus attention on awareness of the process of man's activity itself, as well of its aims, since man is not always aware when pursuing conscious aims in the real circumstances of carrying on activity, of the whole business of realising them. As Marx wrote, the producers of products 'are placed in relationships which determine their thinking but they may not know it'.

The modern sciences of man have shown that instincts and talents are inherent in his biological, natural basis itself, from

which alone the subject of history can be moulded, i.e. man, who 'makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness.' It is through conscious activity, and not just conscious activity, but free, realised activity that the road to aesthetic activity lies, in which all essential human powers are displayed. When man's essence is most fully manifested and consciously employed by him not only to maintain his existence but also so as to affirm himself actively as a species-being.'

The sciences, especially biology, confirm that nature endows every individual born without pathological defects with real natural instincts. But these natural properties themselves may not even be displayed. Gifted, talented people, even geniuses, are only formed through social development, and primarily through the individual's positive activity. Innate abilities may remain only potentialities in unfavourable conditions, and with social passivity of the individual. But since society, as Marxism-Leninism has convincingly shown, develops on an objective law-governed basis and pursues quite definite aims at each stage of its historical development, an individual strives to merge himself organically within a historical necessity that he may or may not be aware of.

Soviet science, especially psychology and psychophysiology, and differential psychophysiology, has concerned itself with investigating the flexibility and mobility of the natural instincts and talents that man is born with. Soviet research has convincingly shown, and the practice of building socialism in the USSR and other socialist countries has proved, that capacities for various types of human activity and various spheres and types of work, can be moulded from one and the same innate abilities in the course of social development and purposive social education, in combinations that bring out and employ all the powers and potentialities of the individual. It has also been shown that the degree of development and manifestation of an individual's natural instincts and abilities are not always determined by the level of his biological perfection. Man's nervous system, in itself mobile, or his natural intellect, for example, do not necessarily lead to a high level of development of his capabilities, or successes in intellectual activity.

Natural, biological properties and qualities are thus only the foundation, the basis of the creative or non-creative individual's development. The innate striving for harmony does not automatically and spontaneously lead to harmony of the

social manifestation of the individual and personality, although it is obvious that it is difficult, without natural harmony, to count on a higher display of the harmony of humankind in the separate individual. The whole sense of man's development, furthermore, consists in ensuring harmony of the biological and social elements in him.

Obviously the whole essence of a truly human use of the natural, biological element consists in creating maximum favourable conditions (in concrete, historical circumstances) for man's material and spiritual being so as to mould a maximally human, creative individual, a personality that is constructive and not destructive. The most intricate task, in that respect, is for society to be able, with the aid of the sciences of man, to work up effective methods of understanding and discovering both the natural, biological harmony or instincts of man and the search for effective ways and methods of achieving harmony of a biosocial order.

Two processes important for the aesthetic level of study of man merge here, viz., (a) society's awareness of the significance of this harmony, and (b) the individual's awareness of the social and personal significance of his natural talents and his movement toward biosocial harmony. It is very important for him to understand that,

in creating a *world of objects* by his practical activity, in his *work upon inorganic nature*, man proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e. as a being that treats the species as its own essential being, or that treats itself as a species-being.

The achieving of such harmony, not as a simply individual achievement, but as a social one, is naturally possible in a society based on the principle of social justice, for which full development of all the essential human powers is an end in itself. For each member of such a society, his maximum self-manifestation in historically necessary, socially positive activity is the true manifestation of harmony. Marx came to the conclusion, in *Capital*, that the true realm of freedom will be created when and where society sets itself the aim of creating conditions of material and spiritual being in which

it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis.⁵

The aesthetic level of the manifestation and development of man's natural biological element can best be achieved in a society in which the free development of each is the condition

for the free development of all'." Only in that way can each person become aware of the fact that

the abstract enmity between sense and spirit is necessary so long as the human feeling for nature, the human sense of nature, and therefore also the natural sense of man, are not yet produced by man's own labour.

It is self-evident that a person's own work, based on the laws of beauty (and truly human work should be such), naturally creates aesthetic taste in each of its participants, or subjects, and an aesthetic attitude to nature, of which he himself is a part, and so to his own nature. Marx in general suggested that truly human taste and feeling should be aesthetic.

During the moulding of new generations of citizens in the joint collective activity of Soviet people, socialist society is not threatened by a danger of educating 'identical individuals'. For real harmony of social life consists in the individual's being fully able to display his own, inimitable individual qualities in society. 'Only within the community has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions', Marx and Engels wrote: 'hence personal freedom becomes possible only within the community'." The point is that even among twins people are not born with identical natural instincts and inclinations: the main point is that it is impossible in principle to provide identical conditions for the forming, moulding, education, and development of identically feeling and identically thinking people, and even more of identically acting ones, in the conditions of collective, family, or society.

The individual and the collective, the personality and society are not mutually exclusive and mutually destructive aspects, but mutually supplementing and mutually enriching elements. Because 'my own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being'." The individual's awareness of himself as a social being can be regarded as an important level of his aesthetic development.

The fact is that not only a person's capacity for a certain socially useful activity is formed on one and the same natural-biological basis in the course of his social life activity, but also the most varied concrete modes of his life activity, through which he also performs his varied social functions, viz., the production and reproduction of life, the upbringing of the rising generation, ordinary, scientific, and artistic cog-

nition of life. Really all-round development of his powers and capacities is demanded of him since each of the forms and modes of life activity can be built up and realised only given certain properties, qualities, and capacities, habits and skills of a person, and the necessary display of his most varied relations with the external world, and with life, since he is drawn by life itself and the increasingly involved system of social relations, against his will and efforts, into all this very complicated interconnection and interdependence.

In complex relationships, however, a person may remain, and often does, an unconsciously, spontaneously active creature who is sometimes moulded and developed against his will. Marx revealed this historically forced character of development as the pattern of change in the character of work under the capitalist system of social production; it

becomes a question of life and death that the monstrosity of an unhappy reserve army of labour kept at the disposal of capital for its varying needs in the way of exploitation, shall be replaced by the perfect adaptability of the individual human being for the changing demands for different kinds of labour.¹¹

The process of change itself, and the complication of the character of work leads (especially in the age of the scientific and technical revolution) to

the detail worker, who has nothing to perform than a partial social function, having to be superseded by an individual with an all-round development,... for whom various social functions are alternative modes of activity.¹²

This natural necessity of the all-round development of the individual during change in the character of work, discovered by Marx, finds practical realisation in socialist society; and in socialist society it is becoming an essential matter what socio-economic, moral, spiritual, and cultural conditions are needed for conscious implementing of this supreme aim of social development.

Discovery of ways of moulding a subject correspondingly interests aesthetics, i.e. of ways of moulding an individual aware of the need to measure his activity against aims that call for the fullest display of his capabilities precisely in an activity undertaken on the basis of lofty social, i.e. aesthetic, ideals.

One can, of course, say that anybody who concerns himself with some form of activity or other is the subject of the activity, since he pursues certain, even though exclusively personal aims in this activity, and consequently has an ideal plan of it in his mind. But this is, so to speak, a subject by necessity. The sub-

ject by realised necessity, acting freely, therefore interests aesthetics, i.e. the subject measuring the activity he is beginning against aims that demand a supreme display of his capabilities of positing aims in accordance with social ideals and the skill needed to realise these ideal plans. For aesthetic activity is such that harmoniously combines aims and results, expectations and achievements.

The CPSU, in developing perspectives of accelerated socio-economic development of the USSR, sets the Soviet people the goal, in the new edition of its Programme, of providing the material and spiritual conditions and moral atmosphere precisely for all citizens' conscious creative involvement in the perfecting of socialism on the road of its movement to communism. The idea of growth of the human factor in the decision of all tasks runs like a red thread through all sections of the Programme, plus the idea of man's all-round development as a realised historical necessity and a requirement of social and individual development.

Soviet society is faced with the task of creating a system of social education, and material and spiritual conditions for educating, in which it would be possible first of all to concentrate all efforts literally on bringing out each individual's natural, innate qualities and talents, and of moulding, developing, and testing them in the most diverse play, study-play, production-practice, and intellectual-creative forms and modes of activity. Actually, it is, and has to be, a matter of creating a scientifically grounded, harmonious, and purposefully operating system of aesthetic education. It is also a matter, moreover, of course, of bringing out and discovering the aesthetically educational possibilities of all means of affecting a person aesthetically, especially of each form of social relation, each form of work and mode of people's activity, and of their whole way of life.

It is a social task of a paramount order to create a system of career guidance of the rising generation that would be oriented on as harmonious a tying-up as possible of individuals' differing innate qualities and talents with social needs for specialists in certain professions and spheres of activity so as ultimately to come close to solution of the problem of 'man in his place', i.e. of providing each member of society with a sphere of application of his human powers in an occupation. Opportunities will be opened up on that road for a truly human manifestation of the individual's powers and capabilities in a state of happiness or, as Marx put it, in a state of 'the absolute movement of be-

coming'.¹² Because a person can never feel himself really happy if he is not occupied with his favourite and vitally necessary business. 'As voluntary, productive activity is the highest enjoyment known to us, so is compulsory toil the most cruel, degrading punishment'.¹³

If the system of upbringing and education created by a society is charged with discovering natural abilities and on that basis moulding a personality capable of creative work in accordance with the laws of beauty in his voluntarily chosen form and sphere of activity and in all modes of activity, the individual himself must bear a full measure of responsibility to life and society for his choice of sphere of application and display of his powers, for achieving high artistry and mastery in his chosen activity, and for a creative attitude to his business. This is an entirely social task, and the individual's social maturity and consciousness are primarily manifested in tackling it. The ascension of an individual who has social characteristics and qualities is primarily completed in this, and in the real subject of activity and history.

Everybody is placed in very contradictory conditions in real life by his choice of life path, profession, and sphere of application of his powers. Family, pre-school institutions and the school train and orient the individual in a certain way, and bring him to choice of activity of some sort. The established ideas of a person's activity shared by family, close friends, and the industrial, scientific, teaching and other institutions in a region, and many other things, often oppose the individual's own ideas and aspirations, and he often does not make his choice voluntarily, of his own free will. Often he is also not prepared to make a choice of his own free will, since he is not aware or conscious of his calling. A blind choice is made in such situations, by which both society and the individual bear considerable intellectual, moral, and material losses. An excuse for that is sought in his having made his choice primarily on a material-consumer plane with the character of adaptation to existing circumstances.

To justify such a purely blind choice of life path, especially in the conditions of socialist society (in which the Constitution of the USSR guarantees the right of every citizen to choose a trade according to his calling) means to take a stand on purely individualistic principles and deprives the person himself of the chance to attain true harmony with the world. Absence of an initial aim in the entire system of social upbringing of developing in every individual of a feeling of responsibility for

choice of his road in life subsequently takes its revenge on the individual himself throughout his lifetime and on society as well. While still a youth, Karl Marx wrote (in his 'Reflections of a Young Man on the Choice of a Profession'):

The illusion about our talents for a profession which we have closely examined is a fault which takes its revenge on us ourselves, and even if it does meet with the censure of the outside world it gives rise to more terrible pain in our hearts than such censure could inflict.¹¹

This pain of the discrepancy between our Ego and what we choose to do blocks access to harmony of feelings, mind, and will, and deprives us of the chance to achieve a harmonious relation with society. There is no place on this road for inspiration or skill when the fire of creation and self-perfection has blazed in us. Spirit, optimistic *joie de vivre*, and good humour, moreover, can hardly have a dominant place in our life.

Absence of a primary, initial aim in the whole system of social upbringing (especially family) of bringing out, disclosing, and moulding all the essential human powers that exist in any specific individual is an essential reason for the often irresponsible and unrealised attitude of many, many young people to choice of their road in life. No small role is also played in this by ideas that creation according to the laws of beauty is the lot of a select few, that it occurs only where man discovers the new and makes something creatively original and unique, that the vast sphere of material production, distribution, consumption, the services sphere, and the realm of people's public and political life, allegedly lie outside aesthetics. This conviction has been drawn from traditional aesthetics, which was mainly regarded as a science of the most general laws of artistic creation.

Only those forms and modes of people's activity in which there are certain analogues of art (folk art, folklore, applied and industrial art, and design) are even now included in the sphere of aesthetic creation. But the individual's artistic powers flower spontaneously in folk art, folklore, and amateur activities in general, and are not expended in all the other modes of life activity since they are still not very compatible with the latter. A conscious choice is therefore not made here but rather an intuitive, simply emotional one. Hence the subject of these forms of 'side' activity is rather the subject of a spontaneous plane, a sensual, emotional level, than the subject of 'high awareness of his place in this activity.'

How does this kind of deception of the individual revenge itself on society?

Though the individual makes his choice independently, he is

guided in it by external circumstances rather than by inner motives, by a striving toward the future, for development, self-perfection, and creation. Since it is not determined by the individual's personal qualities it entails lack of satisfaction with the activity, the individual's lack of capacity for free self-expression of all his powers and faculties, a feeling in him of the discomfort of his existence, of tension in relations with people around him, and an absence of contacts between personal and public interests. The many dramatic situations in which such an individual finds himself seem to him, as a rule, the result of other people's bad attitude to him for reasons unknown to him, lack of appreciation of his personal capacities and merits, intrigues and scheming of the envious, and so on. Very rarely does a subject of this kind look for the reasons in himself, in his own mistakes and miscalculations, and especially in an inner lack of coordination of the motives of his activity with his real powers and capabilities for realising them; everyone and everything seems to him to be guilty of his life adversities except himself.

The best way out of situations like that is a change in the form of activity, and sphere of application of powers in accordance with one's life inclinations. But such a reorganisation and sharp turn is not within the power of very many. The reason lies primarily in a person's ignorance of himself; in the considerable difference in the social prestige of many types of work and profession; in an imperfect system of payment by capacities that often forces the individual to start from the prestige and material security of types of activity when choosing a profession; in the immaturity of many at the time of choice; in a really scientific outlook and understanding of life not having been formed in many at the time of choice; in the isolation of emotions, mind, and will, and a growing gap between pretensions and real individual possibilities; in a desire to obtain, quickly and immediately, that which demands persistent effort of self-perfection.

The system of higher and secondary specialised education fails to find more or less optimum criteria for selecting applicants for places, the level of engineering, designing, and project-planning thought is rising slowly in many branches of social production. This is giving rise to a contradiction between the rate of development of scientific and technical advance and the advantages of the socialist system of economy, and leading to a lengthening of the period of industrial mastering of the knowledge gained by science and of the discoveries made by it, and to a lowering of the economic and technical effectiveness of engineering solutions and technological processes, etc. In these

conditions departmental thinking, and management of the economy from a departmental stance and not a national, state one, which has given rise to many negative phenomena in the Soviet economy, social processes, and culture, have proved resistant to change. Elimination of these negative phenomena has become the object of special attention of the Party in the documents of the 27th Congress and in the new edition of the Programme of the CPSU.

Is a high consciousness, ideological readiness, and feeling of responsibility enough for the individual to become the subject precisely of aesthetic activity through his knowledge of himself and his natural abilities? Unfortunately not! Here that which constitutes the social content of personality comes to the fore: use of the individual's natural abilities during the moulding of his personality for an individual mastering and assimilation of the whole established system of social relations that direct his unique faculties to successful performance of concrete forms of socially useful activity and modes of life activity. Modern scientific psychology's understanding of a person's faculties as an ensemble of the individual's properties and qualities 'operating' and manifested most fully in skillful performance of his freely chosen activity, itself contains an aesthetic characteristic. For psychologists understand 'successful performance of activity' as bringing activity to a high level of perfection and free self-manifestation of the personality during which the individual becomes creative. The individual draws his aesthetic creative capabilities or capacity for aesthetic activity from the whole diversity of the existing social relations into which he naturally enters. His personality is sometimes formed in social relations independently of how far he is aware of them. Some social relations may have a dominant place in this ensemble, others a more modest one, and sometimes even a hardly noticeable one. That does not depend just on the individual, but on what life sphere his personality is being moulded in (family, street, kindergarten, school, technical school, institute, work collective, or whatever). Each of them is determined by such a diversity of factors that it is impossible to list them all. But the general atmosphere of society of course puts its stamp on all these influences of a partial, so to speak, order, and in the first place the all-determining socio-economic relations. In the USSR, for example, the general desire for peace, good-neighbourly relations, mutual understanding, co-operation and humanity cannot help affecting the life of the family, pre-school institutions, school, vocational school, technical college, institute, work collective, and

army. For humanism is the very essence and the deepest and most fundamental principle of the whole system of socialist social relations.

The personality is moulded in socialist society in accord with purposeful training of the rising generation for life, and realising of social and personal aims in free, conscious activity. This is an essential pattern of the development of socialist society. Aesthetic education has an important place in the whole system of communist upbringing.

Aesthetic education is quite necessary as regards raising all types of social relations, all forms of human activity, and all modes of people's life activity to their highest qualitative, i.e. aesthetic, level: By developing a person's feelings, mind, and will, an aesthetic upbringing provides an opportunity to achieve harmony of these three essential human elements. And this harmony ensures a dialectical mutual supplementing of material and spiritual interests in the individual's real life.

Man as a species being, manifesting precisely his species essence, also comes gradually to awareness of the necessity of interacting fully, harmoniously, and completely with the world. Socialist society strives to accelerate the process of becoming aware of this historical necessity. It has an interest in the speediest development of all members of society, rather than of separate individuals. Inculcating a capacity in each member of society not only to comprehend the limit of any object involved in activity and life activity but also to coordinate it with the extent of his own development is therefore a means of making the subject of simple, spontaneous human activity a subject of aesthetic activity. Man becomes the subject in any activity in so far as he realises previously planned aims in it. He becomes a subject of aesthetic activity when his aims and ideal plans are governed by lofty human interests, and he is aware of them precisely as such, and when the result of the activity embodies the aim as fully as possible and reflects the subject's greatest skill, artistry, and conscientiousness.

This is not of course, a one-sided process: society's efforts have to be combined with those of the individual himself. And the better their efforts supplement each other the more the personal and social interests will be harmonised in the personality being moulded. The extent of this combination is only seen in whoever most fully knows both the object of his specific and life activity and himself. Without this knowledge, understanding, and feeling of the fullness of his comprehension of the object and of himself, there is not and cannot be any artistry

and skill, i.e. raising of activity to the level of creation and consequently to the highest manifestation of essential human powers.

Artistry and skill mean a level of mastery of a craft, trade, profession, or speciality at which all its 'secrets and mysteries' are brought out and consciousness is directed to perfecting of the work process and creative activity. Then the work process itself, and the performance of the activity itself, become a form of aesthetic activity, and so the person's greatest delight though the result of the work will not necessarily come under the heading of aesthetic.

Everyone should strive to attain such a level of activity, but that does not mean a levelling of personalities. It is a matter of people's diversity, of the inequality of their powers and capabilities about which the founders of Marxism-Leninism spoke, and not of the equality of people. 'By political equality Social-Democrats mean *equal rights*, and by economic equality... the abolition of classes', Lenin wrote. 'As for establishing human equality in the sense of equality of strength and abilities (physical or mental), Socialists do not even think of such things.'¹¹ It is a matter, rather, that the existing system of the division of labour puts people at levels of the production process at which the individual cannot achieve wholeness of the end result; the work of many people has to be harmoniously merged in it. In the absence of final aesthetic values at all stages of the management of social production it is broken down, as it were, into separate bits or links. The following contradiction arises: the collective is not an aesthetically operating subject, although its separate members are, and everybody is a master in his individual activity.

In the complex of the individual's psychic properties and qualities that provide a capacity to cognise and transform the world in accordance with the laws of beauty, a leading role is played, in addition to aesthetic feelings, taste, and needs, by an aesthetic ideal that is manifested in the individual's activity as his capacity to set himself an aim that not only helps him become the subject of aesthetic activity but also makes his activity and its results part of the activity of the collective and society, and of their end results. The socio-aesthetic ideal emerges as the realised goal of all the individual's aspirations. It helps him to rise from expediency to goal-positing based on the human brain's faculty of an anticipatory reflection. This faculty is developed and cultivated through profound knowledge of the objective patterns of man's interaction with the world, through

noting the main (sometimes only just downing) tendencies of development and perfecting this interaction, i.e. on a proper, profound appreciation of what is being done from a stance of what has still to be done. A highly developed faculty of that kind also constitutes the essence of the creative thinking, imagination, intuition (intellectual and emotional), and improvisation without which aesthetic activity is impossible in principle.

The system of social relations, the peculiar ensemble of which is reflected and harnessed in the individual's emotions, mind, actions, deeds, and positing of aims, needs to be examined precisely from the angle of the moulding and training of a person capable of interacting with the world on an aesthetic level. That approach provides an opportunity to examine not only existing social relations in the aesthetic aspect but also the trends of their development, society's intentions, and the level of development of aim-positing in it. It is a matter, above all, of bringing out the aesthetic aspects in the essence, level, and character of the development of social, economic, political, legal, moral, and spiritual-cultural relations.

The philosophical, aesthetic study of man as the subject of aesthetic activity can thus be represented in its most general form as disclosure of all the forms of the individual's subjectivising in all the forms and modes of life activity flowing from the concrete historical conditions of their realisation, and in the whole system of the social relations of a society at each historical stage of its development. All the forms of human activity and all modes of people's life activity are thereby at their highest stage of development, and the individual who represents them, is thus an all-round developed personality capable of cognising, transforming, and creating the world according to the laws of beauty.

NOTES

- 1 Karl Marx. *Theories of Surplus Value*. Part III, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 163.
- 2 Karl Marx. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. In Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 276.
- 3 The whole character of a species—its species-character—is contained in the character of its life-activity; and free conscious activity is man's species-character. *Ibid.*
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. III, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p 820.
- 6 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 506.

Karl Marx. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 312.

¹⁶ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 86.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p 298.

¹⁸ Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 23, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1968, p 512.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Karl Marx. Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p 412.

²¹ Frederick Engels. The Condition of the Working-Class in England. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 415.

²² See: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p 7.

²³ V. I. Lenin. A Liberal Professor on Equality. *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p 145.

THE AESTHETIC QUALITY OF MAN'S INTERACTION WITH NATURE

N. A. Kormin

The ecological phenomenon of the 20th century has forced us to look again at the perennial problem of the attitude of man and his culture to nature. There have been very diverse cognitive schemes describing the peripety of this relation, but only in the past hundred years, perhaps, has there been a clear awareness of the dramatic character of these two levels of world being. Marx's conclusion that the primitive, spontaneous development of culture creates a desert brings out this dramaticism clearly, indicating the need for a search for other orientators of the movement of culture and coordination of its rhythms with those of nature.¹

Man's fate on planet Earth has been posed in our day in direct dependence on the solution of global ecological problems. A qualitatively new level of socio-ecological relations can only be achieved by the joint efforts of the world community. In his meeting with French M.P. s, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed:

Without all European countries joining efforts, it will also be impossible to really solve such an acute problem as preserving and improving the environment on our continent. In many of its areas, figuratively speaking, the ground is beginning to burn under foot, the rain falling from the sky is, if not fiery, then acid, while the sky itself is hidden by smoke. European rivers and seas are reaching a pitiful state. In our time, it seems, none of us acted with sufficient farsightedness, thus creating problems that now simply defy solution within national frameworks. This is truly a field in which we must all become aware of the continent's common destiny.

Such an alarming situation calls for a reorganisation of the way of thinking, and a making of cultural changes in it that would be adequate to the new ecological reality.

The culture of man's attitude to nature is the result of social development; and its essence cannot be analysed outside the materialist conception of history. The movement and living, pulsing structure of culture are realised through a ceaseless transition of the natural into the social and vice versa, through resolution of the contradiction between the substantial unity and fundamental difference of man and nature. Culture and nature are polar opposites of a unity, but study of their vast opposition acquires great heuristic value from that. The formula of culture is one of a unity of opposites that

embraces the essence of man, society, and nature. In that sense, the socio-historical subject's fundamental culture-creating faculty is his capacity to determine the measure of his own freedom and responsibility in relation to both society and nature, so as to prevent freedom from being converted into despotism.

And if the search for a measure of the natural principle has always been presented in culture as a search for Truth, and that for the measure of the social element as a search for Good and Justice, the search for the measure of freedom has always been one for Beauty.'

The aesthetic search for the measure of freedom is of essential importance both for culture as a whole since (as Engels remarked) each of its steps forward has been a 'step towards freedom', and in particular for the socio-ecological culture of the individual being moulded before our gaze.

The aesthetic quality of socio-ecological relations is brought out sharply by the present period of civilisation's global impact on the environment. Although the theoretical and methodological status of social ecology as a science is still not clear, one can nevertheless quite definitely determine its investigative orientation: viz., analysis of all the growing socio-transformational impact in conditions of scientific and technological advance on the dynamic balance of the biosphere as humanity's ecological niche, and of the ways and tasks of educating the individual ecologically; study of the influence of man-made landscapes on man; examination of the problem of optimising the inter-relations of society and nature, and that of the forming of the noosphere. Study of the aesthetic aspect of this problematic (often called 'ecological aesthetics') is an important section of Marxist-Leninist aesthetics, which may have to be singled out in the future as a special discipline, aesthetics of the noosphere.

The problem field, that the joint efforts of aesthetics and social ecology are directed to cultivating, can be outlined today as follows: the aesthetic quality of the social transformation of nature; the aesthetic potential of the urbanised landscape and its effect on man; the aesthetic parameters of optimising the link between the social and natural organism; the status of aesthetics as a form of mankind's ecological culture; the epistemological foundations of the synthesis of aesthetics and social ecology; the influence of art on society's ecological awareness, and the socio-ecological determinants of artistic thinking; the interconnection of the individual's aesthetic and ecological education.

The culture of a human attitude to nature was born at the

dawn of social history; the main milestones of its development were governed by formation stages of historical advance. One can readily discern both ecophile and ecophobe trends in the cultural traditions of the past.

The living soul and quintessence of culture is philosophy, which also includes the aesthetic form of attitude to the world. The history of world culture witnesses that the weightiest, most active contribution to philosophical comprehension of the 'man-nature' problem has been made by the materialist tradition, which opened up real horizons for cognising the objective world. Materialist doctrines, starting from recognition of the primacy of matter and the knowability of the world that depicted nature as it was, have been in the vanguard of the progressive body of thought and outlook throughout history, have promoted man's real transformation of nature, and have deeply comprehended the principles of this transformation. While the ecological potential of the materialist theories of the past has not yet been much studied, one thing, however, is beyond doubt, namely that the most ecologically significant ideas and propositions of a philosophical character (from the modern standpoint) took shape in the stream of materialism. Materialist philosophers waged a constant struggle against spokesmen of the idealist camp, and disclosed the flimsiness of the principles of the attitude to the world developed by the schools of idealism. One cannot, of course, pass over the real content of the idealist systems: dialectical ideas developed in the womb of idealism, and propositions were put forward that had rational sense, like that of the values of human intercourse with nature.

Insofar as materialist philosophy created a whole picture of the universe, and disclosed the objective character of the cognitive process, and insofar as it erected the edifice of natural reality itself, it emerged as the methodological foundation of aesthetic study of nature, and the basis of study of the aesthetic principles of the relationship of material and spiritual being.

Study of how man's aesthetic attitude to nature was transformed historically, and of how it was reflected in the cultural traditions of nations and peoples, is a pressing task of the science of the laws of beauty. The various kinds of *a priori* schemes and invented constructions that often raise elementary geographical concepts to the status of essential definitions of world cultural development are inadmissible here. They are all far from a truly philosophical approach to the essence of world culture as a unity in diversity (of diverse socio-historical, ethnic, national,

and regional types and forms). This means for aesthetics a need for a realistic analysis of the aesthetic aspects of each culture, disclosure of the common and diverse in aesthetic formations, and their translation, diffusion, interpenetration, and mutual enrichment. But exact knowledge of the aesthetic boundaries of each nation's cultural heritage, and an all-round scientific description and study of it, are primarily needed here. The aesthetic traditions of the world culture of past ages in their continuous movement to the present make possible a deep comprehension of the role of aesthetic knowledge and creativity in the present ecological situation. Study of the principles of the attitude of the aesthetic culture of the past to nature is becoming specially important on that plane.

Aesthetic mastery of nature is directly intertwined in the real life of labour as a specific form of man's material interaction with nature; it is seemingly one of the initial forms of the aesthetic relation born of the universal character of labour, and is therefore the closest to its ancestor. Allowing for the socio-historical determination of the aesthetic attitude to nature, one can construct the following historical model of this relation.

The aesthetic world of nature is first encountered with a qualitatively different aesthetic world (that born of labour) on that spiral of world development when social life was dawning, i.e. at the stage of the primitive community. Because of the low level of development of the productive forces man could only oppose himself to nature by the joint efforts of all the members of the group. Through that opposition he was able, in conditions of complete dependence on nature, to alter and transform nature purposefully by means of tools. The dialectically developed contradiction between man and nature was constantly overcome and resolved during this transforming labour, as an essential expression of man. Primitive production, with its undeveloped character, and attachment to conditions of the environment determined the syncretism of primitive culture and its coherence with nature, conditioned the peculiar aesthetic evolution of the then society. Archaic sociality, which did not permit man to be aware of himself and the society in which he lived, directed all his attention to the surrounding world. There is not another period in history when nature figured as such a universal object of social consciousness. The epistemological parameters of primitive consciousness led, with the undeveloped character of its rational, logical structures and clear preponderance of emotional-metaphysical, associative relations, to aesthetic consciousness taking on the function, in the condi-

tions of ancient times, of spiritual mastery of nature. Nature became the sole object of the creative, aesthetic activity of primitive man. The initial, primitive model of the aesthetic assimilation of nature was thus characterised by an absorption of aesthetic consciousness by nature itself, and by its being entirely directed to the aesthetic quality of natural being.

Subsequent movement to new forms of social unity came about through the agricultural commune, the predominant institution in the period of the transition from primary formations to secondary ones. It was the first social association of free peoples not bound by blood ties. In the local microcosm of rural communes, the personal element developed in relative independence of nature; there was a social differentiation and regulating of professional occupations, and wonderful spiritual values were created. Because of the extraordinarily wide historical and spatial spread of this social formation, it is very difficult to give an exhaustive description of the model of man's aesthetic interaction with nature then; yet certain of its features must be noted: for the first time there was an awareness of man as an aesthetic phenomenon created in the image and likeness of natural perfection; the movement of man and nature was often presented in a single aesthetic rhythm; the transformation of nature was often realised in the main as an aesthetic process; initially nature was treated as the prototype of art; and a theoretical awareness of the sphere of an aesthetic attitude to nature arose. Such were the basic features, in my view, of the second, transitional period of the aesthetic assimilation of nature.

The following periods of this assimilation were linked with the three great epochs of civilisation—the slave-owning, feudal, and capitalist. There is a certain similarity, moreover, in the very models of the structure of the aesthetic attitude to nature, characteristic of precapitalist society, since each of these societies was structured by naturally arising forces of production, and in each of them 'the nature relationship still predominates'. Labour itself was 'helper of the natural process' in agriculture. All that determined the naturalising of the aesthetic attitude to nature characteristic of these societies. But in spite of that community one must also note the differences between them. Under slavery the commencing division of labour into physical and mental led to the forming of an aesthetically neutral attitude to the 'second' nature, i.e. to nature transformed by the physical labour of the slave. In that social organism the aesthetic attitude to nature is built up within a mythological attitude to it. As Marx commented:

All mythology subdues, controls, and fashions the forces of nature in the imagination and through imagination; it disappears therefore when real control over these forces is established."

Mythological culture gradually died out in the spiritual life of that age and lost its universal significance, giving place to logical cognition. Aesthetic comprehension of the world was more and more drawn to rational modes of thinking; with Pythagoras world harmony was already being sought through a turn to the quantitative characteristics of the universe. With the separation of art as an independent form of professional activity imitation of nature was comprehended as an aspect of its (art's) aesthetic essence. In feudal society the aesthetic attitude to nature was determined on the whole by a religious outlook; an aesthetic hierarchy of the levels of world being was established: man was aesthetically superior to nature, and the absolute to man. Natural phenomena were only symbols of transcendent essences; the symbolic element also grew in the artistic depiction of nature.

In the last of these stages, the capitalist, human labour begins to get a direct social character, and the diversity of human nature itself develops 'at the cost of the majority of human individuals and even classes'. Social relations are materialised, and things themselves are personified. Nature is no longer seen as a self-sufficient force; it is now nothing but an object for man. The capitalist mode of production generates an idea in social consciousness of unrestrained, unconditioned domination over this object. The aesthetic attitude is eliminated on the whole from the practical, transforming attitude to nature in which private-property interests completely prevail. With extension of man's aesthetic alienation from nature a crisis set in in aesthetic awareness of it; at the same time the search for ways of overcoming it was increased on abstract, humanitarian principles which led to the idea of its uniqueness, equal to the uniqueness of an artistic work, and to the idea of an increase in its aesthetic value.

Such are the main models of the aesthetic attitude to nature characteristic of the history of mankind up to now. They should not be regarded as self-contained monads. Each has very broad inherent limits of distribution of a magnitude that can also be met in other aesthetic models.

It is important to bear the following in mind when examining the modes of aesthetic assimilation of nature established in the history of world culture.

(1) Ideological, moral, theoretical and cognitive, religious, and other senses, and whole ideological outlooks on the world, are intertwined in the aesthetic attitude to nature. Each of them

affects artistic-aesthetic assimilation of nature in its own way. It would be interesting, for instance, to trace what influence philosophical conceptions of space and time have had on art; the idea of *upanishad*, say, on the 'spatial' character of Indian music, and on the tracing out, so to say, of 'space' in Indian classical dance.

(2) In spite of the special feature distinguishing aesthetic perception of nature in one culture or another, it would be wrong to represent it as incomprehensible to the subject of another culture. The traditions of world culture witness that the experience of aesthetic assimilation of nature gathered in a culture can supplement and enrich the experience of another culture, and promote deeper aesthetic penetration of nature by members of the latter culture, and discovery of new aspects of natural beauty. Suffice it to recall the Russian landscape painters whose canvasses reflected the beauty of the Middle East (M. Vоробьев), the Mediterranean (F. Matveyev and V. Polenov), the mountain landscapes of Tibet (N. Roerich), or the deep impression made by artistic discovery of Russian nature on representatives of the cultures of other nations. Japanese writers, who have come into contact with the beauty of Turgenev's pictures of nature, noted new aesthetic moments in their own nature under its influence. The Japanese literary scholar Syoda Ryohei, speaking of the landscapes in Turgenev's *Rendezvous* remarked that

Russian nature has supplemented our ideas.... Turgenev gave special expressions to nature itself. Spring with its jolly whispering, grumpy autumn. He showed that nature is as changeable as human feelings. Turgenev first acquainted us with this mood of nature.... Never previously have Japanese poets resorted to such allegories as the wind was angry and waves grumbled.¹

Today, when the danger of disturbance of the ecological balance is calling the very existence of humankind in question, the centuries-old humanist tradition of love of nature is getting new meaning, is putting an initial, culturological full stop to the definition of the purpose of man in the universe, and disclosure of the ecological essence of his activity, which is capable, as history is showing, of converting the land into both a flowering garden and a desert. The aesthetic centre of the cultural tradition is also acquiring new meaning; in its correlativity with nature it has always been directed (as regards its true content) to creating a 'flowering garden' and has never striven to produce a 'desert'. In the course of tackling the problem of contemporary ecology and clarifying the horizon of the human aims advanced during the transformation of nature, there is a direct reason for turning

to aesthetics. What interests me most is the aesthetic dialogue between man and nature in the conditions of socialist civilisation.

Socialism has posed the task of achieving a new quality in the relations between man and nature, for the first time in history, as one of a grandiose social scale. The newness of this quality is linked in the Programme of the CPSU with harmoniousness. The harmony that the best of humanity dreamed of for thousands of years has become the principle (and a scientifically substantiated principle) of the CPSU's active social policy in the field of nature-use. One must not oversimplify the paths to achieving harmony between the socialist culture of production of material and spiritual values and nature; it will be actively asserted through overcoming difficulties and contradictions.

The posing of this task has become possible in socialist civilisation precisely because this civilisation has created the real socio-historical preconditions, for the first time, for confirming harmony between man and nature, and real conditions for all-round, harmonious development of the individual. As man achieves his proper harmonious quality and really realises it, he can build his harmonious attitude to nature more effectively.

But such a sharp change of the problem immediately turns us to the aesthetic quality. For aesthetics has as its subject-matter the patterns of harmonious movement and development in nature, society, and consciousness. So it is not by chance that an ever deeper awareness of the exceptional importance and aesthetic quality of socio-economic development, of the aesthetic factors of its acceleration, and of the aesthetic quality of man's attitude to man and to the world, is coming about in public affairs in the period of the perfecting of socialism. That is why the question of the aesthetic dimension of socio-ecological relations is becoming such a very important matter today. The CPSU is giving the aesthetic principle a special role in the sphere of vocational education, and also in connection with working out the directions of reform of the Soviet school, stressing the importance of moulding an ability to truly value the beauty of ancestral nature. It is also no less important for inculcating a feeling of being master of the country and for the spiritual perfecting of Soviet man. In his speech to Party and economic leaders and activists of the Tyumen and Tomsk Regions, Mikhail Gorbachev dwelt on

a matter that bears directly on converting Siberia into a land where life should make man happy. I have in mind the need for a careful attitude to nature. We must act in Siberia as real owners, must not only be concerned

about the profit of the minute but also about how to preserve the wealth and beauty of Siberia for future generations."

The personality of a socialist type mediates his attitude to nature through the principles of ecological culture. It grows on the soil of the ecophilic elements contained in the history of world culture and represents a socio-ecological form of the creative realisation and value expression of the essence of man. The forming of the ecological culture of socialism coincides with the beginning of the movement of the real history of humanity, i.e. the history that free man, who has found his 'all-round essence', begins to write. Ecological culture moves through the 'space' of freedom as the cognised ecological necessity of nature. It is a phenomenon of socio-ecological history and, like any historical process, is governed by the aesthetic laws of the movement of social history. The rhythms of the motion of this culture are aesthetically 'given', and its inner content itself aesthetically 'gushes'. Aesthetic consciousness is also an original form of the self-consciousness of ecological culture. During the forming of this culture aesthetic reflexion furthers manifestation of its critical position in regard to traditional forms of man's 'insertion' into nature, overcoming of the negative elements of this process, the birth of new positive forms, and so the establishing of 'perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations' between man and nature.¹⁰ The utopian socialists' ideas of the need to clothe the body of the earth in the aesthetic raiment of developed socialism are beginning to be realised in reality.

The methodological basis for both aesthetic and socio-ecological research is the materialist theory of history, and its universal principles are concretised in each of them. The methods of aesthetic and ecological knowledge mutually enrich and supplement each other. Ecology, for instance, has given a powerful impetus to theoretical investigation of the aesthetic value of nature and promoted deeper awareness of the aesthetic uniqueness of living matter. Social ecology has transformed the Kantian idea of relating to nature as to a work of art into the decisive precept of all modern social consciousness as well as of aesthetic consciousness. At the same time aesthetic theory, with its categorial structure, can promote a more adequate awareness of the real subject-matter of social ecology. Aesthetics is important as part of the philosophy of ecology, suggesting the idea of an ecological science. The originality of the socio-ecological approach is that it raises the traditional problem of the interaction of society and nature to a new level of awareness: the social subject correlates the intensive, ever mounting character of its activity not

just with certain objects and phenomena of nature but precisely with its integrity and allows for the patterns of this integrity for the first time in its social practice. Relations of coordination, optimal correspondence, harmoniousness, and purposefulness are getting special significance in this, i.e. the properties that penetration of the aesthetic attitude to reality into nature has long been associated with. And it is by no means fortuitous that ideas have been advanced of late on the use of such an aesthetic structure as an image or pattern for constructing ecological forecasts (V. V. Nalimov). Aesthetic concepts are being applied in ecological science in the function of Maxwell's 'scientific metaphores', which can play a considerable role in its development and meaningful interpretation. If there were no beauty in nature, then nature, according to Poincaré, would not be worth knowing. And who knows, perhaps the true ecological interconnections of the world have to be found precisely through search for its aesthetic harmony. However that may be, the relation between the fine ecological and aesthetic structures of animate nature is a not unimportant matter for the contemporary researcher. And the problem here is to bring out nature's aesthetic 'talent', to represent scientifically how like an artist, it creates, as Lomonosov put it, 'without hiding in its art', and so as to revive its aesthetic flowering (Marx's 'sensuous, poetic glamour'¹¹ of the world, with which it smiles on man) in the image of ecological reality.

The natural quality of the interaction of man and nature is mobile and flowing; its maximum level is attained in art. A first testimony of evidence of an understanding of art as a powerful ecological factor is contained in the old Chinese parable of the emperor Ping-gung according to which master Kuang was ordered by the power-hungry ruler to perform a very cherished melody, the sound of which agitated perturbations in the very fine structures of the world *qi*. A consequence was a very real ecological catastrophe (as we would now say) in the kingdom of Jin—destructive hurricanes, and drought from which the whole land became red. It would be naive, of course, to ascribe such fantastic power to art, but art occupies an exceptional place among the socially valuable mechanisms for controlling ecological activity. By restoring the sphere of modern man's relations with nature with impressive concreteness, it functions as a discoverer of the new man as a vehicle of ecological reason. The best works of progressive art in which the motive of nature is predominant have pricked society's ecological conscience, and arraigned the negative aspects of social communion with nature

before the moral court. At the same time the significance of ecological ideas for modern art has been heightened. True creativity is now impossible without great, brilliant knowledge of nature, and without a broadening of the modern artist's horizon of ecological culture.

The main mission of art in affirming the new approach to the environment is that, by uniting emotion, thought, and will, by appealing directly to the entirety of the human being and his spiritual experience and intuition, by embracing the world of his experiences and passions, and by awakening his creative potentialities, it promotes an ecological orientation of the individual's spiritual development, and functions as a form of socio-ecological pedagogics.

Historical practice 'turns' the multifaceted crystal of the art-like assimilation of the world to the facet that can most fully reflect the essential aspects of modern life; it is this facet that is now the method of socialist realism. In Soviet art, imbued with a spirit of socialism and search, the processes of revolutionary, life-asserting transformation of the world are profoundly revealed, and the social and aesthetic ideals of the socialist reorganisation of nature embodied. For Alexei Tolstoy Bolshevism meant a 'desire to make the world wonderful'. By altering nature man alters himself — that is the *leitmotif* of the works of Mikhail Sholokhov, Leonid Leonov, Ilya Ehrenburg, Konstantin Paustovsky, Boris Polevoy, and Victor Azhayev, who told of the socialist creation of the 'second nature'. At the same time the problematic of nature in the social thinking of Soviet artists evolved toward more and more ecologicalness. They farsightedly saw the new that was being born in the relations between socialist culture and nature. In the first Soviet decades the historically justified motives of the taming of and fight against dark elements and enthusiasm for the might of man as the master of the world had mainly made themselves known, but already at the end of the 1920s and 1930s artistic conceptions of the inner kinship of man and nature, permeated with a feeling of that latter's 'humanising' and spiritualising had been advanced in the work of Andrei Platonov, Mikhail Prishvin, and others. These tendencies became predominant in the art of the next decades. Artistic comprehension of Russian nature got a patriotic ring in Leonov's novel *Russian Forest*. The artistic culture of the postwar period strove to cultivate a moral position in regard to nature in man, and called for its conservation and defence. The socialist form of the awareness of man and the world, aesthetically embodied in the highest type of realistic art, is

being enriched and given new content in the period of the perfecting of socialism. A search for a new scale of significance has been mainly characteristic of the creative comprehension of socio-economic reality in contemporary Soviet art (Chingiz Aitmatov, Victor Astafiev, Daniil Granin, Valentine Rasputin, and others), and also philosophical depth in and a convincing realistic depicting of the multidimensional characters of the subjects of the ecological culture of socialism themselves. The positive characters of the best Soviet works that defend the principles of the humanist attitude to the environment, are becoming real acknowledged leaders and inspirers of our contemporaries. Art is entering more and more into decision of the difficult tasks being thrown up by the practice of the socialist mastering of nature with acceleration of the USSR's socio-economic development in the age of scientific and technological advance. The 6th Congress of the RSFSR Union of Writers expressed 'serious concern over the tackling of ecological problems in certain areas of the country'. The Board of the Union was charged to 'convey this concern to the competent authorities and, if necessary, to draw the broad Soviet public into the discussion and solution of these vitally important matters'.¹²

The socio-ecological problematic is being more and more broadly drawn into the realm of the world ideological struggle. Western ideologists are trying to hush up the fact that the ecological crisis is a manifestation of the crisis of capitalism, to embellish the unattractive ecological picture generated by capitalist society, to falsify the achievements of socialist civilisation in the mastery of nature. The deep gulf between ecological and aesthetic development in the capitalist world has been noted by Western writers (R. J. Dobos, Rudolf Arnheim, and others), who have made an ecologo-aesthetic critique of separate elements of the culture of modern imperialism. But they are unable to bring out scientifically the essence of the unresolved contradictions of Western 'asphalt culture' (as Arnold Toynbee called it) and nature, and to ignore the social dependence of aesthetic mastery of the latter. The role of aesthetic activity in tackling the ecological problem of today is often exaggerated. The reasons for man's aesthetic alienation from nature are regarded by some Western thinkers as technological (as was heard at the 10th International Congress for Aesthetics in Montreal in 1984).

The significance of ecology in the struggle of ideas is due to its social-value aspect coming directly into the central problem of the modern world outlook, viz., the problem of man, to the solution of which aesthetics is making an essential contribution.

Problems of the interconnection of the ecological and aesthetic education of the individual, already sharply raised on an abstract humanist basis by Thoreau, who dreamed of man as the artist and sculptor of the environment, are becoming specially topical in this connection.

The importance of shaping the aesthetic vector of man's ecological behaviour is due to the fact that aesthetic education, which is a peculiar means (as V. F. Odoevsky put it), of 'integrating the soul', promotes man's development as a universal bearer of socio-ecological qualities, and helps man to realise himself creatively in the world. Socio-ecological standards and ideals are transmuted in the crucible of aesthetic preferences and passions into real motives of activity, into ecological conviction as an integral attribute of the depth of the individual's outlook on the world. Only an aesthetically developed person and his rich emotional world, in which the truth of the ecological ties of nature is experienced and felt, can display real respect for 'the Genius of the place' (Virgil)¹¹, and the ecological character of the world, find wisdom of view, sincerity and reverence before each little bit of living matter. It is therefore extremely important to develop both the aesthetic activity of the human attitude to the world, directing it to transformation of the whole of our planet into the 'beautiful dwelling of mankind' (Gorky), and aesthetic contemplation of the soul and its oblivious delight, rapture, excitement before the beauty of nature.

The forming of a culture of aesthetic communion with nature in the conditions of socialist civilisation has taken a fundamentally new direction. For the first time in history it has become linked with the educating of a harmoniously developed individual. Rich experience of familiarising the rising generation with the aesthetic values of nature has been gathered in the practice of socialist education and Soviet educational theory (V. Sukhomlinsky, and others). At the same time the level of socio-ecological and aesthetic maturity of social consciousness reached earlier cannot satisfy us now. Today's conception of accelerating all aspects of public affairs calls for new approaches, comprehension of the changes in the aesthetic quality of nature use, and of integral mastery of nature. Today it is necessary to employ the creative potential of Marxist-Leninist aesthetics comprehensively to speed up the USSR's socio-economic development, and to employ the aesthetic factor in the process of ecological education. The main content of work in this direction is to raise the ecologically responsible aesthetic culture of socialism to a qualitatively new level, to realise it on a realistic

basis, to find broader application of socio-aesthetic energy in the sphere of society's ecological activity in conditions of scientific and technological advance, starting from the 'dialectics of Marxist realism',¹¹ to bring out and generalise the real achievements in the field of aesthetic 'guaranteeing' of ecological practice without letting ourselves run ahead too fast or tolerating sluggishness. Not only is beauty of words about nature needed here, but above all beauty of deeds, beauty in the practical transformation of nature. A feeling for the new is needed here, a sensing of the real prospects, an overcoming of the existing contradictions and actual difficulties precisely of today's level of development, and timely singling out of the unsolved problems of the individual's aesthetic involvement in the shaping of a socio-ecological culture. Fuller use of the educational potential of work (this expression of life and affirmation of life) is becoming of paramount importance today in the aesthetic parameters of ecological consciousness, and at the same time broader involvement of the aesthetic principle in vocational education, in the inculcation of an ecological discipline of work and production, a heightened sense of responsibility for the ecological consequences of one's own activity (above all in the leaders of work collectives). Among the problems that our fast-moving time dictates are the perfecting of ecological and aesthetic education and of their contribution to shaping an ideological and life stance, i.e. the stance of a socially active individual, more active involvement of aesthetic activity in eliminating a consumer attitude to nature, overcoming of emotional and aesthetic indifference and deafness of the individual to the world of nature, elucidating the peculiarities of the urban and rural types of these attitudes to the land and its aesthetic riches, the prospect for the development and interconnection of these attitudes, and an artistic-aesthetic filling of the socio-ecological ideal during acceleration of the country's socio-economic development.

The perspective of the mutual relations of society and nature, a perspective inseparable from the movement of human civilisation to communism, is most concretely outlined in the general scientific concept of the 'noosphere' put into circulation in the 1930s by V. I. Vernadsky. Mankind's collective aesthetic activity represented a very powerful social factor to Vernadsky, influencing transformation of the biosphere into the noosphere. Stressing the immense influence of art on science, which is the basic geological force affecting this transformation, he noted, in his article 'Scientific Thought as a Planetary Phenomenon', that not only could the general line of the phenomenon be obtained

ned from study of Earth but also a colourful picture of reality, and an aesthetic picture of the noosphere itself. The theoretical significance of the concept of the noosphere, formed on the basis of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, for aesthetics is that it opens up horizons of the further development of aesthetic knowledge in the mastering of the sphere of man's interaction with nature built up in the age of social, scientific, and technical advance, arming the aesthetic point of view of the existing patterns that determine the integral, self-developing 'society-nature' system with a methodologically true instrument, and making it possible to pose the problems of the aesthetic shaping of the human factor in a scientific way, a shaping that corresponds to the real processes of the creation and transformation of the earthly sphere of life by social reason and action, and throws light on the wonderful essence of this reason.

NOTES

- ¹ See Marx's letter to Engels of 25 March 1868 in which he wrote: 'The whole conclusion is that cultivation when it progresses in a primitive way and is not consciously controlled ... leaves deserts behind it'. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p 190.
- ² Mikhail Gorbachev. *Selected Speeches and Articles*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, pp 221-222.
- ³ See: Culture—man—philosophy: a contribution to the problem of integration and development. *Voprosy filosofii*, 1982, 1:44.
- ⁴ Frederick Engels. *Anti-Dühring*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p 133.
- ⁵ Karl Marx. Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858. Translated by Ernst Wan-germann. In: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 28. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p 44.
- ⁶ Karl Marx. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 216.
- ⁷ Karl Marx. *Theories of Surplus Value*, Part II, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 118.
- ⁸ Cited from: T. P. Grigoriev. *Yaponskaya khudozhestvennaya traditsia* (The Japanese Artistic Tradition), Nauka, Moscow, 1979, p 324. Translated from the Russian.
- ⁹ M. S. Gorbachev. Address to a Gathering of Party and Economic Activists of the Tyumen and Tomsk Regions, 6 September 1985. *Kommunist*, 1985, 14, p 21.
- ¹⁰ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I. Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Av-ling. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p 84.
- ¹¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The Holy Family*, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 128.
- ¹² See the resolution of the 6th Congress of the RSPSR Union of Writers *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 1985, 51; 10.
- ¹³ Virgil. *Aeneid*, VII, 13 (*Genitumque loci*).
- ¹⁴ V. I. Lenin. Revolutionary Tasks, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p 149.

MAN'S FUTURE: FROM DREAMS TO REALITY

V. P. Rachkov

When we speak of the man of socialist (and in the future, of communist) society, and of his actual, but still forming consciousness and way of life, we often and justifiably add the word 'new'. But strictly speaking it is not quite so, and sometimes does not correspond at all to what we want to say or show.

The point, of course, is not the expressions (fortunate or not); and such a linguistic nicety would not merit a place in general, if it did not essentially touch the depth of the problem. It is convenient here to recall that the fathers of scientific socialism urgently warned the future research worker against insisting on the isolated novelty or innovation, or historical uniqueness of their theory and of socialism in general. They never lost an opportunity to stress that socialism is not a 'new dress' for an 'old wardrobe' of theories, conceptions, and all kinds of 'isms', that it does not fall from the sky, does not arise and develop in a direction away from the highroad of the evolution of world civilisation, but along this highroad, in the mainstream of world culture and history, and, becoming part of that mainstream, socialism accelerates humanity's movement from its prehistory to its real history.

It would be wrong to suppose that something quite different, unknown, painted by some hand of genius, but frighteningly new, descends on man and his consciousness, his inner self and outward appearance, and life set-up, along with socialism. The world, however, does not become quite 'different', and the 'man of the new world' does not come from nowhere. Socialism and everything new that it introduces into people's lives, consciousness, character, and culture, are primarily a returning to humanity of what belongs to it by right.

Socialism's returning to mankind its heritage, scattered like precious grains throughout history, whether in the form of ideas, models, and images, or of real things and works, cannot, at the same time, be anything else but the gradual return of man to himself. It was not without reason that Marx loved to use this graphic and meaningful expression when speaking of the pros-

pects of man's future. He emphatically defined the forming of a new, socialist way of life and of people's consciousness precisely as the historical process of man's return to himself. Historical experience and human memory are the deep foundation on which can only rest our present and the future be created. It is like a relay baton of mankind. Tomorrow we shall be obliged to pass it on, in the same way as we must accept it today.

History can be regarded as a continuous change of human nature, something that affirms a humanist view of man as a being with a right to real, earthly happiness, freedom, and conscious historical activity. Such a theory of man and his nature and essence finds realisation in the practice of socialist society and constantly develops in accordance with this practice. At the same time it is linked by thousands of threads with the preceding achievements of human thought. The historically transient and limited, which is always contained in the phenomena of one way of life or another, and in people's everyday notions, dies away with time, leaving no trace, but what was historically valuable in it, 'the brilliant insight', lives on, continually coming back in a new quality and in other historical circumstances, acquiring new force in them, revealing its merits, and demonstrating its indoubted vital value to the full.

We have to turn to history precisely because we are striving to understand our present and to raise the curtain on the future.

The 'Golden Age' and the Happiness of Prince Gvidon

Dreams of man's beautiful future were born in remote antiquity. The hard social circumstances of class society, and the difficulties of combating the elemental forces of nature, gave a push to the creation of myths of a past 'golden age', and of distant countries where happiness flourished.

Many legends were created about the fortunate life of 'our forebears'. In Greek mythology the 'golden age' was on earth at the time when Astrea, the goddess of justice, lived. According to the legend she forsook earth in the Iron Age and had since then shone as the Zodiac constellation of Virgo, while happy times ended on earth with her departure. Utopias were born of such legends.

The first utopias about the 'golden age' were created in the states of antiquity (India, China, Egypt, Persia, and Greece, in the first half of the first millennium B. C.) by Lao-tse, Euhemeros.

Jambul, and Hesiod. Distant cities and mysterious, unknown lands that seamen and travellers had reached by chance, and where good, wealth, and high spirits reigned, were eloquently described in them. Later, when they got back to the society really existing, they told their stupefied listeners about the wonders they had seen overseas.

The world of utopia has always fed on dreams of social justice. But this dream, torn from the specific soil of the historical age, was placed in a world of abstract, imaginary visions. When the thinkers of antiquity talked about justice they started from a metaphysical notion of two elements of progress: unchanging human nature (in connection with which they posed the task of making man happy from outside); and an otherworldly external force that could, in certain circumstances, ensure the happiness of man, constant in his essence, weak, contradictory, and confused.

An appeal to God or to worldly wisdom predetermined utopian hopes of a change in external circumstances in favour of human justice, and of a return to yesterday's 'golden age'. The forming of early utopianism (mainly in the form of religious myths) consequently started from notions of the invariance of human essence and hopes of a divine providence and intervention, i.e., something independent of human society.

There is not a people that has not created its utopian ideals. These are very different depending on the historical conditions that moulded one nation or another. The classic West European utopia hardly resembles the Oriental one, but their nature is the same—belief in the inevitability of social justice. This ideal gave rise to the ideas of the early utopian communism of Thomas More and other utopians of the Middle Ages.

Thomas More himself was a dreamer who preached communist notions of a kind. During the crisis of the Christian ideal he came forward with his *Utopia* not only as a critic of the existing social order, but also as a proponent of social justice, and of a whole set of ideas that can be described as early utopian communism. These ideas were immature and contradictory and were largely based on the secular utopia of Plato's *Republic*. Western scholars sometimes try to present Plato almost as the progenitor of communism. Ignoring the historical circumstances, they put both the aristocratic-slaveowning ideal of the collectivism of a ruling elite developed by Plato on the same level with Thomas More's utopia, and the opinions of the great utopian socialists, trying in that way to discredit the theory of scientific communism and to class it as a branch of utopianism. But these attempts are

built on an arbitrary interpretation of the term 'communism', the essence of which is not reducible, of course, simply to a negation of private property.

Plato's utopian ideal was an absolutist-totalitarian state with an incredibly strict legislation in which man was a puppet and toy in the hands of the gods; not only was it unconnected with a prevision of the scientific principles of communist society but was directly opposed to such. The great utopian socialists Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen were much closer to such a prevision. Their ideas were highly valued by the founders of scientific communism, who, however, consistently criticised their utopian character.

Utopian pictures of the future depict an ideal society and an ideal man, and in that they are one. The utopian socialists' dreams of social justice were divorced from a clear understanding of the social and historical conditions, and of the ways of realising the ideals put forward. The utopian ideal was constructed and depicted as an absolutely new picture of the future, divorced from the real picture, one resembling Pushkin's fairy tale of Czar Saltan and his son, the glorious and powerful knight Prince Gvidon, and of the fair Swan Princess. The Swan Princess promised to repay the Czar's son with good for having saved her from the wizard-hawk; it was enough for the prince to come to the seashore and call forth the White Swan, for his wish to be immediately fulfilled (a town sprang up, riches, stalwart guardsmen, and other wonders appeared). Gvidon's happiness came true simply—by a wave of the Swan Princess white hand. Mankind, however, has to travel difficult roads, sometimes drenched in blood, in order to find it.

Humanity has pursued contradictory dreams in its search for happiness: some wise men counselled living easily and not thinking of the consequences of one's actions; others called for thinking about one's every step; some regarded satisfactions as the 'highest good'; others advocated rejection of satisfactions and reduction of needs and wants to the minimum. But all man's efforts on the road to happiness and prosperity inevitably led to new disappointments.

The thinkers of the past did not take into account the main thing on which earthly well-being and happiness are founded. They failed to notice the fact that man has needs whose immense importance and vital necessity do not lie on the surface. That happened in regard to a person's primary need, the need for another person. A person does not only owe his life to this need, from the moment he is born. People's need for each other is cor-

roborated and reproduced daily by every manifestation of their life activity. Similarly, their existence itself depends on countless inter-relations and is based on them; one person's prosperity and well-being is inseparable from that of another, and is conditional on social prosperity.

In order that concern for man can be realised on a broad social scale it is not enough for man to become aware of himself as a social being, and for people to recognise the strength of their unity. It is necessary for the very basis of people's lives, and their activity transforming nature and circumstances, to become social, and for their productive forces to reach a certain level where the need for a change in their inter-relations comes to light. The attainment of that level in the history of mankind is also the eve of the socialist revolution.

A moment had to come in history when the word 'happiness' would cease to have 'lucky stars' and 'good luck' as its synonyms, when the striving for happiness and well-being would cease to be a 'personal affair' and the care of one person, but would be made the keystone of the organisation of people's social life activity, would become the law of all society's life. Marx was the first to say that, when he discovered a fundamentally new approach to explanation of all the theoretical problems of man, his place and role in history, his significance and worth, freedom and responsibility.

A logical consequence of the revolutionary change in the explanation of social phenomena made by Marxism is the scientific explanation of man's nature as determined by the historical conditions of his existence. Dialectical materialism treats all history as a continuous altering of man, and maintains the humanist view of man as a being with a right to real earthly happiness, to realisation of his freedom, to conscious historical activity. This doctrine of man and his nature and essence is being realised in the practice of socialist society and is being developed in accordance with this practice.

Historical experience has shown that all socialist trends not based on a scientific understanding of the objective laws of social development, that do not take the class struggle into account as the driving force of progress at the contemporary stage, and that have not paid attention to the point that only a revolutionary transformation of capitalism into socialism can alter its exploiter essence, are as utopian as Pushkin's tale of the happiness of Gvidon.

High Ideals Compared with Achievement

Ideology implies an appreciation of activity from a definite, class point of view, and a system of values, in short, from the position of an ideal. The social ideal is the standard and model in which people's ideas about contemporary society and man are summed up. This historically changing ideal developed over centuries, and has a class character in class society. It attains its scientific theoretical form only in Marxism, in the image of communism.

In a class-antagonistic society two ideals that replace each other can be distinguished, which reflect the trend of development of social relations. One is the ideal of the intermediate strata of pre-capitalist formations, which found expression in the ideal of early Christianity, and the other is the bourgeois ideal whose classical formulation was the ideal of the Enlightenment; both are a reflection of historically different forms of the same commodity-money relations, progressive for the whole 'economic formation'. They therefore emerge as two historical varieties of a single type of social ideal, that of private success.

The next, highest type of social ideal is that of classless, communist society. It was born under capitalism as the scientifically substantiated ideal of the proletariat. With the victory of socialism, the communist ideal gradually loses the status of a class ideal as the social uniformity of society grows, and is converted into a social ideal in the full sense of the term.

Since the content of an ideal is ultimately disclosed through solution of the problem of the relation of the individual and society, each type of social ideal is a generalised, historically peculiar solution of this problem. In opposition to primitive society which subordinated the individual to the tribe, the social ideal of antagonistic society, engendered by private property, asserts individualism, the individual's autonomy in society.

The communist social ideal, in contrast to all preceding types, proclaims a harmonious combination of personal and social interests. Whereas the individual and society are directly linked in communist, classless society, in an antagonistic one the relations between the individual and society are mediated by relations between classes, and primarily by political relations. The individual, therefore, for whom the ideal society should provide optimum conditions of life activity, is not an abstract individual 'in general', but a typical representative of the class that has given rise to the social ideal. Each new type of social ideal, being the child of a progressive class or social group, absorbs the humanist content of the preceding one. The early Christian ideal,

for instance, pictured bliss in heaven for the elect. The bourgeois ideal declared equal opportunities for all for success on earth. In contrast to the ideal of antagonistic society, the communist ideal is inseparable from the prosperity of society and ensuring all-round, harmonious development of each person.

The different elements of the general humanistic world outlook, one must note, developed in class society in a context of opposing world outlooks. The idea of the individual's uniqueness and individualism, without which humanism could not have arisen, was born in the medium of the predominant, propertied classes. When humanists spoke of the freedom of the individual, they primarily had in mind members of their class.

On the other hand, protest against exploitation and oppression, and ideas of full social equality reflected the hopes and dreams of an oppressed class. They were often accompanied with an assertion of primitive collectivism. 'Ascetic communism' and ideas of self-restraint grew from idealisation of certain elements of the private life of these classes counterposed to the life of the dominant class. Erection of the underdeveloped nature of own needs into an absolute generated egalitarianism. Therefore, along with the ideal of the Renaissance, the utopian communist ideal, with its appeal to the entire mankind, was a natural expression of the humanism of its time.

The humanist content of an ideal enables a definite branch of succession to be brought out, a certain single trend for the various historical periods. This common trend is a revolutionary denial at various stages of history of concrete manifestations of social evil and injustice, and an assertion of new principles of public life that reflect the broadest opportunities for social progress. This tendency, by expressing the direction of development of social relations, also influenced the ideals of the dominant class. It was most clearly displayed in the development of the content of the social ideal: from primitive material well-being to all-round, comprehensive development of the individual, and from herd instinct through individualism to collectivism.

All progressive ideals have proclaimed freedom of the individual, but the content of this freedom has been concretely historical. The real content of 'freedom' was determined by concrete needs stemming from the level of material production reached.

In reality, of course, what happened was that people won freedom for themselves to the extent that was dictated and permitted not by their ideal of man, but by the existing productive forces. All emancipation carried

through hitherto has been based, however, on restricted productive forces. The production which these productive forces could provide was insufficient for the whole of society and made development possible only if some persons satisfied their needs at the expense of others.¹

In other words, the degree of freedom proclaimed in the ideal was determined by the level of development of material production. And even more important, class-antagonistic society could develop only through exploitation; so the ideal of the Enlightenment, despite all its progressiveness compared with preceding ideals, and despite all the attempts to represent it as the eternal ideal of a free society, in the final analysis, remained only the ideal of the private success and prosperity of the bourgeois class.

Progressive ideals found embodiment only insofar as they corresponded to the objective laws of history. Social ideals were realised in turn while the social relations reflected in them remained progressive. Only in that case was the necessary dialectical connection retained between the ideal's content as a goal and the means of realising it.

From that angle the early Christian ideal was illusory because it arose in a period of temporary decline of the commodity relations that gave rise to it. There were no means in real life for realising its content, so that its realisation was transferred to the other world. The bourgeois ideal is abstract and formal because the liberty, equality, and fraternity proclaimed by it are limited and restricted by private property. They are real only for those who possess this property, and then only with certain reservations. The spread of these principles to all members of bourgeois society makes the ideal abstract. The communist social ideal is truly real, effective, and concrete since the very formulation of it, viz., free development of each as the condition for the free development of all, is an expression of the unity of end and means. The principle of equality, for instance, is a constituent element of all social ideals, but it emerges as an illusory equality before God in the religious ideal, as formal equality before the law in the bourgeois ideal; only in the communist social ideal is the actual equality of people proclaimed, i.e., elimination of class inequality and exploitation, liquidation of classes, the perfecting and development of each person on that basis, and full realisation of all the individual's spiritual and physical powers.

The Shackles of 'True Good'

Whether socialism and communism assume an insufficiency of society's material wealth and a relative poverty of people's material well-being or, on the contrary, whether realisation of their ideals first of all necessitates an unusual development of the material environment and maximum satisfaction of everyone's primary material needs is not a debatable question. It can only be posed by those who for some reason forget that the socialist mode of production takes the place of capitalism only when, and insofar as, the latter becomes a brake on development of the material basis of society and begins to block further expansion of material wealth. Socialism means striking off the shackles from social production of material goods, and not stopping its development. It is a historical and logical requirement for overcoming the material 'hunger' and absolute and relative poverty of the bulk of the population, and therefore its 'minimum' task is to reach the historically highest level of everybody's material well-being.

Under socialism and communism, of course, definite social limits to increase in the number of goods objectively come into play. But these limits depend primarily on the humanisation of human wants, by which

in place of the wealth and poverty of political economy come the rich human being and the rich human need. The rich human being is simultaneously the human being in need of a totality of human manifestations of life—the man in whom his own realisation exists as an inner necessity, as need. Not only wealth, but likewise the poverty of man—under the assumption of socialism—receives in equal measure a human and therefore social significance. Poverty is the passive bond which causes the human being to experience the need of the greater wealth—the other human being.

At the same time the unparalleled expenditure of resources in the 'consumer society' that has attained dramatic acuity today is foreign to socialism; and likewise the plundering and misappropriation of the labour and talents of millions of people caused by the cult of gain and unrestrained and uncontrolled consumption. Under socialism and communism there is no fatal necessity to follow the road of an unlimited increase in the consumption of things; there are limits to the necessary quantity of the latter.

The real and incomparably more complex problem is how to employ material wealth so as to make it play its historical role, i.e., expand the horizons of human existence, and let the human personality flourish freely. Bitter experience has shown (and

continues to show) that unrestrained expansion of the production and consumption of things does not solve this problem, and that much work lies ahead in history before a material good becomes a real good; the 'economic man' groans under the mounting burden of consumerism, and is enslaved physically and intellectually by the Thing. But there is other experience in history; experience of overcoming the contradictions between man and the world of things created by him, and of establishing harmony between them, experience that has armed man with a saving compass in the expanding ocean of things.

The very fact that the 'people and things' problem, when posed seriously, is not one of the quantity of things, but rather of the relations between people with regard to their attitude to things, indicates that what we mainly deal with here is the problem of property. The rise of the 'people and things' problem, this first symptom of their commencing mutual alienation, was linked precisely with the rise of the historical capacity of things to be property (private property). But it also means, at the same time, that removal of this alienation will be achieved by transforming property relations.

Socialism deals a crushing blow to the grandeur of the once unshakeable empire of things by the very act of its formation, i.e., by abolishing private ownership of the means of production and by turning key elements of the wealth of society into the wealth of all; the products of labour cease to dominate the producer, and a most decisive step is taken to a 'winning back' of the world of things for people.

Social expropriation of the means and conditions of production, these 'things of all things', and socialisation of the sphere of production of material goods, are not the last step but only the beginning of a long, difficult road of returning people and things to themselves. A new stride toward the future is gradual but no less essential, viz., socialisation of consumption occurring along with the 'maturing' of socialist property relations. The content of this process is the conversion of a bigger and bigger proportion of the objects of consumption and goods into an object of ownership by all the people, through increase of the funds of social consumption and gradual withering away of personal property. Extensive socialisation of consumption (the second most important area of human activity) will finally become possible under communism when, as the Programme of the CPSU says,

the all-round development of people will be accompanied by the growth of the productive forces on the basis of continuous progress in science

and technology, all the springs of social wealth will flow abundantly, and the great principle 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs' will be implemented.'

The withering away of personal property: how many reproaches and accusations have been levelled at precisely this point in the theory of scientific communism, at the system which is aspiring (they say) to eliminate property personally acquired, won by one's labour, property that forms the basis of any personal freedom, activity, and self-activity. A whole series of questions have been asked, and no few contradictory opinions have been evoked about the future of this form of socialist property both in the Soviet literature and in that of socialist countries. That is understandable, for it is a matter of how the vital material interests of the members of socialist society can be satisfied more fully and more deeply.

In fact, personal property is an area in which contradictions still arise under socialism; once in a while an invisible 'struggle for power', banished from other spheres, continues between man and the world of things around him, an area in which the 'people—things' problem which we have inherited from the past has found its last refuge.

Anyone can answer what personal property is without resorting to specialised literature. There is no need to have a special sense of humour in order to add: it is what there is never enough of. But it turns out that this simple knowledge can also be enough for understanding the inner contradiction that the phenomenon of personal property contains under socialism and which indicates the source of its future development and change.

As for the theory, let me note that personal property is a special economic relation of socialism, or rather a definite, namely the final, stage of the movement of the economic relations of socialist property. At that stage each member of society will realise himself as the owner of public, social means of production, receive his share of the socially produced product in accordance with the law of distribution by work, will have it at his disposal, and the thing, the object of consumption, will be realised as a value, its use value will receive social recognition, and it will thus fall out of social circulation, by entering the sphere of personal consumption. With the completion of this process, the thing will become 'mine' for someone, while personal property will 'cease' to be an economic relation and become as simple and understandable as the thing. Its 'work' as an economic category will have been completed at that stage:

man will have become the owner of the thing by virtue of all the economic relations and juridical laws of society; the thing, having completed its movement to meet him will have acquired a subject. By that act it will have fallen from society's view, 'disappeared' into a possession, while the person who will have acquired it ceases to be 'social obtainer', and becomes a personal owner.

The fundamental dissimilarity of things comes out in this. Some fade out once in consumption; their result being a satisfied need; others only seem to disappear, turning, in effect, into another need. The movement of some really ceases, that of others only then really begins. As for the latter (and they constitute the overwhelming majority of things in personal possession) a process of producing a good has not yet been completed: at best it 'sleeps' in the appearance of a thing; it is necessary to draw it out from there at the price of no little effort, although the thing itself was packed, sold, and became 'mine' and bears the trade mark of the factory that produced it. A gas range and the pots and pans in a kitchen are not yet a ready meal; a yacht is not yet a pleasurable sail; a country cottage is not yet fresh cucumbers and fruit, and so on. The list of such things could be continued. They all only have the name of consumer goods: it is more correct to call them means of satisfaction or objects of use. For the real good embodied in them to satisfy a real human need, there has to be, in fact, a continuation of the production process, but already production that is taking place and continuing outside the socialised sphere, in the sphere of personal consumption.

I would note here how gradually the expression on the face of our 'lucky' owner changes. Perhaps he has not yet actually become the consumer of the thing; but he already is painfully aware that sometimes the reckoning may come before the feasting. What he was striving for has already become a burden to some extent for him. Cares increase. In fact, sociologists estimate, more than two-thirds of the aggregate labour expenditure of Soviet society falls at present on the non-socialised sphere, is laid out 'over the threshold' of what is called final, non-production consumption. Big as it is the figure is understated, in the opinion of many. A whole sector of material production, it turns out, operates—is forced to operate—with its own laws and its own subsectors, under cover of our 'coveted' personal property; and it operates without direct control by society though under its definite influence. It operates on petty, unorganised principles, spontaneously and primitively.

As we see when personal property is closely examined, it proves to be not so much an idyllic relation with material goods, not so much a zone (untouchable) of tasting of the fruits of labour, and not so much a paradise of satisfied wants, as an inefficiently performed exercise in self-service.

But maybe personal property, as a specific form of the consumption of material goods, is optimal from the standpoint of satisfaction of people's personal needs by a comparatively limited quantity of the necessities of life? By no means. The fact that a thing is personal property, and that someone relates to it as 'not his own', in itself signifies only a counterposing (mine—someone else's), but bears no evidence that the thing is fully used or consumed. In general it may prove useless and unnecessary if it seems so to its owner, if he simply does not know how to use it, and so on; and very useful things, and ones, in fact, very much needed by someone else, may prove to be among these. At the same time the personal owner, when acquiring a thing as a commodity, acquires a place simultaneously in the market for goods, and the right to offer this thing for sale. In certain circumstances his property may become a means for obtaining unearned income. If the fact of person's ownership of an object in itself also means some kind of direct participation in consumption of it, this involvement consists in his depriving other people of the opportunity to utilise its useful properties, while the owner himself is forced now and then to deny himself the possibility of satisfying his need by another means and another object, even though the latter may be more acceptable for him.

Personal property thus received a minus in all respects. It is ineffective both as a kind of continuation of the production process in the sphere of personal consumption and as a special relation of production. As a specific form of the consumption of the necessities of life it only lowers their socially-useful yield and so limits society's reserve of life necessities, and in fact impoverishes it. As a synonym of the ordinary use of things, and a synonym of man's natural assimilation of material benefits, the concept of personal property itself can only be misemployed through a misunderstanding; and it is this misunderstanding that usually feeds our involuntary liking and feeling for it as such. As a mode of self-assertion, the 'foundation of the individual's personal freedom', there can be no need for it, already under socialism; its burden, on the contrary, is only a drag on 'personal freedom'. As a reality of socialism it can become a refuge for consumerism, and transmit the infec-

tion of the 'thing disease'.

But it is one thing to point to the 'minuses' and quite another to consider the real state of affairs. At the present time there are several objective reasons for personal property to supplement public property, and perform a number of important functions in the final stage of the development of the system of socialist property relations. The main reason is the still not high enough level of 'maturity' of public property itself, the steadily growing but still limited capabilities of the socialised sphere of production of consumer goods and services. The institution of personal property as a gigantic 'sector' of 'services' that we render ourselves, is still necessary since a similar sector, or group of sectors, is only beginning to take shape in the socialised sphere. It begins with the 'services' most important for man, i.e., development of a health service, public catering, household services, sports and recreation facilities, public transport, pre-school institutions, etc. To the extent that society takes over an ever greater number of these services and socialises the sphere of realisation of the use value of material goods, and that social consumption funds demonstrate their superiority over personal ones, the more easily will they out-compete it; and to that extent the individual, casting all doubts aside, will renounce the dubious and burdensome advantage of private possession. He will thereby renounce such modes of satisfying his growing needs as lay on him a necessity to produce and reproduce the already created use value of goods. Society itself will cope with this necessity and, moreover, will do so more effectively.

This is the meaning of extension of socialisation to the consumption sphere under socialism, a decisive step on the historical road to harmony between man and the artificial world created by him. This and only this will lead to the withering away of personal property, which will create an important organisational precondition for achieving a real abundance of material wealth and leisure time for the man of socialist and communist society, i.e., provision of extensive opportunities for his all-round harmonious development and perfecting. In this, too, is a key to final solution of the seemingly complex 'people—things' problem.

Time and action are needed to erect on the ruins of the collapsed empire of things the majestic edifice of the rational order under which man will really become the true master of his world. Time and action are needed for material wealth to become a real good for man. Time and action are needed to

usher in the age of movement from the world of things to the world of ideas, to the pinnacles of physical, intellectual, and moral culture, to man's need for man, for humanity, for mankind, which towers above all other needs.

The Future in the Present

Marxist-Leninist theory is not only a scientific definition of the future of communism, which is growing in the womb of capitalism, but also a revolutionary programme of struggle for this future. The historical inevitability of communism is expressed in Marxian theory as the social task of the masses' activity. In that sense the prediction of the communist social system is 'self-realising': the objective necessity of the transition from capitalism to communism is embodied in scientifically substantiated conscious actions of the masses to transform reality in a revolutionary way.

The theory of socialism, oriented towards social development in which the human factor plays the most important role, is in the focus of Marxism-Leninism today. Marxism has always seen various possibilities of subjective choice and variants of social development in the context of the historical conditions already established. Recognition of people's subjective activity, activity as a relatively independent factor of history also distinguishes it from fatalist doctrines of the predetermined development of integrated structures. Scientific socialism calls for close attention to the subjective, human factor, i.e., serious study of how and in what way it can influence the content and direction of social processes.

In rejecting the fatalistic view of history one must simultaneously recognise two largely opposing views of man.

First, one must recognise the universal character of human nature. Man's universality is contained in his most general characteristics, which are necessarily manifested throughout history. Proceeding from the universal, creative character of human nature, one can easily demonstrate the impossibility in principle of absolutely precise detailed forecasts of the future, since one always knows only the necessity manifested in the past and consequently only the incomplete, partial experience of humankind.

Second, if the universality of man is interpreted in the sense that he disclosed, with each new stride of history, another, previously undisplayed, creative, positive capability, it could

always be counted on that each new step of his would promote progress (even if one could not exactly predict the concrete consequences of that step) and could reckon on positive chance. But the experience of history, and especially that of the twentieth century, teaches us that human universality and man's boundless creative capacity can also manifest themselves in a destructive capacity, in a universality of evil.

If human reality is the basis of history, i.e., the reality of spiritual life as a process of internal struggle, search, and taking of concrete decisions, of mistakes and delusions, and as a process of actions by individuals, classes, parties, and states, then one must immediately realise that it is precisely this subjective factor that plays an essential role in the character itself and direction of movement of social forces from the past to the future, i.e., the dialectic of man's spiritual life, the dialectic and basic contradictoriness of the very process of his cognizing of his interests, i.e., reflection of the initial objective conditions in his actions and decisions. Scientific socialism maintains, with good reason, that the laws of history, and the context of the different socio-economic formations set but the most general lines for the development of events, leaving all the details to the will of people and circumstances.

Scientific socialism starts from the point that the building of the new society in practice means provision of conditions of life for all people in which

everyone can freely develop his human nature and live in a human relationship with his neighbours, and has no need to fear any violent shattering of his condition... Far from wishing to destroy real human life with all its requirements and needs, we wish on the contrary really to bring it into being.'

When the founders of scientific socialism spoke of the 'real', of the 'real content of people's life' in the future society, of a life 'adequate to the nature of man' as the highest criterion of human development, they had in mind that social life could not exist in general without it. As will be seen from the above quotation from Engels' 'Elberfeld Speeches', they outlined quite normal, attainable social aims: guarantee of condition, normal human relations with his neighbours, and a spiritually full leisure.

Goals that unite the efforts of several generations inspire life, give it a meaning that goes beyond the finite being of the individual. At the same time, the requirement for people's life to be spiritually richer does not appertain to some transcendental aim of history but to social life itself, because every

society, every social organism is first of all an end in itself. Therefore people's life under socialism, being related primarily to what they can create and achieve today, and to their actual and potential opportunities is laying a road, through imitation of the best models and gradual conversion of the exceptional into the norm, not to an imaginary future of man but to a real one.

Socialism creates the material and spiritual preconditions for achieving the communist ideal of man in the future, a man who bears features of ultimate perfection, beauty, and good. The ideal of the man of the communist future contains the fundamental principles of morality stemming from reason, conscience, and appraisal of the individual's activity, developing an active life attitude in man. This concerns an actual ideal, when the communist principles of morality stem from the individual's needs, and become the everyday standards of his behaviour. At the same time, man is free when the standards of his morality coincide with advanced social aspirations, and with everything that promotes the establishment and development of truly human, i.e., communist, relations between people.

The development of socialist society, and the tasks facing it today, are giving the communist ideal of man a living content. Far from contradicting the best features of the universal human ideal, the communist ideal coincides with it in the historical perspective, as the prospect of communism coincides with the common historical fate of all mankind.

Man's prospects are visible in the all-round, all-embracing progress of humanity, beginning with its material existence and ending with the sphere of science, art, and morality. By opening up these vistas communist society affirms truly human relations between people, brings out the entire human potential embodied in the communist ideal of a harmoniously developed individual.

NOTES

- ¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology*. Progress Publishers. Moscow, 1976, pp 457.
- ² Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Progress Publishers. Moscow, 1974, pp 98-99.
- ³ *The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A New Edition*. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House. Moscow, 1986, p 25.
- ⁴ Frederick Engels. *Speeches in Elberfeld*. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp 263-264.

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF WRITING THE BASIC SCENARIO OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

N. I. Lapin

Man and humankind are a pair of related concepts, the conceptual space between which contains the whole ensemble of relations created by man, and which create him himself as a social being. These are social relations, not only those characteristic of a given society and operating within it, but also relations between different societies (on the scale of regional groups of countries and nations or on a global scale of the world community of people).

Until recently social scientists mainly paid attention to narrow-academic aspects of these regional and world social relations, namely, international political, international economic, cross-cultural, and other aspects. Now they are becoming the subject of comprehensive, operational studies, since problems of a new type have come up, viz., global ones, among which the most significant and acute is that of preventing a thermonuclear war. The danger of self-extinction of humankind has made the idea formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 27th Congress of the CPSU extremely obvious:

The course of history, of social progress, requires ever more insistently that there should be *constructive and creative interaction between states and peoples on the scale of the world*. Not only does it so require, but it also creates the requisite political, social and material premises for it...

This is precisely the way, through the struggle of opposites, through arduous effort, groping in the dark to some extent, as it were, that the controversial but *interdependent and in many ways integral world* is taking shape.'

The making of a safe, intact world calls for the development and application to study it of a methodology adequate to the nature of this unique object. The theory and methodology of dialectical and historical materialism fully answers this requirement; its heuristic potential is growing in combination with the arsenal of the means of the systems approach and of systems analysis. This methodology is being actively employed by Soviet social scientists—philosophers, sociologists, economists, political scientists, etc.—to study the prob-

lems of global and regional development of the modern world.

Research into the global problems of today and ways of dealing with them or, as is sometimes said, 'globalistics', is a new field in world science (Soviet included). It is only in its second decade of development, yet in that short time Soviet scientific workers have contributed no little to this field, in which, in fact, each step has been, as it were, a 'stride into the unknown'. Recall the theoretical and methodological work in depth of D.M. Gvishiani, N.N. Inozemtsev, P.L. Kapitsa, N.N. Moiseyev, E.K. Fedorov, and P.N. Fedoseyev, and the books and papers of V.V. Zagladin, I.T. Frolov, D.V. Ermolenko, S.M. Menshikov, and I.B. Novik, and the special studies of V.A. Gelovani, S.V. Dubovsky, E.M. Korzheva, N.F. Naumova, K.N. Popov, V.V. Yurchenko, and others.

Soviet scholars, guided by Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology, have focussed their attention on ideological, philosophical, and socio-political aspects of the study of global problems from the very beginning of their study of this field (including work on the problems of modelling global development).² That has enabled them to employ a qualitatively different approach from that of Western globalistics to the very posing of the aims and tasks of global studies, including global modelling as an instrument for investigating the problems and perspectives of the development of the world and its regions.

The principles of the dialectical-materialist understanding of world historical and regional processes, the basis of which is the conception of socio-economic formations, and of the progressive formation development of mankind, are fundamental for Soviet globalistics. Scientific notions of the possible version of this development in the future can only be formulated from knowledge of the objective laws of social development, and a complex mathematical apparatus of operational research into them be correctly constructed and employed.

Scenarios as a specific form of knowledge play an important role here. Their writing is an original research activity carried out in accordance with a certain total combination of general and specific methodological principles, rules, and procedures.

The Place of Scenarios in the Man-Machine System of Modelling

The writing of scenarios for the man-machine system of modelling is a new exercise that differs essentially from the

tasks of writing scenarios not intended for computer models, i.e., that function as an autonomous means of research, and also from those of writing scenarios for traditional models orientated on a very limited range of problems and having the form of completed, invariant models.

A man-machine system of modelling includes a set of formalised and unformalised information about the object of the modelling, ordered in accordance with the structure and patterns of the object's functioning and development, necessary and adequate for dealing with the tasks that the researcher (user) may pose, i.e., whose solution is the aim of the constructing of the system.

As the work of V.A. Gelovani has shown, this system makes it possible for the user to employ its creative potential more fully and effectively.⁴ Its writing and use not only do not reduce, but substantially increase the role of the unformalised elements, on which, in the last analysis, the quality of the constructed models and the results obtained by means of them depend.

Here I must note that by formalised elements I mean those bits of information in the system that are expressed in a formal language (mathematical, algorithmic). Unformalised elements are correspondingly those bits of information that are expressed in ordinary language. The dividing line between the two is relative; one and the same elements can be unformalised in one system and formalised in another. The dividing line depends on the aims of the research, the mathematical apparatus of the system, and other factors, but it can be established in each concrete case.

Three main types of unformalised elements are distinguished: unformalisable, formalisable, and deformalisable. In combination with a formalised system of modelling, and in relation to the object of the modelling, we get an integrated scheme of the elements of systems modelling (see Fig. 1).

Scenarios are a main formalisable element of a system of modelling. Their specific place in the system is that they serve as a link connecting the unformalised part of the system with the formalised, and the formalised part with the deformalisable. Their role, moreover, grows substantially with the development of the formalised part of the system.

The content of this development can be judged, for example, by the principles employed by the workers of the All-Union Research Institute of Systems Studies (VNIISI) of the USSR State Planning Committee and of the USSR Academy of Sciences at various stages of the work of creating and developing




Fig. 1 Integrated scheme of the elements of system modelling

a man-machine system of modelling. In the first stage qualitatively new principles were laid down that differentiated this system from traditional models: viz., universality, i.e., the system's capacity to create a model for tackling a broad class of problems; adaptability, i.e., the possibility of readily reorganising the initial model and methods of research in accordance with new posings of the tasks, and the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods of research; openness, i.e., the system's capacity to be altered and improved with growth of knowledge through the replacement and supplementing of existing elements of the system by new or better blocks; cumulativeness, i.e., the capacity to accumulate knowledge, and model, scenario, algorithmic, and statistical information; and several other principles.⁶

In its functional possibilities the system of interactive modelling (SIM) developed at the VNIISI is a generalisation of previous developments; it was built by employing new principles that supplemented and developed the initial ones. These new principles included the following: a clear demarcation of the stages of building and employing models; maximum decentralisation of control of the system; singling out and unifying of the supply of dialogue and transformation of information. This approach increased the flexibility of the system as a whole, and simplified the business of modifying and expanding it.⁷

For such a system of modelling it is obviously necessary to elaborate corresponding principles of writing the scenarios.

Principles for Writing a Systems Scenario

Scenarios intended for investigating objects by systems modelling, I call systems scenarios.

The *general principles* follow from the character of a systems scenario. They include the following:

(1) objective-systems relevancy: the content of a scenario must correspond both to the essential characteristics of the structure and dynamics of the object being studied and to the possibilities and limitations of the system of modelling;

(2) complexity: the need to describe all the parameters of the studied object essential for solving the task or problem, in their relationship both with one another and with the parameters of the broader system to which the studied object belongs;

(3) unity of the formalisable and unformalisable parts: the need to describe the parameters, that cannot be formalised at a given stage follows from the principle of complexity as a rule; these parameters also constitute the non-formalisable part of the scenario, which must be in unity, i.e., an uncontradictory relation, with its formalisable part; this unity must be ensured both at the 'input' in the formal part of the SIM and at the 'output' from it, at the stage of interpretation of the results of the model experiment (maximum use of the SIM's possibilities as an instrument for investigating large-scale, complex, weakly structured objects is ensured thanks to this principle);

(4) multivariate: the need to regard several alternative versions of the development of events determined by the complexity of the object and the principle of complexity of writing it in the scenario; the principle of the unity of the formalisable and unformalisable parts of the scenario provides additional possibilities for writing it as a multivariate one; at the same time, multivariate functions as a means of heightening the heuristic significance of the systems scenario and realising the potential of the SIM as a research instrument;

(5) openness: the capacity of a scenario to be improved and altered in accordance with new data obtained in the course of scenario modelling or exogenously in relation to the SIM, and also the capacity of being switched in to other systems scenarios, and of being incorporated in their system, without essential changes in the scenario's inner structure (or rather, these changes are not obligatory conditions for incorporating the scenario in the system).

The general principles are not adequate, however, for

writing the basic scenario. *Special principles* also have to be distinguished for that.

What is a 'basic scenario'? Semantically 'basic' means the main one in a certain ensemble of interconnected components, in their system. It is the nucleus or core around which other scenarios are formed relating to the given system. How can this nucleus be singled out, however, as the foundation?

First of all, it is necessary to regard the scale of the scenario and its place in the hierarchical structure of the set of scenarios of global development. The following types can be distinguished by that criterion: elementary, for studying the simplest element of the global system; regional, for investigating the aggregate of the parameters of a large region of the system; problem, for studying a universal or global problem; general systems, for investigating the global system as a whole though not, naturally, from all possible angles. A scenario that embraces all the main regions and allows for all the main socio-political forces ('dramatis personae', or 'subjects'), bearing on both regional and global development, is, accordingly, a general systems one.

A general systems scenario that meets the requirement of universality, i.e., that makes it possible to investigate a certain set of problems of global and regional development, can consequently be called basic. The functions of basic scenarios cannot be performed by a single systems scenario but can by several general systems, ones that form a network embracing all the global and universal problems characteristic of the historical stage of the global system's development as a whole.

The following special principles for writing such a scenario can be distinguished (in addition to the general principles set out above relating to any systems scenario):

(1) universality: a capacity to describe a certain set of global and universal problems (this principle can be regarded as a manifestation of the principle of universality proper to the system of modelling as a whole);

(2) conceptual validity: agreement with the main theoretical propositions characterising the past and present of the global system and making it possible to determine the element composition of the scenario;

(3) multilevelness (hierarchism): the need for a consistent breakdown of the scenario's propositions, moving from their general systems level through the problem and regional levels to the elementary (this makes it possible, in combination with the general principle of multivariance, to form various,

spatially ramified versions of the development of the global system and of its subsystems):

(4) multisubjectness: a basic scenario includes, by definition, the behaviour of all the main 'dramatis personae', or subjects, of global and regional development: it must be taken into account that these are active subjects each of which is characterised by specific interests, aims, and means and modes of influencing development;

(5) a combination of quest and standardised approaches, and a guaranteeing of their interrelationship in accordance with the considerations mentioned above (this must ensure a combination of the conceptual validity of the subjects' actions and the relative independence of their results from the conceptual propositions);

(6) isomorphism of the procedures of the mechanism of the real processes, i.e., the need to employ procedures of the subjects' action in the scenario that are isomorphs of the mechanisms of the processes actually taking place. This is to ensure relative independence of the results from the influence of the standardised elements included of necessity in the scenario.

Conceptual Elements of the Basic Scenario

Once one has a clear idea of the basic scenario of global development and the principles of writing it, one must try and form the conceptual elements needed to write concrete versions of it. These elements seemingly include operativable notions about the following:

- the essence and trends of the contemporary stage of the global system's development;
- the character of the problems of this development;
- the social and political forces on which solution of these problems depends.

(a) Conversion of the global system into a unity; the dual nature of its systems quality

It is necessary first of all to clarify the specific nature of the present stage of development of a global system understood as an aggregate of the structures and processes of the functioning and development of mankind and nature in their interaction:

in this connection mankind is understood as the global historical community that has arisen as stable interconnections have been formed between all the nations of the world, and has passed through certain stages in its historical development. The basis of the global system's self-evolution is the production activity of the working people.

The transformation of the global system from a summative, additive one to an integral system or totality, which also constitutes the specific feature of the contemporary period of its development, is proposed as the initial conception. A summative system is characterised by additivity, i.e., the system's property of equalling the sum total of the properties of its components. An integral system is characterised by the presence of new, integrative qualities not characteristic of its parts and components. Summative systems can be transformed into totalities in various ways. Marx gave a classic formulation of this process, in regard to the history of society, in the chapter on capital in the *Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy*:

This organic system itself has its premises as a totality, and its development into a totality consists precisely in subordinating all elements of society to itself, or in creating out of it the organs it still lacks. This is historically how it becomes a totality. Its becoming this totality constitutes a moment of its process, of its development."

The transformation of a global system into a totality is a historically protracted process. It signifies that the system's main components interact so strongly with one another that a new systems quality arises that begins to transform its parts. This quality is the growing interdependence of nature and society, and of the countries and regions of the world, which has a tendency toward internationalisation of many structures and processes (technical, economic, social, cultural, ecological, etc.). A synchronising of processes occurring in various regions of the world, and a globalising of their scale take place.

But that does not signify that the global system is becoming uniform and homogeneous, and that the contradictions and antagonisms characteristic of it are disappearing. On the contrary, the interdependence of its components is developing in conditions of the opposition of socialism and capitalism, of a growth of shortages of resources and of ecological dangers, of differentiation of the existing and rising 'centres of power' influencing world processes. The contradiction between the transformation of the global system from a summative one into a totality is expressed in the rise of very closely interwoven global and universal problems and alternatives of development.

This state of the global system permits one to characterise it as a systems complex.

In other words, a systems complex figures as a form of the transformation of the global system from a summative one to a totality.¹¹ This is an objective process with a character of natural-historical necessity, signifying radical changes of the system's fundamental structures.

Scientific and technological advance and the development of mankind's productive forces are the material basis of this process. The industrial revolution developing in the second half of the twentieth century is having a particularly profound effect on the global system. Like many processes it is occurring unevenly in space (by regions) and in time (compare the 'long waves' of radical technical innovations). Having begun with automation of production process and conversion to chemical processes, it has now crossed the frontier of micro-electronics and biotechnology. One must suppose that this is by no means the last of its frontiers, and that a vital one is industrial mastery of thermonuclear energy.

(1) The industrial revolution is immensely increasing humanity's energy power, making it comparable with the power of natural forces, and dangerous for the very existence of nature and the human race, and is consequently calling for fundamentally new relations between nature and society. (2) It is raising the general level of the productive forces qualitatively, accelerating their internationalisation. (3) It is calling for just as radical changes in the relations of production between people, and overcoming of their private property limitedness and narrowness and their elevation to truly social relations.

It is in this, in the existence and struggle of opposing social relations (capitalist and socialist), that the specific nature of the present stage of the transformation of the global system into a totality consists, and also the very deep contradiction of the forming of such a systems quality of it as the growing interdependence of its main components. What social, historical definiteness is the interdependence of various countries, for example, acquiring? Is it taking shape as the subordination of some countries and nations to others, or as the voluntary and mutually beneficial co-operation of equal partners? Posing of the question in this way leads to understanding of the dual nature of the interdependence as an integral quality of the global system. This duality, moreover, is a manifestation of the phenomenon of the duality of the qualities of social systems.

discovery of which was a fundamental methodological achievement of Marx.

The interdependence of the components is, on the one hand, a universal property of any integral system. The social and political content of this property may be very different; it is not for nothing that Western ideologists readily employ the concept 'interdependence', investing it with an anti-democratic sense. In other words, this concept, while enabling the fact of the transformation of the global system into a totality to be fixed, is quite inadequate for bringing out this totality and its historical definiteness. On the other hand, therefore, a scientific analysis of its qualitative definiteness suggests that interdependence should be concretised from the angle of the socio-economic formation that is having a determinant influence on the corresponding stage of the global systems development. This makes it necessary to resort to an analysis of the trends in mankind's formation development in our age, which are also a very important determinant of the historical content of the transforming of the global system into a totality.

The dynamics of nations' formation development, and that of all humanity, can be pictured as a 'wave' whose height corresponds to the proportion of the population living by the laws of one formation or another. As will be seen from Fig. 2, the period 1850-1917 was a stage of comparatively rapid development of capitalism as a socio-economic formation: the share of the population whose life activity was determined by the laws of the capitalist mode of production rose from 10 to 26 per cent of the total population of the world, and its numbers increased fourfold (roughly from 120 million to 470 million). The economic might of capitalism rose to a qualitatively new level in the imperialist epoch owing to capitalists' new forms of international co-operation (cartels, syndicates, trusts) and new ways of exploiting other peoples (export of capital, etc.). This enabled the bourgeoisie, regarded as a class on an international scale, to establish its economic and political domination over almost the whole of mankind at the beginning of the twentieth century (by 1914). This was expressed politically in the fact that six great capitalist powers only (Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, the USA, and Japan), with a total population around 440 million, had deprived nations numbering around one billion of their political independence through military conquest and other means, that is to say, the majority of the nations then in precapitalist stages of social development, and had reduced them




Fig. 2 Dynamics of the social-political map of the world: 1950-1980
(in percentages of population)

to the status of colonies and semi-colonies.¹¹

As Lenin showed:

Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of 'advanced countries'.¹²

Such was the concrete-historical content of the 'interdependence' imperialism imposed on humanity and the whole global system, inasmuch as the predatory laws of capitalism were extended as well to the people's attitude to nature.

The imperialist great powers, struggling with each other to redivide the already divided world, drew all mankind into the First World War. We know what immense human losses and destruction of material values that war caused. But during it

the conditions formed for breaking the chain of imperialism at its weakest link, Russia.

The victory of the October Revolution and the laying of the foundations of socialism in the USSR, meant the rise of a new, communist socio-economic formation and the beginning of a new age in the history of mankind, that of the transition from capitalism to socialism. A fundamentally new type of relations arose in the global system, viz., relations of co-operation, which began to affect the character of the relationships between nations.

German fascism launched a new world war, unprecedented in history, striving to crush socialism and establish its own domination over the whole world. But in the end it was fascism that was crushed, and socialism became a world system, embracing more than 30 per cent of the world's population. Socialism decisively accelerated the collapse of the world colonial system, which had practically ceased to exist in the mid-70s (with the exception of a few 'islets'); more than 100 new independent states appeared on the map of the world. A further deepening of the general crisis of capitalism took place, but it still retains considerable reserves; and the population of the developed capitalist countries constitutes around 25 per cent of mankind.

All these processes are depicted in Fig. 2 and characterise the radical change in the formation development of mankind, the beginning of which was started by the October Revolution of 1917. Thanks to this turning point a new type of relations of interdependence between the elements of the global system was established, viz., relations of co-operation and collaboration. But this type develops alongside relations of dominance, as a counterweight to them and in opposition to them. Though imperialism lost political domination over the former colonies, it largely retained and even strengthened its economic domination, widely resorting to neocolonial forms of exploitation of other nations.

Two types of relations of interdependence are consequently struggling in the global system, viz., relations of co-operation and relations of domination. That is the root contradiction of the transforming of the global system into a totality. It determines many of the other contradictions in the process, and finds expression in a whole set of problems and alternatives of the global system's development.

(b) *The interconnection of the problems of global development*

The contradictory character of the structure and processes of the global system constitute the objective basis of the varied problems of its functioning and development. The list of these problems continues to grow, which makes their typology a pressing task.

In my view, it is expedient to draw a line between the general typology and the special. The general typology presupposes differentiation of the problems of the global system according to the established grounds accepted in the social sciences, the most significant of which is their differentiation into ecological, economic, social, and political problems. The purpose of the special typology is to reflect the specific nature of the global systems as an object of study and investigation.

It is expedient, when constructing the special typology, to distinguish problems and alternatives of development. A problem is a contradiction that has only one line of decision, and the differences relate only to the ways and means of solving it (for example, the problems of preserving the environment, of eliminating dangerous diseases, etc.). An alternative presupposes the existence of two or more directions for resolving contradictions, i.e., the choice is made not in respect of the ways of solving the contradiction, but in regard to one of its aspects (for example, a high or low level of differentiation of incomes; social equality or inequality as the goal of development, etc.). An alternative, strictly speaking, is a specific form of problem, but for convenience's sake I shall distinguish them on the grounds indicated.

The difference between problems and alternatives according to their size and scale is also specific, i.e., according to their effect on the scales of the whole global system or of its separate subsystems and components. One can distinguish a three-level structure of the problematic, for example, by this criterion (see Fig. 3).

The first, highest level is formed by generalised alternatives of the development of the global system as a whole, i.e., as an aggregate of all its main constituents. The second level is formed by global problems and universal problems and alternatives both vitally significant for all nations or a majority of them, but differ in origin and modes of solution: global problems arise 'from above', directly reflect the properties of the global system as a whole that characterise the present stage of its development, and call for consolidation of the efforts of all




Fig. 3 Structure of the problematics of the global system

mankind for their solution; universal problems, on the contrary, arise rather 'from below', from the side of separate regions and sectors of activity, and their solution is primarily a matter for the respective nations and social groups and sometimes presupposes acute struggle rather than consolidation. The third level represents more concrete problems, viz., sectoral ones, corresponding to the main sectors of mankind's life activity (industry, agriculture, etc.), and regional ones that express the specific nature of different regions.

The existence of direct links and feedback connections between the different elements of this structure converts the whole aggregate of the problematic into a strongly linked system. The interconnection of the problems is one of the special features of the current stage of development of the global system, and of its transformation into a totality. That makes a special study of the structure of the links between the problems and alternatives of global development necessary.

More than 20 problems and alternatives can be distinguished, sorted out by the criteria of the general and special classification (see Table 1).

The differentiation of this set of problems and alternatives into three major complexes by means of an expert appraisals presents very great interest (see Fig. 4).

Complex 1 (C-1) includes two generalised alternatives and four global problems, which represent almost the whole spectrum of problems by their general classification (economic, social, and political). Nearly each one of these six problems and alternatives is linked with the others by relations of mutual dependence; a specially close interdependence (complete graph of connections) is recorded between the following three problems and one alternative: No. 1 (maintenance of peace and ending of the arms race), No. 4 (elimination of differences

Table 1


No.	Special classification	General classification			
		Political	Social	Economic	Ecological
1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Global problems</i>					
1	Maintenance of peace and ending of the arms race			+	
2	Conservation and restoration of the environment				+
3	Replacement of exhaustible resources of production (sources of energy, minerals, water, etc.)			+	
4	Elimination of differences in levels of economic development between regions			+	
5	Elimination of dangerous and widespread diseases, and conservation of the gene fund of mankind				+
6	Restructuring of international economic relations			+	
7	Heightening of the role of the world community's agencies (UN, UNESCO, etc.)		+		
<i>Universal problems</i>					
8	Provision of food for the whole population			+	
9	Access to medical care for the whole population			+	
10	Guarantees of human rights	+			
11	Access to education and cultural values for the whole population			+	
12	Provision of housing for the whole population			+	



1	2	3	4	5	6
13 Reduction of crime, alcoholism, and drug addiction				+	
14 Reduction of heavy and harmful types of work				+	
15 Ensuring of coordination of population growth rates and growth rates of GNP per capita				+	
<i>Universal alternatives</i>					
16 A high or low domestic level of differentials of income between different social groups				+	
17 Social equality or inequality				+	
18 A high or low level of social consumption funds					
19 Orientation on maximally fast or socially balanced economic growth				+	
<i>Generalised alternatives</i>					
20 Capitalism, socialism, or a mixed economy				+	
21 Consolidation or frustration of mankind's efforts to tackle global problems				+	
22 Whole man—a scientifically substantiated goal or the blind result of historical development				+	

in levels of economic development between regions), No. 6 (restructuring of international economic relations), No. 21 (consolidation or frustration of mankind's efforts to tackle global problems). The content and high internal integrated character of C-I permit us to call it a general systems complex.

Complex II (C-II) consists almost wholly (four out of five) of global and universal problems and alternatives which are mainly (also four out of five) economic ones; it can therefore be called economic. Its key proposition is the problem of ensuring coordination between population growth rates and per



Three complexes of problems and alternatives
of world development

capita GNP growth rates (No. 15), and the alternative of orientation on maximally fast economic growth or socially balanced growth (No. 19). The two depend on each other.

Complex III (C-III) consists almost wholly (nine out of eleven) of universal problems and alternatives, most of which, moreover, are social. The centre of the interconnections within

this complex is formed by the universal alternative of social equality or inequality (No. 17). I consequently call this complex social.

These three complexes are linked in a system whose structure has a hierarchical character. The general systems complex (C-I) occupies a dominant position; 23 determinant effects on C-II and 19 on C-III flow from it. The economic complex (C-II) occupies a middle position; while being under the direct influence of the general systems complex (C-I) it exerts a certain feedback effect on C-I and direct effect on several problems of the social complex (C-III). The last-named is almost wholly determined by the two other complexes. Its dependent position is reflected as well in its inner structure, which also has a hierarchical character. The following four problems and alternatives emerge as elements in which the determinant effect of this complex is realised, and through it as well of the whole system of problems and alternatives of world development: No. 5 (elimination of dangerous and widespread diseases and conservation of the gene fund), No. 10 (guarantees of human rights), No. 13 (reduction of crime, alcoholism, and drug addiction), and No. 22 (whole man—a scientifically substantiated goal or a blind result of historical development).

It would be wrong, at the same time, to make an absolute of the position of these resultant elements of the system of problems of world development. The point is that each of them can be treated as two positions similar to the way it is registered in alternative No. 22: either as a blind result of historical development or as a scientifically substantiated goal. Only in the first case will one be justified in treating the listed elements as occupying a lower position in its hierarchical structure. In the second case they must be treated as final criteria and their determinant elements as means for optimising these criteria.

(c) *Social and political forces influencing global development*

The processes of global development have a basically objective character governed by the effect of an aggregate of material factors. At the same time their determined character is not single-valued and unambiguous, and includes variants of development formed under the impact of different social subjects (social groups, popular masses, societies). The main classes of modern societies and the mass political parties and states which

express the interests of the corresponding classes are the most important forces actively influencing global processes.

The character and direction of the influence of these forces on the processes of global development are determined by their social and class nature. The following main types of contemporary social and political forces are distinguishable by this decisive criterion:

—socialist countries and developing countries of a socialist orientation, and the Communist and Workers' parties in all countries of the world;

—liberated countries not yet following a socialist or revolutionary democratic road but pursuing a progressive, truly independent policy; and also the democratic national liberation movement;

—developed capitalist states and developing countries trailing in the wake of the policy of imperialism, and bourgeois and bourgeois-nationalist parties.

Communist parties and socialist countries and the communist movement as a whole are the important factor of mankind's social advance, and the main social and political force determining a progressive solution of today's global problems in the interests of the broadest strata of the working people. More than a billion and a half people live under the banner of socialism. Capitalism, on the contrary, is more and more turning from an obstacle to social advance to a global danger for all mankind and for nature itself on our Earth.

Behind the general grouping of social and political forces influencing global development, one must, of course, see the not unimportant differences, special features, and nuances within each group. One must distinguish the following among socialist countries, for instance: those making the transition from capitalism or precapitalist forms of society to socialism and countries building a developed socialist society. The differences among capitalist countries are also significant: differences both in level of economic development, and in the home and foreign policy pursued by them. An increasing diversity is observable among developing countries.

I distinguish two types of social and political forces according to their effect on the processes taking place; the forces that are in power at a given stage and have the appropriate state machinery at their disposal, I call 'controlling forces' and those that are not in control at the moment 'influencing' ones. When the latter become controlling forces, the direction of the state's socio-political activity is correspondingly altered; in other

words, the state system of one and the same country may be transferred from one group of forces to the other. Since both separate countries and groups of countries figure as regions in the system of interactive modelling, what is said of a state will also apply to regions.

The activity of 'controlling forces' is characterised by three sets of parameters: aims, means, and limitations. Parameters can be distinguished in each of these groups that are most essential for writing scenarios, as follows, for example:

—aims and goals: maintenance and consolidation of peace in inter-state relations; heightening of the economic successes of that class or society whose interests a given force expresses; strengthening of the social and political influence of the given force internally and internationally;

—means: politico-economic and socio-political mechanisms of administration and government; scientific and technological policy; policy in the realm of ideology and culture; international trade and economic policy; international military policy;

—limitations: labour, natural, and other resource limitations; the need to conserve and protect the environment; the need to maintain a certain level of stability of the domestic social and political situation.

The breakdown of these parameters into three groups is relative. Maintenance and consolidation of peace, for instance, may emerge not only as an aim but also as a means for achieving other goals (for example, for raising the prosperity of the population). International military policy may become an end in itself under certain conditions, and so on and so forth.

The concrete content of the parameters characterising the activity of certain controlling forces is determined, as I have already stressed, by their social and class nature.

All this makes the task of classifying social and economic forces and determining the concrete aims and goals, means and limits of their real influence on any of the processes of global and regional development very significant. But its solution alone makes it possible to give scenarios the necessary concreteness and reality.

In addition, each process of global development and the problems associated with it are not only conditioned by general groups of factors, but are also governed by specific groups of them, the fact necessitating an additional differentiation of the actions of the different social and political forces. The stance of countries on matters of war and peace, for instance,

is influenced by social and class, resource and economic, social and cultural, geopolitical, and other factors. The social and class nature of different states is the main factor, but not the only one, shaping their attitude to maintenance of peace.

These concrete historical variants, and other possible ones, correspond to the principles of multisubjectness and multivariance of the basic scenario of global development and need to be taken fully into account when writing it.

Procedures for the Pre-Model Writing of a Basic Scenario

Three main steps of scenario research are distinguished: pre-model, model, and post-model. In what follows I shall speak only of the first step, i.e., the procedures and substance aspects of the pre-model writing of a basic scenario.

I must note, first of all, that one does not have to name exact dates when researching the future. As Marx, Engels, and Lenin stressed more than once, it is impossible to know the dates of future events, and it is a matter only of tendencies that are realised in the course of approximate intervals of time. The business of determining the chronological framework of the basic scenario therefore consists primarily in singling out the time interval that is necessary and sufficient for structuring the investigated processes in steps and stages, and to represent and appraise versions of this structuring and of the transitions from stage to stage, and from one step to another, i.e., the variants of the global system's development.

The major steps during which the fundamental processes (both economic and social) develop sufficiently fully are usually taken as around 20 to 25 years, i.e., the time of the effective activity of one generation of people. The basic scenario must consequently embrace periods of not less than 30 years, and desirably up to 50, so as to have the possibility of studying the transition from one step to another.

But lengthening the period being researched is limited by the possibilities of obtaining information, the complexities of identifying models, and other considerations of a formal and informal nature. Because of that the optimum would seemingly be to take 35 to 40 years as the base period, i.e., from 1980 (the last 'round date' for which I have sufficient information) to 2015 or 2020.

There are also certain empirical grounds for choosing this



period. On the one hand, substantial changes, like a new wave of demographic growth, the attainment by a sizable group of developing countries the level (in terms of economic advance) of relatively developed ones, a significant sharpening of social tensions in developed capitalist countries, etc., are to be expected in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. On the other hand, the time horizon up to 2015 or 2020 comes into the zone of the centenary of the Great October Revolution, which was the beginning of the radical break in mankind's formation development, and of the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism.

In addition to the general chronological framework of the basic scenario, or base period, it is necessary to distinguish a shorter unit of time as well—the stage, which it is expedient to define as the time for realising the concrete strategy of the 'controlling' social and political forces. It is realistic to suggest that a stage of development takes some ten years.¹³

I thus distinguish three time intervals for writing a basic scenario of global development: a stage of around ten years' duration, the time for realising the concrete strategy of the controlling forces; a step of 20 to 25 years' duration, the development time of the main trends of the objective processes of development in the course of which two or three successive strategies of the controlling forces are realised, i.e., a step consists of two or three stages; the base period of 35 to 40 years long, the time of the transition of the global system from one step to another, which not only includes the transition process itself but also takes in disclosure of the main trends of both steps, i.e., the base period coincides with the chronological framework of the basic scenario as a whole.

The given period is a continuation of the contemporary age. The scientific premise for analysing it should therefore be clarification of the content and steps of our age.

A scientific understanding of the essence of the present epoch is only possible by way of a dialectical materialist approach to history that treats the consecutive succession of socio-economic formations, the struggle of the successive classes for their fundamental vital interests at the bottom of these processes.

The conception of the conversion of the global system into a unity which I have formulated above on the basis of this approach performs a heuristic function during this analysis, i.e., it makes it possible to regard the history of the global system in the twentieth century not simply as an aggregate of historical processes taking place in various regions and countries but as

the history of the development of its systems qualities, as steps in the forming of an organic system that completes the making of 'the organs it still lacks'.¹¹ This helps concretise application of the principles of the materialist conception of history and scientific communism to analysis of the dialectic of the global system's evolution as a unique historical object.

Socialism, of course, unlike previous socio-economic formations, cannot arise spontaneously: the proletariat must first smash the political machine of the old society, and establish its own political state by means of a dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., a state of a new type. Then, by means of the state, the working class in alliance with all working people carries out socialist transformations and reforms in the socio-economic field. On the basis of these changes a further development of the political organisation of socialist society takes place, and so on.

A similar sequence can be distinguished in the implementing of socio-political and socio-economic changes on the scale of the global system, as steps in its conversion into a unity. The nature of these steps in the different countries and regions, however, is extremely varied.

The first step (1917-1945) was the beginning of a radical turn in mankind's formation development; the laying of foundations of socialism in one country (the USSR); the beginning of the general crisis of capitalism and break-up of the world colonial system; the defeat of fascism by the anti-Hitler coalition, with a decisive contribution by the USSR. In this step the basic types of change (socio-political, socio-economic, international-political) that constitute the content of the next steps in the global system's development, were made in concentrated form.

The second step (1945-1975) was the transformation of the socio-political structure of all humanity: the rise and spread of the world system of socialism; liquidation of the world colonial system; the acquiring of state independence by almost all the nations of the world; a new spiral in the development of military-political relations between the socialist and capitalist countries, from the anti-Hitler coalition through the 'cold war' to detente which was not however materialised in ending the arms race.

The third, contemporary step (1976-2000) is one of structural changes in the economies of most countries: the transition of developed capitalist countries to intensive development, a qualitative renewal of the socialist countries and their switch to intensive development; the spread of technical advance to the

economies of most developing countries and the beginning of their switch to intensive development; a new spiral in the development of the military-political relations between socialist and capitalist countries that began with the imperialist powers' rejection of detente (primarily by the USA), the proclamation of a 'crusade' against the socialist countries of CMEA and especially the USSR (this, incidentally, is only the beginning of a new spiral in international relations that may, judging by historical experience, have other, more favourable phases).

In the fourth, forthcoming step (2001-2020) there will again develop far-reaching, radical socio-political transformations in many countries, above all in developing ones, but also in several developed capitalist countries, development of the socio-political structure of socialist countries will continue; intensive development of the economies of most countries (including developing ones, some of which will become relatively developed) will continue; the character of the military-political relations between countries with different social systems will largely depend on how their spiral in the preceding step develops; the genesis and spread everywhere of a qualitatively new structure of the scale of values of the population's broad strata can be expected, including labour morality, and ideological and ecological values.

Such is a general hypothetical description of the foreseeable stages of the transformation of the global system into a unity. The problem of the possible concrete trends of this process in the base period needs to be examined further. But it requires a more specialised study.

NOTES

¹ Mikhail Gorbachev. *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, p 23.

² See D.M. Gvishiani. Global modelling: the complex analysis of world development. *World Marxist Review*, 1978, 8; V.V. Zagladin and I.T. Frolov. Global problems of today. Socio-political and ideological-theoretical aspects. *Kommunist*, 1976, No. 16; N.I. Lapin. Social problems—the kernel of the specialised conception of global modelling. *Sbornik trudov VNIISI*, No. 6, Moscow, 1979.

³ For more details see: D.M. Gvishiani. Methodological problems of modelling global development. *Voprosy filosofii*, 1978, 2; N.I. Lapin. The writing of the basic scenario of global development. In: *Global'noe modelirovaniye: sotsial'nye protsessy. Trudy seminara*, VNIISI, Moscow, 1984.

⁴ See, for example, V.A. Gelovani. The man-machine system of modelling processes of global development. In: *Sistemnye issledovaniya. Metodologicheskie problemy*. *Ezhegodnik*, Nauka, Moscow, 1980.

- For further details see: N.I. Lapin. *Unformalised elements of a system of modelling*. In: *Sistemnye issledovaniyu. Metodologicheskie problemy. Ezhegodiak*. Nauka, Moscow, 1979.
- For further details see: V.A. Gelovani. *Art. cit.*
- S.I. Bolotkin, V.A. Gelovani, V.V. Yurchenko. The structure and functions of a system of interactive modelling. In: *Elementy chelovekomashinnoi sistemy modelirovaniya protsessov global'nogo razvitiya. Shurnal trudov VNIISI*, No. 3, Moscow, 1983.
- For further details see: G.G. Pirogov. Scenarios in the system of modelling global development. Approaches and principles. In: *Neformalizovannye elementy global'nogo modelirovaniya. Materialy seminara*, VNIISI, Moscow, 1981.
- Karl Marx. *Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy*. In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p 208.
- On the difference between a systems complex and an integral system see: V.P. Kuzmin. *Printsip sistemnosti v teorii i metodologii K. Marksya* (The Systems Principle in Marx's Theory and Methodology), Politizdat, Moscow, 1980.
- The figures are drawn from: V.I. Lenin. *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp 71-82; V.I. Lenin. *Notebooks on Imperialism. Collected Works*, Vol. 39, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, pp 294-295.
- V.I. Lenin. *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p 11.
- A fine detailing of the scenario time (five-year or one-year) is not expedient for writing a scenario like the basic one of global development.
- See Karl Marx. *Op. cit.*, p 208.

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